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Preface
This volume is a truly interdisciplinary anthology with contributions from lin-
guistics, philosophy and psychology which cover a broad range of research on
language and cognition. The articles contain theoretical, empirical and experimental
work which explores the nature of mental representations that support natural
language production/understanding, other manifestations of cognition as well as
general reasoning about the world. Many, but not all papers in this volume, were
originally presented at the conference “Cognitive Structures: Linguistic,
Philosophical and Psychological Perspectives” (CoSt16) held at Heinrich Heine
University Düsseldorf in September 2016. The conference, which was intended as a
platform for the interchange of different perspectives on the nature of cognition, is
part of a conference series. This series was realized by the Collaborative Research
Centre 991 “The Structure of Representations in Language, Cognition, and
Science” funded by the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft DFG (German Research
Foundation). Both, this book as well as the conference series, are the direct result of
one of the research center’s main aims of bringing together approaches from var-
ious disciplines in order to find an adequate way for capturing aspects of concept
formation in science, cognition and the description of natural language semantics.
We would like to express our gratitude to the reviewers of the single papers as
well as to the two anonymous reviewers of the entire book. Without their help and
insightful comments this book project would not have been possible. Furthermore,
we are grateful to the DFG for the financial support of the conference series and the
publication of this volume. Special thanks go to Helen van der Stelt and Anita van
v
der Linden-Rachmat at Springer for their experienced support and patience at any
stage of the book project. Finally, we would like to thank Chungmin Lee who gave
us the opportunity to publish the volume in the series “Language, Cognition and
Mind”, a series we consider an ideal place for this book.
Düsseldorf, Germany Sebastian Löbner
Düsseldorf, Germany Thomas Gamerschlag
Düsseldorf, Germany Tobias Kalenscher
Düsseldorf, Germany Markus Schrenk
Amsterdam, The Netherlands Henk Zeevat
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Introduction
Sebastian Löbner, Thomas Gamerschlag, Tobias Kalenscher,
Markus Schrenk, and Henk Zeevat
In order to help to explain cognition, cognitive structures are assumed to be present
in the mind/brain. While the empirical investigation of such structures is the task of
cognitive psychology, the other cognitive science disciplines like linguistics, philos-
ophy and artificial intelligence have an important role in suggesting hypotheses.
Researchers in these disciplines increasingly test such hypotheses by empiricalmeans
themselves. In philosophy, the traditional way of referring to such structures is via
concepts, i.e. those mental entities by which we conceive reality and with the help
of which we reason and plan. Linguists traditionally refer to the cognitive structures
as meanings—at least those linguists with a mentalistic concept of meaning do who
do not think of meaning as extra-mental entities.
The cognitive structures that are discussed in this volume are frames, concep-
tual spaces, prototypes, cascades, and motor representations of content. Frames are
the attribute-value structures proposed in lexical semantics by Fillmore (1976) and
in psychology by Barsalou (1992a, b). They are closely related to the attribute-
valuematrices in computational linguistics andknowledge representation inArtificial
Intelligence. The notion of conceptual spaces refers to the tradition of geometrical
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approaches to meaning started with Gärdenfors (2000). Cascades are combinations
of frames in a tree, introduced in this volume by Löbner. Prototypes are the idea
that concepts are defined by typical cases. It is not clear that there are important
divisions here. Cascades are a natural extension of frames, as they integrate several
frames into a coherent more complex structure; attributes in frames often (or even
always) have values in conceptual spaces and the regions defined by concepts within
the spaces seem to behave much like prototypes. The motor representations are not
accessible to introspection and can possibly be defined as frames. It seems encour-
aging that most of these notions can be connected to each other either by integration
or by combination. There is a set of closely related hypotheses that is fine-tuned by
reflection, increasing formalization, and connection to an ever widening group of
phenomena.
Formal semantics does not aim directly at the cognitive level. It aims at the
logical analysis of natural language, using logical relations like entailment and
equivalence, and the relation between a predicate and its arguments as a probe
into linguistic meaning. Meaning representations in formal semantics are essen-
tially logical formulae for truth conditions. However, there are tendencies to take a
closer look at the underlying model-theoretic ontology and provide a more differ-
entiated landscape of things referred to. These developments provide another road
of approximation to the cognitive enterprise, as the ontology relevant for natural
language semantics is closely related to the way we conceive of the world. The three
contributions from formal semantics by Liefke, Krifka, and Morzicky fit in here by
introducing agents with a subjective epistemic perspective into the model (Liefke),
and arguing for a refined ontology in the models underlying the formal interpretation
of natural language (Krifka and Morzicky).
There are in principle two ways of approaching concepts: the extensional way and
the intensional way. The extensional way aims at approaching concepts by getting
more grip on their extensions, mostly by developing general constraints on concepts
and by invoking learning. Formal semantics is themost elaborate representative of the
extensional approach as it approaches conceptual meaning from outside; more on the
character of formal semantics as opposed to cognitive approaches will be said in the
next section. Another example is Gärdenfors’ condition of convexity in a conceptual
space (used in van Rooij & Brochhagen, Douven, Strößner et al.). In prototype-based
accounts of concepts, one can learn a precise criterion for determining whether (or to
what degree) an object falls under the concept,without thereby obtaining a conceptual
decomposition that would characterize the conceptual content and thus be a properly
intensional account of the content.
In a sense, all the experimental psychological contributions belong here:
grounding cognitive analysis on behavioral data is an “extensional” approach, as
also are approaches based on brain images: Kalenscher et al., Sieksmeyer et al. and
Tait et al.
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The intensional approach tries to model conceptual content. Here belong the clas-
sical approaches to concepts from Aristotle to modern cognitive theories of concep-
tual representation like Barsalou’s frame theory. In this volume it is all frame contri-
butions : Berio, Andreou & Petitjean, Balogh & Osswald, Gamerschlag & Petersen,
Löbner, Strößner et al., Taylor & Sutton; Cooper can also be affiliated here.
Umbach & Gust develop an original approach to similarity in which similarity
ends up as a strongly context-dependent notion. This can be seen as a concernwith the
notion of attribute: each perspective under which a and b can be similar is in principle
an attribute that applied to a and b returns identical values in some domain. It seems
attributes can be made up at will—within certain limits. While this is undoubtedly
an intensional approach, it also captures aspects of the geometrical way of thinking.
Several papers discuss the cognitive operations allowed by the structures. In
Cooper, this is reasoning over record types with a type logic, in Löbner inferring
higher levels in a cascade of frames, in Douven pragmatic reasoning in conceptual
spaces. Lexical semantics has always been connected with one special cognitive
operation, lexical combination to obtain the meanings of larger units than words.
Learning is discussed in Sieksmeyer et al., in Tait et al. and in Taylor & Sutton.
The phenomena and approaches discussed in the papers of the volume and
the fields from which they are coming span a wide area. There are philosoph-
ical discussions of enactivism (Zipoli-Caiani), the analytic-synthetic distinction (de
Almeida & Antal), stereotypes (Strößner et al.), color perception (Berio), percep-
tion (Cooper), and implicature (Douven); linguistic semantic approaches to aspect
(Fuchs et al.), attitude verbs (Liefke), particles (Balogh & Osswald), non-local read-
ings of adjectives (Morzycki), derivational morphology (Andreou&Petitjean), verbs
of movement (Gamerschlag & Petersen), and counting (Krifka). There are psycho-
logical studies of pragmatics and the connection between modifiers and movement
(Sieksmeyer et al.), rat vocalizations (Kalenscher et al.) and rat reversal learning (Tait
et al.). All approaches are relevant to the connected hypotheses mentioned above.
1 Cognitive Structures in Natural Language Semantics
The dominant paradigm in linguistic semantics still is the framework of formal
semantics; it goes back to Richard Montague’s seminal work on the formal analysis
of natural language syntax and semantics (Montague 1970, 1973). The semantic
component of this framework is amodel-theoretic possible-worlds semantics. Lexical
and compositional meanings are essentially functions (called “intensions“) from
the set of possible worlds to appropriate types of entity such as truth values (for
sentences), sets of individuals in the universe (for intransitive verbs, common nouns,
or one-place adjectives), or sets of sets of individuals in the universe (for quantifiers).
The meaning of a sentence is given by its truth-conditions which assign, per possible
world, a truth value to that sentence. The criterion of adequacy for semantic analysis
is logical adequacy: do the truth-conditions account for all and only those logical
entailments a sentence carries?
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The approach is cast in classical Cantorian set theory. Notably, the ontology of
Cantorian set theory, and consequently of mainstream mathematics, does not know
things like concepts—unlike Frege’s approach to logics and mathematics. Frege
distinguishes concepts and objects, (intensional) sense and (extensional) reference
(Frege 1892). Montague grammar is a mathematical model of natural language
grammar and meaning in this Cantorian framework. The notion of meaning is a
set-theoretical, and therefore extensional mathematical reconstruction of Frege’s
conceptual approach to linguistic meaning, notwithstanding the “conceptual” termi-
nology introduced by Montague, who speaks, for example, of ‘intensions’, ‘proper-
ties’ and ‘individual concepts’. A central point of Montague’s approach is a distinc-
tion between intensions and extensions, properties and sets, individual concepts and
individuals; however, the distinction between the “intensional” object and its exten-
sional correspondent is reconstructed in the a-conceptual framework of set theory:
Montague’s intensions are just sets of extensions across the set of assumed possible
worlds. As pointed out by Thomason in his introduction to the 1974 collection of
papers of Richard Montague, “According to Montague, the syntax, semantics and
pragmatics of natural languages are branches of mathematics, not of psychology.”
(p. 2, Thomason, ed. 1974).
As a consequence, there is no simple connection between this semantic theory and
psychology. What figures as meanings in formal semantics is nothing that can claim
direct psychological reality: Our minds are finite and can handle only finite contents.
There are, however, not only infinitely many possible worlds—each possible world
itself is a complex of infinite information: all the information necessary to determine
for all the infinitely many sentences of a language whether they are true or not.
Formal semantics was never meant to provide a psychological model of meaning
and semantic composition. It always aimed at capturing the logical side of language:
the truth conditions for natural language sentences on the background of “worlds”
taken as given, and the logical relations between sentences.
One price that the mathematical, extensional approach to meaning has to pay is
fundamental: it can capture the truth conditions, more generally, the logical proper-
ties, of a sentence, but these are arguably only a derivative of the underlying concep-
tual level of meaning. Sentences with different meanings may have identical truth
conditions. A logical approach to meaning cannot capture the differences in meaning
in such cases. The most conspicuous examples are mathematical and logical truths
(two times three is six) and analytical sentences true for just semantic reasons (ducks
are birds) (see the contribution by de Almeida & Antal in this volume). A concep-
tual analysis in an intensional approach to meaning is able to capture the meanings
directly, and with them the differences.
In most varieties of formal semantics, meanings are represented as expressions
in an appropriate language of formal logic which is equipped with a rigid model-
theoretic interpretation (other approaches formulate the truth-conditions directly).
In particular, the meanings of sentences are represented by logical formulae. These
formulae serve the primarypurpose of formulating the truth conditions of the sentence
whosemeaning they represent. To give a simple (and grossly simplified) example, the
meaning representation of the sentence some spectators fainted would be a formula
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like ‘∃x(spectator′(x) and faint′(x))’. What the meaning representation reflects is
that there is existential quantification involved and there are two predications, ‘spec-
tator’ and ‘faint’, applied to the same argument. Notably, the parts of the sentence
that are explicitly interpreted are the functional element some and the predication
structure of the sentence; more advanced analyses would also take care of mood,
tense and aspect of the verb. Content words, however, the ordinary nouns, verbs, or
adjectives, here spectator and faint, are left unanalyzed.
Formal semantics tries to account for the general rules of semantic composition,
and the interplay of syntactic structure with the rules of semantic structure. For the
general rules, formal semantics started out with basic logical distinctions between
lexical meanings, based on logical properties that are shared by a large number
of words, such as whether they denote objects, events, or properties; whether they
are used for predication, and what types of arguments they predicate about. These
properties constitute the “logical type” of lexical items. Semantic rules of compo-
sition essentially describe how the meanings of certain logical types of expressions
combine. From this point of view, idiosyncratic differences in lexical meaning, i.e.
the precise lexical meanings of individual words, do not, and should not, matter.
However, for a deeper understanding of semantic composition, it turns out that one
wants to know more about the expressions that combine than their logical type and
their syntactic category. In Montague’s own papers, he takes care of particular words
that exhibit different combinatorial properties than the “ordinary” members of this
part of speech. One example is intensional verbs like rise in the famous construction
the temperature rises (known as “Partee’s paradox”, see Löbner (2020) for discus-
sion).As an intensional verb, or to be precise: in intensional use, rise exhibits different
logical properties than verbs in extensional use, like rise in the balloon rose to 30,000
m. The intensional verb predicates about the course, or trajectory, of the temperature
function, and thereby about a Montagovian “intension”, roughly the intension of the
subject NP the temperature. By contrast, the extensional verb predicates just about a
simple object, i.e. (simply speaking) about the extension of the subject the balloon.1
Montague accounts for the logical difference between the intensional and the exten-
sional construction by meaning postulates, not by analyzing the lexical meanings.
Almost fifty years later, we are able to deal with the compositional properties of
verbs like rise on the basis of a decomposition of their meaning (see the contribu-
tion by Gamerschlag & Petersen in this volume). The decomposition explains how
the verb meaning interacts with its arguments in different constructions, intensional
and extensional, resulting in sense variation of the verb. The analysis of the lexical
meaning of the verbs predicts the compositional behavior of this (and similar) verbs.
Natural language semantics, ultimately, needs to provide theories and analysis
of lexical meaning, not only of general rules of semantic composition. This is the
more so as formal semantics has long since taken a course of constant differentiation,
turning tomore andmore detailed problems, ever closer to the analysis of phenomena
that hold only for a small number ofwords, if not sometimes for a singleword. Ideally,
1Montague’s formal solution is in terms of more complex logical types, but it is logically equivalent
to the simplified picture given here.
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a theory of semantic composition would start out from decomposition—a descrip-
tion of the structure and content of lexical meanings—and proceed to describe how
they combine in a given syntactic construction. The starting point of this endeavor,
the analysis of lexical meanings, is, however, an arduous enterprise: there are so
many words; each of them potentially with different senses, resulting in hundreds
of thousands of lexical meanings in a language like English. Thus, it makes sense
to first start out with very coarse semantic distinctions such as the logical type (like
‘n-ary predicate expression’, ‘quantifier’, ‘logical connective’, and so on). Beyond
that, most developments of formal semantics have investigated lexical meanings of
content words only to a very limited extent.
There are a few exceptional forays by formal semanticists into the realm of lexical
meanings, notably Dowty’s decomposition of different types of verb (Dowty 1979)
which becamewidely accepted. Otherwise, lexical semantics remained a stepchild of
formal semantics; the discipline never came up with a general framework for decom-
position. A later proposal for amore general approach to the decomposition of lexical
meaning was presented in Pustejovsky’s (1995) theory of the “Generative Lexicon”.
It was extended substantially in many follow-up case studies. The theory proposes a
general structure of lexical meanings in terms of four qualia that capture focal prop-
erties of the potential referents including form, purpose, origin, along with argument
structure and event structure for verbs. The theory models lexical meanings not only
of verbs, but also of nouns. The structure of the lexical entries can be considered
some variant of frame; Pustejovsky’s lexical meanings are, however, considerably
more restricted than general Barsalou frames. Pustejovsky’s theory of the lexicon
is an influential and very important development in linguistic semantics. For many
phenomena, it is able to model semantic composition in a much more detailed and
differentiated way. This is possible because there is so muchmore information on the
lexical meanings available. Pustejovsky convincingly demonstrated that any detailed
theory of semantic composition ultimately needs to be based on decomposition if
one wants to better understand how the meanings of the components of a complex
expression combine.
However, evenwith decompositional elements and an apparatus likePustejovsky’s
Generative Lexicon, mainstream formal semantics never developed into a psycho-
logical (or cognitively oriented) theory of meaning. With the growing influence of
cognitive psychology, attempts at connecting linguistic semantics to the facts and
theory of cognition have been gaining considerable momentum (see, e.g., Murphy
2002, Chap. 11). This development is in the interest of both semantics and cognitive
psychology. If one assumes that linguistic meanings correspond to concepts stored in
the cognitive system, then semantic analysis can yield insights into the architecture
and mechanisms of the cognitive system, and the empirical investigation of the latter
can provide stronger, and different, criteria for adequate semantic analysis.
A theory of linguistic meanings as structures stored or formed in the cognitive
system, requires a theory of representations ofmeanings and concepts in general. One
of the goals of the Düsseldorf CRC 991 was to develop a frame theory as a generally
applicable theory of representations. The origin and point of departure is Barsalou’s
theory of frames which he claimed are a candidate for the general format of cognitive
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representations (Barsalou 1992a, b). The CRC research has applied Barsalou’s frame
hypothesis to language, for the modeling of linguistic representations in semantics,
syntax, morphology and phonology (see Löbner 2014 for a general discussion of
the consequences of the frame hypothesis for the understanding of language). Other
scholars applied the approach in their philosophical and psychological research.
Many contributions in this volume take a position with respect to the relationship
between meaning and concepts for the issue of decomposition. There’s the extreme
position argued for by de Almeida & Antal, who argue against decomposition. In
their model of natural language semantics, lexical meanings are stored units not to
be decomposed, i.e. atoms in the semantic system.
While formal semanticists mostly have practiced lexical atomism by assuming
that lexical meanings are just given as they are, they would not argue against decom-
position if necessary and feasible. This practice is to be observed in the three formal
semantics contributions by Morzicky, Krifka, and Liefke, whose concern is not so
muchwith lexical meanings and their interaction but with the interpretation of certain
constructions. RobinCooper’s contribution is in a similar vein as far as lexical decom-
position is concerned. He develops a remarkable theory of connecting semantics and
cognition and accounting for semantic phenomenawith complex cognitive structures,
but these structures still contain unanalyzed lexical meanings. At the opposite end
of the scale, there are frame-based semantic analyses (Andreou & Petitjean, Balogh
& Osswald, Gamerschlag & Petersen, Löbner). These contributions propose frame-
based decompositional structures as the basis of modelling semantic composition for
a variety of phenomena. Berio applies the frame approach to her discussion of the
meaning of color terms.
2 Cognitive Structures in Philosophy
In the introductory part on natural language semantics, we sketched Montague’s
semantics and mentioned Gottlob Frege, one of the founding fathers of philos-
ophy of language and of linguistic semantics in general. Indeed, Frege’s notions
of Sinn (sense) and Bedeutung (reference) are what Montague intends to capture
with his notions of intension and extension, using Rudolf Carnap’s development of
possible worlds in, for example, his Meaning and Necessity (1947). Moreover, Frege
already formulated the central semantic principle of compositionality which we find
in Montague and in Alfred Tarski’s work on the truth predicate for formal languages
(1936). It was also taken up by Donald Davidson (1967) to introduce truth-functional
semantics for natural languages: the meaning (truth-conditions for sentences) of
a complex expression is a function of the meaning of its parts and the way these parts
are put together in the expression. In fact, most of those who built the foundations of
formal semantics were not linguistic semanticists, but philosophers, such as Frege,
Carnap, Tarski, Davidson, Montague, Lewis or Cresswell, to mention only a few.
Barbara Partee and Robin Cooper are among the early protagonists with a genuine
linguistic background;RobinCooper is one of the contributors to this volume. Formal
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semantics with its background of analytic philosophy and logic was tremendously
important for linguistics because it helped to establish semantics as one of its central
disciplines. However, the extensional turn—the replacement of Frege’s Sinn by the
mathematical notion of intension severed the discipline from a conceptual, that is
psychological point of view. This made it difficult to connect mainstream semantics
to the developments in cognitive science.
The emergence ofmodern cognitive science is the arrival of computationalmodels
within cognitive psychology, models that are inspired by logic, philosophy, linguis-
tics, and artificial intelligence, and required intensive collaboration between logi-
cians, philosophers, linguists, psychologists, and computer scientists. One of these
models, of particular influence for many contributions in this volume, is Barsalou’s
frame model; it “borrows heavily from previous frame theories, although its collec-
tion of representational components is somewhat unique”.2 Cognitive structures
belong to cognitive science in the sense described above where cognitive science
is meant to improve the understanding of human cognitive skills, like categorizing,
learning, reasoning and planning, and by developing better and better models of these
skills, models that—if they are not directly implemented—clearly could contribute to
implementation if existing limitations were removed. Modeling concepts and other
cognitive structures is a core enterprise.
Theories of concepts have been central in philosophy for as long as it is practiced
as a discipline. One of the most important, if outdated theories is the one found in
Locke and Hume, but related to a tradition going back to Aristotle where concepts
are identified with images or (pictorial) representations. Another classical view—
recently defended again by Peacocke (1992)—takes the necessary and sufficient
conditions for the application of a concept to an instance as identity criterion for a
concept. Amodern alternative to such classical theories is the so-called theory theory
of concepts (Gopnik andMeltzoff 1997) in which an analogy is made to the meaning
of theoretical terms in scientific theories and in which the content of concepts is
given by the theories in which they figure. The exemplar theory of concepts (Brooks
1978) starts from classification learning and defines the extension of the concept as
the class of objects which are sufficiently similar to typical exemplars. Rosch (1978)
develops a prototype theory of concepts in which objects fall under a concept if they
match with a prototype to a certain degree. This view can be related to the family
resemblance theory of Wittgenstein. The approach most elaborate on representation
is Barsalou’s (1992a, b, 1999) frame theory of categorization. For the Düsseldorf
CRC 991, Barsalou’s frame theory is the central candidate for a theory of cognitive
conceptual representations and means of categorization.
The success of cognitive science research also means that improvements in cogni-
tive modelling can lead to new insights within the disciplines that inspired the first
versions of the models. In the case of logic and philosophy, the contribution to cogni-
tive science ranges over a number of areas. The development of formalizations of
logic for the mathematical study of logic has led to precise versions of notions such
2Barsalou (1992a, p. 21). In Barsalou (1992b, p. 158), he mentions various sources from linguistics,
artificial intelligence and logic.
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as proposition, proof, entailment, contradiction, tautology, validity, completeness,
and others that can be used as first models of human inferential and representational
skills, to be tested against empirical data.
Alvin Goldman’s is a different kind of contribution from philosophy to cognitive
science. His theory of human action (1970) turns out to provide a novel general,
very far-reaching, model for the cognitive theory of categorization. According to
Goldman, human action very often constitutes simultaneous action at many levels.
His theory was presented as a contribution to ontology, but in reply to his critics he
later stated that it is in fact a psychological theory of categorization (see Löbner’s
chapter in this volume).
There is an increasing number of philosophers of mind and of language who are
themselves cognitive science researchers (or at least followcognitive science research
closely), among themAlvinGoldman (withmore recent work), Peter Hanks, Thomas
Metzinger, Friederike Moltmann, Albert Newen, Elisabeth Pacherie, Josef Perner,
François Recanati, GottfriedVosgerau andMarkusWerning.While this researchmay
be directed at new results or new arguments within ongoing philosophical discus-
sions, it is nonetheless straight cognitive science, even if the questions addressed do
not come directly from a psychological cognitive science agenda.
3 Cognitive Structures in Psychology
The ability to form conceptual representations has been a core research interest in
psychology since the cognitive revolution almost half a century ago. Much of the
theoretical and empiricalwork in cognitive psychology is, andhas been, influencedby
parallel research lines in philosophy and natural language semantics, some of which
are mentioned above. One example is the classic feature list model in cognitive
psychology that was developed by Glas & Holyoak (1975) and Hampton (1979).
They proposed that each category representation is a list of features, that is, a list of
independent representational components forming a single level of analysis, whose
sum represents the category. Feature lists treat attributes and values as the same
kind and do not specify relations between features. By contrast, as outlined above,
frame theory according to Barsalou and others (Barsalou 1992a, 2005) is supposed
to be an alternative to flat feature list representations, but also to other theories
prominent in the research literature such as prototype theory and exemplar theory. The
frame approach holds that concepts can be represented in attribute-value structures.
Each attribute can be connected to a cluster of more specific attributes, and certain
attributes can also constrain the range of other attributes putting the concepts into
dynamic connection and relation.One implication is that the activation of a perceptual
property of a concept in frame format may automatically lead to the representation
of a whole conceptual system, which allows a structured description of knowledge
(Barsalou 2005).
The feature- or attribute-list framework has been hypothesized to be species-
general. Referring to the work of Sutherland and Mackintosh (Mackintosh 1965;
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Sutherland & Mackintosh 1971), Barsalou already proposed in 1992 (Barsalou
1992a) that not only humans, but non-human animals, too, use attribute-value sets
to conceptually represent their world, and he more recently made the claim of a
continuity of the conceptual system across species more specific (Barsalou 2005).
For example, in a rat version of the set shifting task (Birrell & Brown 2000), animals
had to choose between two different bowls where one contained a food reward,
and the other did not. The bowls differed in three attribute values: odors, mediums
that filled the bowl, and surface textures. One of these attributes cued which of the
two bowls contained the reward. Once rats learned to identify the reward-predicting
cues, the cue-reward contingencieswere shifted. Results showed that learning a novel
discrimination was faster in so-called intradimensional shifts when the discrimina-
tion was based on the previously relevant perceptual dimension (e.g. odor–odor cue
reversals: oregano to cinnamon) compared with a condition when attention had to
be shifted to the previously irrelevant dimension in so-called extradimensional shifts
(e.g., odor–filling reversals: oregano to sand). The shift-costs, i.e., the post-reversal
reacquisition rate, should be identical after intra- and extradimensional shifts if the
cue was represented as a feature list. However, this was not the case: the animals
were slower to reach pre-shift performance after an extra- compared to an intradi-
mensional shift. This observation is difficult to explainwith the hypothesis of isolated
feature list representations. A better way to understand these phenomena is that the
stimulus is represented by each of its attributes and attribute values, e.g. “odor” with
the values oregano or cinnamon. A shift between the values of the same attribute
should be easier than a shift between different attributes. The chapter by David Tait,
Verity Brown and colleagues in this volume stands in the tradition of this research,
and investigates the neural mechanism underlying reversal learning in rats.
It has recently even been argued that frame theory can be extended to understand
conceptual representations of animals in the social domain. For example, Gil-da-
Costa et al. (2004) studiedmacaques, and investigated the cognitive and neural repre-
sentation of social calls emitted by conspecifics. They found that the calls conveyed
information about the caller and its socioecological context. There were two types
of calls: the first was named coos and was associated with positive social context,
such as friendly approach behavior. The second type was termed screams, which are
usually emitted in threatening situations, such as an attack by a conspecific. By using
Positron-Emission Tomography, it was found that these conspecific vocalizations
elicited activity in neural networks that strongly correspond to the network shown to
support the representation of conspecifics and affective information in humans. The
chapter by Kalenscher and colleagues in this volume expands on this finding, and
argues that conspecifics’ calls in rats evoke multi-level representations by carrying
acoustic and motivational value; they can, thus, structure rat social interaction.
These examples show that cognitive and comparative research can yield insights
into a universal representation system of cognition that applies across species and
domains. Hence, bringing together theoretical and empirical work from philosophy,
natural language semantics and cognitive comparative psychology bears synergies
that either discipline alone could not achieve.
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4 Summaries
4.1 Part I Pushing the Boundaries of Formal Semantics
This part consists of contributions by formal semanticist, which—in one or the
other way—undertake to push the boundaries of present formal semantic theory.
They push the boundaries in different respects and in different directions. There is
the general challenge to the truth-conditional model-theoretic approach that formal
semantics is taking (invariably from its early beginnings until today), that it is
intrinsically noncognitive, assuming essentially an idealized omniscient epistemic
perspective on truth and truth-conditions. In an early paper on the nature of the
Montagovian approach, Barbara Partee posed the question “Semantics—mathe-
matics or psychology?”, where she observes that Montague semantics is a math-
ematical method of doing semantics and modeling meaning; however, she points
out, attitude reports seem to require a psychological perspective on their semantic
analysis (Partee 1979). We reencounter an aspect of the problem in Liefke’s attempt
to include the existence of subjective cognitive systems into a wider framework of
formal semantic analysis of belief sentences. Counting of various logical types of
things has been a challenge to logical analysis and the ontological design of the frame-
work of possible-worlds semantics (cf. Krifka’s classical 1990 paper “Four thousand
ships passed through the lock: Object-induced measure functions on events”). In
Krifka’s contribution to this volume, we will tackle with temporary configurations.
A different challenge is the assumption of the homomorphism of morphosyntax
and semantic composition. It was a central topic since Montague’s first treatment
of quantification in 1973 which proposed a formal solution to the seeming incon-
gruence of syntactic and semantic structure in the case of nominal quantification.
Certain types of seemingly displaced adjectives remain a challenge to date (cf. the
paper by Morzicky in this volume).
Kristina Liefke’s chapter “A Compositional Pluralist Semantics for Exten-
sional and Attitude Verbs” proposes a new account of linguistic content that recon-
ciles content-pluralism with compositionality. This is achieved by integrating truth-
conditional content and attitude report content into a single notion of content.
A parametrized version of this notion (with parameters for agents, times, and
information states) serves as input to the compositional semantic machinery. By
supplying different parameter-values to the parameterized contents of their comple-
ments, different verbs select for different components of the complement’s inte-
grated content. The resulting account explains the different substitution properties
of extensional and attitude constructions and captures the role of agents’ epistemic
perspective in the determination of attitude content. The account improves upon
other accounts of truth-conditional and attitude content (esp. two-dimensional seman-
tics) by interpreting different occurrences of an expression—in extensional and in
attitude embeddings—as objects of the same semantic type, and by explaining the
substitution-resistance of attitudinal embeddings of extensional constructions.
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Manfred Krifka, in his contribution “Counting Possible Configurations” deals
with entities such as outfits: these consist of a configuration of pieces of clothing;
they come into existence when actually combined, cease to exist when not worn,
and may or may not come into existence again. To count how many outfits one
has is a challenge to formal semantics, as it is often assumed that a requirement
for counting objects is that they do not overlap. This condition is violated in cases
such as outfits. The article develops an analysis of such configurational entities as
individual concepts. It investigates the interaction of noun phrases based on such
nouns with modal operators and in collective and cumulative interpretations. The
general direction of this paper points towards a theoretical framework in which the
objects referred to in language, and consequently, the objects of our cognition, should
be seen as individual concepts. The notion of an object contains the ability to identify
the same object over different indices, and this is precisely achieved by individual
concepts. Someobjects are temporally convex in the sense that they have a continuous
existence from an initial time to a final time (such as shirts and pants), others have a
more spotted existence (such as outfits).
Marcin Morzicky’s concern is with cases of adjective constructions that appear
to provide notorious problems to the assumption of a match between grammatical
and semantic structure. In his paper “Structure and Ontology in Nonlocal Readings
of Adjectives”, he refers to them as adjectives with “nonlocal” readings, i.e. read-
ings in which the adjective (for example occasional or average) appears to make
the contribution of an adverb. Morzicky points out that the phenomenon is more
general than usually assumed. There are two options, he argues, to deal with this
kind of phenomenon: to invest into a richer and maybe cognitively more ambitious
ontology and to invest in more involved composition rules. As to the intuition that
these nonlocal adjective readings are a grammatical oddity, Morzicky concludes:
“These adjectives are indeed odd, but in a precise and interesting sense. They are
odd in the way that platypuses and lungfish are odd: they are—perhaps metaphor-
ically, or perhaps more than metaphorically—transitional forms in an evolutionary
progression, unusual because they combine features of two distinct categories that
we normally regard as mutually exclusive.”
4.2 Part II Concept Theory
The papers in this section provide more general accounts of how one can approach
the nature of concepts from a formal point of view. They deal with very essen-
tial questions: Should the meaning of lexical items be approached by means of
decomposition/internal analysis or rather be treated as atomic/opaque? How is the
concept space structured and what makes a “natural” concept? How is categoriza-
tion related to perception and which system of types does one have to assume in this
regard?What’s the impact of language on concepts? The contributions in this section
show that these questions—in spite of their classic nature—are at the very heart of
present-day research on concepts, meaning and representation.
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In their contribution “How Can Semantics Avoid the Troubles with the
Analytic/SyntheticDistinction?”RobertoG. deAlmeida andCaitlynAntal present
a criticism of semantic theories that differentiate between analytic and synthetic
features, a distinction originally grounded in the philosophical opposition between
statements that are logically true and those whose truth depends on additional
world/contextual knowledge (Kant 1781; Carnap 1956). In favor of their opinion, de
Almeida and Antal discuss potential problems of the lexical decomposition account
of causative verbs and the type-coercion analysis of semantic mismatches between
verb and argument meaning. As an alternative to these accounts, the authors sketch
analyses based on the assumption that concepts invariably contribute all of their
contents and do not involve a characterization by features (“concept atomism”). They
show how some of the regularities found with causatives as well as type-coercion
can be analyzed in terms of inferences/meaning postulates triggered by the meaning
of lexical items.
Leda Berio discusses the way conceptual representations can be conceived of as
being determined by language in her chapter “Linguistic Relativity and Flexibility
of Mental Representations: Color Terms in a Frame Based Analysis”. She argues
that Whorfianism/language relativity on the one hand and universalism on the other
hand are extreme oppositions one of which needs not be necessarily assumed given
more recent developments which offer a more differentiated, less radical picture of
the interrelation between language and concept formation. As a format of mental
representation and a device for mediating between linguistic and perceptual infor-
mation in concepts, Berio proposes frames in the sense of Barsalou (1992a, b) and
Löbner (2015). She shows that frame representations exhibit a high degree of flex-
ibility which allows for the representation of the interaction between linguistic and
perceptual information necessary to capture the results of experiments related to the
relativity/universalism debate, in particular those dealing with color labeling.
Starting from the major division into conventional and conversational implica-
tures and following subtypologies such as the differentiation between various kinds
of scalar implicatures which have developed as some kind of mainstream after the
original definition of the term byGrice (1975), Igor Douven investigates the concep-
tual properties of implicatures in his paper “Implicatures and Naturalness”. In partic-
ular, Douven is interested in the question whether implicatures should be regarded as
natural concepts having a reality independent of what he refers to as “linguistic intu-
itions”. The author proposes to deal with that question in terms of Gärdenfors’ theory
of conceptual spaces (Gärdenfors 2000) and to checkwhether different kinds of impli-
catures satisfy Gärdenfors’ “Criterion P” that a natural concept is a convex region of
a conceptual space. Based on data from a self-conducted study, Douven constructs a
conceptual space for different types of implicatures and argues that the distribution of
items in the implicature space suggests a characterization of implicatures as natural
concepts.
In his chapter “Perception, Types and Frames”,Robin Cooper offers an approach
to perception and categorization formulated within his framework of Type Theory
with Records (TTR, Cooper 2012). He claims that perception is determined by the
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way we classify entities (i.e. objects and events) according to this framework. Char-
acteristically, TTR goes beyond the traditional binary distinction between entities
and truth values put forward by Montague (1974) in building on a more elaborate
system of types following the type theory of Martin-Löf (1984). Thus, TTR also
assumes basic types for physical objects and events. Cooper gives an introduction to
the essentials of TTR with special reference to the conception of “record types” and
their instantiation by particular records both of which play a central role within this
theory. Moreover, Cooper discusses how his model is related to Fillmore frames and
to cognitive frames in the sense of Barsalou (1992a, b) and their formal adoption
by Löbner (2014, 2015), Kallmeyer & Osswald (2013) and Kallmeyer et al. (2017)
among others.
4.3 Part III Conceptualizing Eventualities
Eventualities are temporal entities, usually understood as comprising events and
states both of which have a temporal structure and a location in time. According
to Guarino (1997) eventualities can be characterized as ‘occurrents’ which differ
ontologically from ‘continuants’ defined as objects lacking both temporal location as
well as temporal partswhile characteristically exhibiting ‘mereo-topo-morphological
properties’.Both types of entities are closely related to eachother such that “occurents
are ‘generated’ by continuants, according to the ways they behave in time” (Guarino
1997: 7). The papers in this section deal with different aspects of eventualities and the
way they are conceptualized. Since events are referred to characteristically, but not
exclusively, byverbs, all contributions are concernedwith phenomena related to verbs
such as deverbal nominalizations, verbal aspect, verbal particles and stative readings
of dynamic verbs. The last chapter proposes a cognitive structure for representing
action, and thereby the meaning of action verbs: the model of so-called cascades. It
is based on Goldman’s multi-level account of human action that assumes that action
more often than never is to be categorized simultaneously at different levels.
In their paper “An XMG Account of Multiplicity of Meaning in Derivation”
Marios Andreou and Simon Petitjean propose an account of the various readings
exhibited byEnglish deverbal nouns resulting from -al-suffixation. Based on a corpus
study, the authors show that apart from an event and result reading -al derivatives can
display also readings of a non-eventive nature which refer to a variety of participants
involved in the event denoted by the base verb. The different readings which are
available (or excluded) for a specific verbal base are captured by type constraints
which single out particular components in a frame representation of the base verb as
referents of the nominalization. One merit of this approach is the reduction of over-
generation, a problem characteristic of monosemous accounts of derivation which
assume a general underspecified meaning for an affix. In the final part of their paper,
Andreou and Petitjean offer a formalization of their analysis by modelling it using
Extensible Metagrammar (XMG, Crabbé et al. 2013).
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Martín Fuchs, Ashwini Deo and María Mercedes Piñango discuss the way
nonlinguistic constraints determine the use of aspect markers in their contribu-
tion “Operationalizing the Role of Context in Language Variation: The Role of
Perspective Alignment in the Spanish Imperfective Domain.” The authors start out
from the results of a study on the relevance of the context on the availability of
the simple present as a marker of progressive meaning as opposed to the context-
independent accessibility of the present progressive marker in three different vari-
eties of Spanish. Fuchs et al. propose an account which builds on a process they call
‘perspective alignment’. Perspective alignment aims at bringing the hearer’s perspec-
tive closer to the speaker’s perspective. According to the authors, this process can be
considered as mediating between the opposite principles of linguistic economy and
linguistic expressiveness. In particular, the progressive interpretation of the simple
present in Spanish is only available if speaker and hearer both have perceptual
access to the event denoted by the verb which ensures the speaker-hearer perspective
alignment in a non-linguistic way.
In “A Frame-Based Analysis of Verbal Particles in Hungarian” Katalin Balogh
and Rainer Osswald provide a formal approach to the semantic contribution of the
Hungarian particles meg-, le-, el-, and fel- and the way they combine composition-
ally with their respective verbal base. In their account, they apply a formalization of
Role and Reference Grammar (Van Valin & LaPolla 1997) on the one hand and a
decompositional frame semantics as a device for combining lexical decomposition
with a frame representational format on the other hand. The explicit formalization of
the semantic interaction between verbal base and particle sets their approach apart
from previous approaches to Hungarian particles which do not elaborate formally on
the semantic and syntactic representation of the base verb and the particle and the
way they are combined in a compositional semantics. A further aspect addressed by
the authors is the syntactic distribution of verbal particles and resultative phrases and
how these patterns can be analyzed compositionally by means of frame semantics.
In their paper “On the Fictive Reading of German Steigen ‘Climb, Rise’: A Frame
Account”, Thomas Gamerschlag and Wiebke Petersen deal with the stative use
of verbs of motion frequently referred to as ‘fictive motion’ (Talmy 2000). The
authors present a case study of the fictive motion reading of the German movement
verb steigen ‘climb, rise’ and show how it can be analyzed by contrasting it to
the dynamic readings of the verb within a frame account. In particular, they argue
that both the fictive motion reading as well as the so-called ‘intensional’ reading
of steigen derive from the non-figurative directional reading of the verb since all of
these readings obligatorily exhibit a value change restricted to a positive difference.
In Gamerschlag and Petersen’s frame account, the intensional and the fictional uses
result from different operations on the frame representation of the directional use
(replacement of the position-attribute in the former case vs. deactivation of the
dynamic frame components and accommodation of the meaning of the subject in the
latter case).
Sebastian Löbner’s contribution “Cascades. Goldman’s Level-Generation,
Multilevel Categorization of Action, and Multilevel Verb Semantics” proposes a
novel theory of the categorization of acts and applies it to the semantics of action
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verbs, with fundamental consequences for semantic theory and beyond. The theory
is based on Goldman’s (1970) multilevel theory of action which is taken here as
a theory of categorization. Goldman’s central notion is level-generation: acts of a
type may under circumstances generate acts of other, more abstract, types. The acts
form a hierarchical structure that Goldman calls an act-tree. Level-generation results
in a conceptual relation called c-constitution here, i.e. constitution under the given
circumstances. Löbner introduces the more general term cascade for act-trees. In the
second part, multilevel cascade-structure categorization is conflated with a cognitive
semantics that models meanings with Barsalou frames. A multilevel analysis of the
concept of writing is discussed in depth and detail in order to illustrate the potential
and the consequences of a cascade approach to verb semantics. It is shown that the
concept of c-constitution can be generalized as to cover the roles of persons and
objects across levels in a cascade. The generalization suggests that multilevel cate-
gorization may be a very general and fundamental phenomenon in the psychology
of categorization.
4.4 Part IV Prototypes and Probabilities
It is a well-known phenomenon that human cognition is able to recognize less-
typical specimens as belonging to a particular category although they differ more or
less drastically from the perfect representatives of this category (Rosch & Mervis
1975; Rosch 1978). From a theoretical point of view, the challenge in this regard is
to capture the relevant cognitive factors underlying the process of categorization and
in particular to provide suitable mechanisms able to deal with the non-representative
instances of a category. The contributions in this section offer approaches to the
categorization and comparison of individuals which deal with the question how the
underlying concepts are structured. Characteristically, all of these accounts assume
representations of a much more elaborate structure than the feature lists of early
prototype theory.
Corina Strößner, Annika Schuster and Gerhard Schurz discuss the effect of
modification on prototype compositionality in their paper “Modification and Default
Inheritance”. Starting from the observation that modification characteristically leads
to a decrease of how likely typicality statements are rated, the authors propose an
account of prototype composition in adjective-noun combinations as a representative
pattern of modification. Their analysis is based on an extension of the selective
modification model by Smith et al. (1988). In particular, Strößner et al. add the
expressivity of Barsalou frames (Barsalou 1992a, b) which allows for capturing
cross-attributional constraints, i.e. co-variation of different attributes of an entity
such as the indication of a sour taste of an apple by its green color. The formal
approach is complemented by an exploratory study in which participants rated the
typicality and likelihood of properties of modified and unmodified nouns as well as
the typicality and likelihood of particular modifiers of a given noun.
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Samuel Taylor and Peter Sutton present a frame approach to Bayesian models
of categorization in their article “A Frame-Theoretic Model of Bayesian Category
Learning”. They claim that frame representations are advantageous over unstruc-
tured feature list representations which are commonly applied in Bayesian models.
In particular, Taylor and Sutton argue that it is a shortcoming of the use of feature list
representations that they usually depend on supervised training data for assigning
weights to features. As an alternative, they introduce frame representations for medi-
ating between sensory input and behavioral output and show that the recursive
structure of frames can be exploited in a way which allows for the weighting of
attribute values in an unsupervised process of categorization. By analyzing a simple
example of animal categorization, the authors demonstrate that attribute values can
beweighted in terms of their appearance in the frame: features belonging to attributes
closer to the central node of a frame aremore important and are assignedmoreweight
than features of attributes located more distant from the central node of a frame.
In their contribution “Extremes are Typical. A Game Theoretical Derivation”,
Robert van Rooij and Thomas Brochhagen challenge the hypothesis that a proto-
type understood as a typical specimen of a category is also a central member of that
category. By contrast, the authors claim that rather stereotypes which are defined
as extreme exemplars constitute the typical instances of a category. Consequently,
although they followGärdenfors’ (2000) idea that basic categories are always convex
sets, they oppose his assumption that prototypes are at the center of a convex set. By
discussing color and taste space as basic examples of Gärdenfors’ theory of concep-
tual spaces, Rooij and Brochhagen argue that typical representatives of color and
taste are at the edges of the respective spaces and “as far away from each other as
possible”. In line with their assumption, they propose a game theoretic analysis in
which both convexity ofmeaning as well as stereotypes are accounted for as resulting
from principles of rational language use.
In deciding whether an entity belongs to a particular category, similarity of
objects plays a central role. In their paper “Grading Similarity” Carla Umbach
and Helmar Gust present an analysis of the German/English similarity expressions
ähnlich/similar, so/such, and gleich/same with a particular focus on the explanation
of gradability asymmetries (ähnlich/similar are gradable expressions in contrast to
so/such and gleich/same). The authors propose an approach to similarity in which
the three different expressions of similarity in German and English are treated by
means of a similarity relation sim(x, y, F ) with F being defined as a quadruple
comprising the domain of entities, an attribute space, a measure function and a set
of classifiers. Umbach and Gust argue that the use of the similarity expressions
under discussion can be analyzed by considering in particular the set of classifiers
and the different dimensions of comparison which are associated with a specific
attribute space. Their account of the gradability of ähnlich/similar is motivated by
ideas originally put forward in Klein (1980).
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4.5 Part V Cognition and Psychology
This part addresses the question of cognitive structures from an empirical perspec-
tive that applies not only to human cognition, but also to the cognition of rats.
Both contributions on rat psychology address basic questions of cognitive structures
concerned with cognitive mechanisms that play a role in reinforcement learning. One
of the “human” contributions concerns the interaction of language processing with
the cognitive motor system. The study differentiates and corroborates the findings
on the embodiment of semantic knowledge first reported in Pulvermüller (2005) and
in many later studies. The other addresses the radical question whether cognitive
representations should be assumed to exist at all.
In their paper “Escitalopram Restores Reversal Learning Impairments in Rats
with Lesions of Orbital Frontal Cortex”, David Tait, Ellen Bowman, Silke Miller,
Mary Dovlatyan, Connie Sanchez and Verity Brown investigate the neural under-
pinnings and the malleability of cognitive structures. Cognitive structures can be
defined as mental models, and they improve the efficiency of information processing
byproviding a situational frameworkwithinwhich there are parameters governing the
nature and timing of information. Tait, Brown and colleagues study cognitive struc-
tures by training rats in a reversal learning task where previously acquired stimulus-
response contingencies are reversed, and subsequently reverted to the original contin-
gency. Lesions of the rats’ orbitofrontal cortex resulted in poorer reversal perfor-
mance. For example, they showed higher perseveration errors (the rats continued to
choose the previously rewarded, nowunrewarded cue after a reversal) and took longer
to acquire the novel stimulus-response contingencies after a reversal. This impair-
ment in reversal performance was restored to normal performance by administration
of escilatopram, an antidepressant drug that increases the synaptic transmission of
the neurotransmitter serotonin. In addition, the orbitofrontal cortex lesions resulted
in an increase of neuronal activity markers in prefrontal regions, which were even
more amplified by escilatopram administration. These results suggest that cognitive
structures, enabling learning by representing the world as a cognitive map, involve
orbito- and prefrontal brain structures, and can be modulated by serotonergic action.
The contribution by Tobias Kalenscher, Lisa-Maria Schönfeld, Sebastian
Löbner,Markus Wöhr,Mireille van Berkel,Maurice-Philipp Zech and Marijn
van Wingerden deals with rats psychology, too. In their paper “Rat Ultrasonic
Vocalizations as Social Reinforcers—Implications for a Multilevel Model of the
Cognitive Representation of Action and Rats’ Social World”, the experimental focus
is on prosocial behavior; the second part offers a cognitive modelling of reinforce-
ment learning as cascade formation. The empirical research investigated the role of
certain ultrasonic vocalizations (USV) which rats produce at frequencies of either 50
or 22 kHz. The chapter presents evidence supporting the hypothesis that USVs act
as social reinforcers. In line with the social reinforcement hypothesis (Hernandez-
Lallement et al. 2017), it is shown that rats preferred T-maze compartments associ-
ated with 50-kHz USV playback over compartments associated with non-ultrasonic
control stimuli. This observation fuels the hypothesis that USVs might orchestrate
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and structure social interaction between rats. From the point of viewof cascade theory
(cf. the contribution by Löbner in this volume), ultrasonic vocalizations with a social
“meaning” are assumed to be represented in the rat’s brain as two-level cascades
with a lower, physical, level of vocalizing and a higher, social, level of signaling.
The main application of cascade theory is to the modeling of reinforcement learning,
considering it as the formation of a cascade that invests a particular behavior with
the aspect of making oneself have a rewarding or aversive experience. This model of
learning would explain the acquisition of practical knowledge-how as the result of a
basic brain mechanism of cascade formation. This is important in the given context
because the same cognitive learning mechanism is very plausibly to be observed
with human subjects, too, in their acquisition of the daily knowledge-how. Thus, it
appears, cascade formation is a basic brain mechanism across species.
Jan Sieksmeyer, Anne Klepp, Valentina Niccolai, Jaqueline Metzlaff, Alfons
Schnitzler, and Katja Biermann-Ruben’s contribution “Influence of Manner
Adverbs on Action Verb Processing” aims to investigate motor cortical involve-
ment in the processing of hand- and foot-related action verbs combined with manner
adverbs, applying behavioral methods and EEG recordings. The study provides an
indication that manner adverbs influence motor behavior while corroborating the
already existing data concerning the interaction between action verb processing and
motor output. These findings are in line with assumptions made by embodied cogni-
tion theories proposing an essential role of sensorimotor areas in the processing
and storage of action concepts inherent in action-related language. The adverbial
modulation of motor behavior might reflect a certain variation of motor involve-
ment in language processing. This involvement could be susceptible to grammatical
constructions modifying the action component of action verbs. Yet, effects of the
verb material in a closely matched verb set and influences of timing have to be taken
into account.
In his paper “When Mechanical Computations Explain Better” Silvano Zipoli
Caiani discusses the position of radical enactivism (e.g. Hutto and Myin 2012)
whose supporters argue that the representational-computational paradigm does not
add explanatory power over and above the physical description of a cognitive system,
and therefore should be abandoned. Zipoli Caiani defends the representational-
computational paradigm in a careful study of the phenomenon of optic ataxia, a
disorder characterized by difficulties in executing visually-guided reaching tasks,
although ataxic patients do not exhibit any specific disease of themuscular apparatus.
He demonstrates that the assumption of the dual stream model of vision—and hence
a computational brain mechanism—explains phenomena that the radical enactivism
paradigm is unable to account for.
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Pushing the Boundaries of Formal
Semantics
A Compositional Pluralist Semantics
for Extensional and Attitude Verbs
Kristina Liefke
Abstract We propose a new account of linguistic content that reconciles content-
pluralism with compositionality. This is achieved by integrating truth-conditional
content and attitude report content into a single notion of content. A parametrized
version of this notion (with parameters for agents, times, and information states)
serves as input to the compositional semantic machinery. By supplying different
parameter-values to the parametrized contents of their complements, different verbs
select for different components of the complement’s integrated content. The resulting
account explains the different substitution properties of extensional and attitude con-
structions and captures the role of agents’ epistemic perspective in the determination
of attitude content. The account improves upon other accounts of truth-conditional
and attitude content (esp. two-dimensional semantics) by interpreting different occur-
rences of an expression—in extensional and in attitude embeddings—as objects of
the same semantic type, and by explaining the substitution-resistance of attitudinal
embeddings of extensional constructions.
Keywords Pluralism about linguistic content · Compositional interpretation ·
Intensional verbs · Attitude reports · Epistemic perspective · Two-dimensional
semantics
1 Introduction
The notion of linguistic content lies at the core of research in semantics and the
philosophy of language. This notion describes the context-dependent meaning of
(utterances of) linguistic expressions that is used to capture the truth-conditional
contribution of these expressions and to predict the entailment relations between
these expressions (see Lewis 1970; Montague 1970). Many semantic theories today
adopt some form of pluralism about linguistic content (see, e.g., Zimmermann 2012;
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Ciardelli and Roelofsen 2018; Potts 2005). These theories assume different kinds,
or types, of linguistic content that serve as the contents of expressions in different
contexts and that, hence, play different explanatory roles.
Among the different kinds of linguistic content are typically truth-conditional
content and attitude (report)1 content. Truth-conditional content is sometimes alter-
natively called denotational content, intensions, or objective meaning. Attitude con-
tent is sometimes called epistemic content, information content, or subjective mean-
ing. Respectively, these two kinds of content capture agent-independent criteria for
assigning truth-values to utterances (i.e. truth-conditional content) and agents’ par-
ticular ways of grasping the truth-conditional content of these utterances (i.e. attitude
content).
The distinction between truth-conditional and attitude content is often motivated
by the observation that certain linguistic constructions resist the truth-preserving
substitution of truth-conditionally equivalent expressions in their complements. Such
constructions include de dicto-readings of clausal embeddings under attitude verbs
likebelieve or hope. Constructions that exhibit this substitution-resistance are called
(hyper-)intensional constructions and can be described as cognitively opaque.2 They
differ from extensional3 constructions (e.g. embeddings under the verb indicate) that
allow for such substitutions and are, hence, cognitively transparent.
The difference between extensional and attitude constructions is reflected in the
possibility, or impossibility, of substituting DPs like sodium by their co-referential
DPs (here: natrium) and, hence, of substituting (1a) by the truth-conditionally equiv-
alent (1b): while this substitution is typically allowed in the complement of indicate
(s.t. one can infer (2b) from (2a)), it is often disallowed in the complement of believe
(s.t. one cannot generally infer (3b) from (3a)). The latter inference is blocked if the
attitude complements have a different cognitive significance for the attitude subject
(in (3): for Len).
(1) a. Sodium is a metal.
b. Natrium is a metal.
(2) a. The reaction indicates [cpthat sodium is a metal]. (T)
⇒ b. The reaction indicates [cpthat natrium is a metal]. (T)
1Because of our focus on linguistic content, we hereafter take attitude content to refer to the content
of attitude reports, rather than to the content of the mental attitudes underlying these reports (see
Hintikka 1969).
2Our notion of cognitive opacity differs from the familiar notion of (referential) opacity (see Quine
1953),which captures the sensitivity for truth-conditional, rather than for attitude content.Our notion
of cognitive transparency differs from referential transparency, which captures the sensitivity for
reference/extension. The difference between these notions is exemplified by the verb indicate,
which creates a referentially opaque, but cognitively transparent context.
3Wewill hereafter use extensional verb (or construction) as a cover term for verbs (or constructions)
that take extensional and for verbs (or constructions) that take intensional complements. Our use of
this term ismotivated by the common description of objectual attitude verbs as intensional transitive
verbs.
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(3) a. Len believes [cpthat sodium is a metal]. (T)
 b. Len believes [cpthat natrium is a metal]. (F)
To explain the difference in substitutivity between (2) and (3), most pluralist
theories about linguistic content (e.g. Chalmers 2006; Zimmermann 2012; Lappin
2015) interpret extensional verbs as expressions that select for the truth-conditional
content of their complement and interpret attitude verbs as expressions that select for
the combined (truth-conditional and attitude) content of their complement. However,
these theories often yield a disunified semantics that interprets different occurrences
of a complement—in extensional and in attitude embeddings—as objects of different
types. As a result, these theories often resist an easy compositional formulation.
However, given their intended role as an account of natural language content, this is
highly problematic.
This paper outlines a new account of truth-conditional and attitude content, called
Integrated Semantics, that solves the above problem by integrating truth-conditional
and attitude content into a single notion of linguistic content. The account enables
a uniform compositional treatment of extensional and attitude constructions that
correctly predicts the substitution behavior of these constructions.
The paper is organized as follows: To show the need for an integrated account of
truth-conditional and attitude content, we first describe the relation between truth-
conditional and attitude content, review the most popular account of these two kinds
of content (i.e. two-dimensional semantics), and identify some shortcomings of this
account (in Sect. 2). The rest of the paper will be concerned with an incremen-
tal presentation of our alternative account of truth-conditional and attitude content,
i.e. Integrated Semantics, and with a demonstration of the ability of this account to
avoid the above shortcomings. To this aim, we first give an informal presentation of
Integrated Semantics (in Sect. 3), which we subsequently turn into a compositional
semantics for a small fragment of English containing extensional and attitude verbs
(in Sect. 4, 5). The paper closes with a summary of our results and with pointers to
future work.
2 Accounts of Truth-Conditional and Attitude Content
The distinction between truth-conditional and attitude content is anticipated by the
different roles of Frege’s notion of sense [German Sinn]. In (Frege 1892), the sense of
an expression serves both to determine the denotation [Bedeutung] of this expression
and to provide the linguistic content of this expression in indirect (e.g. attitude)
contexts. The latter role is enabled by the fact that the sense of an expression contains
the denotation’s mode of presentation [Art des Gegebenseins; MoP] to the cognitive
agent. Newer work in semantics captures the difference between the above roles by
distinguishing, e.g., between truth-conditional content/reference and guises of this
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content (see Heim 1998), between truth-conditional content and epistemic roles (see
Perry 2012), between intensions and intentions (see Thomason 1980), and between
objects and cognitive concepts (see Barsalou 1992).
The distinction between truth-conditional and attitude content is sometimes also
captured by separating hyperintensions from Carnapian intensions: intensions of lin-
guistic expressions are functions from indices (i.e. worlds, or world-time pairs) to
the expressions’ denotations at these indices (see Carnap 1988; Montague 1970).
Intensions thus encode the expressions’ truth-conditional content. Hyperintensions
are objects with stricter identity-conditions than intensions that serve as the comple-
ments of attitude verbs, i.e. they play the role of attitude content. Hyperintensions
typically take the form of structured contents (see Lewis 1970; Cresswell 1985), of
sets of (im-)possible worlds/situations (seeMuskens 1995; Zalta 1997), of unanalyz-
able primitives (see Thomason 1980; Pollard 2015), or of computational operations
(see Moschovakis 2006; Lappin 2015).
2.1 The Relation Between Truth-Conditional and Attitude
Content
Most theories of linguistic content assume some relation between truth-conditional
and attitude content. This relation is suggested by Frege’s assumption that the sense
of an expression (qua MoP) determines the expression’s denotation. The possibility
of obtaining truth-conditional content from attitude content enables a compositional
semantics for extensional and attitude verbs. However, this possibility is compro-
mised by the fact that speakers’ actual MoPs often underdetermine or misdetermine
the expression’s denotation. In particular, Kripke (1980) has observed that speakers
often lack uniquely identifying information about the expression’s denotation (s.t.
their MoPs identify other objects in addition to the expression’s denotation) or have
false information about this denotation (s.t. their MoPs identify a different object
than the expression’s denotation).
To avoid the challenge from under- or misdetermination, many contemporary
theories treat truth-conditional content as the ‘default’ kind of content and only
introduce attitude content in response to special contextual triggers (e.g. occurrence in
the complement of an attitude verb). However, this strategy causes a serious problem
for the compositional interpretation of natural language: to enable the compositional
interpretation of attitude reports, the linguistic content of the attitude complement
(i.e. anattitude content)must, in someway, be obtainable from the kind of content that
serves as input to the compositional machinery (here: a truth-conditional content).
However, since attitude content is often richer than truth-conditional content, this is
not generally possible.
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2.2 Attempts at (Re-)Connecting Truth-Conditional and
Attitude Content
In semantics and the philosophy of language, there have been some recent efforts
towards a theory of truth-conditional and attitude content that avoids the dilemma
between under- or misdetermination and non-compositionality. These efforts include
two-dimensional semantics (see Kaplan 1989; Haas-Spohn 1995; Chalmers 2006;
Zimmermann 2012), which interprets linguistic expressions as functions (Kaplanian
characters) from contexts to intensions, i.e. as functions from contexts to contents.
Contexts c are tuples containing the world wc, time tc, location lc, and agent/speaker
ac of the context. Intensions are functions from indices to extensions. The intension
of a character χ at a context c, λwλt.χ(c)(w, t), serves the role of truth-conditional
content. The diagonal of a characterχ, i.e. a function, λc.χ(c)(wc, tc), from contexts
to the character’s extension at the context and the context’s index, 〈wc, tc〉, serves
the role of attitude content.
Two-dimensional semantics has been a remarkable success story. However, this
semantics faces several problems regarding the compositional interpretation of atti-
tude reports. These problems are identified below. We will see that each of these
problems motivates a desideratum for an alternative, compositional theory of inte-
grated (truth-conditional and attitude) content.
2.2.1 Problem 1: Empirical Adequacy
To explain the substitution behavior of attitude reports (see (3)), most theories
of two-dimensional semantics (e.g. Lerner and Zimmermann 1991; Haas-Spohn
1995; Schlenker 2003) treat proper names and kind terms as indexical expressions
whose truth-conditional content is determined by the utterance context. In virtue
of this treatment, co-referential names/kind terms are assigned different charac-
ters. The interpretation of attitude verbs as relations to characters (or to diagonals
of characters) and the identification of compositionality with compositionality of
character4 then explain the substitution failure in (3). However, without further—
still underexplored—restrictions on the notion of character, the resulting semantics
gives trivial, inadequate truth-conditions for attitude reports (see von Stechow and
Zimmermann 2004).
4According to this principle, the character of a complex expression is a function of the characters of
the expression’s syntactic constituents and their mode of composition (see Westerståhl 2012). The
adoption of this principle predicts the preservation of an expression’s character under the substitution
of same-character constituents.
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2.2.2 Problem 2: Semantic Uniformity
To capture the different substitution properties of extensional and attitude con-
structions (e.g. (2) vs. (3)), some two-dimensional theories (esp. Chalmers 2006;
see Lerner and Zimmermann 1991) vary the interpretation of expressions with the
expressions’ linguistic context: when an expression occurs in the complement of
an attitude verb, it is interpreted as the diagonal of its character; otherwise, it is
interpreted as its intension. However, this variation challenges the uniform interpre-
tation of extensional verbs: since constructions like (2a) often lose their cognitive
transparency in attitude embeddings (note the cognitive difference-for-Len between
(1a) and (1b), and the resulting non-substitutivity of (2a) by (2b) in (4a)), exten-
sional verbs require—next to their ‘extensional’ interpretation (on which they take
intension-type complements)—a hyperintensional interpretation (on which they take
diagonal-type complements). But this doubling seriously complicates their compo-
sitional interpretation (cf. Theiler et al. 2018; Liefke and Werning 2018).
(4) a. Len believes [that the reaction indicates [that sodium is a metal]]. (T)
 b. Len believes [that the reaction indicates [that natrium is a metal]].(F)
2.2.3 Problem 3: Perspective-Dependence
The treatment of attitude reports in two-dimensional semantics is further challenged
by the inability of this semantics to explain agent- and time-specific differences in the
substitutivity of truth-conditionally equivalent complements (compare (3) and (5)).
To account for these differences, some two-dimensional theories (e.g. Haas-Spohn
1995) relativize the diagonal of an attitude complement to the attitude subject (i.e.
to the object at the origin of the causal chain of uses of the complement’s name-
constituent in the subject’s language). However, apart from the need for further
relativization (e.g. to the time of use; see the difference in substitutivity between (3)′
and (6), which assumes the cognitive identity-for-Len of (1a) and (1b) at the later
point in time tk+1), it is not clear how this relativization can be implemented in a
compositional interpretation of attitude reports.
(5) a. Eve believes [cpthat sodium is a metal]. (T)
⇒ b. Eve believes [cpthat natrium is a metal]. (T) !
(3)′ a. Len believes (at tk) [cpthat sodium is a metal]. (T)
 b. Len believes (at tk) [cpthat natrium is a metal]. (F)
(6) a. Len believes (at tk+1) [cpthat sodium is a metal]. (T)
⇒ b. Len believes (at tk+1) [cpthat natrium is a metal]. (T) !
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2.3 Desiderata for an Account of Truth-Conditional and
Attitude Content
The above problems suggest an alternative theory of truth-conditional and attitude
content that has the following properties:
(P.1) The theory is compositional [cf. the problem of empirical adequacy]
(P.2) The theory gives adequate truth- and entailment-conditions for extensional
and attitude constructions [cf. the problem of empirical adequacy]
(P.3) The theory enables a uniform interpretation of extensional and attitude con-
structions [cf. the problem of semantic uniformity]
(P.4) The theory accommodates agents’ epistemic perspective on the entities in the
domain of discourse [cf. the problem of perspective-dependence]
At present, there does not exist a theory of linguistic content that satisfies all of
(P.1) to (P.4). However, such a theory is essential for the adequate compositional
interpretation of natural language.
3 Integrated Semantics
Integrated Semantics [hereafter, IS] is a novel account of linguistic content that satis-
fies properties (P.1) to (P.4). This account is a version of two-dimensional semantics
that obtains linguistic contents by applying meanings to contexts (here: to centered
informational situations). In contrast to contents in two-dimensional semantics, con-
tents in Integrated Semantics contain attitude content next to their familiar truth-
conditional content. We call the relevant notion of content integrated content, abbre-
viated ‘IC’. A parametrized version of this notion (with a parameter for centered
informational situations; dubbed ‘parametrized IC’, or ‘PIC’) serves as input to the
compositional semantic machinery. By supplying different centered situations to the
PICs of their complements, different verbs select for different (truth-conditional, or
integrated) components of their complement’s IC. This selection explains the distinct
substitution behaviour of the verbs’ complements.
Below, we first introduce centered (informational) situations (in Sect. 3.1). We
then give an initial presentation of IS. This presentation proceeds by describing the
IC of sentences and proper names at a centered situation (in Sects. 3.2, 3.3).
3.1 Centered Informational Situations
Centered informational situations (or simply, centered situations) are ordered triples
σ∗ := 〈σ, tσ, aσ〉 consisting of an informational situation σ, a point in time tσ, and
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a cognitive agent aσ .5 Such triples represent the informational situation of aσ at tσ.
Because of our particular use of such situations, we do not require that σ contains
information about aσ him-/herself.
Informational situations σ are world-level6 correlates of information states. Such
states are typically represented by sets of worlds (i.e. sets of those worlds that are
compatible with the available information in this state). In virtue of the correspon-
dence between situations and information states, every sentence that is true (or false)
at all worlds in an information state is true (resp. false) in the corresponding situa-
tion. This is made possible by the partiality of situations: a sentence may be neither
true nor false in a situation. The partiality of situations captures the informational
imperfection of cognitive agents. To allow for the possibility of false information,
we also consider impossible situations (see Zalta 1997).
The partial nature of informational situations induces a partial ordering on the set
of situations. In particular, a situation σ2 includes a situation σ1 if σ2 contains all
information that is contained in σ1. We call any situation that includes a situation
an extension of that situation and identify the maximal (consistent) extension of
a situation with a (possible) world extending this situation. We assume that every
ordering of situations has a bottom element (called the ‘empty’ situation; denoted
‘†’) an a top element (some world w). We assume a single empty situation.
As a consequence of the correspondence between informational situations and
sets of worlds, situations have fairly coarse-grained identity conditions. For exam-
ple, sentences that contain different co-referential or truth-conditionally equivalent
expressions (e.g. (1a), (1b)) are true (or false) in the same situations. The ‘enrichment’
of informational situations by cognitive agents and points in time compensates for
this shortcoming, as we will see below.
3.2 The Integrated Content of Sentences
We have mentioned above that a sentence’s integrated content at a centered situation
contains both truth-conditional and attitude content. To combine these two kinds
of content into a single notion of ‘integrated’ content, Integrated Semantics identi-
fies the integrated content of a sentence with the result of restricting the sentence’s
classical truth-conditional content at a centered situation (i.e. the set of worlds or
situations in which the sentence is true) to smaller sets of situations that also encode
the interpreter’s salient description, guise, or MoP of the sentence’s constituents at
the time of interpretation. For (1a) and the centered situation σ∗0 := 〈σ0, t, a〉 (where
a is the sentence’s interpreter), such a set is given in (7).
In what follows, we will use denotation brackets,  · , as a notational device for
the IS-interpretation of linguistic expressions. The PIC of the sentence Sodium is
5Centered informational situations are, thus, a variant of centered situations (see Stephenson 2010),
which are ordered pairs of an agent and a world-part.
6Situations are thus objects of type s, not of the type of information states, 〈s, t〉.
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a metal (i.e. (1a)) is then denoted by ‘Sodium is a metal’. The IC of this sentence
at the centered situation σ∗0 is denoted by ‘Sodium is a metal(σ∗0)’ (see (7)). In (7),
sodium(σ∗0) is the set of properties that captures a’sMoP of sodium in σ0 at t . This
set is obtained from the IS-interpretation of the name sodium at σ∗0 (see Sect. 3.3)
and enters the IC of (1a) through the sentence’s compositional interpretation at σ∗0
(see Sect. 4). Below, we use σ as a variable over situations.
Sodium is a metal(σ∗0) (7)
= {σ | sodium is a metal in σ
︸ ︷︷ ︸
truth-cond’l content
& sodium has all properties from sodium(σ∗0) in σ
︸ ︷︷ ︸
attitude content (at σ∗0 )
}
As a result of the coarse grain of situations (in particular, by the identification of
sodium- and natrium- (i.e. Na-)containing situations), (7) is equivalent to (8):
{σ | Na is a metal in σ & Na has all properties from sodium(σ∗0) in σ} (8)
The first restriction on the set from (7) (see the grey underbrace) identifies the
truth-conditional content of (1a). The second restriction (see the black underbrace)
identifies the attitude content of (1a) at a’s information state σ0 at time t . Since
truth-conditional and attitude content perform different restrictions on the same set
of situations, a sentence’s IC is an object of the same type (i.e. a set of situations, type
〈s, t〉) as the truth-conditional and the attitude component of this IC. This enables
the same-type interpretation of the occurrences of the verb indicate in (2a) and (4a).
Integrated Semantics thus meets Desideratum (P.3).
Notably, by integrating an expression’s (agent-independent) truth-conditional
content with its (agent-dependent) attitude content, we do not suggest that linguistic
agents know the expression’s truth-conditional content: the agentive center of the
situation σ∗0 may possess the information contained in (1a)’s attitude content at σ∗0
without thereby also possessing the information contained in (1a)’s truth-conditional
content. For example, a may be unaware of the referential relation between the name
sodium and the chemical element Na. In (7), the element Na only provides an ‘exter-
nal anchor’ for the properties in the set sodium(σ∗0). While this anchor simplifies
the representation of integrated content, nothing depends on it.
3.3 The Interpretation of Proper Names
In Integrated Semantics, proper names (e.g. sodium) are interpreted as intensional
generalized quantifiers [IQs], i.e. as functions from centered situations to partial sets
of properties of individuals. This interpretation is justified by the existence of a non-
injective function, ◦, from IQs to individuals, s.t. we can obtain the referent of a name
from the name’s PIC. The non-injective nature of this function captures the intuitive
semantic distinctness of co-referential names.
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We illustrate the IS-interpretation of names through an example: assume that,
in σ1 at t7, Len thinks of sodium as the reactive substance and of natrium as the
silvery-white substance and that, in σ4 at t7, Eve thinks of both sodium and natrium
as the silvery-white reactive metal. The IQs, sodium and natrium, that serve
as the PICs of the names sodium and natrium, then have the following values at
σ∗len := 〈σ1, t7, len〉 and σ∗eve := 〈σ4, t7, eve〉:
sodium(σ∗len) = {is reactive} (9a)
natrium(σ∗len) = {is silvery-white} (9b)
sodium(σ∗eve) = {is reactive, is silvery-white, is a metal} (9c)
= natrium(σ∗eve)
On the basis of the above, (1a) and (1b) are interpreted as (10) and (11) by Len,
and as (12) by Eve:
Sodium is a metal(σ∗len) (10)
= {σ | Na is a metal in σ & Na has all properties from sodium(σ∗len) in σ}
= {σ | Na is a metal in σ & Na is reactive in σ}
= {σ | Na is a metal in σ & Na is silvery-white in σ}
= {σ | Na is a metal in σ & Na has all properties of natrium(σ∗len) in σ}
= Natrium is a metal(σ∗len) (11)
Sodium is a metal(σ∗eve) (12)
= {σ | Na is a metal in σ & Na has all properties of sodium(σ∗eve) in σ}
= {σ | Na is a metal in σ & Na is silvery-white and reactive in σ}
= {σ | Na is a metal in σ & Na has all properties of natrium(σ∗eve) in σ}
= Natrium is a metal(σ∗eve)
The difference between the ICs of (1a) and (1b) at σ∗len – and their identity at σ∗eve –
captures Len’s and Eve’s different epistemic perspectives on the referents of sodium
and natrium, and explains the difference in substitutivity between (3) and (5). As a
result, Integrated Semantics also meets Desiderata (P.2) and (P.4).
4 The Compositional Interpretation of VPs
We have suggested above that the attitude content of (1a) at σ∗0 is obtained from the
value-at-σ∗0 of the IS-interpretation of the name sodium. The present section specifies
the interpretation of the VP is a metal, which obtains the IC of (1a) from this value.
To keep this specification as simple as possible—and to make the interpretation
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of linguistic expressions reminiscent to the description of sentence-interpretations
from the previous section –, we combine set-theoretic with lambda notation.7 In the
resulting ‘mixed’ notation, the PIC of (1a) is described as follows (cf. (8)):
Sodium is a metal (13)
= λσ∗. {σ | Na is a metal in σ & Na has all properties from sodium(σ∗) in σ}
We have mentioned in the previous section that the PICs of names are related to
the names’ individual referents through the non-injective function ◦. This function
allows us to render (13) as (14), where ◦ is written in postfix notation (s.t. ‘x◦’ denotes
◦(x)):
λσ∗. {σ | sodium◦ is a metal in σ & (14)
sodium◦ has all properties from sodium(σ∗) in σ}
Axiom Ax1 ensures the non-injectivity of ◦. Below, we let x and y be variables over
IQs.
∃x∃y [x◦= y◦ ∧ x = y] (Ax1)
Ax1 is instantiated by the relation between the PICs of sodium and natrium (in a
standard model, given a standard interpretation function):
Na = sodium◦= natrium◦∧ sodium = natrium (15)
The PICs of the name sodium and of sentence (1a) (cf. (14)) then suggest the
following interpretation of the VP be a metal (in (16)): (For simplicity, we treat this
VP as a single lexical unit.)
be a metal (16)
= λxλσ∗. {σ | x◦ is a metal in σ & x◦ has all properties from x(σ∗) in σ}
The above enables the compositional interpretation of (1a) at σ∗0 as follows:
[dpSodium][vpis a metal](σ∗0) (17)
= λxλσ∗. {σ | x◦ is a metal in σ &
x◦ has all properties from x(σ∗) in σ}(sodium)(σ∗0)
≡ λσ∗. {σ | sodium◦ is a metal in σ &
sodium◦ has all properties from sodium(σ∗) in σ}(σ∗0)
≡ λσ∗. {σ | Na is a metal in σ & Na has all properties from sodium(σ∗) in σ}(σ∗0)
= {σ | Na is a metal in σ & Na has all properties from sodium(σ∗0) in σ}
7The resulting ‘mixed’ notation is adopted, e.g., in (Ciardelli et al. 2017).
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With the interpretation of names andVPs in place,wenext turn to the interpretation
of clausally complemented verbs in Integrated Semantics.
5 Extensional and Attitude Verbs in IS
We have seen in Sect. 1 that different clausally complemented verbs impose differ-
ently strong restrictions on the substitutivity of their complements. Integrated Seman-
tics captures this difference by assuming that different verbs supply different centered
situations to the PICs of their complements.8 In particular, while extensional verbs
like indicate typically9 supply a designated centered situation (hereafter called the
‘empty’ centered situation, denoted by ‘†∗’) that contains the empty situation †, atti-
tude verbs like believe supply a contextually chosen centered situation that depends
on the particular state or event described by the verb. Below, we first describe the
interpretation of extensional verbs in IS (in Sect. 5.1). We then turn to the interpre-
tation of attitude verbs (in Sect. 5.2) and of attitudinal embeddings of extensional
verbs (in Sect. 5.3).
5.1 The Interpretation of Extensional Verbs
In Sect. 3.1, we have identified the ‘empty’ situation † as the bottom element in the
partial ordering on situations, at which no sentence is true or false. As a result of
this characterization, the set of properties that is associated with the name sodium
at the centered situation †∗ will be empty. This is captured in Ax2. Below, x and P
are variables over IQs and properties, respectively.
∀x [x(†∗) = (λP.⊥)] (Ax2)
The interpretation of the verb indicate is given below, where p is a variable over
PICs10:
indicate = λpλxλσ∗. {σ | x◦ indicates p(†∗) in σ} (18)
The above interpretation enables the compositional interpretation of (2a) at σ∗0 as
follows:
8Since their interpretation thus influences the content of their complement, such verbs are Kaplanian
monsters (see Kaplan 1989, Sect.VIII). The ‘monstrous’ interpretation of attitude verbs follows
(Israel and Perry 1996) and (Schlenker 2003).
9This is not the case in attitudinal embeddings of such verbs, as we show in Sect. 5.3.
10In order to allow its application to the entire sentence, this interpretation stipulates a simplistic
semantics for the DP the reaction (see Sect. 6).
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the reaction [indicates [that sodium is a metal]](σ∗0) (19)
= λpλxλσ∗. {σ | x◦ indicates p(†∗) in σ} (λσ∗′ . {σ′ | Na is a metal in σ′ &
Na has all p’ties from sodium(σ∗′ ) in σ
′})(the reaction)(σ∗0)
= λσ∗. {σ | the reaction indicates {σ′ | Na is a metal in σ′ &
Na has all properties from sodium(†∗) in σ′} in σ}(σ∗0)




Na has all properties from sodium(†∗) in σ′
︸ ︷︷ ︸
attitude content (at †∗)
} in σ}




The above shows that the application of the IS-interpretation of the complement
of indicate to the empty centered situation effectively deletes the attitude content
of the complement. This reflects the fact that extensional verbs only select for the
truth-conditional component of their complement. As a result of this selection, (2b)
has the same PIC (and, hence, the same IC-at-σ∗0) as (2a) (see (20)), such that the
former can be substituted salva veritate for the latter.
the reaction [indicates [that natrium is a metal]](σ∗0) (20)
= {σ | the reaction indicates {σ′ | Na is a metal in σ′ & Na has all
properties from natrium(†∗) in σ′} in σ}
= {σ | the reaction indicates {σ′ | Na is a metal in σ′} in σ}
5.2 The Interpretation of Attitude Verbs
In contrast to extensional verbs, attitude verbs obtain their complement’s IC at a
centered situation that is provided by a pragmatically given choice function (see von
Heusinger 2013). This function selects, from the set of all centered situations, Σ∗, a
centered situation whose situation-coordinate the ascriber of the attitude ascribes to
the bearer of the attitude at the time of the ascription.
Since the attitude ascriber and the ascription-time are coordinates in the centered
situation at which the attitude report is interpreted (hereafter, the external (centered)
situation), the choice of the ascribed situation (i.e. of the internal (centered) situa-
tion) depends on the external situation. Since the standards of information vary with
different attitudes (e.g. knowledge vs. belief), the choice of situation further depends
on the particular state or event that is described by the attitude verb. Below, we rep-
resent these dependencies by superscripting the constant, f , for the choice function
with the external situation, and by co-indexing this constant with the attitude verb.
The resulting interpretation of the verb believe is given in (21).
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believe = λpλxλσ∗. {σ | x◦ believesi p( f σ∗i (Σ∗)) in σ} (21)
The compositional interpretation of (3a) at σ∗0 is given below:
Len [believes [that sodium is a metal]](σ∗0) (22)
= λpλxλσ∗. {σ | x◦ believesi p( f σ∗i (Σ∗)) in σ}
(
λσ∗′ . {σ′ | Na is a metal in
σ′ & has all properties from sodium(σ∗′ ) in σ
′})(Len)(σ∗0)
= λσ∗. {σ | Len believesi {σ′ | Na is a metal in σ′ & Na has all properties
from sodium( f σ
∗
i (Σ
∗)) in σ′} in σ}(σ∗0)






















∗) = σ∗eve for j the index
of Eve believes (see Sect. 3.3). Then, the pairs of sentences from (3) and (5) are
interpreted as (23) and (24), and as (25), respectively:
Len [believes [that sodium is a metal]](σ∗0) (23)
= {σ | Len believesi {σ′ | Na is a metal in σ′ &
Na has all p’ties from sodium( f
σ∗0
i (Σ
∗)) in σ′} in σ}
= {σ | Len believes {σ′ | Na is a metal in σ′ &
Na has all properties from sodium(σ∗len) in σ
′} in σ}
= {σ | Len believes {σ′ | Na is a metal in σ′ & Na is reactive in σ′} in σ}
= {σ | Len believes {σ′ | Na is a metal in σ′ & Na is silvery-white in σ′} in σ}
= Len [believes [that natrium is a metal]](σ∗0) (24)
Eve [believes [that sodium is a metal]](σ∗0) (25)
= {σ |Eve believes j {σ′ | Na is a metal in σ′ &
Na has all p’ties from sodium( f
σ∗0
j (Σ
∗)) in σ′} in σ}
= {σ |Eve believes {σ′ | Na is a metal in σ′ &
Na has all properties from sodium(σ∗eve) in σ
′} in σ}
= {σ |Eve believes {σ′ | Na is a metal, silvery-white, and reactive in σ′} in σ}
= Eve [believes [that natrium is a metal]](σ∗0)
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The above shows that—in contrast to the verb indicate—believe does not, in
general, allow the truth-preserving substitution of truth-conditionally equivalent CPs
in its complement. This is due to the fact that the internal situation at which the
complement’s IC is obtained preserves the attitude content of the complement of
believe (see the black underbrace in (22)). As a result, the substitutivity of equivalent
CPs only holds, in general, forCPs that have the same IC at all centered situations and,
specifically, for CPs that also have the same attitude content at the particular centered
situation at which the complement’s IC is obtained. The latter case explains bearer-
(and ascriber-)specific differences in the substitutivity of equivalent complements of
attitude reports (see (P.4)).
5.3 Attitudinal Embeddings of Extensional Verbs
The interpretation of extensional and attitude verbs from the last two subsections
enables the compositional interpretation of constructions containing these verbs (s.t.
Integrated Semantics also meets Desideratum (P.1)). However, the interpretation
of extensional complements at the situation †∗ (see Sect. 5.1) fails to capture the
substitution-resistance of truth-conditionally equivalent complements of extensional
verbs that occur in attitude embeddings (see (4)). To compensate for this shortcoming,
we also interpret the complements of extensional verbs at a contextually given cen-
tered situation. The IS-interpretation of the verb indicate from (18) is then replaced
by the interpretation below:
indicate = λpλxλσ∗. {σ | x◦ indicatesi p( f σ∗i (Σ∗)) in σ} (26)
The identification of f σ
∗
i (Σ
∗) with the empty centered situation †∗ if i is the
index of an unembedded extensional verb (see Ax3) then captures the substitution-
allowanceof constructions like (2a) (in (33); see 19).The identificationof f






∗) if i is the index of an extensional and j the index of its embedding





∗) = †∗ if i is the index of an unembedded extensional verb ((Ax3))
f
[ f σ∗j (Σ∗)]
i (Σ
∗) = f σ∗j (Σ∗) if i and j are the indices of an extensional ((Ax4))
and an attitude verb, respectively
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the reaction [indicates [that sodium is a metal]](σ∗0) (27)




∗)) in σ′} in σ}
= {σ | the reaction indicates {σ′ | Na is a metal in σ′ & Na has all properties
from sodium(†∗) in σ′} in σ}
= {σ | the reaction indicates {σ′ | Na is a metal in σ′} in σ}
Len [believes [that the reaction indicates [that sodium is a metal]]](σ∗0) (28)




σ′ | the reaction indicates j {σ′′ | Na is a metal in σ′′ & Na has all
properties from sodium( f
σ∗′
j (Σ
∗)) in σ′′} in σ′})(Len)(σ∗0)
= λσ∗. {σ | Len believesi [λσ∗′ .
{
σ′ | the reaction indicates j {σ′′ | Na is a metal









∗)) in σ} (σ∗0)
= {σ | Len believesi {σ′ | the reaction indicates j {σ′′ | Na is a metal in σ′′ &







∗)) in σ′′} in σ′} in σ}
= {σ | Len believesi {σ′ | the reaction indicates j {σ′′ | Na is a metal in σ′′ &
Na has all properties from sodium( f
σ∗0
i (Σ
∗)) in σ′′} in σ′} in σ}








∗)). As a result, Integrated Semantics solves all of the
problems of two-dimensional semantics from Sect. 2.2.
6 Conclusion and Future Work
We have shown that Integrated Semantics resolves the tension between composi-tionality
(or uniformity of interpretation) and pluralism about linguistic content: the semantics
provides a uniform interpretation of extensional and attitude verbs that predicts the sub-
stitution behavior of constructions containing these verbs and that captures the agent-
dependent interpretation of attitude reports.
We have restricted our considerations in this paper to the integrated contents of proper
names (as representatives for referential DPs) and have limited the interpretation of verbs
and VPs to an update of the attitude content of the verbs’ DP-arguments by the verbs’
truth-conditional content. However, as is illustrated in (29), the substitutivity of equivalent
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CPs in attitude reports may also depend on the attitude content of other syntactic CP-
constituents (here: on the content of the constituent nouns groundhog and woodchuck).
(29) a. Eve believes [cpthat Phil is a groundhog]. (T)
 b. Eve believes [cpthat Phil is a woodchuck]. (F)
Future work will extend the interpretation of verbs and VPs from Sect. 4 to a contextually
determined interpretation that also respects the verbs’ cognitive content, and will provide
IS-interpretations of expressions from other syntactic categories.
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Abstract It is often assumed that a requirement for counting objects is that they do
not overlap. However, this condition can be violated. The paper deals, specifically,
with counting objects that consist of parts, that is, with configurations.One example is
outfit as a configuration of articles of clothing; notice that one article of clothing may
be part of different outfits. The article develops an analysis of such configurational
entities as individual concepts. It investigates the interaction of noun phrases based
on such nouns with modal operators and in collective and cumulative interpretations.
Keywords Counting · Configurational objects · Individual concepts · Modal
operators
1 Introduction
One of the conditions for counting is that the atoms of counting should not overlap
(cf. e.g. Rothstein 2010; Landman 2016). The reason for this is obvious: In cases in
which the atoms of a count noun are not settled, only a non-overlap condition will
provide us with a counting function that yields a unique number. For example, when
asked how many body parts a person has, it would be misleading to count the left
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arm, the left hand, and the five fingers of the left hand as distinct body parts, ending
up with seven body parts on the left upper limb. Similarly, when asked how many
sequences of letters there are in the set {abcde, hijkl, mnopq}, the answer 3 will be
appropriate, but not 39, the number of sequences of two or more letters contained in
these three maximal sequences.
However, there are contexts in which the disjointment requirement can be loosened
up. There are riddles like How many squares are in this figure? which can perfectly
well be answered by considering overlapping squares (in the picture to the right, this
would result in 40 squares1). Counting overlapping entities may also be necessary in
contexts that clearly are not riddles. For example, one study found that there are 5815
craters on the moon with a diameter ≥ 20 km, many of them overlapping.2 Or we
might want to know how many stories are actually contained in the Arabian Nights,
which famously contains stories nested in stories—e.g., there is a story contained
in a story contained in a story contained in a story contained in a story.3 Even the
counting of sequences might give rise to second thoughts, as the following entry in
the discussion board for the board game Sequence shows4:
(1) Just bought this game today and was playing with my young son. In the
second game, he managed to construct a 6 in a row sequence. Now, this 
could be considered as being 2 overlapping  5 chip sequences. The rules
are fairly sparse,  but the strict definition is a sequence is "a connected 
series of five of the same colour marker chip in a straight line. If the 
definition was modified to " .. five or more .." then it would be clearer that
you cannot overlap sequences in the same direction. 
1Cf. http://www.puzzlesandriddles.com/PerceptualPuzzle06.html.
2https://cosmoquest.org/x/blog/2012/02/how-many-craters-are-on-the-moon/.
3E.g. the e.g. the Tale of the Husband and the Parrot, see https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_stor
ies_within_One_Thousand_and_One_Nights.
4https://boardgamegeek.com/thread/587189/why-dont-you-count-6-row-two-sets-5-sequences.
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In addition to entities that overlap in a given world, there are entities that arguably
show overlap only in other worlds than the real world. Consider the following
example5:
(2) You have 3 shirts and 4 pairs of pants.  How many different outfits can you
make? [...] You get twelve outfits. Not counting if a dude makes an outfit 
without a shirt, or a crazy person without pants. 
Assume we have three shirts s1, s2, s3 and four pairs of pants p1, p2, p3, p4, we can
form twelve pairs of a shirt and a pair of pants, such as 〈s1, p1〉, 〈s2, p2〉, 〈s2, p1〉
and so on—twelve possible combinations altogether. Notice that the question here
is not, How many outfits are these? The answer to that question would probably be
three, if we count as an outfit a pair of a shirt and a pair of pants. That shirt s1 makes
an outfit with p1 and also with p2 does not count, because we could not dress two
persons at the same time with it. The question, rather, is How many outfits can you
make?, where the modal can makes a crucial contribution. It requires that we look
at different circumstances, where in some 〈s1, p1〉 makes an outfit, in others 〈s1, p2〉
makes an outfit.
Once one is aware of such cases, it is not difficult to find more, or to construct
convincing examples at will6,7,8:
(3) [Description of a tangram set.] With just seven simple pieces, you can 
make dozens of amazing shapes.
(4) [Description of fischertechnik crane construction kit:] 100 Bauteile 
ermöglichen den Bau dreier unterschiedlicher, einfacher Kräne. 
‘With 100 construction parts enable one to build three different, simple cranes.’
(5) [Description of Scrabble Word Builder:] We typed in the letters 
C, D, P, N, Y, E, A, and  U and the Word Builder provided dozens
dozens of words that could  be created with those letters. and
5answers.yahoo.com/question/index?qid=20080723031442AAYcny3. The text continues: “Now
let’s say you throw in three different pairs of socks…then you’d have 3 shirts times 4 pairs of






Our main concern here is in the fact that even though these sentences talk about
twelve outfits, dozens of tangram shapes, three cranes, and dozens and dozens of
words, they do not imply that at any one possible world or point in time, dozens
of shapes, twelve outfits, three cranes, or dozens of word tokens constructed with
a set of eight scrabble pieces co-exist. Nevertheless, these sentences are true. The
numeral constructions like twelve outfits appear to count things that exist across the
different possible worlds or times referred to by the modal or temporal operators
of the sentences. Notice that each of the sentences contains a modal marker, here
underlined.
Perhaps this might not appear so remarkable for our examples if tangram shape,
crane, or word refer to types (or kinds), which presumably have a more abstract way
of existence anyway. But the examples can easily be read to refer to the concrete
tangram pieces, construction parts, and scrabble letters in front of our eyes. And (2)
does not lend itself to a type reading; the shirts and pants that are mixed and matched
may well be unique.
2 The Problem with Configurations
I will assume that words like outifit, tangram figure, but also crane and word, apply
to “configurations”. They refer to entities that consist of well-individuated parts that
come together at certain worlds and times to form a certain configuration or to serve
a purpose, but may be taken apart and be reconfigured at other indices. I take this to
mean that words like outfit do not refer to regular individuals, type e, as this would
not account for the fact that their parts are used to make up another individual at
other indices.
To make our discussion more concrete, consider the following example, a
simplified variant of (2).
(6) It is possible to make four outfits with these two shirts and two pants.
We assume an interpretation format with explicit quantification over indices for
worlds or times (including time intervals), and with entities that can be combined to
form sum entities. I use i, i′ etc. as variables over indices (type s), and u, u′ etc. as
variables over entities (type e), and I write u  u′ for the sum (join) of u and u′, which
is also of type e (cf. Link 1983 for the material join operation). Entities like outfits,
tangram figures, cranes, and words are complex, as they typically consist of parts that
are recognizable entities themselves. For example, a fischertechnik toy crane consists
of various plastic pieces that are stuck together to resemble a crane, a tangram figure
consists of the seven tangram pieces arranged in a way that iconically depicts another
entity, an orthographic word consists of letters arranged in a linear sequence, and
an outfit consists of articles of clothing that dress a person in a culturally acceptable
way. The noun outfit comes with an additional complexity, as it is also a functional
term (Löbner 2011); we speak of the outfit of Mary at a time t as the clothes that
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Mary wore at t.9 However, in examples like (2) it has a non-functional interpretation,
and other nominals like crane and tangram figure that show the same configurational
interpretation do not have a functional reading at all. In the non-functional reading
of outfit, the person that is wearing the outfit is implicit, and the meaning of outfit
could be given as follows:
(7) ⟦ ⟧  = i u[u consists of articles of clothing worn by a person in i, 
where the articles and their arrangement in i satisfy the  
accepted dress codes in i] 
outfit
According to this approach, the intension of outfit maps each index i to the set of
entities u that consists of articles of clothes worn by a person at i in a way that follows
the dress code at i (the latter provides for the facts like that a shirt and a pair of pants
would not count as a complete outfit at an index with more formal standards).10
There is an implicit assumption in configurational objects like outfits that is impor-
tant to be made explicit here: At any one index, an article of clothing can be used to
dress only one person. We normally do not count two shirts and one pair of pants as
two outfits, even if the pants are very large so that one slender person squeezes into
each pant leg, and is additionally dressed by a shirt.
The numeral four can be represented in various ways. Let us assume here the
standard Generalized Quantifier analysis, where P is a variable over properties, type
set, and # is a function that, when applied to a function of entities to truth values,
type et, yields the number of entities that are mapped to the value 1, truth. In the
Generalized Quantifier interpretation of numerals this is commonly assumed to be
at least 4, in contrast to the quantifier exactly four (cf. Barwise and Cooper 1981).
(8)  = i P[#( u[ (i)(u) P(i)(u)]) ≥> 4]four outfits outfit
The predicate make u with u′ is quite complex in its own right. For our purpose we
understand it as follows: The agent selects parts of u′ and creates an u out of these
parts that did not exist immediately before. Following von Stechow (2001) on verbs
of creation, I express this as in (9), where i′ ∠ i stands for “i′ immediately precedes
i”, EXIST(i) identifies the entities that exist at the index i, and CONST(i)(u) is the
set of entities that u consists of at i.
(9)
= i u u u i [i i ¬EXIST(i )( u)
u causes in i : [EXIST(i)(u) ] u [u CONST(i)(u) u u
make ... with ...
9Thanks to Sebastian Löbner for pointing out the semantic complexities of outfit.
10In the functional reading, as present in expressions like outfit of Mary, the intension of outfit would
consist in a function OUTFIT-OF = λiλu′ιu[u consists of articles of clothing worn by the person
u′ in i, provided that the satisfying the dress code in i]. The sortal meaning we are interested in here
can be derived by existential binding over the person argument u′, as λiλu∃u′[OUTFIT-OF(i)(u′)
= u], ‘outfit of a person’.
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To illustrate, consider the following example, where this refers to the sum individual




∃i[i<i0∧∃u[⟦ ⟧(i)(u) ∧ ∃i′[i′∠i ∧ ¬EXIST(i′)(u) ∧
[John causes in i : [EXIST(i)(u) ]
u [u CONST(i)(u) u s1 s2 p1 p2]]]]
John made an outfit with this
outfit
This means that at some time i in the past relative to i0, John caused at an immediately
preceding index i′ that at i an entity is created that is an outfit at i, such that the things
the outfit consists of are part of the two shirts and two pairs of pants referred to by
this. We are not interested in a fine-grade analysis of causality here—this would state
that there is some action on John’s part at or before i′ such that without that action the
result, here that u exists, would not have been achieved (cf. Lewis 1973, based on the
analysis of causality by David Hume). Also, we will not go into the CONST relation
for now, but note here that it must allow for a newly created outfit to consist of parts
that existed already before. Finally, it should be noted that we often understand (10)
in a way that the person that wears the outfit at i is the agent, John, himself—but this
need not be the case, e.g. if John is a fashion designer.
It is obvious that when s1, s2, p1, p2 are the only articles of clothing, and any
combination of a shirt and a pair of pants satisfies the dress code requirements for an
outfit, the four combinations s1  p1, s1  p2, s2  p1, s2  p2 are the only acceptable
ones that can be used to create outfits. And as the same article of clothing cannot
serve as part of two different outfits at the same index, sentence (11) cannot be true
at any particular index i0.
(11) ⟦ ⟧(i0)
= ∃ i[i<i0 ∧ [#( λu[⟦ ⟧(i)(u) ∧ ∃i′[ i′∠i∧ ¬EXIST(i′)(u) ∧
[John causes in i : [EXIST(i)(u) ]
u [u CONST(i)(u) u s1 s2 p1 p2]]]) 4]
outfits
John made four outfits with this
This is because (11) requires that four outfits exist at time i. We might think that the
modality of the original example (2) helps. However, this is not the case. Consider
the following simple interpretation of possibility:
(12)  = i p i R(i )[p(i)]it is possible
First, themodalmay havewide scopewith respect to theDP, resulting in the following
interpretation at an index i0.
(13) ⟦[ ] [[ ] i [ i ]]⟧(i 0) 
= λi[⟦ ⟧(i)(λi′[⟦ ⟧(i ′)(⟦ ⟧(i ′))])](i0) 
= ∃i∈R(i0)[#( λu[⟦ ⟧(i)(u) ∧ ∃i′[i′∠i ∧ ¬EXIST(i ′)(u) ∧
u [u  causes in i : [EXIST(i)(u) ] 
u [u CONST(i)(u)  u s1 s2 p1 p2]]]]) 4]
outfit
four outfits
four outfitsit is possible
it is possible
to make t  with this
to make with this
Counting Possible Configurations 49
This states that there is some index i′ accessible from i0 such that the cardinality of
outfits made with the two shirts and two pairs of pants at i′ is at least four. Clearly,
this is not the intended reading: The sentence does not refer to a possible index in
which, for example, a seamstress undoes the two shirts and two pants and makes
four shirts and four pants out of them, thus creating four outfits in that world.
Second, the DP might have wide scope with respect to the modal. This results in
the following interpretation:
(14) ⟦[ ]i [  [ i ]]⟧(i0) 
= λi[⟦ ⟧(i)(λu[⟦ ⟧(i)(λi′[⟦ ⟧(i′)(u)]))⟧(i0) 
= #(λu[⟦ ⟧(i0)(u) ∧ ∃i∈R(i0) ∧ ∃i′[i′∠i ∧ ¬EXIST(i′)(u) ∧
u [u  causes in i : [EXIST(i)(u)] 
u [u CONST(i)(u)  u s1 s2 p1 p2]]])  4 
t four outfits it is possible
four outfits
to make with this
it is possible to make with this
outfit
This result is even worse because it states that there exist four outfits made with the
two shirts and two pairs of pants at the index of interpretation i0 itself.
3 An Individual Concept Analysis
What went wrong? The problem is with the analysis of outfits as simple entities, type
e. The representations in (11), (13) and (14) force us to assume that there are four
outfits made of the two shirts and two pairs of pants at the same time. The solution I
would like to propose is that outfits and their ilk are rather individual concepts, that
is, functions from indices to entities, type se. Such functions may be partial, that is,
they need not be defined for a particular index. In this case we say that the individual
concept does not “exist” at that index, in the sense that it does not have a value. But it
exists as a concept, as a function from indices to entities, and this concept may have
properties, like being an outfit.
Individual concepts were used byGupta (1980) tomodel themeaning of sentences
like National Airlines served two million passengers in 1975. Gupta pointed out that
this does not entail that National Airlines served two million persons, as one and the
same person can perform the role of a passenger multiple times. Gupta’s solution—
which analyzes passengers as individual concepts defined only for the time of a
person’s flight—is problematic, as we find the same interpretation for sentences like
National Airlines served two million persons in 1975, and persons, unlike passengers,
are not individuated by flights (cf. Krifka 1990). But individual concepts appear to
be well-suited for configurations.
To illustrate the individual concept analysis, take the four outfits one can make
with the two shirts s1, s2 and the two pairs of pants p1, p2. I make use of the notation
introduced in Heim and Kratzer (1998) according to which an expression of the form
λv. Restriction[v]. [Value[v]] denotes the (possibly partial) function from entities of
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the type of v that is only defined for arguments for which Restriction[v] holds; if
defined, the function gives as value whatever is specified in Value[v].
(15) o1 = λi. s1 and  p1 dress a person following cultural norms in i. [s1⊔p1]  
o2 = λi. s1 and  p2 dress a person following cultural norms in i. [s1⊔p2]  
o3 = i. s2 and  p1 dress a person following cultural norms in i. [s2 p1]  
o4 = i. s2 and  p2 dress a person following cultural norms in i. [s2 p2] 
For example, o1 is an individual concept that is only defined for indices i if the entities
s1 and p1 dress a person following the dress code in i; if defined, o1 maps to the sum
entity consisting of the entities s1 and p1. As one piece of clothing cannot be part of
two outfits at any given index, the outfit concepts o1, o2 and o3 have non-overlapping
domains and cannot exist at the same indices; only the outfits o1 and o4 (and the
outfits o2 and o3) can co-exist, as they consist of non-overlapping parts.
It is clear what it means that an individual concept x exists at an index: It exists
precisely at the indices in its domain. That is, if x is an individual concept, type se, and
EXIST is a predicate of individual concepts, type s(se)t, then we have EXIST(i)(x)
= 1 iff i∈DOM(x). For example, the concept o1 exists for all indices i for which o1(i)
is defined, that is, for which s1  p1 dresses a person following cultural norms in i.
This means that o1 does not exist for all indices i at which s1  p1 does not dress a
person, or else s1  p1 dresses a person but the cultural norms are so different that
this does not follow the dress code. Consequently, the outfit o1 probably is of a rather
punctuated or spotty nature: It may exist on May 1, then again on July 22, and on
September 7, the times when o1 is actually used to dress a person, but not in the times
in between.
Gupta analyzed common nouns as properties of individual concepts, type s(se)t,
and we will follow him in this respect. The common noun outfit applies to individual
concepts like o1 in (15), and not to simple entities. I first give the extension of this
common noun meaning at an index i0 in the set notation; it is of type (se)t.
(16) ⟦ ⟧(i0) 
= { i. u consists of articles of clothing worn by a person in i, where the
articles and their arrangement in i satisfy the accepted dress code
0 . [u] | u De} in i
outfit
This is the set of all functions from indices i to entities u in the universe De whose
parts areworn by a person in i and form an acceptable dress according to the standards
of i0. The condition about the parts of u are expressed by way of a restriction of this
function. This accounts for the fact that there might be indices at which we do not
consider the arrangement of a striped shirt and a checkered pair of pants a suitable
outfit.
We can describe the intension of outfit as follows, in a first approximation:
(17) ⟦ ⟧ = λi′λx∀i∈DEF(x)[x(i) consists of articles of clothing worn by a person 
in i, where the articles and their arrangement in i
satisfy the accepted dress code in i ] 
outfit
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Notice that it might happen that at a given index i0, all the individual concepts in
outfit(i0) are such that they are not defined for i0, because none of them is worn
in an acceptable way. Nevertheless, outfit(i0) is not empty in this case. To give a
concrete example, assume a set of seven indices i0,…i6, and assume that the four






i0 i1 i2 i3 i4 i5 i6= [i1→s1⊔p1, i2→s1⊔p1] indices:
o2 = [i4→s1⊔p2, i5→s1⊔p2] outfits:
o3 = [i5 s2 p1, i6 s2 p1]
o4 = [i2 s2 p2, i3 s2 p2]
Notice that o1 and o4 both are realized at i2, and o2 and o3 both are realized at i5, but
that o1 and o3 as well as o3 and o4 do not co-exist. At i0 no outfit is realized at all.
But the noun outfit denotes for all indices, including i0, the set of all these individual
concepts, if what qualifies as outfit is the same for all indices. The meaning of outfit
is a constant property.
(19)  = i {i0, ... i6} x[x {o1, o2,o3,o4}]outfit
The meaning in (17) is not restrictive enough. In a situation like (18) it does not
prevent us from calling, say, the function [i1 → s1  p1] an outfit as well that is
distinct from o1, as it is only defined for the index i1. Clearly, outfits are maximal
with respect to indices, in the sense that for every index i at wich s1  p1 is worn by a
person, satisfying the dress code, this index belongs to the domain of the individual
concept. Furthermore, in a situation like (18)we could not count an individual concept
like [i1 → s1  p1, i4 → s1  p2] as an outfit, because it maps its indices to different
articles of clothing. This violates the identity criteria that we normally assume for
individual concepts, that they consist of the same entities, or the same substance.11
A spelled-out version of (17) that includes these general conditions for cognitively
relevant individual concepts would read as in (20), where the second line guarantees
substance identity, and the third line maximality.
(20) ⟦ ′ ⟧
same substance
= λi′λx [(17) (i′)(x) ∧
i,i DEF(x)[(17) (i )(x) x(i)=x(i )]
x [(17) (i )(x ) DOM(x ) DOM(x)]] maximality
outfit
The semantic type of outfit, a property that refers to individual concepts, would have
to work with the expressions outfit combines with. For example, the predicate wear
would have the following interpretation, where the object concept x is reduced to the
value of x at the index of interpretation.
(21) = i x u[u is wearing x(i) at i]wear
11This is no quite true, as incremental changes are sometimes possible, cf. e.g. the example of
the ship of Theseus, whose planks are replaced one by one over time, or living creatures that
undergo metabolism, or entities like waves that consist in an ever-changing configuration. In all
such examples there must be additional criteria of identity beyond material constituency.
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Non-extensional predicates like rise or change are not reducible in this way (cf.
Montague 1973).12 This also applies to predicates of creation. The verb make states
that an agent causes an individual concept to be realized at an index. For example, if
John makes outfit o1 at index i then John causes that at i, o1 becomes defined. This
presupposes that during the making of i, the individual concept o1 was not defined
(one cannot be making something that exists already) and involves some action by
the agent on the parts that o1 refers to, s1  p1, during the time before i. The essential
parts of this is captured in the following interpretation.
(22)
= i x u u x i [i i i DOM(x) u causes in i :[i DOM(x)] x(i) u]]
make ... with ...
This states that at i′ the individual concept x is not realized, but the agent u′ causes
that it is realized at the immediately following index i, where x(i) consists of parts
of u.
TheDP four outfits is interpreted as follows in theGeneralizedQuantifier analysis,
where P is a variable for properties of individual concepts, type s(se)t.
(23) [DP ]  = i P [#( x[ (i)(x) P(i)(x)]) 4]four outfits outfit
We now can give an appropriate interpretation to our example. It states that there
are four outfit concepts such that there are accessible indices at which these outfits
are made. Notice that the predication is understood as distributive: For each of these
individual concepts, there is an accessible index at which it can be made.
(24) ⟦[ ] λt[  [ ]]⟧(i0) 
= λi[⟦ ⟧(i)(λx[⟦ ⟧(i)(λi′[⟦ ⟧(i ′)(x)]))⟧](i0) 
= ⟦ ⟧(i0)( λx[⟦ ⟧(i0)( λi′[⟦ ⟧(i′)(x)])
= #(λx[⟦ ⟧(i0)(x) ∧ ⟦ ⟧(i0)( λi′[⟦ ⟧(i ′)(x)]) ≥ 4 
= #(λx[x∈{o1, o2, o3, o4} ∧ 
i R(i0) u i [i i i DOM(x)





to make with this
to make with this




to make with this
outfits
This is true iff for each of the four individual concepts x there is an index i′ accessible
from i0 such that x is realized by someone at i′, and x(i′) is part of the two shirts
and two pants. It is crucial that this does not entail that there is an index at which all
four individual concepts are realized simultaneously. In particular, (23) is compatible
with a situation in which only two outfits can be realized at a time.
It should be pointed out that there is also a consistent interpretation for the
following example, if the quantifier scopes over the past tense operator:
12The verb change can be used for outfits in its functional sense, as in Mary changed her outfit. Let
us represent the functional reading OUTFIT-OF as λiλuιx[outfit′(i)(x) ∧ u is wearing x(i) at i]
(alternatively, we can start with a functional reading and derive the sortal reading, as in footnote
10). Then Mary changes her outfit is true at i iff there is an i′ shortly before i, and an i′′ shortly after,
such that OUTFIT-OF(i′)(Mary) = OUTFIT-OF(i′′)(Mary).
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(25) ⟦ ⟧(i  )





, o2, o3, o4} ∧=
i [i <i i [i i  ¬ i DOM(x)
[John causes in i :[i DOM(x)]  x(i ) s1 s2 p1 p2,]]])  4 
John made four outfits with this
four outfits
The sentence can be true at a given index, as the individual concepts may come
into existence at different times; notice that the existential quantifier ∃i′… has scope
under the quantifier four outfits.
In this section I have proposed a semantic interpretation of sentences like (2)
that stays close to the standard Generalized Quantifier analysis of sentences with
numerically modified nouns like four outfits. The only substantial change is that the
noun outfit does not refer to ordinary individuals, but to individual concepts. In the
next section we will argue that the individual concept analysis should be generalized;
it should apply to entities such as shirts and pairs of pants as well.
4 Generalizing the Individual Concept Analysis
4.1 Is Everything an Individual Concept?
There are good reasons to apply the individual concept analysis to other individ-
uals than to just configurational individuals, like outfits. Take, for example, Ludwig
Wittgenstein; he can be represented by an individual concept that maps all indices
i at which Wittgenstein exists to Wittgenstein—in our world, these are all indices
from April 26, 1889 to April 29, 1951. In contrast to the domains of configura-
tions that fade in and out of existence, this is a convex set of indices: If i and i′ are
indices of the same possible history that are in this set, and if i′′ is an index of the
same possible history that is temporally in-between i and i′, then i′′ is in this set as
well.13 As another example, take role concepts like the tallest woman, or the Pope. In
contrast to configurations, such concepts may refer to different entities for different
indices. As a third example, take individual concepts like the denotation of the gifted
mathematician that John claims to be (cf. Grosu and Krifka 2008). Such expressions
denote individual concepts that refer to the same entity, but are restricted to those
indices that are compatible with John’s claims. The individual concept analysis also
affords for analyses of concepts like a wave (of water), which has a convex set of
indices but maps these indices to ever-changing water entities.
If regular individuals are also based on individual concepts, then this also should
hold for pants and shirts. After all, they certainly are created, and destroyed. As
13The individual concept view opens a new way to deal with modified names, like (the) young
Mozart (cf. Paul 1994), as a subconcept; the term refers to the same entity as Mozart but is only
defined for those indices at which Mozart was young.
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individual concepts, they differ from outfits insofar as they have a convex domain:
Whenever it holds that i, i′∈DOM(x), then for all i′′ that are temporally in between,
i < i′′ < i, it also holds that i′′∈DOM(x). But what, then, do individual concepts
map their indices to? We might think of the substance or matter they consist of (this
corresponds to the h homomorphism in Link (1983) that maps objects to matter).
Hence, the shirt s1 would be also of type se, a function from indices to the matter the
shirt consists of, provided that this matter forms a shirt at these indices. Moreover,
for concrete objects like shirts we have to assume additional conditions, namely that
the matter is more or less the same between indices, allowing for occasional small
changes like replacing a button in the case of a shirt, or metabolic exchanges of
matter in the case of living creatures.
The outfit o1 consisting of the shirt s1 and the pair of pants p1, which are analyzed
as concrete object concepts themselves, can then be defined as follows:
(26) o1 = i. s1 and p1 dress a person following cultural norms in i. [s (i) p (i)]  1 1 
That is, o1 maps every index i for which it is defined to the same stuff as the join of
the stuff of s1 and p1 at i. In general, we would have the following interpretation of
outfit as a property of individual concepts; an appropriate maximalization as in (20)
would have to be added.
(27) ⟦ ⟧= λi ′λx∀i∈DEF(x)[x consists of articles of clothing worn by a person 
in i, where the articles and their arrangement in i
satisfy the accepted dress code in i ]
outfit
The only difference to (17) is that x, not x(i), is required to consist of articles of
clothing. That is, for each outfit x there must be articles of clothing x1, x2, … xn such
that x = x1  x2  …  xn. The material join operation for individual concepts is
defined as follows:
(28) x y = i[x(i)  y(i)]
This is an individual concept that is defined for all indices for which x and y are
defined, and maps these indices to the sum of x and y. This leads to the following
definition, where  P is the join of all individuals in the set P.
(29) ⟦ ⟧ = λi ′λx∃P∀i∈DEF(x)[∀y∈P[y is an article of clothing in i ′] 
∧ x = ⊔P 
z[person(i)(z)  dressed-with(i)(z)(x) 
 satisfies -dress-code(i )(z)(x)]]. 
outfit
This says that whenever x is an outfit, then it applies to the same matter as the sum of
some set P of articles of clothing. The sum of the matter of these articles of clothing
is the same as the matter of the outfit, but the articles of clothing may be defined
for a larger, and typically convex, domain. Even though (28) does not require this
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literally, we can think of each outfit x being associated with a unique set of articles
of clothing P.
4.2 Coercion to Constituting Parts
Commenting on an earlier version of this article, Sebastian Löbner suggested an
analysis in which entities like outfits are regular entities, type e, instead of individual
concepts. The idea is that any combination of entities that can form an outfit is in the
extension of outfit; in our example, these are the entities s1  p1, s1  p2, s2  p1, s2
 p2. This suggests the following interpretation, where outfits are of type e:
(30) (i0 0) = u i R(i )[u is worn by a person in i in a way that satisfies 
the dress codes in i]
outfit
Note that under this analysis outfit still has an intensional component (an entity s  p
of type e is an outfit iff in some possible world i, a person wears i, and this satisfies
the dress code in i). But the intensionality is not hard-wired in the notion of objects
itself, which remain of type e. They are not lifted to individual concepts, se.
A problem of this analysis is that it does not motivate the use of creation verbs
like make, bauen ‘build’ and create in examples (2)—(5). If the outfit o1 is identical
to the sum of entities s1  p1, what does it mean to make an outfit? It would perhaps
refer to the tailor’s sewing of the shirt and the pair of pants, but not to the person
that combines this shirt and this pair of pants to wear them together, as suggested in
example (2). For this reason, the individual concept analysis, even though it is more
complex, appears appropriate.
On the other hand, the interpretation (29) would allow for a straightforward anal-
ysis of examples like (30) that are problematic for the interpretations in (17) or
(26).
(31) There is an outfit in the wardrobe. 
When we understand outfits as entities that are defined only when someone wears
them, then (30) could not be true, except in the peculiar case of a person sitting in
the wardrobe and wearing an outfit.
I assume that individual concepts with spotted realizations like outfits can be
coerced into individual concepts with a more permanent interpretation, and it is these
coerced concepts that are involved in sentences like (30). If (30) refers to o1, which
consists of the concrete individual concepts s1 and p1, then o1 can be coerced into the
individual concept s1  p1 as defined in (27). Let us call this coercion “grounding”.
Then (30) states that this sum concept is in the wardrobe.
Grounding in general can be interpreted as the following function:
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(32) Grounding (coercion to parts)
For any individual concept x,
if there are cognitively salient individual concepts x1, … xn
1 (i) …xn(i)] ,  
then g(x) = x1
such that i DOM(x)[x(i) = x
… xn
Let us assume that s1 and p1, a shirt and a pair of pants, are modeled by indi-
vidual concepts as suggested in example (25). The outfit o1 would have the following
grounded version:
(33) g(o1 1 1) = i[s (i) p (i)]
This is the individual concept that has the same domain as o1 and always refers to
the sum of the shirt s1 and the pants p1. As s1 and p1 have convex domains, so has
g(o1), the grounded version of x1. In particular g(o1) does also exist at indices i at
which no-one is wearing s1 and p1 as an outfit; in our small model (18), g(o1) exists
at all indices from i0 to i6. Consequently, g(o1) can have the property of being in the
wardrobe at an index like i0 at which o1 does not have any realizations.
It should be noted that, as g is a function, g(x) presupposes that there is a unique
cognitively most salient way to analyze x as consisting of concrete objects x1, …
xn. These are the elements in the set P in (28). For an outfit, these are the articles of
clothing, but not their parts, like the buttons, buckles and the pieces of cloth that they
consist of. As they may have existed before the shirt, and may exist after, their sum
may lead to an individual concept with a longer duration. If a unique decomposition
could not be guaranteed, we would have to model g not as a function, but as a relation
that maps x to different decompositions.
When predicates like be in the wardrobe are applied to individual concepts, then
we can assume coercion by the grounding operation triggered by the meaning of
the predicate. This is because such predicates can be reduced to the matter that an
individual concept realizes at an index, which requires coercion to a more permanent
entity14:
(34) ⟦ ⟧(i )0
0
0
=  x[ (i )(x) (i )(g(x))] 





an outfit is in the wardrobe
in the wardrobe
This is true at i0 iff x is an outfit, as before, and the things x consists of—the shirt s1
and the pair of pants p1—are in the wardrobe.
Grounded individual concepts can also explain the use of creation verbs to refer
to the entities an individual concept consist of, as in the tailor made an outfit. In this
case, the object is coerced to its grounded interpretation, due to the knowledge of
what tailors typically create.
14This reduction from individual concepts to stages is similar to the reduction from individuals to
stages for stage-level predicates in Carlson (1977).
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4.3 Joining and Counting Individual Concepts
Grounded individual concepts can be counted, as the examples (34) and (35) show.
(35) There are 100 outfits in this wardrobe.  
(36) The supply department ordered 100 new outfits for the employees. 
Obviously, the regular individual concept analysis of outfit in (17) does not work,
as outfits are not worn by anyone when they are in the wardrobe or when they are
ordered. But the entity analysis (29) and the grounded individual concept analysis
(31) also are problematic. They would make our examples true in case 10 shirts and
10 pants that can be randomly combined to outfits are in the wardrobe, or are ordered,
because they can be configured to 100 outfits. This is illustrated for the grounded
individual concept analysis in (37).
(37) #{x | (i )(x) & (i )(g(x))} = 100
if g(x) = i[s(i) p(i)], s {s
0 0
1 10 1 10,…s }, p {p ,…p }, and both conjuncts are true
in the wardrobeoutfit
The problem here is that configurational individual concepts like outfits defy the
usual property of additivity under the current interpretation. Additivity would tell us
that if x is one outfit, and y is another outfit, then x and y together are two outfits.
However, as we have seen, we might end up with four outfits. This is because outfits,
other than ordinary individuals like shirts and pants, can overlap. The generalized
quantifier strategy of representing numbers inherent in (36) cannot rule out such
counting of overlapping objects. A theory that fares better is the one proposed in
Krifka (1995), according to which count nouns are measure functions that can be
applied to sum entities, and specify the number of the things they are applied to. We
need something like count noun variants of nominal predicates (marked here by *)
that map individual concepts to numbers, and that follow the rule of additivity:
(38) a. ⟦ *⟧(i)(x) = 1 if x consists of one outfit, i.e. ⟦ ⟧(i)(x)
b. *
*
*(i)(x) = n (i)(x ) = n  x, x  do not overlap at i





Here, x ⊕ x′ stands for the sum of the individual concepts x and x′. Notice that
(37)(a) and (b) happen to be the same standardization and generalization operations
proposed in Krifka (1990) for event-related quantification. Arguably, they belong to
the general conceptual tool kit for constructing measure functions in language.
But what does the sum of two individual concepts actually mean? This would
need detailed elaboration; I can give here just the basic construction steps. We have
to assume that the domain of individual concepts, type se, has a sum structure. Let
AIC the set of all atomic individual concepts; this is the set of individual concepts
as considered so far. The set of sum individual concepts SIC then is defined as the
smallest set such that (a) AIC ⊆ SIC, and whenever x, x′ ∈ SIC, then also x ⊕ x′ ∈
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SIC. Here, ⊕ is a join operation that is idempotent, commutative, and associative.
We understand it in such a way that the resulting set SIC is homomorphic to the
power set of all individual concepts, with atomic individual concepts x represented
by singletons, {x}, and sum individual concepts like x⊕ x′ represented by set union,
{x} ∪ {x′} = {x, x′}.
Sum individual concepts are still functions from indices to entities. In particular,
a sum individual concept maps an index to the sum of the parts when they are defined
for that index. That is, we require that [x⊕ x′](i)= x(i)  x′(i), if x and x′ are defined
for i; [x ⊕ x′](i) = x(i), if only x is defined for i, and [x ⊕ x′](i) = x′(i), if only
x′ is defined for i. Notice that different sum individual concepts can have the same
functional value. For example, take w to be theWittgenstein individual concept from
1889 to 1951, wy the individual concept of the younger Wittgenstein defined from
1889 to 1921, and wo the concept of the older Wittgenstein defined from 1922 to
1951, then w and wy ⊕ wo are different sum individuals, but have the same value.
For (37) we still have to define what it means that two individual concepts x, x′
overlap at an index i; this is the case if there is an entity that is a part of g(x) at i and
a part of g(x′) at i, that is, if there is an u such that u  g(x)(i) and u  g(x′)(i).
The truth conditions of an example like (34), here simplified, can be rendered as
follows:
(39) (i ) =
x[ *
0
0(i)(x) = 2 (i )(g(x))]outfit in the wardrobe
there are two outfits in the wardrobe
The sentence is intuitively true under our assumption that the outfit o1 made of s1
and p1 and the outfit o4 made of s2 and p2 are in the wardrobe. According to (37)(a),
it holds that outfit*(i0)(o1) = 1 and outfit*(i0)(o4) = 1, and as o1 and o2 do not
overlap, we have outfit*(i0)(o1 ⊕ o2) = 2. Even if the outfit o2, made of s1 and p2,
and outfit o3, made of s2 and p1, are also in the wardrobe, they could not be counted
because they overlap with o1 and o4. We of course could also sum up o2 and o3
instead, which would yield the same result.
It appears that sentences like There are four outfits in the wardrobe are felt to be
ambiguous by some speakers, and can be considered true in one reading in which
there are only two shirts and two pants in the wardrobe. This second reading can
be generated by another construction of measure functions that differs from (37) by
requiring that in the additivity clause, it is sufficient that x = x′, that is, x and x′ may
in fact overlap. Such weakened cases of additivity that allow for overlap are also
relevant in cases like counting craters on the moon.
4.4 Collective and Cumulative Interpretations
Having sum individual concepts also enables the interpretation of collective
interpretations as in the following case:
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(40) Two (of the) outfits are rather similar to each other.
This is a predication on a sum individual concept, which is true iff the atomic parts
stay in a similarity relation to each other (the strong interpretation of reciprocals;
for weaker interpretations see Dalrymple et al. (1998) and subsequent literature on
the “strongest meaning hypothesis”). Here, ≤ a is the atomic part relation on sum
individual concepts.






The interpretation of expressions like two outfits proposed here is also possible for
the non-collective examples we started out with, provided that we assume that verbal
predicates, when applied to sets of individual concepts, distribute over their elements.
Instead of (23) we can entertain the following analysis:
(42) [ ] (i )
= x[ * (i )(x) = 4 x = s1 s2 p1 p2
0
x [x a x i R(i0
0
) y i [i i ¬ i DOM(x )
[y causes in i : [i DOM(x)]]]]
outfit
it is is possible to make four outfits with this
This states that there are four outfits x that consist of the two shirts and two pants,
and that it is possible for each atomic part x′ of x that some agent y brings it about
to be realized.
Sum individual concepts are also relevant for cumulative interpretations (Scha
1981). Assume that a kindergarten owns a construction set with which all kinds of
vehicles can be constructed, but only one at a time (there are only four wheels in the
construction set).
(43)   Dozens of children have built hundreds of vehicles with this construction set.
Such interpretations have been explained as a consequence of the cumulativity of
verbal predicates (cf. Krifka 1989; Sternefeld 1998). That is, transitive predicates
like build are interpreted such that if x builds y and x′ builds y′, then x ⊕ x′ builds
y ⊕ y′. This interpretation is triggered by Sternefeld’s operator **, here adapted as
in (43), where R stands for the verbal predicate, type s(se)(se)t, and ≤ is the part
relation for sum individual concepts.
(44) **R = i x y[ x x y y[R(i)(x )(y )] y y x x[R(i)(x)(y)]]
This allows for the following representation of (42) at an index i0, where “ 24” and
“ 200” state that a number is in the range of dozens and hundreds, respectively.
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(45) x y[ * (i )(x) >>24 * (i0)(y)>>200  ** (i )(y)(x)],
where ** (i )(y)(x) =
x x y y i i [i <i i i ¬ i DOM(x )
[y causes in i :[i DOM(x)] ´]]]
y y x x[ i i [i <i i i ¬ i DOM(x )
[y causes in i :[i DOM(x)] ´]]]
child vehicle built
built
This states that there is a sum individual concept x that are dozens of children and
a sum individual concept y that are hundreds of vehicles, and that each part of the
children built some part of the vehicles, and each part of the vehicles were built by
some of the children. This renders the cumulative reading of (43) in an adequate way.
5 The Property Analysis
In this paper I have argued for individual concepts in our conceptual representation,
and in particular, for the ability to count individual concepts. There is a proposal on
a related topic, “Counting Concepts” by Condoravdi et al. (2001), which analyzes
examples like the following in a way that looks similar to what we have proposed
for configurations.
(46)   The mayor prevented three strikes.
Prevent is analyzed as an intensional predicate, like seek, which Condoravdi et al.
(2001) interpret, following Zimmermann (1992), as having a property argument:
(47) (i0)
= i<i 0 [ (i)( )( )]
= i<i 0 [ (i)( i u[u is a strike in i ])(the mayor)]




This captures the reading in which no reference to a specific strike is intended. The
object DP, a strike, denotes a property of entities.
There is also a specific reading: There was a threat for a strike that was about
to form, and the mayor prevented that strike from happening. The normal solution
for specific reading, giving the noun phrase wide scope (cf. (3)), does not work. It
entails the existence of a strike u—but this is exactly what the next conjunct says
was prevented.
(48) i<i0 u[ (i)(u) (i)( i v[u=v])(the mayor)] preventstrike
Condoravdi et al. propose a solution for the specific interpretation using “subcon-
cepts” (that is, subproperties). No strict definition is given, but we certainly should
assume that a superconcept applies to all indices and individuals a subconcept applies
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to. The specific reading of the mayor prevented a strike can be given as follows,where
⊆sc is the subconcept relation.
(49) P [P sc i[i<i 0 (i)(P)(m)]]strike prevent
For the interpretation of three strikes, Condoravdi et al. (2001) discuss various
options, settling on a generalized quantifier analysis:
(50) (i0) 
= #( P[P sc ] i[i<i0 (i) (P) (the mayor)])  3 strike prevent
the mayor prevented three strikes
But for this to work, the notion of subconcept must be properly restricted. One entity
may fall under different subconcepts of strike, e.g. it might be a strike of the railroad
workers and at the same time (as railroad workers are public workers) a strike of the
public workers. Obviously, the subconcepts that we count should not be such that
one is included in the other. Hence Condoravdi et al. propose to restrict counting to
minimal subconcepts, that is, to “maximally specific instantiated concepts”.
The use of minimal subconcepts suggests that we actually better work with indi-
vidual concepts, because then we get minimality for free, as individual concepts
can apply to maximally one entity. Hence it seems natural to propose the individual
concept analysis to examples of this type as well. The natural reading of (45) is that
what the mayor prevented was that three specific strike threats led each to a full-
blown strike. In each world at which these strikes would have been realized, there
would have been exactly one realization.
(51) (i0) 
= x[ * (i0)(x) = 3 x a x i <i0 [the mayor prevented x  at i ]]
the mayor prevented three strikes
strike
This says that the three strikes consists of three individual concepts x that are strikes,
and that for each x′ there exists an index i′ in the past of the actual time i0 such
that the mayor prevented at i′ the strike x′ from happening. Where prevent denotes a
rather involved concept; it means that the subject referent (here: the mayor) caused
the object referent (here: x′) not to be realized, which means in turn that, if the mayor
would not have acted then x′ would exist for all normal continuation of i′.
But there is still an issue of identity to be considered: For example, assume that an
announced strike is declared illegal, and the workers plan another strike with similar
goals and methods to circumvent the court ruling, but this strike is declared illegal as
well. In which sense can we say that two strikes were declared illegal? This depends
on rather specific criteria. Formal semantics can only provide the general format of
the objects of lexical semantics.
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6 Conclusion
In this paper I have discussed the meaning of sentences that contain reference to
what I called “configurational” objects, as denoted by such terms as outfit or tangram
figure, or even crane and word. Configurational objects consist of parts that can be
reconfigured, and exist only at those indices in which they stand in the appropriate
configuration. I have argued that configurational objects can fruitfully be analyzed as
individual concepts, functions from indices to entities. I have developed ways how
such concepts can be counted in count-noun constructions like four outfits. I then
argued that more regular entities like shirts should also be represented by individual
concepts, albeit with more stable temporal properties, and I have shown that there
are contexts in which a configurational object like outfit can actually be coerced to
the object it consists of.
Thegeneral direction of this paper points towards a theoretical framework inwhich
the objects referred to in language, and consequently, the objects of our cognition,
should be seen as individual concepts. The notion of an object contains the ability
to identify the same object over different indices, and this is precisely achieved
by individual concepts. Some objects are temporally convex in the sense that they
have a continuous existence from an initial time to a final time (such as shirts and
pants), others have a more spotted existence (such as outfits). There are various other
examples of objects with apparently extraordinary identity criteria, such as waves.
Whether this view is suitable, or even sustainable, cannot be answered in this short
paper. At least I hope to have shown that it provides us with ways to give truth
conditions to sentences that count configurational objects.
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Structure and Ontology in Nonlocal
Readings of Adjectives
Marcin Morzycki
Abstract In certain uses, adjectives appear to make the semantic contribution nor-
mally associated with adverbs. These readings are often thought to be a peripheral
phenomenon, restricted to one corner of the grammar and just a handful of lexical
items. I’ll argue that it’s actually considerably more general than is often recognized,
and that it admits two fundamentally different modes of explanation: in terms of the
syntactic machinery that undergirds these structures and in terms of the ontology of
the objects manipulated by its semantics. Both modes of explanation have been sug-
gested for some of the puzzles in this domain, and I’ll argue both are necessary. With
respect to adjectives including average and occasional, the key insight is that their
lexical semantics is fundamentally about kinds. But to arrive at a more general the-
ory of adverbial readings, it is also necessary to further articulate the compositional
semantics. In this spirit, I’ll argue that these adjectives actually have the semantic
type of quantificational determiners like every. If this way of thinking about adver-
bial readings is on the right track, it instantiates a means by which these two distinct
modes of explanation—and the distinct aspects of cognition they may ultimately be
associated with—both play a crucial role in bringing about the apparently aberrant
behavior of this class of adjectives.
Keywords Adjectives · Nonlocal readings · Average · Occasional · Kinds ·
Natural language metaphysics
1 Introduction
It is, of course, not news that the way language organizes the world may tell us some-
thing about how the mind does so. Nor is it news that that perhaps the best window
into how language organizes the world is how language works: what words mean
and how grammars manipulate those meanings. This is the project that Emmon Bach
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memorably dubbed ‘natural language metaphysics’ (Bach 1986, 1989) or ‘natural
language ontology’. Importantly, it’s a project that’s worthwhile even if—perhaps
especially if—it should fail to coincide with metaphysics proper, because our theory
of natural language metaphysics is a repository of linguistic analysis. If we’re doing
it right, its structure explains the structure of language. The structure of the world is
another matter entirely, best left to others.
There is an important trade-off in this domain, however, that I’d like to use to
frame this paper. Structures in natural language ontology can serve to explain lin-
guistic phenomena, and when they do, they may lighten the explanatory burden on
other components of linguistic theory, including the syntax and semantics. Con-
versely, introducing complexity in the syntax or semantics can make possible a
simpler ontology.
Itmayhelp to sketch an example ofwhat I have inmind. It’s entirely independent of
the one I’ll focus on primarily in this paper. It concerns polar antonyms of adjectives,
such as tall and short. Noonewould defend the view that they are unrelated, of course,
so only the question is where to install a theory of their difference. One possibility is
ontological. Height is measured in abstract representations of measurement, degrees,
which include things like ‘6 feet’. The set of degrees that measure height (as opposed
to e.g. weight) tell us the dimension along which a given measurement exists, but
they don’t actually tell us whether we’re measuring how tall someone is or how short.
They tell us that the dimension is spatial extent, but not whether the scale is tallness
or shortness. To know that, we must know at least one more thing: the ordering
imposed on those degrees. ‘6 feet’ is a greater degree of tallness than ‘5 feet’, but
a lesser degree of shortness. On such a theory, advocated in Kennedy (1997, 2001)
and elsewhere, the key to the relation between tall and short is that they measure on
scales that impose opposite orderings on degrees along the same dimension. Their
denotations therefore need not reflect any direct connection between the adjectives
beyond specifyingwhich scale they use, because the connection is between the scales,
not between adjectives themselves.
The alternative is to suppose that the relation between tall and short is a matter of
grammar, not (primarily) ontology, and that they use precisely the same scale after all.
One might suppose, with Heim (2006, 2008) and Büring (2007), that short involves
a special kind of negation, present in the syntactic tree but not normally pronounced
as a separate morpheme. Short, on this view, is actually a way of pronouncing ‘little
tall’ or ‘untall’. There are a variety of arguments to bemade for thismore complicated
syntax, and with it in place, the ontology needn’t provide an independent analysis of
the connection between the two antonyms because the richer syntax already does.
It’s not the case, of course, that any analysis of any arbitrary phenomenon can be
said to be primarily grammatical or ontological. In the context of this volume, it’s
especially worth noting that an approach that involves decomposition into features
might occupy an intermediate position with respect to this distinction: the decom-
position is in some respects like decomposing short into ‘little tall’, but of course
the decomposition needn’t be implemented directly in the syntax in this way, and
there are interesting discussions to be had about the relationship between decom-
posing word meanings and decomposing the underlying concepts themselves. The
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former seems still a robustly grammatical enterprise; the latter considerably more an
ontological one.
All that said, at some point there’s a danger of putting more weight on this dis-
tinction than it can bear. Its purpose here is chiefly just to situate another empirical
puzzle for which a balance has to be struck between grammatical and ontological
explanation: adjectives like average. The first thing to notice is the curious effect
they often have on the referent of the nominal in which they occur:
(1) The average American has 2.3 children.
This sentence, Carlson and Pelletier (2002) point out, is doubly mysterious. What
sort of entity is ‘the average American’? Certainly, on its most natural reading, it
doesn’t refer to some particular American who is especially typical of Americans.
Second, what sort of entity is ‘2.3 children’? If the average American referred to
a particular American—say, one named Steve—it would suggest, alarmingly, that
Steve has only a fraction of one of his children. That’s not what the sentence means,
at least ordinarily. Nor, indeed, is it possible to straightforwardly disentangle the
strangeness of the first nominal from the strangeness of the second. Even if we
avoid the reading under which (1) involves direct reference to Steve, it still fails to
communicate that it is typical for Americans to have fractional children.
On its face, it would seem that to avoid suchmorally outlandish outcomes,wemust
embrace a metaphysically outlandish one. We must accept that there are such things
as ‘average Americans’ in the model underlying the semantics, and indeed perhaps
in some extended sense such things as ‘2.3 children’. I don’t think we should dismiss
this possibility too readily. For one thing, as Bach would remind us, our judgment
in these matters must be guided by language, not a priori notions about what sorts
of objects populate the actual world. That’s the difference between natural language
metaphysics andmetaphysics proper. Indeed, this metaphysical direction is precisely
the one in which Carlson and Pelletier head. For this reason, Hornstein (1984) was
ultimately mistaken in saying that ‘no one wishes to claim that there are objects that
are average men in any meaningful sense’. Yet, he argued, nominals like the average
American act no different from more referentially pedestrian ones. He concluded
that this was an argument against the enterprise of formal semantics itself.
My aim here will be more modest. Kennedy and Stanley (2009) observed that
sentences such as (1) can be analyzed as a special case of amore general phenomenon:
readings of adjectives in which the adjective is interpreted as though it were an
adverbial. This requires amore complex syntax, but thatmore complex syntax is a low
price to pay for the metaphysical benefit. It frees us from having to posit any spookily
abstract and therefore implausible entities in the ontology. I’ll argue, building on
Morzycki (2016b), these adverbial readings are in fact part of a considerably more
general pattern of readings available to a far wider range of adjectives than generally
recognized. I’ll argue that these readings actually fall into three classes, and that this
leads us to an analysis distinct in important respects from Kennedy and Stanley but
that, as they argued, places the explanatory burden on the syntax and compositional
semantics rather than the ontology.
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In Sect. 1, following largely the argument in Morzycki (2016b), I’ll present the
case that what I’ll call nonlocal readings of adjectives (following Schwarz 2006 et
seq.) are farmore general than is typically recognized, and that they fall into three dis-
tinct classes. In Sect. 2, I’ll review some ways these problems have been approached
in the past, highlighting the interplay between grammatical and ontological expla-
nation. In Sect. 3, I’ll propose a strategy for approaching these facts that I hope may
eventually scale up to the larger empirical picture and that has components of both
kinds of explanation. In particular, I’ll combine elements of syntactic assumptions
that have widely been made with a new ingredient in the compositional semantics:
the idea that adjectives with external readings have determiner-like meanings, and as
a consequence have the complex grammar associated with determiners. I’ll sketch
this idea in general terms for average in particular, relating it to Gehrke andMcNally
(2010, 2015)’s crucial insight that adjectives like occasional involve reference to
kinds. Finally, in Sect. 4, I’ll very briefly return to the larger issues with which we
began: the analytical balance between structure in the syntax and semantics and
structure in the ontology.
2 Nonlocal Readings of Adjectives
2.1 On ‘Occasional’
Let’s begin with the classic example of a nonlocal reading of an adjective, which
isoccasional (Bolinger 1967; Stump1981;Larson1999;Zimmermann2003; Schäfer
2007; Gehrke and McNally 2010, 2015; DeVries 2010). It’s the best-studied such
case, and this will serve as a useful background against which to consider average.
The standard sentence is (2):
(2) An occasional sailor strolled by.
a. internal: ‘Someone who sails occasionally strolled by.’
b. external: ‘Occasionally, a sailor strolled by.’
It has what’s called an internal and an external reading. The internal reading is
interesting in a number of respects, but from our current perspective, it’s the external
reading that is most immediately relevant. On this reading, the adjective makes
a semantic contribution that is, to all appearances, completely divorced from the
nominal in which it finds itself. The sailors that strolled by are sailors simpliciter.
There is no question about the frequency of their sailing. But the situation is more
puzzling still. On the external reading, the sentence means more or less the same
thing as (3), where the definite determiner replaces the indefinite:
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(3) The occasional sailor strolled by.
Yet the meaning is essentially the same (but see Gehrke and McNally 2015 for
detailed discussion). Indeed, some adjectives of this class (odd and rare) have the
external reading only with the.1 Setting apart a subtle change of flavor, the external
reading also occurs with your and in the bare plural:
(4) a. Your occasional sailor strolled by.
b. Occasional sailors strolled by.
So there are three mysteries so far: an ambiguity, unexpectedly wide scope, and
unexpected interpretations of the determiner.
There are more still. Another is that, on the external reading, the adjective must
occupy the leftmost position in the structure of the nominal:
(5) The angry occasional sailor strolled by.
a. internal: ‘Someone angry who sails occasionally strolled by.’
b. #external: ‘Occasionally, an angry sailor strolled by.’
Indeed, the range of determiners with which occasional is possible on the external













occasional sailor(s) strolled by.
a. internal: ‘D person/people who sail(s) occasionally strolled by.’
b. #external: ‘Occasionally, D sailor(s) strolled by.’
Yet another idiosyncrasy of the external reading is that it renders the adjective unable
to coordinate with ordinary adjectives:
(7) The occasional and angry sailor strolled by.
a. internal: ‘Someone angry who sails occasionally strolled by.’
b. #external: ‘Occasionally, an angry sailor strolled by.’
Another still: on this reading, the adjective becomes incompatible with degree words
such as very or the comparative2:
1Berit Gehrke (p.c.) points out that this fact doesn’t follow from what will be proposed here—but
then, I don’t really have an analysis to offer here of the occasional class more generally. That said,
this fact is precisely what one might expect if, as Larson (1999) has argued, syntactic incorporation
into a determiner gives rise to some lexical idiosyncrasy here. See Sect. 5 for more.
2For some speakers, even the internal reading is missing. Others can get an external reading
marginally with very, but not with more.
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(8) The very occasional sailor strolled by.
a. internal: ‘Someone who sails very occasionally strolled by.’
b. #external: ‘Very occasionally, a sailor strolled by.’
(9) The more occasional sailor strolled by.
a. internal: ‘Someone who sails more occasionally strolled by.’
b. #external: ‘More occasionally, a sailor strolled by.’
2.2 Returning to ‘Average’
Having noted the crucial features of occasional, let’s return to average with them
in mind. First, there was ambiguity. As Carlson and Pelletier (2002), Kennedy and
Stanley (2009) among others noted, there is an ambiguity with average too:
(10) An average American has 2 children.
a. internal: ‘An American, who is typical, has 2 children.’
b. external: ‘On average, an American has 2 children.’
For the internal reading to be available without counterpragmatically ghastly back-
ground assumptions, we must change our earlier sentence to 2 children. On this
reading, the claim is that there is an American somewhere that is typical and that
he has two children. There is another reading of average that also occurs in (11)
(Sebastian Löbner, p.c.), which is also internal, or in any case fails to be external:
(11) He’s so average.
The external reading is the one with which we are now familiar from occasional.
It’s worth noting that it paraphrases naturally with an adverbial, on average, which
is analogous to how occasional morphed into occasionally.
Here we encounter a set of properties that elegantly mirror those of occasional.
There are unexpected interpretations of the determiner. Switching to the definite
determiner leaves us, on the external reading,with apparently the same interpretation,












American that’s a typical one has 2 children.’
b. external: ‘On average, an American has 2 children.’
Again, on the external reading, other determiners don’t seem to work:













average American(s) has/have 2.3 children.
And again, on the external reading average has to be leftmost among the adjectives
in its nominal:
(14) a. An average irritable American has 2.3 children.
b. #?An irritable average American has 2.3 children.
It is also unable to coordinate with other adjectives on the external reading:
(15) #An irritable and average American has 2.3 children.
It is incompatible with degree modifiers on this reading:
(16) #A very average American has 2.3 children.
So, once again, the same mysterious patterns manifested themselves as with occa-
sional. At a minimum, this supports the connection between the two that Kennedy
and Stanley (2009) posited—perhaps indeed more robustly than they intended. But
the pattern is more widespread still.
2.3 Wrong
Before considering the bigger picture, it will be necessary to lay out a few more
examples of the general phenomenon. A version of the now-familiar pattern emerges
once again withwrong (Haïk 1985; Schmitt 2000; Schwarz 2006, 2019). It too has an
internal/external ambiguity, though perceiving it is slightly trickier. Suppose Floyd
is a spy who is required to provide his interlocutor with false information and deprive
her of true information. If he succeeds in this, (17) is true on the internal reading, on
which the information provided was incorrect:
(17) Floyd gave the wrong answer.
a. internal: ‘Floyd gave an answer that was incorrect.’
b. external: ‘Floyd gave an answer that it was wrong of him to give.’
On the external reading, (17) is false, because Floyd answered as he is supposed to.
On the other hand, if Floyd slips up at some point and accidentally answers a question
truthfully, the situation is flipped: (17) is still true, but only on the external reading:
he provided information that he isn’t supposed to provide, namely, true information.
Something similar happens in (18):
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(18) Floyd killed the wrong person.
a. internal: ‘Floyd killed a person that was wrong (perhaps prone to error or
wrong in general).’
b. external: ‘Floyd killed a person that it was wrong of him to kill.’
Again, the internal reading in (18) is more easily discerned with some context.
Consider a dystopian game show in which participants are executed for answering
a quiz question incorrectly. Floyd is the executioner. If he killed the contestant that
answered incorrectly, (18a) is true only on the internal reading. (‘Clyde was wrong,
so I killed him,’ he might explain.) If Floyd accidentally killed a contestant that
provided the correct answer, (18b) would be true only on the external reading.
There is again an odd fact about the interpretation of the determiner: the is inter-
preted as an indefinite. In (17), there need not have been only one wrong answer, and
in (18), there need not have been only one person whomust not be killed. The picture
is slightly different, though. Your is impossible here except on its usual possessive
reading, irrelevant here:
(19) a. ?Floyd gave your wrong answer.
b. ?Floyd killed your wrong person.
Strangely, it’s not just that the definite determiner is interpreted as an indefinite, but
it’s the principal way to say this. The indefinite would be unusual on the external
reading:
(20) a. Floyd gave a wrong answer.
b. Floyd killed a wrong person.
It’s not actually fully clear what reading these receive. For me, an external reading
is possible, but only when there is a desire to communicate that there are multiple
answers that shouldn’t be given and people that shouldn’t be killed.
Apart from that quirk, again we encounter restrictions on the choice of determiner














As before, inherently quantificational determiners fail.
The requirement that the nonlocal adjective be structurally higher than other adjec-
tives again emerges:
(22) a. Floyd opened the wrong brown envelope.
b. #Floyd opened the brown wrong envelope.
So does the ban on coordination:
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(23) #Floyd opened the wrong and brown envelope.
And so does the ban on degree modification:
(24) #Floyd opened the very wrong envelope.
So a rather large class of adjectives that includes wrong, average, typical, occa-
sional and a number of its synonyms seems to manifest quite a number of common
properties.
2.4 ‘Whole’ and ‘Entire’
The parallels continue withwhole and entire, though there will be an important twist.
As before, there is an ambiguity (Moltmann 1997, 2005; Morzycki 2002), which I’ll
assume is a special case of the internal/external ambiguity:
(25) A whole ship was submerged.
a. internal: ‘A complete, structurally intact ship was submerged.’
b. external: ‘A ship was wholly submerged.’
(26) The whole apple is terrible.
a. internal: ‘The complete, structurally intact apple, the one with no bites
taken out of it, is terrible.’
b. external: ‘All parts of the apple are terrible.’
The internal reading is actually the unusual one in these cases, andmay take amoment
to perceive. It’s what could be expressed more or less unambiguously with com-
plete—indeed, I suspect that it’s precisely the existence of this unambiguous alterna-
tive that accounts (on broadly Gricean grounds) for the unnaturalness of the internal
reading.
As before, there are restrictions on the determiner, but they take a different form.
First, a, the, and your retain their usual meanings, and don’t become interchangeable.
Second, strong quantifiers are still incompatible with the external reading, but weak
ones are perfectly compatible with it (I will now indulge in the habit of marking



















3Sebastian Löbner (p.c.) points out that one might explain the ill-formed examples in (27) because
one nominal can’t express two different quantifications (Löbner 2000), which would accord with




















The other, now increasingly familiar restrictions reemerge in their customary form.
The external reading is only possible when the nonlocal adjective occurs high:
(28) a. A whole enormous ship was submerged.
b. An enormous whole ship was submerged. (internal only)
It’s incompatible with coordination:
(29) A whole and enormous ship was submerged. (internal only)
And it’s incompatible with degree modification:
(30) An entirely whole ship was submerged. (internal only)
2.5 Epistemic Adjectives
Abusch and Rooth (1997) observed a proposition-modifying interpretation of what
they called ‘epistemic adjectives’ that now won’t come as a shock. These adjectives
includeunknown,undisclosed,unspecified, andunexpected. They can receive awide-
scope reading:
(31) Solange is staying at an unknown hotel. (Abusch and Rooth 1997)
a. internal: ‘Solange is staying at a hotel no one has heard of.’
b. external: ‘Solange is staying at a hotel and it is not known which hotel
she is staying at.’
The external reading systematically supports concealed-question paraphrases. For
many years in the early 2000s, (32) was a kind of running joke in American political
discourse, and it’s actually very hard to make sense of its internal reading:
(32) Dick Cheney is hiding at an undisclosed location.
The external reading is that Dick Cheney is hiding at a location and it has not been
disclosed, for his safety, what location that is. On its internal reading, perhaps it
would have to be the very fact that it is a location that is not disclosed.
At this stage, we will encounter the same empirical refrain, and the reader can
presumably sing along. On the external reading, there are again restrictions on the
determiner. Although the and a seem to behave normally, strong inherently quantifi-
cational determiners remain impossible:
Structure and Ontology in Nonlocal Readings of Adjectives 75













As for whole, weak determiners are compatible with external readings.
The restrictions on the structural position of the adjective in the DP remain the
same. The external reading is, as we have come to expect, possible only when the
adjective is high4:
(34) a. Solange stayed at an unknown horrible hotel.
b. Solange stayed at a horrible unknown hotel. (internal only)
The external reading is unavailable when the adjective occurs in a coordinate struc-
ture:
(35) #Solange stayed at a horrible and unknown hotel. (internal only)
It’s incompatible with degree modification:
(36) #Solange stayed at a very unknown hotel. (internal only)
2.6 Same and Different
Other adjectives fall under broadly the same rubric. Among the best-studied of
these are same and different (Nunberg 1984; Heim 1985; Carlson 1987; Keenan
1992; Moltmann 1992; Beck 2000; Lasersohn 2000; Majewski 2002; Alrenga 2006,
2007a, b; Barker 2007; Brasoveanu 2011). The facts in this domain are complicated
in ways that muddy the waters considerably, and the terminology is different and
confusing, but for our purposes the important point is that there is an ambiguity.
The main terminological confound is that the internal reading involves an
anaphoric dependency on preceding discourse. This is in an important sense ‘exter-
nal’, but it is not external in the relevant sense of seeming to require the adjective to
access to the semantic content of the clause outside the nominal itself. This is clearer
when considering the readings:
4Sebastian Löbner suggests a mode of explanation of this fact: the concealed question-style seman-
tics reveals these nominals denote individual concepts, which is incompatible with the sort of
run-of-the-mill extensional intersective adjectival modification attempted in (34) and (35). Perhaps
that strategy could help with the quantificational facts in (33) as well.
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(37) Floyd and Clyde read the same book.
a. internal (anaphoric): ‘Floyd and Clyde read a book that is the same as
the one previously mentioned.’
b. external: ‘Floyd and Clyde read a book in common.’
(38) Floyd and Clyde read a different book.
a. internal (anaphoric): ‘Floyd and Clyde read a book that is the different
from the one previously mentioned.’
b. external: ‘The book Floyd read was not the same book as the one Clyde
read.’
I won’t rehearse the full song-and-dance yet again, in part because it presents, in this
instance, complications that go considerably beyond the scope of this paper. Suffice
it to say that on the external reading, same and different impose restrictions on the
determiner with which they combine:













On this reading same and different are subject to the now familiar structural position
requirement:
(40) a. Floyd and Clyde read the same good book.
b. *Floyd and Clyde read the good same book.
2.7 Modal Superlatives: ‘Possible’ and Its Kin
There is another important class of nonlocal readings of adjectives, which I will
mostly set aside. These involve possible, conceivable, and the like (‘modal superla-
tives’; Bolinger 1967; Larson 2000; Schwarz 2005; Cinque 2010; Romero 2013;
Leffel 2014):
(41) They interviewed every possible candidate.
a. external: ‘They interviewed every candidate that it was possible to
interview.’
b. internal: ‘They interviewed every person who was possibly a candidate.’
There are important distinctions between these cases and the ones we’ve examined
so far, but for the moment I will note only the similarity: again, there is an ambiguity
between an internal and external reading.
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2.8 Miscellaneous Obscurities and Novelties
Without further discussion, I’ll note a few examples of nonlocal readings that are
either obscure or, to my knowledge, novel:
(42) The inevitable counterexample arose.
‘Inevitably, a counterexample arose.’
(43) He spooned a moody forkful. (P.G. Wodehouse; Hall 1973)
‘Moodily, he spooned a forkful.’
(44) An unlikely chiropractor discovered the solution.
‘A chiropractor discovered the solution and it was unlikely that that
chiropractor (or a chiropractor?) would do so.’
(45) Clyde asked a random linguist.
‘Clyde asked a linguist randomly.’
(46) Floyd received an unfortunate grade.
‘Floyd received a grade such that it was unfortunate to receive it.’
One shouldn’t read too much into these without careful examination, of course, but
they collectively suggest that more external readings lurk just over our analytical
horizon.
3 Three Classes of Nonlocal Readings
This paper is not a linguistic curio cabinet. We’ve established, I hope, that there are
patterns in this domain. That’s not to say that there aren’t genuine mysteries here.
It’s just that the phenomena at issue are mysterious in parallel ways. The next stage
is to systematize the patterns more robustly so we can move toward an analysis.
There are, I will argue, three distinct classes of nonlocal adjectives. The first class I
will set aside here. It includes the aforementioned ‘modal superlatives’ like possible.
They differ from the others most strikingly in which determiners are involved in the























Analyses for these cases can be framed around ellipsis, along the lines first proposed
in Larson (2000), with structures like (49):
(49) We interviewed the best candidate possible for us to interview.
There is a satisfying account built from standard assumptions about superlatives in
Romero (2013).
It will be the other two classes that will be of interest here. These are what I’ll call
the weak-quantifier class, which includes whole and unknown and which permits
external readings with weak quantifiers, and what I’ll call the no-quantifier class,
which includes occasional and average and permits external readings only with non-
quantificational determiners. Of course, describing various particular determiners as
‘non-quantificational’ is already a bit tendentious—though for the moment, I mean
this only descriptively, in the sense of Heim (1982), Kamp (1981), and DRT more
generally—so more needs to be said for explicitness.
It goes beyond the scope of this paper to advocate a particular theory of how
determiner quantificationworks in general. Allwe require is some general conceptual
machinery to characterize particular classes. I’ll refer to every andmostDPs as strong
and inherently quantificational; definite descriptions and other DPs that arguably
directly refer as strong but not inherently quantificational; and all others as weak.
Setting the ellipsis class aside, all nonlocal readings observe a generalization:
(50) Strong Quantifier Resistance Generalization
Strong, inherently quantificational determiners (every, most) are incompatible
with nonlocal readings.
This has been observed for specific lexical-semantic families of adjectives, but the
important point is that it seems to be true of all of them.
As we’ve seen, a few nonlocal adjectives—occasional, average, and wrong—
are even more constrained in that they are incompatible with any determiner apart
from (some combination of) the, a, bare plurals, and generic your. Stating it more
officially:
(51) Broader Quantifier Resistance Generalization
Some adjectives with nonlocal readings idiosyncratically resist all inherently
quantificational determiners.
These generalizations are the crucial element in the taxonomy, so it may help to
summarize things in a table:
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Of course, the challenge now is to explain these generalizations. That’s a tall order,
inasmuch as it requires a synthesis of a vast array of adjectives and (collectively) a
vast literature and set of analytical approaches. Thiswon’t happen in any single paper.
Nevertheless, having framed the challenge in this way, we are in a better position to
assess what an explanation might look like.
4 Some Background
4.1 Incorporation
First, we must dispense with a straw man. One might imagine that external readings
of adjectives are brought about simply by moving the adjective from its base position
to an adverbial position, where it is interpreted as an adverb. The idea is a natural one,
and I’ll argue that in a certain sense it’s not entirely wrong—but formulated in this
crude way, it’s unenlightening. Why should this movement happen? Why would an
adjective have an adverb meaning? How does this help us understand the interaction
of the adjective with the determiner?
More enlightening alternatives are available. There are many analyses on the
market of individual instances of the larger problem of nonlocal readings, but they
aren’t straightforwardly generalizable to the full range of facts. There is one idea,
though, that constitutes an excellent starting point. It’s Larson (1999)’s proposal
(further developed in Zimmermann 2000, 2003) that, in the occasional construction,
the adjective moves from its base position to incorporate into the determiner in a
process of ‘complex quantifier formation’5:
5I use ‘incorporation’ here following Larson and Zimmermann, in the generalized sense derived
from Baker (1985) that is standard in the generative syntactic literature.
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(53)
This movement creates a single quantificational determiner, an+occasional. It is
then possible to provide this determiner with a denotation, listed in the lexicon just
like that of any other. The advantage of that is that it’s straightforward to capture
various idiosyncrasies. If we need to stipulate that for occasional and average, the
denotations of the, a, and your should be identical but for wrong they shouldn’t be,
we can reflect it directly. Indeed, we should expect such idiosyncrasies, inasmuch as
the lexicon is, after all, a repository of the idiosyncratic.
What’s less comfortable is that we have to stipulate not just that an+occasional,
the+occasional, and your+occasional all have identical denotations, but also to
make precisely the same stipulation independently for a+sporadic, the+sporadic,
and the+sporadic—and indeed for other combinations of a, the, and your with adjec-
tives of this class (though see Zimmermann 2003) for some inroads on this).6
Some analysis is necessary of why these readings fail to occur with determiners
other than a, the, and your. On this approach, it would simply be to fail to stipulate any
complex determiners that fail to have these as components. It would be essentially
an accidental lexical gap, a mere accident of the development of language.
This approach provides helps in one way right off the bat. Quantificational deter-
miners have access to the VP by perfectly ordinary means: Quantifier Raising (May
1977, 1985; Heim and Kratzer 1998). A generalized quantifier—the type of expres-
sion a quantified nominal denotes—takes aVP as its argument. The basic architecture
of a quantified sentence is as in (54):
6This isn’t uniformly a flaw. Certain combinations of frequency adjectives and determiners do seem
to lack external readings for mysterious reasons. The odd sailor strolled by gets an external reading,
but it’s far more difficult to get it for ?An odd sailor strolled by, as Gehrke and McNally (2015)
observe. I’m not entirely sure what to make of these facts, but they don’t strike me as sufficient
reason to give up on the cause of trying to derive these generalizations from something deeper. In
this specific case, the independently pragmatic naturalness of the internal reading may be relevant.









(55)  every dog  = λQ〈e, t〉 .∀x[dog(x) → Q(x)]
The determiner every here has ‘access’ to the VP in the sense that its denotation asks
for a predicate, Q in (55), that it can subsequently manipulate. The manipulation of
VPmeanings is the signature property of adverbials, of course, so on the incorporation
view, what makes it seem like occasional has an ‘adverbial’ external reading is that
it incorporates into a quantificational determiner and therefore has access to a VP
meaning. Its access to clausal material external to the DP is a side-effect of the access
the VP it has by actually being, in a deeper sense, a determiner.
If an adjective is part of a quantificational determiner meaning, it will gain access
to the VP as a matter of course.
Thus this approach accounts for the adverbial scope of occasional and its kin,
for the idiosyncratic interpretations of determiners in this construction, and (by stip-
ulation) for restrictions on the determiner. It also accounts for the restriction on
coordination: any adjective in a coordinate structure would be unable to move out
of it without violating the Coordinate Structure Island. In general, movement from
outside of one conjunct in a coordinate structure is not possible:
(56) a. Floyd ate rice and beans.
b. *Beans1, Floyd ate rice and t1.
That’s precisely the sort of movement that, on this view, would be required in (57)
to achieve the impossible external reading:
(57) a. The occasional and angry sailor strolled by.
b. #[The+occasional1] [t1 and angry] sailor strolled by.
The obligatory high position of the adjective is explained as well—any adjectives
above it would block its path to the determiner.
The incompatibility of external readings with degree modification would also be
expected, because only a bare adjective, and not a phrasal constituent, can do head-
to-head movement, the kind required here. Occasional on its own is the head of an
AP, but very occasional is not. This approach may even shed light on Zimmermann
(2003)’s observation that external readings are often absent where Quantifier Raising
is blocked. This analysis can be extended to average, wrong, perhaps same, and
maybe others.
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Nevertheless, one might have some qualms. The movement required would seem
to violate the Head Movement Constraint (Travis 1984), which would normally
prevent a head from moving outside of an adjoined phrase (the AP, in this case) as
in (53).
More worrying, perhaps: why are a, the, and your alone the determiners that have
been targeted for complex quantifier formation? Could it in principle have been any
other combination? And why is it that the denotations of these complex determiner-
adjective combinations aren’t unpredictable? If they’re specified in the lexicon, one
might imagine virtually arbitrary variation, but the generalizations we would like to
explain aren’t arbitrary.Whatever the answers to these questions, more would have to
be said to make weak-determiner-compatible adjectives such as whole, unspecified,
and different fit in.
4.2 Structure Versus Ontology: The First Step
Framing the current project as a trade-off between structure and ontology, at leastwith
respect to average, is as I’ve said not novel. What I propose here is a variation on a
theme fromKennedy and Stanley (2009). They observe the connection between aver-
age and occasional, and that this connection affords an analytical opportunity. For
them, average incorporates into the determiner, just like occasional does for Lar-
son (2000). The actual combinatorics required to achieve the necessary readings are
complicated in ways that can be set aside, but they require a non-standard scope-
taking mechanism that Barker (2007) dubbed Parasitic Scope, though appeals to it
without the brand name can be found in Sauerland (1998) and earlier. The structure
they propose is this:
(58)
2.3






The variable n here ranges over real numbers, or what number terms like 2.3 denote.
The denotation is built up using the complex determiner th’average as in (59):
(59)  th’average  ( λnλx . has n children )(American )( 2.3 )
The denotation of th’average applies to three arguments. The first is a relation
between numbers and individuals that have that number of children. The second
is a property indicating what population is being averaged over, in this case, Ameri-
cans. The final one is a real number indicating the computed average.
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The details of implementation won’t be crucial here, but they involve computing
a mean on the basis of the maximal number of children each individual has,7 and |P|
should be interpreted as the number of individuals that have the property P:





Themost important point, for current purposes, is that on this view averageDPs don’t
refer to anything metaphysically exotic because they don’t refer to anything at all.
Rather, they have an exotically high semantic type,which, coupledwith incorporation
from an adjective into a determiner and an unusual scope-taking operation, add up
to a semantics that yields the right reading. For them, the right reading is strictly
adverbial. It’s the reading that can be paraphrased ‘on average, Americans have 2.3
children’. It’s worth noting, though, that this analysis has many of the same costs as
the basic incorporation analysis, including having to stipulate the equivalence of the,
a, and your on this reading.
4.3 The Kind Analysis of ‘Occasional’
The balance between the compositional semantics and the ontology is tilted in pre-
cisely the other direction in Gehrke and McNally (2010, 2015), building on Schäfer
(2007). The distinctive property of occasional nominals, for them, is not in their
grammar but rather in their referential properties—and it is therefore there that we
should locate an analysis. So they seek a simpler syntax-semantics and a richer
ontology.
It would require navigating quite a bit off my intended course to do justice to
their proposal, but at its heart is an idea on which I will build: kind reference. The
observation is that the occasional sailor involves reference to realizations of sailor-
kinds. Very approximately, the truth conditions of the now-familiar sailor sentence
can be rendered as in (61):
(61) The occasional sailor strolled by.
Approximately: ‘Suitably-distributed realizations of strolling-by event kinds
involved realizations of the sailor kind.’
The major advantage to this strategy is that it doesn’t require the compositional
backflips that the incorporation analysis—and especially the Kennedy and Stanley
(2009) variant for occasional—requires. Indeed, because there is no movement at
all, it doesn’t violate the Head Movement Constraint. It also provides insight into
why a, the, and your should be the determiners that uniquely have a special status in
7The maximality operator is required because anyone with three children also has two.
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this construction. This is precisely the class of determiners that have a special status
with respect to kinds and genericity:
(62) a. The domestic dog is a good friend.
b. A dog is a better friend than a cat.
c. Your purple-breasted snicklewarbler is a magnificent bird. (dialectal)
To the extent that this approach is successful, it requires no special stipulations about
the denotations of determiners. And because of that, it helps explain why determiner
interpretations don’t vary freely. No special stipulations are necessary to explain
why your+occasional or the unattested *every+occasional don’t just happen by
chance to mean something they don’t actually mean.
The main shortcoming of this approach, from the current perspective, is that it’s
not clear how tomake it scale up. On its own, it seems convincing that kind-reference
is going to be a crucial ingredient in the analysis of external readings. But it’s not
clear to me how to make it the principal ingredient in a fully general theory.
5 The Modular Strategy
5.1 Determiner-Like Adjectives
The aimof this paper is not to present a general theory of nonlocal readings, but taking
a confident step in that direction requires a theory of how they arise that is modular:
that is, one that relies on multiple interacting parts to arrive at an explanation. Such
a theory makes it possible to activate or deactivate certain of these components to
explain variation among subclasses of adjectives and—most directly at issue here—
to explain the biggest split among nonlocal readings, the one between adjectives that
give rise to Broader Quantifier Resistance and those that don’t. (This sets aside, of
course, the possible ellipsis class.)
One satisfying aspect of the incorporation analysis sketched above is that it reflects
that nonlocal adjectives aren’t prototypically adjective-like, even on a purely descrip-
tive level. They don’t pass standard diagnostics for adjectives, such as the ability to
occur in comparatives, with degree modifiers, or in the complement position of seem.
They don’t conjoin with adjectives. Nor do they occur in the same positions as adjec-
tives generally; rather, they are obligatorily high.
This might suggest incorporation or another form of syntactic differentiation, but
all these properties also follow from simply assuming that nonlocal adjectives have an
unusual semantic type. In the spirit of the incorporation approach, I’ll assume these
adjectives have precisely the same type of denotation as quantificational determiners,
namely type 〈et, 〈et, t〉〉. Switching back to average American, the picture would be
as in (63):













This has as a consequence that the node above the adjective, the NP average Amer-
ican, would denote a generalized quantifier. Following standard assumptions (see
Heim and Kratzer 1998 for a review), it would therefore have to quantifier-raise and
adjoin to the clause to avoid a type clash. I’ll leave aside what happens higher in the
clause for the moment to focus on the DP. The trace this movement leaves behind
would standardly denote an individual. To make these LFs slightly easier to read








But this is hardly any help at all. It just gives rise to a different type clash: the NP
would now denote an individual, but the is of type 〈et, e〉 and expects a property.
There is a natural solution. It’s to adopt the standard be type shift (Partee 1987),
which shifts an individual to the property of being that individual:
(65)  be  = λxλy[x = y]
Applied to Floyd, for example, this shift would yield the property of being Floyd:
(66)  be  (Floyd) = λy[Floyd = y]
Partee used it for copular constructions, and it has subsequently proven useful else-
where. In this case, this resolves the type clash by providing the with the property-











(68)  be  ( x1 ) = λy[x1 = y]
But as it turns out, at the next node up, this shift will achieve for us something more.
5.2 Determiners That Work
One of the things we would like to explain is why the, a, and your seem to work
robustly with a number of nonlocal adjectives, and why distinctions in their inter-
pretations seem to be neutralized in the presence of frequency adjectives and aver-
age/typical. That result follows from the type shift alone. There is one and only one
individual that has the property of being Floyd, and it is Floyd. For this reason, the
person who is Floyd and Floyd mean the same thing. So too, here the would com-
bine with the property the shifted trace denotes to yield the unique individual that is
identical to the one the unshifted trace denotes:
(69) a.  the  = λP〈e, t〉 . ιy[P(y)]
b.  the  ( be x1 ) = ιy[x1 = y] = x1
This is precisely the same individual as the one denoted by the trace alone. The effect
is as though the were absent entirely, as though the nonlocal adjective and its NP
sister had occurred in subject position on their own.
The semantically-bleached variant of your that occurs in e.g. your average Amer-
ican mostly amounts to a version of the with a slight whiff of genericity about it,
which would leave us in more or less the same place (see Gehrke andMcNally 2010,
2015 for more).
As for a, the right result follows from a simple equivalence. To say that there’s
a person x such that x is wearing a hat and x is Floyd is just to say that Floyd is
wear a hat. The same equivalence manifests itself in (70). The standard denotation of
the indefinite article in (70a) when combined with the shifted trace denotation, as in
(70b), yields an expression that asks for a predicate Q and says that some individual
identical to x1 satisfies Q:
(70) a.  a  = λP〈e, t〉λQ〈e, t〉 . ∃x[P(x) ∧ Q(x)]
b.  a  ( be x1 ) = λQ〈e, t〉 . ∃x[x1 = x ∧ Q(x)]
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To say that there is an individual identical to x1 of which the predicate Q holds is
simply to say that Q holds of x1:
(71) ∃x[x1 = x ∧ Q(x)] ⇔ Q(x1)
The result, again, is truth-conditionally identical to what would have happened had
the determiner been absent entirely.
To articulate this a little bit further, let’s adopt the toy denotation for average
in (72a). This applies to the denotation of the modified NP, and predicates the VP
meaning of the kind that corresponds to the NP meaning, using Chierchia (1998)’s
∩ property-to-kind type shift8:
(72) a.  average  = λP〈e, t〉λQ〈e, t〉 . Q(∩P)
b.  average American  = λQ〈e, t〉 . Q(∩American)
This probably isn’t adequate on its own as a theory of average, and much of Kennedy
and Stanley (2009) may have to be layered on top of it. A few more words on this
follow in Sect. 6.1 below. But it suffices to sketch the compositional machinery. Thus
the updated tree would look like this (I’ve ornamented the tree with a superscript k









the be xk1 has
2.3 children
The result of the computation is just what we need:
(74) a.  the be xk1  = xk1
b.  the be xk1 has 2.3 children  = has-2.3-children(xk1 )
c.  average American  = λQ〈e, t〉 . Q(∩American)
d.  average American  ( λxk1 the [be x
k
1]] has 2.3 children )
= has-2.3-children(∩American)
So the upshot is a semantics that requires that Americans generally have 2.3 children.
The crucial component to notice here is not the semantics of average, though, so
much as the way the combination of the type shift, compositional assumptions, and
8Given this denotation, I could have equivalently dispensedwith the λQ in the denotation of average
and had average American denote a kind directly. This is possible here only because I am using a
considerably simplified denotation, though.
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kind-reference have achieved the effect of ensuring that precisely the determiners
that systematically license external readings yield the right result.
5.3 Determiners That Don’t Work
What of determiners thatdon’twork?Again, the nature of themovement and resulting
type shift helps the situation—or rather, undermines it in the right way.
Strong determines like every and most presuppose that their domain has more
than one member. If there is only one person in the corner, for example, (75) gives
rise to failure of presupposition:
(75) Every person in the corner left.
I’ve spelled it out explicitly in the denotation of every in (76) (the colon indicates the
presupposition; |P|, as before, indicates the cardinality of individuals that satisfy P)
(76)  every  = λP〈e, t〉:|P| > 1 . λQ〈e, t〉 .∀x[P(x) → Q(x)]
In (77), every combines with the property  be xk1 :
(77) a. #Every average American has 2.3 children.
b. [average American] λxk1 [ every [be x
k
1 ]] ] has 2.3 children
(78)  be xk1  = λy[xk1 = y]
But (78) is a singleton property—there is only one individual that is identical to xk1 .
It therefore violates the presupposition every imposes on its first argument.
This presupposition is not a peculiarity of every, but rather a property of strong
quantificational determiners in general. Thus most would work similarly. Because
movement below the DP level, in the framework proposed here, systematically gives
rise to such singleton properties, it systematically precludes combining with strong
quantifiers.
We have thus derived one of the two generalizations articulated earlier: the Strong
Quantifier Resistance Generalization. All external readings observed it, so if this
mechanism is crucial to deriving external readings, this explains it. Weak quantifi-
cational determiners do not have this presupposition, so they don’t in general block
external readings.
But what of the Broader Quantifier Resistance Generalization, the one only some
adjectives observed? Some adjectives—like our test cases, average and occasional—
do block the external reading with weak quantifiers too. But despite the absence of
the fatal presupposition, these fail in another respect. The denotation of three is as
in (79), a property of individuals that have a cardinality of 3:
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(79)  three  = λx[|x | = 3]
When this combines with the shifted trace, it will combine intersectively with its
denotation to yield (80):
(80)  three be xk1  = λy[xk1 = y ∧ |y| = 3]
This is a property satisfied by a plurality with three elements that is identical to
the kind xk1 . That means, naturally, that the kind x
k
1 has to be a plurality of three
elements. But kinds aren’t pluralities, and they don’t have cardinalities. This is pretty
straightforward metaphysically, but again, linguistic evidence makes it clear. As
Chierchia (1998) demonstrates especially convincingly, across languages kinds are
essentially a kind of mass term. Cheese, for example, denotes a kind in English,
and *three cheese is ungrammatical.
So in this case, the problem that rules out weak quantifiers has to do with kinds,
and it will be only nonlocal adjectives that leave behind kind-denoting traces that will
be subject to this additional restriction. Occasional is also incompatible with weak
quantifiers, and, asGehrke andMcNally (2010, 2015) demonstrate, its semantics also
relies crucially on kinds. Nonlocal adjective with no kind overtones such as whole
or wrong or unspecified should therefore avoid running afoul of this difficulty and be
compatible with weak quantifiers even on their external readings. And indeed they
are. More on both of these points follows in the subsequent two sections.
5.4 A Word About ‘Occasional’
Occasional and its kin aren’t the focus here, but a brief word about how they might
work in this framework is appropriate. The approach to which I’m most sympathetic
would be to simply combine the insights of two competing classes of approaches.
Kinds must occupy a central place, for the reasons discussed above. But quantifi-
cation can play a central role too. In particular, there is no reason not to adopt the
Zimmermann (2000)’s quantifier OCCASIONAL, which quantifies jointly over the
individuals and events, though here it will be crucial that it be kinds and events (with
s as the type of events):
(81)  occasional  = λP〈e, t〉λQ〈e, st〉.OCCASIONAL xk, e : ∩P(x)[Q(xk)(e)]
This denotation would trigger movement to a position just below where the event
argument is closed, and yield sentence denotations like (82):
(82) a. The occasional sailor strolled by.
b.  occasional sailor λxk1 the be x
k
1 strolled by 
= OCCASIONAL xk, e : ∩sailor(x)[strolled-by(xk)(e)]
This seems a reasonable happy medium between the two approaches.
90 M. Morzycki
5.5 The Weak Quantifier Class
There remains to discuss the class of external readings that are compatible with weak
quantifiers. For those, though, in one sense there is little to be said. What ensured
incompatibility with weak quantifiers above was the role of kinds. Adjectives whose
semantics makes no special reference to kinds don’t give rise to the problem of
computing the cardinality of a kind.
To illustrate, the denotation of unknown could be characterized as in (83), where
I’ve used ?xφ to abbreviate the embedded question ‘which x is such that φ?’9:
(83) a.  unknown  = λP〈e, t〉λQ〈e, t〉 . ∃x [P(x) ∧ Q(x) ∧ ¬known(?y[Q(y)])]
b.  unknown hotel 
= λQ〈e, t〉 . ∃x [hotel(x) ∧ Q(x) ∧ ¬known(?y[Q(y)])]
What unknown hotel does is a little complicated. First, it requires that there exist a
hotel that satisfies the property formed by raising the whole quantified NP. Second,
it requires that it not be known which individuals satisfy this property.
It will help to see how this works in action. The tree for (84a) arrived at by raising
would be as in (84b):









[∃ three be x1] λx2 Solange
stayed at x2
This assumes a null existential determiner in the head of the nominal, and that,
standardly, it undergoes quantifier raising. The denotation of (84) would be as in
(85):
(85) a.  be x1  = λy[x1 = y]
b.  three be x1  = λy[x1 = y ∧ |x1| = 3]
c.  ∃ three be x1  = λg〈e, t〉 . ∃y[x1 = y ∧ |x1| = 3 ∧ g(y)]
d.  λx1 [∃ three x1] λx2 Solange stayed at x2 
= λx1 . ∃y[x1 = y ∧ |x1| = 3 ∧ stay-at(y)(Solange)]
= λx1 . [|y| = 3 ∧ stay-at(y)(Solange)]
9One may freely substitute one’s favorite theory of indirect questions here, so far as I can see,
though what I have in mind is that ?y[Q(y)] should be taken to be the set of propositions formed
by varying the value of y, i.e., an abbreviation for {p : ∃x[p = Q(y)]}.
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This is a property that holds of any three-membered plural individual such that
Solange stayed at its members.10
What unknown hotels adds to this is that this plurality is required to consist of
hotels, and that it not be known which hotels precisely these are. The computation
for the full sentence is in (86):
(86)  unknown hotels λx1 [∃ three x1] λx2 Solange stayed at x2 
= ∃x
[
hotel(x) ∧ |x | = 3 ∧ stay-at(x)(Solange)∧
¬known(?y[stay-at(y)(Solange)])
]
The result, correctly, is that there must be three hotels at which Solange stayed, and
it must not be known which hotels these are.
The crucial element in all this, though, is that there is nothing about unknown
that prevents cardinalities from being computed, and so nothing that resists, in this
instance, three, and more broadly any of its kin.
5.6 Summary
The result, then, is that there is no need for incorporation. The external scope facts
follow from quantifier raising. The interpretation of determiners is standard. Restric-
tions on determiners follow from independent considerations. The general resistance
of nonlocal adjectives to strong quantifiers follows from the compositional circum-
stances of their movement, which invoke a type shift with which they are incompat-
ible. The resistance of certain nonlocal adjectives to weak quantifiers follows from
independent facts about the lexical semantics of the adjective—specifically, having a
kind-based semantics. Other restrictions, like the lack of coordination with ordinary
adjectives and absence of degree modifiers, follow from the quantifier type of these
expressions.
This means it was not necessary to stipulate which determiners support incor-
poration and which don’t, or what interpretations result for every combination. Nor
was it necessary to stipulate why the, a, and your wind up making the same seman-
tic contribution, or to do so repeatedly for each frequency adjective. It also wasn’t
necessary to stipulate anything about the interaction of quantificational force with
external readings. This is possible in part precisely because what I have offered here
is only a sketch. The devil, as always, is in the details. But I hope this illustrates an
analytical approach to these facts that might hope to scale up to the broader analytical
picture I sought to draw.
10I set aside questions of distributivity and collectivity here.
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6 Taking Stock
6.1 Could Things Be so Simple?
One issue remains strikingly unresolved. I’ve characterized the denotation for aver-
age I’ve provided above as a toy denotation. I’ve said, perhaps a bit defensively,
that things couldn’t possibly be so simple. Surely, it couldn’t suffice to say that the
average American means, essentially, the same thing as the kind-denoting nomi-
nal Americans, and (87a) and (87b) mean more or less the same thing:
(87) a. The average American has 2.3 children.
b. Americans have 2.3 children.
But the truth is, I think the simple toy version of the facts may be onto a deeper
grammatical intuition than the more complicated one.
To be sure, we have the option of layering on components of the Kennedy and
Stanley approach here, introducing elements of their machinery on top of the bits I
propose to achieve their desired adverbial reading. There is a danger of redundancy,
though. And the more one does that, the farther one gets to the connection to kind-
reference, for which Gehrke and McNally provide ample evidence.
The defense of the naïve theory proceeds in several steps. The first is empirical.
Suppose we adopt a theory that involves computing a mean. On such a view, (88a)
and (88b) would both be predicted to be true, and, therefore, quite probably (88c)
too:
(88) a. The average human has one ovary.
b. The average human has one testicle.
c. The average human has one ovary and one testicle.
Yet they are all false, or in any case false outside of exceptionally odd statistical
contexts. Any theory that revolves primarily around calculation of means would fail
to predict this. But in a theory that relies on kind reference, it’s expected. On such a
view, it’s the 2.3 children case that’s puzzling.
That, I think, is precisely where we should want to be puzzled—that is the case
that we should treat as exotic rather than as the core example.Most languages through
most of human history had no reason to refer to fractions. Moreover, the semantics of
fractions is independently puzzling. They are problematic completely independent
of their role in average sentences. It makes sense, then, that the theory of average
shouldn’t be itself founded on this independent mystery.
That said, nothing in the general conception of external readings proposed here
rests above all on any particular assumptions about kinds. Perhaps other notions
could do the necessary work without putting us on thin ice with respect to sentences
containing fractions. Indeed, I consider one such possibility in Sect. 6.2 below. The
only crucial role kinds play here is to rule out computing cardinalities, which in turn
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is crucial to distinguishing the weak-quantifier class from the no-quantifier class.
That’s not nothing, but there may be other means of accomplishing this. Neverthe-
less, it’s worth recognizing that there are several converging lines of evidence that
point to kinds or some form of genericity in these sentences: initial intuitions about
what average sentences mean, the judgments in (88), the role kinds play in distin-
guishing classes of external readings, and its place in correctly predicting which
determiners have which readings. One might be still able to explain 2.3 children by
simply adopting,with Kennedy and Stanley, an extraordinarily high type, but it seems
right that special stipulations should be required there and not elsewhere.
It’s worth pointing out, though, that one could also follow in the spirit of Carlson
and Pelletier (2002) and appeal to fictive entities in place of some form of kind.
This analytical avenue may actually be more available on this approach. Kennedy
and Stanley argue against the fictive entity approach in part on the grounds that it
doesn’t explain the limited inventory of determiners possible with average. Those
facts, however, can be explained independently here. But again, if the relevant notion
of fictive entities can emerge with an appropriate kind flavor, that seems preferable
on independent grounds to the alternative.
None of that directly addresses what the semantics of 2.3 children should be.
My suspicion is that an ultimately satisfying answer requires not just a theory of
nonlocal readings of adjectives, but a better theory of mathematical language, and
in particular of what I elsewhere call ‘semantic viruses’ (Morzycki 2017), in the
spirit of Sobin (1997) syntactic viruses (see also Lasnik and Sobin 2000; Schütze
1999). I argue there that some expressions associatedwith educated, often highly self-
conscious language may use special semantic mechanisms not otherwise available
in the semantics. Making this distinction may help us distinguish which operations
and what grammatical phenomena truly are exotic and may call for some brute-force
high-type complexity, and where we should seek simplicity, even occasionally in the
face of apparent counterevidence.
6.2 Kinds and Concepts
Sebastian Löbner (p.c.) suggests that a number of the restrictions on external read-
ings of average and occasional may involve characterizing more precisely the con-
cept types they give rise to. Average American on the relevant reading isn’t a sortal
concept—one that supports counting and is neither uniquely referential nor rela-
tional. That accounts for its incompatibility with strong quantifiers (#every average
American), and perhaps for its incompatibility with stacked or conjoined adjectives
(#an average (and) irritable American).
This mode of explanation in some respects has the same shape as a kind-based
one, or indeed as one organized around fictive entities. They all seek to derive the
properties of the expression from the ontological status of the extension of the nomi-
nal. Both kinds and the relevant non-sortal concepts are uncountable. It doesn’t seem
too far-fetched to claim that fictive entities might not be countable either, though
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that’s less obvious. Insomniacs are sometimes advised to count sheep in order to fall
asleep, yet under normal circumstances the livestock in one’s bedroom are entirely
fictive. Likewise, the resistance to quantification that I earlier attributed to a failure of
presupposition could be attributed to countability as well. As I expressed it in (76),
the presupposition involved determining the cardinality of individuals that satisfy
the property expressed by the nominal argument. In this implementation, that is not
undefined. Even though this property has in its domain kinds, it denotes a property
that holds of precisely one kind. Therefore it is countable. This follows from how the
movement and type shift interact. Onemight imagine, though, an alternative analysis
where the inherent countability of the noun is crucial. In order for the analysis of
adjective stacking and conjunction to go through, however, one really would have to
have the NP average American denote this concept kind quite low in the tree, before
any type shifts have taken place. On this view, then, the crucial difference could
be viewed as being in how high in the structure of the nominal kinds are invoked.
But there are good reasons to think properties of kinds are to be found deep in the
nominal extended projection, very near the noun (Zamparelli 1995 among others).
So this fact too may be insufficient to distinguish these two approaches on a deep
level, setting aside particular analytical choices I’ve made here.
The adjective order facts, however, might be of use. Most evidence for a layer in
the nominal projection that is concerned with kinds rather than objects suggests that
it is the lower of the two. So-called Bolinger contrasts (Bolinger 1967; see Morzycki
2016a and Leffel 2014 for extensive discussion) such as the one in (89) show that
adjectives lower in the nominal ascribe inherent or individual-level properties, and
higher ones ascribe contingent or stage-level properties:
(89) a. the invisible visible stars
b. #the visible invisible stars
On its only possible reading, (89a) refers to stars that are visible in principle but
invisible at the moment, perhaps by clouds. But (89b) is contradictory, because it
refers to stars that are invisible in principle but visible at the moment. A broadly
similar fact, in the spirit of Larson (1998, 2000):
(90) an ugly beautiful dancer
a. ‘an ugly person who dances beautifully’
b. *‘a beautiful person who dances in an ugly way’
(91) a beautiful ugly dancer
a. *‘an ugly person who dances beautifully’
b. ‘a beautiful person who dances in an ugly way’
Larsonmarshals such facts to argue for a generic quantifier in the nominal projection.
But be it about kinds or not, the domain of genericity in the nominal is low. Yet as
we’ve seen, adjectives associated with external readings are exclusively high. A
reminder:
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(92) An ugly occasional sailor strolled by.
a. ‘An ugly person who sails occasionally strolled by.’ (internal)
b. *‘Occasionally, an ugly sailor strolled by.’ (external)
(93) An occasional ugly sailor strolled by.
a. *‘An ugly person who sails occasionally strolled by.’ (internal)
b. ‘Occasionally, an ugly sailor strolled by.’ (external)
If kinds or non-sortal properties were at issue lower in the nominal, this effect would
be expected to be either reversed or absent entirely.
One appeal of such an approach, in either of these incarnations, would be that the
quantificational facts and the facts about conjunction and stacking could be brought
under the same rubric. As it stands, the latter derive from the quantificational type of
the NP. A major disadvantage is that they wouldn’t readily extend to the rather large
class of adjectives compatible with weak quantifiers. Nor, in the absence of a scope-
taking mechanism, would they permit the adjective access to the VP denotation. Yet
this access is precisely what seems to be required for e.g. epistemic adjectives such
as unknown, as shown in Sect. 5.5.
7 Final Remarks
To close, a fewwords about the commonly expressed intuition that nonlocal readings
are a grammatical oddity. These adjectives are indeed odd, but in a precise and inter-
esting sense. They are odd in the way that platypuses and lungfish are odd: they are—
perhaps metaphorically, or perhaps more than metaphorically—transitional forms in
an evolutionary progression, unusual because they combine features of two distinct
categories that we normally regard as mutually exclusive. Over succeeding gener-
ations of speakers, certain adjectives may emerge from the swampy depths of the
inner NP to which they are usually confined, and tentatively make their way onto
the dry land of the determiner domain. They can’t be expected to make this leap in
a single stride, so we can observe them in the midst of their evolutionary journey
and thereby discover more about both their evolutionary origin and their destina-
tion. Like platypuses and lungfish, they are important and analytically revealing not
despite their strangeness, but because of it.
Substantively, the proposal was that nonlocal adjectives have quantificational
determiner denotations, trigger raising of the NP in which they occur, stranding
the determiner, and sometimes require properties of kinds as their arguments. This
isn’t a general theory of all nonlocal readings, naturally. That would be far too ambi-
tious for any single paper. But it has the shape of a general theory, and my hope is
that further research will be able to fill in the gaps in a similar spirit.
From the broader cognitive perspective, though, one of the larger lessons is the
balance between the explanatory burdenon the ontology andon the structuralmachin-
ery. For average, for example, one might have gone in the direction of recognizing
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‘averageAmericans’ as actual, if very abstract, objects in themodel, ‘fictive persons’.
For occasional, I followed Gehrke andMcNally (2010, 2015) in placing a great deal
of explanatory weight on the notion of kinds, if perhaps not quite so much weight as
they have.
On the other hand, structural components played a crucial role. For average,
one could go so far as Kennedy and Stanley (2009) do, and invoke quite high-
powered syntactic and semantic machinery to twist the tree into the shape we require.
For occasional, Larson (1999), Zimmermann (2000) and others provide a path that
also requires quite a bit of syntactic machinery.
It is misguided, I think, to ask where we wind up in each respect: how much
compositional structure do we need, how much metaphysics, and what the right
balance is. Rather, we should recognize that there may be some explanatory trade-
offs, but that inevitably, we will need a bit of both modes of explanation—and it is
up to language to tell us how much we need of either.
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Concept Theory
How Can Semantics Avoid the Troubles
with the Analytic/Synthetic Distinction?
Roberto G. de Almeida and Caitlyn Antal
One failure a week is just bracing and good for you.
—Allen Newell (1991).
Abstract At least since Quine (From a logical point of view. Harvard University
Press, Cambridge, MA, 1953) it has been suspected that a semantic theory that rests
on defining features, or on what are taken to be “analytic” properties bearing on the
content of lexical items, rests on a fault line. Simply put, there is no criterion for
determining which features or properties are to be analytic and which ones are to
be synthetic or contingent on experience. Deep down, our concern is what cogni-
tive science and its several competing semantic theories have to offer in terms of
solution. We analyze a few cases, which run into trouble by appealing to analyticity,
and propose our own solution to this problem: a version of atomism cum inferences,
which we think it is the only way out of the dead-end of analyticity. We start off
by discussing several guiding assumptions regarding cognitive architecture and on
what we take to be methodological imperatives for doing semantics within cognitive
science—that is a semantics that is concerned with accounting for mental states. We
then discuss theoretical perspectives on lexical causatives and the so-called “coer-
cion” phenomenon or, in our preferred terminology, indeterminacy. Andwe advance,
even if briefly, a proposal for the representation and processing of conceptual content
that does away with the analytic/synthetic distinction.We argue that the only account
of mental content that does away with the analytic/synthetic distinction is atomism.
The version of atomism that we sketch accounts for the purported effects of analyt-
icity with a system of inferences that are in essence synthetic and, thus, not content
constitutive.
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Our concern in this paper is, on the surface, not new. For long—at least since Quine
(1953) in modern times, to say little of Kant’s “cleavage” problems way back then—
it has been suspected that a semantic theory that rests on defining features, or on what
are taken to be “analytic” properties bearing on the content of lexical items, rests on a
fault line. Simply put, there is no criterion for determining which features or proper-
ties are to be analytic and which ones are to be synthetic or contingent on experience.
But that is just the glossy if old shell of our concern. Deep down, our concern is what
cognitive science and its several competing semantic theories have to offer in terms
of solution, if any at all. With this in mind, we analyze a few cases, which run into
trouble by appealing to analyticity, and propose our own solution to this problem: a
version of atomism cum inferences. We are aware that the proposal we have to offer
is at odds with widely held views, but we think it is the only way out of the dead-
end of analyticity, if one is not to be burdened with producing an analytic/synthetic
criterion. We start off by discussing several guiding assumptions regarding cognitive
architecture and on what we take to be methodological imperatives for doing seman-
tics within cognitive science—that is a semantics that is concerned with accounting
for mental states. We then discuss theoretical perspectives on a range of seemingly
disconnected phenomena—in particular lexical causatives and the so-called “coer-
cion” phenomenon or, in our preferred terminology, indeterminacy. Andwe advance,
even if briefly, a proposal for the representation and processing of conceptual content
that does away with the analytic/synthetic distinction. We will argue that the only
account of mental content that does away with the analytic/synthetic distinction is
atomism. The version of atomism we will sketch accounts for the purported effects
of analyticity with a system of inferences that are in essence synthetic and, thus, not
content constitutive.
1 Semantics and the Architecture of Cognition
It is not uncommon for cognitive scientists working in semantics to mix their
metaphors regarding how they envision the nature of mental representations and
processes. Perhaps they do so inadvertently, but the price is a lack of clarity on what
one takes to be the very nature of the representation of content and the computational
processes that are content-bearing. And if there is one issue that research in semantics
needs to be clear about, it is how it conceives content representation and processing.
As an example, consider sentence (1).
(1) Mary began a book.
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Imagine now that the issue at hand is how a sentence such as (1) might be inter-
preted. The proposal quoted in (2) is apropos the sorts of psychological events carried
out during the comprehension process of (1). The semantic issues underlying this
proposal will be dealt with a little later, but we start off with the commitments of this
proposal vis-à-vis cognitive architecture.
(2) “(a) When encountering the noun book, comprehenders access the word’s
lexical entry and attempt to integrate various stored senses of this word
into the evolving semantic representation of the sentence.
(b) The mismatch between the verb’s selectional restrictions and the stored
senses of the noun triggers a coercion process.
(c) Comprehenders use salient properties associated with the complement
noun and other relevant discourse elements (including but not necessarily
limited to the agent phrase) to infer a plausible action that could be
performed on the noun.
(d) Comprehenders incorporate the event sense into their semantic
interpretation of the VP by reconfiguring the semantic representation of
the complement, converting [β began[α the book]] into [β began[α reading
the book]]. (Conceivably, this could also require reconfiguration of an
associated syntactic representation.)” (Traxler et al., 2005, p. 4)
We use this as a convenient example of the kinds of constraints—or lack thereof—
that may drive semantic proposals within the language processing literature. As we
will see, similar proposals abound in semantic theory.
To begin, our commitments unequivocally reside with the view that representa-
tions are symbolic, with processes over these representations being computational.
These general commitments comewith numerous caveats. First, it is not clearwhether
the nature of computations performed over symbolic representations involve hard-
wired algorithmic, intra-modular kinds of principles, or heuristic, perhaps malleable
principles. This difference is important for semantics because, by hypothesis, it
marks the boundary between linguistically-driven computations bearing on “shal-
low” meaning (viz., a logical form), and those deemed pragmatic or based on world-
knowledge, contingent on experience. We mentioned “intra-modular” computations
because our proposal relies on there being a modular level of linguistic computa-
tions whose output is a form of compositional semantic representation, a shallow
one nonetheless (see Fodor, 2001; and de Almeida, 2018; and de Almeida & Lepore,
2018, for recent discussion).
Postulating that linguistic processes are computations over symbolic represen-
tations is crucial to our take on what sorts of knowledge representation enter into
tasks such as understanding a sentence or having a thought. This is so because we
assume that some of these processes are executed in virtue of the formal prop-
erties of the expressions that are computed, including properties of its constituent
symbols, while others are entirely dependent on the content of token symbols—or the
content that token symbols point to. Furthermore, we assume that semantic units—or
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concepts—are the very elements of higher-level representations and processes, not
only of linguistic representations proper. That is, thoughts have concepts as their
most elementary parts, and those happen to be the same elements one recovers in the
process of understanding a sentence; they are the same we ought to use in semantic
analysis. As such, we assume that in order to account for the nature of these cognitive
processes—that is, in order to account for the nature of those thoughts—it is crucial
we not only understand the nature of the elementary parts, but also how they combine
to yield the meaning that the thought carries.
Moreover, we think that to entertain a thought is to entertain something like
a proposition whose basic elements are concepts. We take a proposition to be a
mental object, a symbolic expression standing for the meaning of a sentence or other
higher cognitive representation. Thus, we argue that any complex representation
carrying content is propositional, baring cases in which ideas are incomplete (viz.,
arguments are not saturated) or when representations refer to individuals.1 Thinking,
thus, entails combining all the elementary concepts into series of propositions, which
are most likely represented as something akin to a logical form specifying the rela-
tions between conceptual constituents (see Kintsch, 1974; and McKoon & Ratcliff,
1992, for early propositional theories). This view also applies to the process of
language comprehension: understanding a sentence requires recovering themeanings
of words/morphemes in the context of the proposition that the sentence expresses.
Propositions are thus the mental objects whose referents are states and events in the
world (and ideas about events and states in the imaginary world, if you will). In
order for propositions to refer, or in order for propositions to stand for the events and
states whose contents they represent, they have to compose, and in order for them to
compose they require a syntax.
Much of what we talk about in the present chapter, thus, has a particular notion of
compositionality lurking in the background: namely, one that takes lexical and func-
tional constituents and how they are combined syntactically to determine sentence-
level meaning. Clearly, any position one takes on the analytic/synthetic distinction
(or lack thereof) has direct consequences for the kinds of elements that enter into the
composition of meaning. For instance, let us assume that one holds an enriched form
of compositionality, as proposed by Pustejovsky (1995) and Jackendoff (2002)—a
proposal towhich (2) above adheres. Leavingdetails aside, enriched compositionality
takes the meaning of a sentence to rely on the interpolation of some features or onto-
logically primitive properties stored within lexical entries. Such a view is burdened
with establishing an analytic/synthetic distinction. In principle, by appealing to the
internal analyses of lexical items, compositionality cannot hold, for analyticity is
necessarily unbounded, thus holistic. Furthermore, assuming that our thoughts are
productive, and that productivity requires compositionality, then thoughts ought to
be compositional. Thus any theory on the basic elements of meaning necessarily
needs to account for the compositionality of thoughts (see Fodor, 1998, for a similar
1We could argue that general or singular terms carry a property, viz., that ‘∃x (MARY= x)’ is about
being Mary. But we will eschew this issue and assume that complex representations include at a
minimum singular terms and their predicates.
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point). We think, in summary, that holding on to a strict notion of compositionality is
imperative for determining which concepts theory prevails. However, as we will see
in Sect. 3, there are different approaches to compositionality and this issue interacts
with the position one takes with regards to the analytic/synthetic distinction.
So far, this general view of the nature of complex representations strikes us as stan-
dard, though by nomeans consensus. But before wemove on to discuss analyticity in
semantics, we have two other brief methodological observations to make regarding
semantics research in cognitive science. The first methodological observation is this:
sincewe are realists and naturalists aboutmental representations—semantic or other-
wise—we contend that to do semantics one needs to appeal to all tools of cognitive
science, bar none.We take it that linguisticmethodsmay take precedence over others,
for crosslinguistic generalizations and distributional properties of expressions often
provide us with rich data, supporting arguments for the reality of particular types of
semantic algorithms. But by the same token,we take the experimental tools employed
in cognitive psychology and neuroscience to be crucial to advance theory, rather than
simply supporting linguistic postulates. As Fodor, Fodor, and Garrett (1975) once
suggested, native speakers’ intuitions are psychological data; and if we are tasked
to investigate the realm of psychological data, experimental evidence might be at
par with crosslinguistic and distributional evidence. This is important to mention
here because what we are about to discuss requires analyzing certain phenomena not
only in light of theoretical arguments, but also relying on the results of empirical
observations typically obtained in experiments.
The second methodological observation we want to make regards how semantics
research often proceeds.We take it that the fault line of the analytic/synthetic distinc-
tion, which we will address in the next section, has caused some other cracks in the
foundations of semantics. Virtually all attempts to develop a theory of features has
taken place by appealing to what one knows to be true about referents—objects and
events—in the world, which are not necessarily the kinds of information one repre-
sents in mind about these objects and events. Appeals to intuitions here can only go
so far. We surmise, however, that much of what drives the proposal for feature sets as
constituents of concepts relies on what has been called the “intentional fallacy”. In a
nutshell, the intentional fallacy arises when the particular properties that one assumes
to be part of a stimulus are attributed to its mental representation. In psychology, this
is sometimes referred to as the “stimulus error”, after Titchener (1909). The inten-
tional fallacy permeates work in semantics, for any semantics that appeal to features
has the burden of establishing the criteria for what is to be taken as true properties of a
stimulus (whatever those may be) from properties that may result from one’s knowl-
edge or beliefs about that particular stimulus. To put it simply, what the researcher
knows to be true about a referent is not necessarily true of its mental representation.
The consequences of this fallacy are pervasive, crucially affecting the discussion on
what is analytic and synthetic, and by extension, where the line should be drawn
between semantics and pragmatics (for further discussion, see de Almeida, 2018).
As we will see, a key issue–in line with what we see in proposal (2)–is the idea of
“coercion”. We turn to these matters now.
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2 The Analytic/Synthetic Distinction and Semantic
Theories
We start off by briefly revisiting the problem of analyticity and why it poses a chal-
lenge for semantic theories—at least semantic theories that share our architectural
commitments—in particular the key issue of compositionality. We do so aware that
these issues are far from new. But at the same time, we are concerned that they are
rarely, if ever, addressed in the semantics literature.2
The analytic/synthetic distinction has been like a dark cloud over semantics ever
since Quine wrote his Two dogmas paper. Quine was interested in debunking a kind
of semantics—in particular Carnap’s—that appealed to what Carnap called logically
true (or L-true) as opposed to “indeterminate” or factual (F-true) statements. The
distinction goes back at least toKant’s attempt at separation between analytic (L-true)
and synthetic (F-true) (see Carnap, 1956, Chap. 1). But as Quine showed, there were
no firm criteria for establishing this difference: in essence, L-true and F-true were
sourced from the samedata, even if on the surface some statements appear to be true in
virtue of the meaning of their constituents (the likes of A dog is an animal). It should
be clear, before we advance discussion, that our concern is not with truly analytic
statements such as those in which a conjunction entails its parts. These are run over
form—something like P&Q → P. The first case is obviously compatible with the
architecture we adopt: in fact it is essential to algorithmic cognitive processes that
they run over form, not content, such that it is always the case thatP&Q→P orP&Q
→Q, no matter what P andQ stand for. Thus, analyticity of form holds. Our concern
is with other, often subtler, forms of analyticity, common to lexical-semantic theories
as well as theories of composition relying on certain types of semantic operations
such as “coercion”. And, more broadly, our main concern is with the shaky ground
upon which all of semantics that appeal to analytic features stands.
There are, we think, roughly three ways to conceive how a concept might enter
into—i.e., contributes content to—a proposition. (i) The first is by contributing its full
content, whatever that may be. If one believes concepts to be composed of particular
sets of features, then the content that a given concept contributes to a propositionmust
necessarily be that particular set of features–nothing more, nothing less. (ii) Another
way in which a concept might contribute content to a proposition is by contributing
some, but not necessarily all, of its features. If one believes a concept to be made
up by a set of features, then, the kinds of features that a concept might contribute to
a particular proposition is relative to the particular context of the proposition—that
is, it is sensitive to other constituent concepts, perhaps to the wider discourse, and
perhaps to the syntax of the expression. And (iii) the third way in which a concept
2An anonymous reviewerwas right at pointing out, amongother problems, that the analytic/synthetic
issue that we are trying to “reawaken” is “not new”. This, of course, is not an argument against
our view. If anything, this is an embarrassment for semantic theories. We believe that the two case
studies we discuss below, though limited in scope, are representative of a widespread practice in
semantics. It should be noted that the kind of a/s issue we are raising is about mental representation,
not linguistic analysis.
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can contribute content to a proposition is somewhat similar to (i), but does away with
analyticity: concepts contribute all their content, except that, according to this view,
a concept has no features. In the present section, we will discuss (i) and (ii); the case
for (iii) will be further advanced in Sect. 3.
We cannot possibly be exegetic in our evaluation of semantic theories that are
committed to analyticity (see, e.g., Engelberg, 2011a, for review). Our goals here
are to illustrate the state of the art and thus motivate our proposal for moving away
from analyticity—namely, to make the case for our brand of atomism. And we will
substantiate our case by discussing work from two particular semantic phenomena,
one involving the representation of causative verbs, and one involving the represen-
tation of what we call “indeterminate” sentences, which in some circles is known as
“coercion”. These two cases are illustrative for two reasons. The first, and perhaps
most important one, is because both cases expose the root of the problem we want to
shed light on: the problem of analyticity in semantics. The nature of the representa-
tion of causative verbs has long been the focus of disputes in linguistics and lexical
semantic theories at least since the time of generative semantics (e.g., McCawley,
1972). The case of indeterminate sentences such as (1) has also received some atten-
tion early on (see Culicover, 1970). Aswewill see, these two topics are representative
of how intuitions about meaning can lead to the intentional fallacy trap. And both
represent challenges to the classical way of conceiving compositionality. But as we
will see, in Sect. 3, we offer a parsimonious treatment of these two cases with the type
of atomism cum inferences we propose and the classical notion of compositionality
it entails. The second reason we focus on these two cases is, not coincidently, that
they have been topics of our own research—so we conveniently stay close to familiar
cases to make a point we deem fundamental for investigating semantics in cognitive
science, more broadly.
2.1 Causatives
Most theories of lexical semantic representation are committed to a form of analyt-
icity that takes lexical meaning to be represented in terms of a cluster of features,
usually expressed in the form of templates filled with variables and predicates.
Causative verbs are the paradigm example as they have been the topic of many
disputes between camps. A typical case is (3a), whose meaning is represented in
(3b).
(3) a. Johnx broke the vasey
b. [[x ACT] CAUSE [BECOME [y BROKEN ]]
A representation such as in (3b), in the notation of lexical semantics (Levin&Rappa-
port Hovav, 2005) is nonetheless representative of other approaches such as concep-
tual semantics (Jackendoff, 1990, 2002), cognitive semantics (Croft, 2012), frame
semantics (e.g., Fillmore & Baker, 2009), to cite a few. These theories differ in terms
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of the types of information that enter into meaning representation, how features
are combined, the nature of the primitive bases (viz., ontological categories upon
which concepts are built), as well as the level, whether it be linguistic or concep-
tual, at which these representations are entertained.3 But their commonalities, by far,
surpass their differences, for they all seem to appeal to hidden predicates and other
analytic properties to account for the semantic representation of lexical constituents
and their carrier sentences.
We assume that semantic templates such as (3b) are intended to represent the
propositional content of (3a) specifying its form and key elements of meaning.4
The evidence corroborating this view either comes from distributional data or from
experiments suggesting that complex templates are more difficult to process than
simplex ones (i.e., they engender longer reading times;McKoon&Macfarland, 2000)
or involve more “connections” (Gentner, 1981) between other simpler concepts in
memory and are thus better recalled. We won’t repeat the review of the arguments
and experimental studies supporting predicate decomposition, here (see de Almeida
& Manouilidou, 2015; also Engelberg, 2011b): there seems to be widespread agree-
ment of decompositional views, which spares us from a more thorough review. Our
mission is rather to call attention to the evidence against decomposition, which also
comes from distributional evidence and experiments—but which enjoy much less
acceptance.
The first kind of evidence pertains to the lack of synonymy between sentences
that are supposed to be semantically represented by the same constituents.5 Take
(4a) and (4b) as examples. These sentences, by hypothesis, yield the same semantic
representation, as in (4c): while (4a) involves the lexical causative, (4b) involves its
periphrastic counterpart. Unless the periphrastic cause x to die does not mean what is
in (4c), the idea is that the two sentences are synonymous—hence that the template
in (4c) should hold for both (4a) and (4b).
(4) a. John killed the cat
b. John caused the cat to die
c. [[x ACT] CAUSE [BECOME [y DEAD ]]
But as Fodor (1970) argued sentences such as (4a) and (4b) do not denote the same
events, for one can cause the cat to die onSaturday by poisoning his food onThursday,
3We are assuming throughout that these theories all postulate that template structures are represen-
tations of psychological objects, as in Jackendoff (1983), similar to representations in a language
of thought, though this is not always explicit in the works we cite.
4Although most of our discussion focuses on a theory such as Levin and Rappaport Hovav’s (2005),
we assume that the main points we make apply to all theories we mentioned.
5An anonymous reviewer pointed out that, “Most people don’t assume that in order for there
to be synonymy (and thus, analytic truths), the expressions in question need to be psychologically
perfectly equivalent. For instance, it is standardly accepted that a correct analysis can be highly non-
obvious.” We fail to understand what “most people” assume, for we do take synonymous sentences
in natural language to be expressions of “perfectly equivalent” mental states (viz., propositions).
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but one cannot kill the cat on Saturday by poisoning his food on Thursday. The
distribution of time adverbials suggests that these are not similar events.6
Along similar lines, there are diverse experiments suggesting that causatives donot
decompose, for they donot exhibit complexity effects (e.g., deAlmeida, 1999a; Fodor
et al., 1975, 1980;Kintsch, 1974;Manouilidou&deAlmeida, 2013; Rayner&Duffy,
1986; Thorndyke, 1975; see de Almeida & Manouilidou, 2015, for review). These
studies have employed numerous techniques—from judgment to reading times—and
have been consistent in pointing to the lack of decomposition effects. More recently,
data fromAlzheimer’s patients have also landed support to this camp. For instance, if
verbs are represented by semantic templates, we should expect the pattern of deficits
to reflect the purported effect of semantic complexity—with more complex concepts
being harder to retrieve. Notice also in passing that the more predicates a template
carries, the greater the chances that the concept might be impaired. But as we have
recently shown (de Almeida, Mobayyen, Antal, Kehayia, Nair, & Schwartz, 2021),
when Alzheimer’s patients are asked to name video clips of events and states which
depict classes of verbs with varying complexity (e.g., causatives, motion, and percep-
tion/psychological), these patients’ naming pattern does not line up according to the
predicted complexity. Causatives, which contain hypothetically more predicates are
not affected as severely as psychological verbs, which contain less predicates. The
pattern of results suggests that categorical deficits are not along the lines of semantic
template complexity, but rather along the lines of thematic structure, with verbs
assigning an Experiencer role to the subject position being harder to name. We
assume that thematic roles are “psychologically real”: they affect the composition of
a sentence in the mapping between syntax and the logical form, viz., by assigning
roles to constituents based primarily on their syntactic positions and following the
structural specifications of the predicate (see also Manouilidou, de Almeida, Nair, &
Schwartz, 2009, for compatible results).
Crucially, the properties that enter into templates are far from well justified, for
neither their ontological status has been determined, nor has the selection of features
been principled.7 At first, it may seem like a daunting task to think of a concept
without thinking about the constituent parts we know (or more like think) to be
true of that particular stimulus. For instance, it may be difficult to think of DRINK
without entertaining thoughts such as LIQUID, or MOUTH. But entertaining these
thoughts, as a function of entertaining DRINK does not necessarily entail that the
likes of LIQUID and MOUTH are to be taken as constituent features of DRINK.
Furthermore, if these features are taken to be constituents of DRINK, then, we can
conclude that they too carry content themselves which are expressed in terms of
6This is perhaps old news but to our knowledge, with few exceptions (e.g., Jackendoff, 1990, 2002;
Harley, 2012), it has not been addressed in the literature.
7As Jackendoff (2002, p. 377) puts it, lexical-semantic decomposition “… is a richly textured system
whose subtleties we are only beginning to appreciate (…). It does remain to be seen whether all this
richness eventually boils down to a system built from primitives, or if not, what alternative there
may be.” While we take this position seriously, our point here is that the a/s distinction stands as
the main obstacle to the empirical prospects of lexical semantics.
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other features. The consequence of this is holism about content. And holism is the
antithesis of semantics—as Quine had first suggested.
As a further example of this state of affairs, consider the distinction between
so-called “externally caused” and “internally caused” change of state verbs such as
those in (5a) and (5b) respectively.
(5) a. The cement crumbled
b. The apple rotted
Although much of this distinction bears on the realization of predicate-arguments
(e.g., externally causedverbs usually donot enter into transitive forms), a critical issue
is how the distinction is made in semantic analysis. For Levin and Hovav (1995),
internally caused change of state verbs denote events brought about naturally in
the object, while externally caused change of state verbs “imply the existence of an
‘external cause’with immediate control over bringing about the eventuality described
by the verb: an agent, an instrument, a natural force, or a circumstance” (p. 92).
The way the difference between these verb classes is presented appeals to our
(perhaps naïve) knowledge of physics. But even that might fail us for we are not
certain whether what makes something rot is internal or external, that is, whether
atmospheric variables are the triggers of rotting, or alternatively if an object—say,
an apple—rots entirely on its own. The same can be said of cement crumbling. The
physics baggage is heavy. And we suspect this case lines up with classical cases
of intentional fallacy plaguing semantics: even if the rot/crumble distinction can be
determined solely on linguistic (viz., structural) principles, it is an entirely different
claim to attribute the difference tomentally represented properties of the two types of
events. Understanding the properties of the world will not help us fix the properties
of semantic representations.
The point we are making, in summary, is one we have briefly touched upon in the
previous section: just because one knows a stimulus or phenomenon to be composed
of certain properties, it does not entail that these properties are encoded as mental
representations of the stimulus or phenomenon. This is precisely the perennial effect
of the intentional fallacy on semantic theorizing.
Before we further explore this issue, in contrast to atomism in Sect. 3, we would
like to address rather briefly a second semantic phenomenon—coercion—one for
which appeals to analyticity are also quite evident.
2.2 Indeterminacy (or “Coercion”)
The term “coercion” (or type-coercion, or type-shifting) is identified with partic-
ular hypotheses on how sentences such as (1) are interpreted—among which is the
proposal presented in (2). We refer to these sentences as “indeterminate” because
the actual action that Mary performed with the book is not determined, although the
sentence is grammatical and a truth value judgment can be made (namely, it is true
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if Mary began to do anything with the book); so much for terminology. The “coer-
cion” hypothesis assumes that the proposition expressed by sentences such as (1) are
necessarily enriched along the lines of what is exemplified in (2), but in particular
proposal (2d), which we repeat here for convenience.
(2) (d) Comprehenders incorporate the event sense into their semantic
interpretation of the VP by reconfiguring the semantic representation of
the complement, converting [β began[α the book]] into [β began[α reading
the book]]. (Traxler et al., 2005, p. 5)
This processing hypothesis largely follows the theory of type coercion proposed by
Pustejovsky (1995). The essence of coercion is that the allegedmismatch between the
verb’s selectional restrictions and the nature of the internal argument. By assumption,
the verb begin selects for an event, though the noun book is an entity. This mismatch
triggers the search for a “plausible action” that would yield an enriched semantic
composition, by interpolating a semantic constituent such as reading into the final
form. But as we briefly alluded to in Sect. 1, a commitment to such a process entails
a commitment to determining which, among all possible senses, are the ones to be
interpolated into the resulting representation.
There is perhaps some confusion here betweenmeaning, sense, and use—damage
that unfortunatelyWittgenstein cannot come back to repair. If we tell you that it is hot
today, in Montreal, when actually it is −20 °C, we are most likely being sarcastic.
It does not entail, now, that the concept HOT includes COLD, among its senses.
We are certainly using the word hot to convey something else entirely, to provoke
you or, as Davidson (1978) would say, to invite you to think, just like we would do
with a metaphor. And even if we were to admit that senses are represented in close
proximity (by some metric) with the original concept, as a function of extensive use,
there is no saying on how a sense is to be accessed, other than via its actual host
concept. Thus, to make a simple point: it is HOT that needs to be accessed such that
COLD can be entertained.
It is clear that hypotheses committed to multiple layers of properties supposedly
stored with token items are simply question begging: which sorts of elements are
the ones to be chosen, and how are they to be chosen? As we will argue in Sect. 3,
a different explanation can be offered in cases of conceptual tokening: inferences
driven by synthetic relations are the ones that yield the effects which decomposition-
alists claim to be effects of constituency. We will, thus, offer a more parsimonious
analysis of this phenomenon, doing away with analyticity and placing the burden of
interpretation on the identification of gaps, at the syntactic and logical-form repre-
sentation of sentences, with most interpretation post-logical form being inferential,
not relying on analytic properties of lexical concepts.
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3 Alternative: Atomism and Inferences
What is, then, our proposal for doing away with analyticity? We should warn you
that the proposal might be disappointingly simple, and our presentation of the theory
will be somewhat constrained by the scope of the present chapter. Here is how we
proceed. We start off by connecting our view of concepts with what we envision to
be the architecture of cognition, as briefly presented in Sect. 1. Then, we discuss two
main issues: (i) the representation of concepts according to our brand of atomism;
and (ii) how concepts might be causally connected to each other—viz., as inferential
relations. And, throughout, we tailor our discussion of atomism and inferences to the
analysis of the two phenomena we discussed in Sect. 2.
We have mentioned that we are committed to symbolic representations and to
computational processes. Patently, we take symbols that stand for content to be
atomic, not molecular representations. And we take these symbols to compose
into complex structures the classical way: complex symbolic expressions get their
meaning as a function of the meaning of their constituent symbols and how they
are arranged in propositions. Symbols then carry (or point to) information about the
things (and events) they refer to. We do not establish a lower limit on the content
that the simplex symbols convey—or more properly on the very content that they
individuate—but we suggest that they are properties, predicates, and “particulars”,
as Russell (1913) once put it. We assume that, for the most part, atoms are expressed
by the simplex bound and free morphemes of natural language. And since we take
concepts to be the very symbols of (again, Russell) our “experience”, we assume that
they enter into different cognitive processes via computations.
So much for linking our view of conceptual representation and processes to the
architecture we presented in Sect. 1. As for the nature of conceptual representation, if
concepts are “atoms”, they are simply individuated by the kinds of things they refer.
One quick note should suffice to address the problem of reference here: while we
take concepts to be pointers to objects (in a very broad sense, including properties
like patches of color) and events, they are also representations of things for which
there is no referent (or, again, as Russell put it, in the “past, present, or not in time at
all”, p. 5).
Two further observations are in order. The first is that it is likely that the things
concepts individuate are full objects—the midsize things that populate scenes like
chairs and pencils—or full events. But they can be just fractions of these: there is
nothing in the systemwe suggest that ties the tokeningof concepts to these ontological
categories. And, to our knowledge, there is no clear line demarcating parts and
objects, or objects and scenes (to wit, HORIZON is an “object” for all practical
purposes; and so are DOG and TAIL). Second, a related issue: it is quite plausible
to take “particulars” to be the tokening elements upon which one arrives at a given
concept. For instance, it is well known that events have no fixed boundaries, that is,
that the meaning of the verb to kill, say, does not pick up particular time and space
properties, with well determined beginning and end points. Not even the property
of being dead marks the endpoint of kill, for to die also lacks clearly perceptually
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marked boundaries. Moreover, it is not the case that having kill entails having dead.
In our system, the relation is inferential, not one of dependency.8 If so, most likely
the kinds of “particulars” that the conceptual system locks into may be the very entry
points to the sets of inferences one runs in conceptual processing. This may become
clearer with an example.
Take (6) to be the referential relation that obtains between the word (or the object)
dog and its concept.
(6) dog → DOG
The locking mechanism that affords DOG out of the word or object is a mechanism
that in principle is tokened by whole objects, assuming that the visual attentional
mechanism locks into full objects (see Fodor & Pylyshyn, 2015; Jackendoff, 2002).
But it may well be the case that what one gets are parts of objects. Thus, getting
TAIL tokened is what gets one to eventually entertain DOG. Notice that in order for
this system to work, there ought to be a system of relations between concepts. As
we mentioned above, we are committed to having conceptual relations that are not
necessary; that is, to use the example, it is not the case that tokening TAIL necessarily
causes DOG; only tail causes TAIL, but we suggest that one might get to the host
object via its parts, not because they are conceptually dependent, but because they
are inferentially connected.
We owe you, of course, a bit more clarity on how the systemmight work regarding
these non-analytic inferences. We propose to work with the two phenomena we
discussed in Sect. 2, beginning with causatives and, soon after, with the compre-
hension of indeterminate sentences. Along the way, we make a few observations
regarding the less developed parts of our proposal.
3.1 Back to Causatives
Although we take Carnap’s commitment to analyticity in semantics to be
misguided—just like Quine put it—the tools we inherited from him are of partic-
ular importance for conceiving psychological inferences bearing on meaning. Enter
meaning postulates (henceforth MPs), which are quasi-logical inferences. We say
quasi-logical only in the sense that they are not proper inferences whose consequent
is by necessity entailed by the antecedent. And while this is a common tool in seman-
tics, we take the kinds of MPs that run between concepts to be the very inferences
8We note in passing that, although this would take us far afield, what counts for us as a perceptual
boundary for, say, to die, is tied to observation, not to the actual act of dying which is independent
of observation. To wit, consider the end point of the verb to break as in John broke the vase: would it
be when all physical particles of said vase cease moving? The concept BREAK is not determined by
the actual physical phenomenon, by Newtonian laws (those are not “in the head”; cf. the intentional
fallacy) but by when break causes BREAK.
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that give rise to a myriad of relatedness effects found in the empirical literature and
in other frameworks committed to analyticity.
Consider causatives.Aswediscussed above, voices in unison claim that causatives
decompose. But there is strong evidence—from experiments and arguments—that
causativesmight not decompose. How, then, can one account for the pervasive effects
obtained in the relations between arguments of the verb?How can one account for the
pervasive effect of relations between transitive and intransitive variants of the same
root verb? One way to conceive the relation between concepts—such that KILL
and DIE or BOIL-transitive and BOIL-intransitive are related—could be by running
inferences such as in (7).
We can cast this proposal in simple predicate logic, by attributing properties to
individuals and by linking predicate relations as inferences. We can only highlight
a few of the characteristics of this system—the ones that are in direct contrast with
decompositional views discussed in Sect. 2. Notice also that the relation between
transitive and intransitive variants of the same core concept can be accounted for
by the entailment between arguments of the verb. But our suggestion is that beyond
those entailments—which are in essence argument-structure driven— “properties”
of the event denoted by the verb are also attained by these relations. We won’t
extend this account of causatives here much further (but see de Almeida, 1999a, b,
for early versions of this proposal). Suffice it to say that these inferences are not
content-constitutive, thus, that it is not the case that the content of an utterance or a
thought somehow depends on the “appropriate” inferences being computed. To us,
the inferences that are typically run when concepts are tokened are synthetic, thus
their actual content cannot be accounted for by semantic analysis.
We also acknowledge that even those with whom we share the main tenets of
atomism have argued against adopting MPs for they are too unconstrained and thus
cannot be used as an account of semantic inferences (Fodor, 1998).Wepartways here.
While we agree that they are unconstrained, our goal is not to model the very content
tokened by a concept such as KILL or BOIL, but the inferences that might ensue that
are taken to account for the conceptual content in all sorts of psychological effects
(from priming to prototypicality to semantic-memory impairments). In summary,
we suggest that inferences such as (7b) are entirely contingent on experience. And
we suggest (7c) to be a basic law of how inferences run over predicates. To assume
that those inferences constitute the representation of lexical content is, in principle
to incur in the intentional fallacy.
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3.2 Back to “Coercion”
We turn now to the other phenomenon, that of the comprehension of indeterminate
sentences such as (1). To ease discussion and comparison with (2)—we will cast our
proposal rather informally as in (8).
(8) (a) Every incoming token lexical item (i) maps onto its corresponding concept
(book →BOOK), (ii) contributes its syntactic information to the evolving
syntactic tree (book __N ), and (iii) contributes logical information to an
evolving semantic composition (viz., a logical form; [∃ x, BOOK(x)]).
(b) The evolving syntactic parsing for a sentence such as (1) tags all its
lexical constituents and its linguistically motivated gaps—viz., the gaps
for syntactic positions that may be optionally filled-in lexically. As for (1),
the gap is potentially in the VP, as in [VP [V0 began [V0 e [OBJ NP]]]].
(c) The concepts that are accessed (mapped onto) by each lexical item are
premises for synthetic inferences whose consequents are experience-based
relations yielding between predicates (thus, a possible inference would be
[∀x BOOK(x) → [READ[ABLE]](x)]).
(d) The meaning of a sentence is obtained by combining the token concepts—
the translations of morphemes—into the evolving logical form, such as
∃x(=MAN), ∃y(=BOOK) (BEGIN (x, y)) (or, alternatively, ∃w (BEGIN
(x, y, w))); that is the shallow, unenriched interpretation of (1).
(e) Many processes of enrichment ensue; among them are the processes of
filling the gaps identified during syntactic structuring with the concepts
that were part of the postulates triggered by (i) the utterance context, and
(ii) the co-text.
Wecan onlymake brief observations about (8)—butwe trust that the contrast with (2)
is quite clear. First, notice that the meaning of book is not a sense; and, according to
our proposal, there are no senses stored with the meanings of words. We do not deny
that there are uses, but uses are obtained pragmatically (they are synthetic; see below),
within the inferences that run after conceptual tokening (as in 8a) and conceptual
composition. Also, as suggested in (8b) there are linguistic arguments for holding
a syntactic gap within the VP of sentences such as (1) without appealing to effects
of “coercion”.9 And we hold that the coercion effects shown in most experimental
studies could be effects of this gap as they can also be effects of inferences that the
indeterminate sentence triggers.
The advantage of a proposal such as the one sketched in (8), in summary, is that
it does away with analyticity. For any of the proposals appealing to analytic proper-
ties, the burden is to determine the criterion for separating analytic from synthetic
9Several linguistic arguments for the VP gap hypothesis appear in de Almeida and Dwivedi (2008)
and in deAlmeida andRiven (2012).Also, see arguments against coercion alternatives in deAlmeida
and Lepore (2018) and in de Almeida et al. (2016), which we cannot begin to discuss here.
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properties. We do not appeal to such properties because to us concepts are atomic,
but we see a role for such properties in the inferences that ensue upon conceptual
tokening and semantic composition.
3.3 Conclusion: Atomic Concepts and Inferences
We conclude by stressing a few points about our proposal. First, in the sense we take
in the present proposal, the inferences about lexical-conceptual properties are mostly
(if not all) synthetic, not analytic, as mentioned above. Thus, one can know what a
dog is without knowing what an animal is or what a pet is, for that matter. Crucial
to this approach is the idea that all such relations, commonly known as constituent
features, are synthetic and thus the inferences that run over them are not necessary for
content attainment. In fact, only the content that each individual symbol instantiates
suffices, independent of the inferences it generates. If inferences are synthetic, they
cannot be part of the meaning of a token item. And if they are not part of meaning,
we can dispense with a semantics that attempts to legislate on experience and world
knowledge.
Second, we assume that many of the inferences that run as a consequence of
a concept being triggered are common to many inhabitants of the same commu-
nity, those sharing similar kinds of experiences. We cannot be precise on this idea
because it points to something whose variables are virtually infinite. Crucial to our
approach, in fact, is the idea that these commonalities cannot be legislated on. We
also suggest that many, perhaps most effects found in the literature—from priming to
prototypicality—are manifestations of these inferences; they are effects of the causal
connectedness established between concepts as a function of use and experience.And
we even acknowledge that it may be difficult to dissociate—empirically—between
inferences computed upon tokening concepts and effects of “activation” of prop-
erties. However, we have presented some clear signs from the literature that point
against decomposition.
We do hold that there is a crucial distinction, upon which a theoretical advantage
stands: by not taking properties to be analytic, there is no commitment to building
a semantic theory whose foundations are faulty. The crucial distinction between
atomism and molecularism is that the former, but not the latter does not require
semantic analysis based on features or synonymy and, because of that, there is no
analysis of content other than assuming that concepts (and their lexical labels) are
largely referential, symbols that point to things, events, ideas, and so forth. Reference
does not entail being in the presence of the object or event: it entails bringing to fore
the relation between the symbol and the thing/event/idea it designates.10
If semantics appeals to features, without an analytic/synthetic distinction, it turns
to holism, which is the antithesis of semantics—at least of a semantics committed to
10This point wasmade by Russell (1913, Chap. 3) and, more recently, by Fodor and Pylyshyn (2015,
Chap. 5) regarding reference “beyond the perceptual circle”.
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compositionality and productivity. If semantics appeals to properties of the world to
fix properties of mental representations, it may fall into the intentional fallacy trap.
The way semantics can avoid all this trouble is to turn to atomism cum inferences.
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Linguistic Relativity and Flexibility
of Mental Representations: Color Terms
in a Frame Based Analysis
Leda Berio
Abstract This paper connects the issue of the influence of language on concep-
tual representations, known as Linguistic Relativity, with some issues pertaining to
concepts’ structure and retrieval. In what follows, I present a model of the relation
between linguistic information and perceptual information in concepts using frames
as a format of mental representation, and argue that this model not only accommo-
dates the empirical evidence presented by the linguistic relativity debate, but also
sheds some light on unanswered questions regarding conceptual representations’
structure. A fundamental assumption is that mental representations can be conceptu-
alised as complex functional structures whose components can be dynamically and
flexibly recruited depending on the tasks at hand; the components include linguis-
tic and non-linguistic elements. This kind of model allows for the representation of
the interaction between linguistic and perceptual information and accounts for the
variable influence that color labels have on non-linguistic tasks. The paper provides
some example of strategy shifting and flexible recruitment of linguistic information
available in the literature and explains them using frames.
Keywords Colors · Labels · Concepts · Perceptual information · Frames
1 Introduction
Cross linguistic1 research about basic color terms has been for a long time a central
concern in the debate regarding Linguistic Relativity, i.e. the influence of language
on conceptual representations. However, this has been seldomly connected to the
1Many thanks are owed to Kurt Erbach, Gottfried Vosgerau and the Ph.D. students of the SFB
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Beckmann for discussing the frames, and to my reviewers. This research was funded by the German
Research Foundation (DFG) CRC 991, Project D02.
L. Berio (B)
Department of Philosophy, Heinrich–Heine–Universität, 40204 Düsseldorf, Germany
e-mail: leda.berio@hhu.de
© The Author(s) 2021
S. Löbner et al. (eds.), Concepts, Frames and Cascades in Semantics,




issue of the structure of mental representations. In this paper, I will argue that a
frame-based model of mental representations allows for the representation of the
relation between the perceptual information contained in color concepts and their
linguistic labels in a way that is compatible with the empirical evidence used in the
Linguistic Relativity debate. In doing so, I shift the problem of Linguistic Relativity
to a matter of the structure of mental representations. In the account I present, mental
representations are conceived as complex functional structures that are dynamically
and flexibily recruited according to the task at hand and that include both linguistic
and non-linguistic information. The core claim of the paper will then be that such a
model allows for the presentation of the interaction between different components
of a mental representation and can account for the variable influence of linguistic
labels on color-related tasks in terms of strategy shifting and flexible use of mental
representations’ components.
In the first part of the paper, I delineate the debate about Whorfianism and its
more recent declinations, connecting the debate to the problemof flexibility inmental
representations. Secondly, I briefly present a few examples of effects of what is called
“shallowWhorfianism”, describing the available experimental evidence. In the third
section, I propose away to represent color concepts in frames and I subsequently show
how this can be applied to concepts in general. In Sect. 4 of the paper, I explain how
this view can be fruitfully applied to communicative situations and pragmatic effects
and, most importantly, to model the experimental data presented in Sect. 2. In Sect. 5,
I provide an example from a different conceptual domain (number representation)
that can be treated efficiently with the proposed model. In Sect. 6, I show how, in
the same spirit, the model can be used to model a classical color task, i.e. the Stroop
task. Finally, I draw conclusions regarding the debate and suggest further necessary
steps.
2 Color Terms and Whorfianism: Some Coordinates
2.1 Universalism, “deep” and “shallow” Whorfianism;
Intertwined Issues
For a long time, the debate regarding color terms acquisition has been influenced by
a (sometimes well grounded) bias against the idea of Linguistic Relativity: one of its
earliest formulations, namely the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis, suggests as amatter of fact
a particularly strong and simplistic influence of language on thought. However, the
debate has seen a partial re-ignition due to more modern studies and techniques that,
revisiting the Whorfian hypothesis’ too strong initial assumptions and statements,
have postulated a role for language in various tasks. This is also partially due to the
fact that what was initially taken as the final word on the color terms debate (namely
the study by Berlin and Kay 1969) has been scaled down to be an important but
not decisive piece of evidence. This is not the place to discuss Berlin and Kay’s
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research and proposal for universal patterns in color terms; for the present purpose,
it is sufficient to keep in mind that it is possible to postulate some kind of influence
of color terms on color cognition without necessarily contradicting Berlin and Kay’s
fundamental insight that there are universal tendencies and/or constraints on focal
colors that are perceptually more salient and therefore easier to identify in absence
of corresponding color terms.
It is essential to specify that this debate is concerned with a particular aspect of
language, which is indeed lexical labeling: most studies regarding color cognition
are focused on whether or not color terms that are present in one language have
any influence on performance as far as color recognition is concerned. This brings
us to the other important specification, which is that the debate is concerned with
influence on perception and categorization tasks. The color words debate is often
enough considered the privileged (if not exclusive) ground for deciding about the
whole debate concerningWhorfianism andLinguisticRelativity.However, it isworth
underlining that the main focus of a big part of the debate is very specific: whether
or not lexical entries influence perception and attention mechanisms.
As a matter of fact, as Lalumera (2014) already notices and as it will be clear in
the next paragraphs, the evidence available in the literature cross-cuts the distinction
betweenWhorfianism andUniversalism, since there are in this sense various kinds of
results suggesting, on the one hand, some influence of linguistic labels on perception
mechanisms, and on the other hand, rejecting the extreme claim made by language
relativity supporters in the past, namely that language strongly shapes mental rep-
resentations. Thus, the distinction between Universalism and Language Relativism
has partially been replaced in the literature by what Lalumera phrases as a distinction
between “deep” and “shallow”Whorfianism, separating those phenomena where the
influence of linguistic labels seems to be constant, pervasive and stable, from those
cases in which it is “only” a flexible, context dependent, task dependent influence of
some sort. The reason why this distinction cross-cuts the previous one, i.e. Univer-
salism vs. Whorfianism, is that the old debate was concerned with a less fine-grained
question: through the universalist lenses, Whorfianism was seen as threatening the
idea of concepts as something that follows potentially the same “rules” of formation
and development regardless of the language of the speaker, therefore menacing the
idea that humans have a somehow universal conceptual repertoire. Whorfianism, on
the other hand, was concerned with the fact that universalism seemed not to admit
any interference of language with mental representations’ structure and complexity.
Framing the debate as “deep” and “shallow” Whorfianism shifts the focus of the
debate to a somehow more pragmatic issue, namely how do linguistic processing
and linguistic labeling interfere with non- linguistic processes, including but not
confined to conceptual formation, and to what extent is that relevant in non linguistic
tasks. The question then becomes, when is this influence relevant and how stable
and pervasive is it. In what follows, I will also try to argue that this might shed some
light on how to think of conceptual structure itself, without making the bold, original
Whorfian claim that language invariably shapes representations.
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Note that this whole debate is better understood if connected with the parallel
but distinct issue regarding cognitive penetrability.2 Cognitive penetrability can be
defined as the property of perceptual experience to be influenced by what happens at
the so-called higher cognitive level; in other words, we speak of cognitive penetration
when perceptual experience is influenced by beliefs, desires, intentions and concepts
(Newen and Vetter 2017). In a way, the debate can be conceived to proceed hand
in hand with the issue treated here: admitting an influence of linguistic information
on non linguistic processing means admitting permeability of perceptual experience.
The problem of permeability, on the other hand, is of a broader nature, as it comprises
considerations regarding modularity and specialization of brain areas; in other terms,
the debate regarding permeability brings us to a broader scale of issues regarding
cognition in general. The focus of the current paper is on the relation between lin-
guistic labels and color concepts; which means, on the one hand, that perception is
obviously relevant for the discussion, given color perception is at the center of the
debate; but also, on the other hand, that the focus is already onmental representations
employed in experience and not on perceptual experience itself, which implies that
the focus is on the level of “higher cognition” only.
Admitting permeability means admitting that the experience of color changes
depending on (among other things) linguistic processes; the debate regarding Lin-
guistic Relativity focuses on whether or not the concepts related to color and used
in perception are influenced by color labels. This claim is therefore both weaker
and related. Related, because color mental representations are supposedly recalled
in color perception; but weaker, because it moves prevalently at the level of higher
cognition (linguistic information influencing representations) and because it does
not make claims on the experience related to color but only on the representational
means employed.3
As it will be clear in the rest of the paper, the view proposed here, despite being
mainly concerned with mental representations and higher cognition as said, assumes
permeability. As amatter of fact, it is assumed here that different kinds of information
such as perceptual and motor information are integrated in mental representations
alongwithmore abstract kinds of information, like linguistic-based one. In this sense,
the view even endorses an account of mental representations that accepts cognitive
penetration and refuses strict modularity.
Getting back on the shallow–deep spectrum, “deep Whorfianism” is problematic
to argue for, given the scarce evidence in favour of an influence of language on thought
that actually is not task dependent but stable and pervasive. Moreover, it is arguably a
type of influence that is more likely to be related to words and concepts that are more
complex and less perceptually-bound than color ones, as it will be argued elsewhere.4
However, the focus of this paper is the so-called “shallow”Whorfianism, or, in other
2Thanks to the anonymous reviewer for pointing out the necessity of mentioning this.
3Note that Macpherson (2012) contains an interesting review of color literature connected to cog-
nitive penetration.
4One assumption of my work on the interface between language and cognition is that it varies
depending on the type of concept/category that is considered.
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words, the influence of language that is only detectable in specific tasks. In the frame
of the Universalism-Whorfianism debate, this kind of influence is irrelevant, because
the question at issue is whether having a different language irreversibly shapes the
conceptual repertoire in a deep, pervasive way. In this sense, the answer going along
with shallow Whorfianism is, clearly, negative. However as Lalumera points out.
[…] someWhorfian effects show themselves to be task dependent and temporary. A question
on this point is worth raising here. Is that enough to deem such effects as uninteresting, qua
task dependent and temporary? The answer is that it would be enough, but at the price of
committing to the view that only stable and context-free representations are employed in
perception and cognition. (p. 7).
This is an essential remark: arguing against any kind of influence of language on
non-linguistic cognitive processes appealing to the fact that the supposed influence
might only be task dependent and not always present means endorsing a view of
mental representations that is not trivial (anymore). In other words, it means com-
mitting not only to the idea that there is a stability in mental representations and
categories, but also that this stability is such that everything that regards the flexible,
online, task dependent application of these same categories is not relevant because
it does not tell us anything about mental processes. Lalumera points out that this
does not seem to be the case, and that there is plenty of evidence suggesting the con-
trary. My claim goes in a slightly different direction: I think that what the evidence
available in the literature suggests is that a way to represent the interaction between
linguistic labels and conceptual units is needed and that, whatever the model, it has
to cope with how variable this influence actually is. In what follows, I will briefly
present some examples of “shallow Whorfianism” that are present in the literature
and then propose a way to model them using frames. I will then try to show how the
model can be flexible and fruitful in dealing with some challenges that conceptual
representations and language present to us, if we assume a view of representations
as flexible adaptable structures that can be differentially activated depending on the
task at hand.
2.2 “Shallow” Effects of Color labelling
Many examples in language cognition and color deal with perception tasks. In this
paragraph, I will focus on two well-known studies that are often referred to in the
literature because they’re considered evidence that Whorfian influence is “shallow”
because it is task dependent. Later in this paper, I will focus on one of them as a
paradigmatic case that points in the direction of a flexible, context dependent use of
linguistic representations in non-linguistic tasks, while at the same time underlining
the open questions that are left.
A well known and cited study, therefore worth mentioning as a valid example, is
Winawer et al. (2006). Russian has an obligatory distinction between light blue and
dark blue (goluboy and siniy), as many other languages, like Greek and Italian, do.
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In the study, subjects (divided between Russian speakers and English speakers) were
shown three color squares arranged in a triad; the task consisted of saying which
one of the bottom squares was identical to the one on top, while reaction times were
measured. In “within category” trials, the square was from the same color category of
the match, whereas in “cross-category” trials the distracter and the match belonged
to different categories in Russian color categorization system.
The hypothesis was that the presence of a color boundary available in one lan-
guage (Russian) but not the other (English) would have affected performance across
the boundary; more specifically, that Russian speakers would havemade faster cross-
category discriminations than within category ones. The prediction was confirmed:
there was indeed a difference between the performance of Russian speakers and that
of English speakers. Even more interestingly, the effect disappeared if the subjects
also had to perform a verbal interference task at the same time (the task consisted in
silently rehearsing digit strings): it seemed, then, that blocking language resources
with task-irrelevant processing was preventing the effect. At the same time, esti-
mating the difficulty of the trials, the research group found out that the difference
between cross-category and within-category trials performance for Russian speakers
increased the more difficult the discrimination was.
Several interpretations can be given of the results. First of all, the fact that the
facilitation disappears when linguistic interference is added, suggests at least two
things: firstly, that the effect on perception is temporary and tied to the specificity
of the task, and secondly, that language labels are extremely likely to be the cause
of the effect, because linguistic coding seems to be involved. Clearly, then, we are
in the realm of what has been referred to as “language as a meddler” (Wolff and
Holmes 2010): there is an online interference that takes place during a certain task
and that is heavily dependent on the context and conditions of the task itself. It
is also clearly a case of language changing the performance as far as an already
existing skill is concerned, namely, to be precise, color discrimination. One of the
most interesting results is definitely that the difference in performance increased if
the task was perceptually more difficult: this suggests that language was used as a
facilitator of some kind, with linguistic labels possibly used too, as a support for the
difficult discrimination task. In this case, then, we have a case in which language is
improving the performance on a task.
Different kind of data comes from studies like that of Roberson et al. (2008), who
explored differences between English and Korean speakers. Korean has fifteen basic
color terms, as opposed to the eleven English ones. Once again, color perception was
the focus of the study, which was aimed at comparing linguistic distinguishability
and perceptual one. It is often argued that language centres are to be located on the
left hemisphere and categorization functions are to be attributed to clusters in the
right hemisphere; wanting to test this distinction, the study investigated the categories
of yeoundu and chorok, respectively yellow-green and green in Korean. In the task,
participants were presented with an array of color patches, among which one was
different from the others. The patches all belonged to the category green for English
speakers; for Korean speakers, however, the “odd ball” patch could belong either to
the same category as the others or not. Participants had to say whether the odd ball
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was right or left in the screen (hence, the stimulus was presented to be elaborated
either in the right or in the left hemisphere). Once again, there was a difference
in cross-category and within-category discrimination: Korean speakers made faster
cross-category judgments compared to within category ones; the effect was present
regardless of the visual field. However, a comparison between fast responders and
slow responders led to an interesting result; fast responders onlywere facilitatedwhen
the stimulus was presented in the right visual field, whereas the effect was present for
slow responders even for the left visual field-presented stimuli. This was interpreted
as a sign that the effect was due to linguistic labels: in case of slower responses,
time allowed the information to be transmitted via corpus callosum. Even here, the
influence of language labels is evident, but at the same time clearly dependent on
task constraints. Similarly to the previous case, moreover, we are talking about an
influence of language labels on perception and attention mechanisms.
In both the mentioned cases, there is an influence of language that is clearly
constrained by determined conditions and tasks: moreover, these are not isolated
cases. Evidence very similar to Roberson et al., for instance, was collected by Gilbert
and colleagues (2007). In general, what this kind of evidence tends to suggest is
that influence of color words is variable and task dependent, and this seems to be
suggested by other studies as well in other semantic domains (see Papafragou, 2008
for instance). However, these results, while suggesting cognitive penetration of some
kind, still do not shed any light on what the possible relation between linguistic labels
and mental representations is and how it can be modeled.
3 Frames and Representation of Colors
Let us take a step back and consider the kind of picture that is compatible with
the presented data. As underlined, this kind of data is often cited in the domain of
Linguistic Relativity as an influence of language on color concepts; however, little
is said about how color concepts enter the picture.
There are several accounts out there that try to tackle the issue of the structure of
mental representations, and this paper is notmeant to be a reviewof them; on the other
hand, it is at least worth underlining that papers as influential as the one published by
Casasanto and Lupyan (2019) efficiently sum up plenty of good evidence in favour
of representations as task and context dependent in various ways, showing how
evidence from psycholinguistic and cognitive science accounts for a great flexibility
in mental representations.5 In what follows, I will adopt the idea that concepts can be
efficiently represented as frames as developed byBarsalou (1992). There exist several
theoretical elaborations of frame theory and the research regarding its compatibility
with other theories of mental representation is vast; for the purpose of the paper,
5Casasanto and Lupyan use this evidence to argue, at the same time, against (1) the idea that there
is any stability in mental representations (2) the possibility of talking about shared representations.
I think their claim is, in this sense, far-fetched, but this goes outside the scope of this paper.
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Fig. 1 Frame for the color concept BLUE
however, only a few specifications are needed, starting from the idea that frame
theories assume that an efficient way to describe and model conceptual components
is to think of complex structures where attributes get assigned unique values.
Furthermore, note that frame theories are quite different from feature lists
approaches, for instance, or from concept atomism, since they all assume that con-
cepts have a fine-grained complex structure (contra atomism) and that attributes are
functional, contra feature list approaches.6 However, choosing frames as a model,
in this instance, does not mean necessarily buying one specific philosophical theory
of concepts. Assuming this is a good model for conceptual representations does not
mean necessarily take a stance on the issue, for instance, of whether or not prototype
theory is a good account for concepts; there is currently a lot of research regarding
how and when frame theory can be integrated in other approaches, and that heavily
depends on the kind of frame theory that is chosen. For the purpose of this paper,
however, only two characteristics of frame theory have to be assumed: the possi-
bility of building recursive structures (1) and the possibility of imposing functional
relations and constraints among attributes and nodes (2).
Let us assume that labels for colors can be considered as an attribute, label,
functionally connected to another node in an attribute-value structure.7
The frame for a color concept then would look like Fig. 1. The expression “portion
of color space” is here intended as a place holder for a region of the color space,
i.e. a value interval (note that thinking about it in terms of a prototypical blue or
an exemplar-like blue does not make a difference for the present purpose). The
arrows in the frame represent the functional attributes; the non-arrow arches represent
constraints between the attributes. Roughly speaking, the idea is that a color concept
can be represented in terms of a portion of color space characterized by a given
6This is a characteristic of Düsseldorf frame theory, adopted in this paper; see Löbner 2015.
7Modelling the relation between linguistic information and conceptual one, far from being contra-
dicting frame theory, is also the focus of other current research. For a compatible account see for
instance Beckmann, Petersen and Indefrey, submitted).
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saturation, hue and brightness, whose value range constraints the attribute English
label. Ideally the constraint can be spelled out in these terms:
If (x ∈ {..}, y ∈ {..}, z ∈ {..}, )then ι = “blue” (1)
where ι represents the value of the attribute English label, which is in this case
“blue”. The formula reads so that, if the values of hue, brightness and SATURATION
are included in a given interval, then a given label applies to the portion of color space
considered.
Note that there is a clear difference between attributes like hue, brightness and
saturation and one like English label. In the first case, we have information whose
knowledge does not have to be declarative, whereas in the latter we have a linguistic
attribute of which we necessarily have a declarative knowledge. This is not problem-
atic because the frame does not represent the declarative knowledge about a color,
but rather the structure of the representation. This applies even more significantly
to the values that the attributes take, since it might be explicit in my representation
that colors are characterized by these three aspects, but I might not know the val-
ues involved. Clearly, the idea for these three attributes is that the values they take
range in a determined interval. The importance of specifying the language considered
should be clear; the idea is that different languages will have different constraints
operating (constraints where the intervals for the values of hue, brightness and sat-
uration are different) and will give different results in terms of the label. Another
obvious necessity of specifying the language in the attribute will be, for instance,
considering the fact that bilingual speakers might have more than one label available
for the same values x , y and z. Such a mental representation, then, contains both
explicitly known and implicitly known information, represented by values that can
be either an interval or not, depending on the kind of attribute.
Let us embed a frame for a color concept like this one in a different frame, in
Fig. 2. The given example illustrates a frame for themental representation of a banana.
Clearly much more than what is represented could enter a speaker’s representation
of a banana, but only salient or situationally-relevant attributes are listed in the
representation. The underlying idea is that this might be a way to represent what an
individual speaker has inmindwhen thinking about a banana.8 Clearly, an assumption
here is that the linguistic label for an object, like for instance a banana, is part of the
set of information connected to the perception of the object in themind of the speaker
or, in other words, that it makes sense to think about the semantics of word meaning
not to be disconnected from mental representations of the objects that words denote.
The advantage of such a move will hopefully be clear once we will be proceeding
with the rest of the argument.
8Albeit, again, with all the simplifications applied here for the sake of brevity. The individual’s
representation of a Banana might include a lot of idiosyncratic information: judgements about how
bananas taste like, for instance, or individual experiences concerning this type of fruit, or even some
kind of danger signal in case of an allergy to bananas. The amount of idiosyncratic information
included in a frame is a matter of discussion.
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Fig. 2 Instantiated frame for a banana
First thing to notice is that the frame includes information that is basically only
perceptual in one of the nodes.
The idea is that a flexible structure like a frame (or, better, the interaction between
frames) can be used to incorporate different sources and kinds of information, includ-
ing purely perceptual one. The intuition under this frame is that different essential
features of “banana” are listed that constitute some of the relevant parts included
in an individual’s representation of what a banana is. Other standard attributes we
probably might associate with it include, for instance, SHAPE. COLOR is also a
standard attribute; what is fundamental here is that frames are recursive, combinable
structures. In this case, the color of a particular banana the speaker might have in
mind is related to the concept of that color, which might be an exemplar-like repre-
sentation or a prototype, for example. This concept is then labeled in English. Just
like in the “banana” case, the label is considered an attribute among others in the
mental representation. The suggestion, then, is to consider the fact that an attribute
like English label can be inserted and that it applies to both the color and other
features of the frame.
Note, furthermore, that the frame represents the banana in the context of ripeness;
it is clear that in another context the value for the functional attribute COLOR could
be a different portion of the color space (since, for instance,wewould have a brownish
color when seeing a overripe banana, or a greenish color when seeing one that it’s
not ripe enough). In that case, the values for the attributes saturation, brightness and
hue will be different, and depending on the constraints operating on the language,
the resulting label will be different.
Now, one of the advantages of frames is that they spell out the functional relation-
ships between elements of the representations and, therefore, can be used to give a
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picture of what happens during communication in an effective way. In the next ses-
sion, I will briefly discuss two kinds of communicative phenomena that can involve
color words.
4 Color Words and Flexible Use of Representations’
Features
A characteristic of communication involving color words is that it can give rises to
interesting phenomena; to proceed with the argument, let us consider some of the
most common examples that can be givenwhen treating the sorites paradox ormodels
of vagueness (see for this variant Rayo 2011). Having a grayish-blueish house among
a group of houses that are painted in red and green, we can successfully utter.
[1] Peter’s house is the blue one.
and be understood as indicating the grayish-blueish house. In this context, the
portion of color space the color of the house can be placed in can be labeled correctly.
However, in a context where the block consists of a blue house, the same blueish-
grayish house, a red house and a green house, [1] cannot be used to point to the second
one. In this case, “blue” does not apply correctly (or, at least, it does not represent the
most successful communicative choice), even if we are considering the same portion
of perceptual space. In other words, the label we are using in communication has
to change to make the conversational exchange effective. The value of the attribute,
then, will vary.
Integrating the two frames representing the two houses can help (Fig. 3); the
strategy of labeling the grayish house (house number 2, for instance), “blue” is not
a felicitous one because it means recalling the same label used for house number
1; given that the task includes differentiating between the two houses, having the
same label does not aid the discrimination and it’s therefore not a winning strategy,
communicatively speaking. In this context, the discrimination task cannot succeed
because the label can be applied to both houses. The frame representation makes the
pragmatic effects, in this way, very easy to spot.
The first type of variability I want to draw attention to is therefore this one;
color labels for the same portion of color space referring to the color property of an
Fig. 3 Two houses’ frames
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object vary in their communicative efficacy. It is essential to stress that this is a point
regarding how mental representations are used in communication. It is certainly
true that, giving an array of color terms available and wanting to apply them in
a rigorous way to a representation of color space, we do not have the same kind
of phenomenon, but rather a series of determinable-determinate relations: hence,
a portion of color space “blue” that can be labeled, on a more fine grained level,
“ultramarine” and another that can be “Nivea blue”.9 However, what is meant with
the given example is something different, i.e. that a communicative situation can
make a label for a determined color more or less communicatively efficient and
appropriate in a context, even more so in Sorites-like cases, where this depends on
whether or not the perceived color is close in perception to other present portions of
the color space. Frames make it particularly easy to see, granting a format of mental
representation modeling that aids the understanding of pragmatic effects.
There is also another element of variability, namely the relevance that the acti-
vation of a determinate attribute (and therefore of the respective value) has in a
determined situation. In other words, at least as far as a certain understanding of
frame theory is involved; attributes can be activated or not during tasks that involve
the representation in question. Let me use another example at the intuitive level to
express the idea. Let us assume I ask a colleague to hand me a folder in my office that
contains the notes from the Dynamic Semantics class I am following. The colleague
knows me and my office and knows that my folders are all of the same color, say
gray, and therefore to find the right folder she will have to read the tags until she finds
the one that says “Dynamic Semantics” and then give me the folder. In this case,
information about color is not relevant for the task that my colleague has. Let us
now imagine that, in the exact same dialogical situation, my folders are colorful, and
that my colleague knows my “Dynamic Semantics” folder is the red one; browsing
through my shelves in my office, she’ll look for the red folder; color information will
be in this case salient for the task at hand. This has a lot to do with the fact that the
color of an object can be of some relevance or not depending on the situation. When
browsing the room looking for an object, different characteristics can be relevant and
therefore acquire salience.
There’s no intention here to directly compare a perceptual task like that described
in the studyofWinawer and colleagues to the described situation; the two tasks clearly
involve different levels of explicitness and entail different relationships between the
attribute color involved and the rest of the representation; however, the point is to
embrace the intuitive idea that information about certain features of a determined
object can be more or less salient and relevant depending on the task at hand. What
these classical examples in pragmatics show is that, in communication, features
associated with an object can acquire relevance and salience depending on the sit-
uation at hand. In these communicative situations, arguably, mental representations
are employed to “solve” the comprehension or production task. In the case of the red
folder, different attributes acquire relevance.
9Thanks to the anonymous reviewer for bringing my attention to this fact.
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This kind of idea is not only intuitively plausible, but also what underlies research
enterprises in psycholinguistics that aremeant to assesswhat the relationship between
concepts and their components is; for instance, studies like Redmann and colleagues
(2014) investigate the activation of color attributes in high color-diagnostic concepts
(like, for instance, bananas). Studies like this focus on language production; how-
ever, the idea is that concepts can be treated as complex structures whose different
components can be “activated” depending on the situation. Moreover, it is assumed
that definite relations among attributes and nodes in a frame exist, the idea being that
the activation of a conceptual component can potentially facilitate the activation of
other parts of the concept.
Another analogy will help clarify the position. Consider my own representation
of DOG. Presumably, it entails different kinds of attributes encoding several kinds of
information - purely perceptual, verbal, and so on. Approximately, a frame represen-
tation of DOG for me might include not only information about basic dog attributes -
such as for instance number of legs, fur, eating habits, and so on, but also plenty of
information about Nala, my dog, about other dog encounters that I had in the past,
about my grandma’s dog that I got to know when I was very young, about the names
for dogs I’ve heardmost often when in Italy, and so on. This entire repertoire of infor-
mation, however, does not need to be recruited every time I have to activate my dog
representation in a communicative situation; it’s reasonable to think, on the contrary,
that this only happens when certain kind of information is required, or relevant, for
a given task - namely, the one I am performing, whatever this might be. Depending
for instance on the communicative situation, I will need to recruit different kinds of
knowledge.
Let us now apply this understanding of concepts and attributes within them to
the main focus of the paper, trying to put the pieces together. The debate is open as
far as how lexical information enters the conceptual domain, as described above; the
question of how linguistic representations and non-linguistic ones interact is precisely
the kind of question that, after all, guides the debate about Linguistic Relativity.
On the other hand, if one assumes that information about how certain perceptual
features can be linguistically coded in different ways (hence, that we can assume
the presence of attributes-like structures like the LABEL one and that the value can
change) and that conceptual components can be recruited according to the situation
and the context at hand, it is natural to assume that the linguistic information can
or cannot be activated and recruited, depending on the context. The modalities and
circumstances of this activation, then, would need to be investigated.
A case like that of Winawer seems to suggest that conceptual representations of
colors, and consequently their labels, can be used and activated during a perceptual
task; one of the possible interpretations of the results is that, while English speakers
operate comparing different perceptual inputs without activating linguistically coded
representations, Russian speakers use a different strategy, namely they employ color
concepts and their labels; at least that’s what seems to be suggested by the difference
in performance. Crucially, however, this kind of strategy seems to be replaced by the
same strategy English speakers employ, in case of linguistic interference: somehow,
then, performing another linguistic task “blocks” or inhibits the label-influenced
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Fig. 4 Winawer’s task in frames: Russian
Fig. 5 Winawer’s task in frames: English
strategy. Given the fact that the task is still possible for English speakers, this is
clearly not something that prevents them from performing the task, regardless of the
presence of color labels. What this study seems to suggest, then, it is that recruiting
or not recruiting linguistic information can depend on the type of task: in this sense,
the choice of strategy is flexible.
Let us try and represent this in frames again with Figs. 4 and 5.
A plausible explanation that is easily representable in frames is that the task is
solved by the Russian speakers by comparing two different nodes including linguis-
tic information. This strategy is not available in the case of English speakers, since
there is only one node containing linguistic information available; therefore, a strat-
egy based on comparing, for instance, visual patters in SATURATION, HUE and
BRIGHTNESS is used. Russian speakers can then shift to the same strategy when
the label attribute is unavailable- i.e. in within-category trials.
To reiterate: this means assuming that it is possible to draw a parallelism between
concepts like BANANA and concepts like BLUE; in other words, assuming that it
makes sense to consider an attribute like label (in language x) to be something that
pertains to the representation of both. In a sense, this is the first tenet of the model
presented here. The second tenet is that a mental representation can be considered
as a structured file where not every part gets activated every time the concept is
evoked; instead, the amount and the kind of information that will be used in the task
at hand will vary according to task constraints, context and possibly other factors.
Finally, a point that has been stressed while presenting the view is that different kinds
of information, of perceptual and not perceptual nature, can be incorporated in the
same mental representation.10
10This is clearly not the only available theory. An alternative account can for instance be found in
Newen (2011)A thorough comparison between the two viewswould be fruitful butwould go beyond
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Arguably, more research has to be done in this direction, as the issues are multiple
and complex. However, it should be clear that results of studies like that of Winawer
or Roberson should be considered as interesting because they fit into an account of
cognitive processes manipulating representations in a flexible, task dependent way,
where different information is recruited according to what is useful for the task at
hand. In Winawer’s case, paradigmatically, linguistic labels seem to play the role
of facilitators for the task at hand, or at least to make a difference when recruited.
Phrased using the vocabulary introduced until now, this implies assuming that there
are complex interactions among linguistic information and perceptual information
which are functionally connected and can be differently employed. Frames are just
one way to represent this kind of relation: however, they help in seeing how data
such as that presented, more than settling the debate about language relativism,
should suggest to see it in another light. A difference between “shallow” and “deep”
Whorfianism ceases to be relevant, once one assumes that the kind of information that
has to be considered when modeling mental representation can be of different kinds
(linguistic and perceptual, for instance) and that this kind of information interacts in
complex ways: the fact that effects of language categorization on cognitive tasks vary
depending on context and task demands seems to point towards an understanding of
mental representations precisely in this direction.
So far, it has been argued that a view of mental representations that involves flex-
ible use depending on the task at hand can be represented efficiently in frames and
that it has a good chance to be related to a model of how representations are used
in communication. However, a few steps are still needed. In the Russian-English
speakers example, what we apparently have is the use of two different strategies for
performing the task: however, there is still no direct evidence in favor of consider-
ing “LABEL” as an attribute that gets activated depending on the task. For all we
know, the strategy employed by English speakers (and by Russian speakers when
linguistic interference is present) might not include any kind of conceptual activa-
tion. Participants might be comparing perceptual input, solving the task on the basis
of this comparison, and using a strategy based on labeled mental representations
instead when two different color terms are present: this suggests switching between
strategies, but does not support necessarily the idea that the linguistic information in
a concept can be activated or not depending on the situation. I think this is a viable
option, as will be argued below. In order to push further Lalumera’s suggestion, to
consider the compatibility of the color terms evidence with a more dynamic picture
the aim of the paper. Two basic differences are however to be noticed; firstly, Newen adopts a model
where relations between conceptual parts are not spelled out in terms of functional relations like
in frames. Secondly, he makes a distinction between two different concepts: RED referring to the
property of being red and RED EXPERIENCE referred to the property of having a red experience,
where the information contained in the first can be integrated in the latter, albeit not as a defining
component. I believe this idea could be integrated in a frame network, but this would require further
investigation.
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of mental representations, it is necessary to go a few steps further. To get there,
we will consider now a different example from another conceptual domain before
turning to colors again.
5 A Brief Excursus into Another Conceptual Domain:
Counting and Motor Representations
Asargued so far, in the case of cross-linguistic evidence for color terms, the debate has
focused a lot on whether effects are to be considered “just” shallow and temporary or
“deeper”. In the context of embodied cognition, somethingvery similar has happened,
in a somehow opposite direction. Embodied semantics is concerned with the role of
motor and perceptual representations in conceptual units, the idea being that is worth
exploring themultimodality of mental representations or, in other words, the role that
sensory modalities play in their structure, use and retrieval. One of the battle grounds
in the embodied cognition debate has always been that of abstract concepts: even
if it’s more or less accepted that motor and perceptual information can have some
relevance as long as concrete concepts are concerned, the same does not hold for
concepts that, intuitively, have less to share with perception, hence abstract concepts.
Moreover, one common argument against embodied cognition lies in the idea that,
even when perceptual and motor resources are recruited during semantic processing,
this is only a somehow shallow “cascade effect” that has nothing to do with “deeper”
conceptual processing (Mahon and Caramazza 2008).
In the context of research regarding representations of numbers, which are consid-
ered quite abstract, there have been several attempts to connect numbers and count-
ing to the more (supposedly) concrete domain of space, the idea being that abstract
concepts like mathematical ones are mapped to more concrete representations like
spatial ones, which is what guarantees their being “grounded” in experience. In a
famous study run by Dehaene and colleagues (2019), the so called SNARC (Spa-
tial Numerical Association of Response Codes) effect was described: large numbers
elicited rightward response and small numbers leftward ones, meaning that small
numbers were classified faster with the left hand and bigger digits were classified
faster with the right hand. Since similar effects were found as long as the vertical
axis is concerned (up for bigger digits and down for smaller ones), this kind of idea
was investigated in a number of other studies. A particularly interesting one is that
by Pecher and Boot (2019). The task was to judge the magnitude of numbers in
comparison with other digits: the stimulus was a digit that was located congruently
or incongruently with the image schematic location of the number (left for smaller
digits, right for bigger ones). In the concrete contexts, participants had to say whether
the digit was bigger or smaller than the one in concrete sentences (“The man read
two books a day”). In the abstract context condition, the digits were to be compared
to other numbers. The idea was to test whether the congruent spatial condition was
facilitating the task or not, which ended up being true only for the concrete context.
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Fig. 6 Frame for a number
Regardless of the debate about embodied cognition, which is vast and complex,
the result is interesting because it has been used to argue against the idea that spatial
representations are relevant for number processing because they only appear to be
used in certain processing contexts. This is somehow very similar to what happens
in the color labeling debate: even here, the key of the arguments lies in the fact that
certain kind of information is only thought to be relevant in determined contexts and
tasks. However, this is hardly enough to say that the positive result (the facilitation
effect in the concrete condition) is not interesting: on the contrary, it suggests that
different processes are going on linking different kinds of information depending on
the task at hand. Moreover, the result goes hand in hand with theories of embodied
cognition like that proposed by Barsalou (2008), where the role of motor and per-
ceptual representations and that of linguistic ones varies depending on the type of
task, but where both have a crucial role in conceptual representations.
Let us look at a possible frame for a concept of a number in Fig. 6.
Different kinds of attributes are present, comprising different kinds of information.
A number has a label, which implies a phonological representation and a graphemic
one and, in this picture, includes spatial mapping information and possibly motor
grounding (lots of the research regarding grounding of number has focused on finger
counting).
A frame like that in Fig. 6 does not imply that motor grounding and spatial infor-
mation are always recruited when the concept of a number is evoked. On the contrary,
it is conveniently compatible with the view of mental representations that has been
presented so far and with the idea that different attributes can be recruited depending
on the situation at hand. Let’s consider the experiment reported: in one condition (the
concrete one), spatial information seems to be relevant, since the subjects’ perfor-
mance changed depending on whether the spatial information was congruent with
the magnitude of the numbers or not. One can then assume that the attribute named
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here “spatial grounding” was then evoked and recruited. The same does clearly not
apply to the abstract condition: in this case, the spatial information did not seem to
be relevant, since the performance did not change depending on the congruency of
the position. This, more than speaking for an alleged scarce relevance of the spatial
mapping, seems to suggest that some other kind of information was relevant for the
task: for instance, the graphemic representation was probably employed. Lacking
a concrete context for the digits, the task was performed using a different strategy,
which probably included in this case comparing the graphemic representations of
the numbers: this is another kind of information, namely visual. Even in this case,
there is a switching of strategies. However, this time, it is plausible to think that
different parts of the involved mental representations are recruited. Depending on
task demands and conditions, different parts of the representations are relevant, and
different attributes are activated. The frame captures the multi-modal nature of the
concept and the flexibility that underlies its use.
6 Back on Colors: Stroop Task And Language-Perception
Interface
Let us then come back to colors now, and consider another set of evidence that is
often discussed, namely the Stroop effect. The phenomena was investigated for the
first time in 1935 (Stroop 1935), and very often recreated. In the traditional set up,
color words are printed in either congruent or incongruent ink (e.g. the word blue is
printed either in blue or red, for instance), and participants are instructed to name the
color of the ink used for printing and to ignore themeaning of the word. Typically, the
task is quite difficult and the incongruent trials cause a significant delay in reaction
times.
Let us think about a possible frame (Fig. 7) describing the situation in the same
terms that have been spelled out above:
Even in this case, there is a graphemic representation of the English label that
can be included in the mental representation. Being a graphemic representation, it is
perceived by the viewer; hence, it makes sense to include perceivable attributes in
the frame. The font will have a size and a color, for instance; only the latter is then
relevant for the task at hand, which is the individuation of the color. The label that is
represented on paper, however, also has a clear connection with a color concept, that
includes a portion of color space (and therefore has determined attributes). Now,what
can happen in such a representation is that the two portions of color space involved
have different values in terms of saturation, brightness and hue i.e. that they identify
a different color, possibly named differently. The mental representation becomes,
in this sense, more complex and can therefore be the reason why processing costs
actually become higher: having to produce a response based on the label given to a
color concept, and being the case that two different labels and two different concepts
are evoked and involved, the task becomes difficult to solve. Note that the participant
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Fig. 7 Frame for a Stroop task (incongruent colors)
does not perceive the label “red” anywhere; however, an attribute is evoked and
activated and the task gains complexity and potentially makes it easier to produce
mistakes. Having two nodes of the same kind, with the same sort of information,
makes it harder to process it, since there is conflicting information regarding the
label involved in the task. In a way, this is the opposite of what happens in the case
of the blue houses; since the task is not a discrimination one, but rather one where
one label has to be produced, the presence of two different nodes of the same kind
delays solving the task.
7 Conclusions and Open Questions
In the present paper, a way to model color representations has been proposed that
represents them as complex structures used in perception tasks and communicative
tasks in a flexibleway. The view, as stressed above, is notmeant to disprove or support
Whorfian-like hypotheses. Rather, the model shows how task requirements shape
conceptual retrieval, and how complex representations can be used flexibly in the
context of specific tasks in a way that is compatible with the evidence regarding color
terms and perceptual tasks presented. Lalumera’s suggestion, to consider the idea that
“shallow” effects of language labels on non linguistic tasks are still interesting if one
does not assumemental representations to be rigid units, is here accepted and pushed
a bit further: it has been argued that what the evidence suggests is, as a matter of fact,
that a view of mental representations that integrates several kinds of information,
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recruited flexibly and task-dependently, is indeed able to potentially account for
the findings. This idea is implemented in terms of functional attributes representing
linguistic information. This is embedded in a view where mental representations are
modeled in terms of different kinds of information as functionally integrated in a
complex structure, which is what results like that of Pecher and Boot actively seems
to suggest and what can be potentially modeled in the Stroop task case.
The presented evidence clearly only gives some clues about how determined
mental processes are affected by linguistic labels for perceptual information and
about how this can be modeled. The limited set of examples, moreover, can only
partially be considered decisive, and the advanced proposal has to be integrated in a
full blown theory of frames. The ultimate goal of such a proposal, moreover, would
be to have a empirical paradigm that addresses the specific hypothesis regarding the
structures of the representations involved. However, the fact that the model seems
to be potentially able to accommodate evidence from different research fields is
encouraging as far as the possibility to have a better understanding of how perceptual
and linguistic information interaction in complex mental representations goes
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Abstract Pragmatics postulates a rich typology of implicatures to explain how true
assertions can nevertheless be misleading. This typology has been mainly defended
on the basis of a priori considerations. We consider the question of whether the
typology corresponds to an independent reality, specificallywhether the various types
of implicatures constitute natural concepts. To answer this question, we rely on the
conceptual spaces framework, which represents concepts geometrically, and which
provides a formally precise criterion for naturalness. Using data from a previous
study, a space for the representation of implicatures is constructed. Examination of
the properties of various types of implicatures as represented in that space then gives
some reason to believe that most or even all types of implicatures do correspond to
natural concepts.
Keywords Conceptual spaces · Implicatures · Multi-dimensional scaling ·
Natural concepts · Pragmatics
Linguists and other language researchers customarily distinguish between syntax,
semantics, and pragmatics, where (roughly) the first pertains to the ways words can
and cannot be combined into sentences, the second to word and sentence meaning,
and the third to language use. This paper is concerned with a question central to
pragmatics, specificallywith the scientific status of so-called implicatures,whichplay
a key explanatory role in this field.More specific still, we are interested in the question
of whether all types of implicatures that the current literature distinguishes between
are natural concepts, where the notion of a natural concept will be understood as
defined by researchers working on psychological spaces. The question is important
insofar as only natural concepts deserve a place in mature scientific theories (Lewis
1983; Boyd 1991).
To address this question, we use data from a study reported elsewhere (Douven
and Krzyżanowska 2019) to construct a psychological space for the representation
of implicatures. In that space, we examine the properties of various types of impli-
I. Douven (B)
SND/CNRS/Sorbonne University, Paris, France
e-mail: igor.douven@paris-sorbonne.fr
© The Author(s) 2021
S. Löbner et al. (eds.), Concepts, Frames and Cascades in Semantics,




catures, with a special interest in seeing whether they satisfy an important criterion
for naturalness (convexity—see below) as proposed in the psychological spaces lit-
erature. The outcome will be seen to provide some support for holding that most or
even all types of implicatures do correspond to natural concepts.
1 Theoretical Background
The basic insight at the root of pragmatics is that we can mislead our audience not
only by telling lies, but also by telling nothing but the truth. Suppose someone asserts,
(1) President Obama has one daughter.
The assertion is true yet misleading, given that it suggests that Obama has exactly
one daughter—which is false. What is suggested is not asserted, but it is nonetheless
conveyed due to a normally warranted presumption of a kind of cooperativeness that
goes beyondmerely telling the truth. In the present example, wemay suppose that the
speaker was in a position to assert, and could with just as much effort have asserted,
that Obama has two daughters, which would have been true as well but would in
addition have been more informative. Precisely because we expect each other to be
cooperative in this kind of way—to try to make our contributions to a conversation
not only true but also relevant, clear, and informative—a person unaware of how
many daughters Obama has would be justified to infer from an assertion of (1) that
he has exactly one daughter. That Obama has exactly one daughter is said to be an
implicature of (1), whose semantic content is only that Obama has one daughter,
possible among many more.
There exist a number of different typologies of implicatures, which are partly
independent of each other. One broad division is that between conventional and
conversational implicatures, where the former are said to arise due to the meaning
of specific words, and the latter due to the context in which an assertion is made. For
instance, the word “although” in
(2) Although Obama won a second term as president, dolphins are mammals.
Suggests the existence of a contrast between the two conjuncts in this sentence
(which strikes us as wrong, given that the conjuncts appear unrelated). On the other
hand, there is no single word in (1) that might lead a hearer to think that Obama
has exactly one daughter. That suggestion can arise for the reason mentioned above:
because wewould normally assume that (1) is the strongest statement the speaker can
make regarding the number of daughters Obama has. Indeed, there are conversational
contexts where this assumption would not be warranted. For instance, if it has just
been asserted that anyone who has at least one daughter qualifies for a certain special
government program, we would not interpret an assertion of (1) as suggesting that
Obama has exactly one daughter. Rather, we would take the speaker’s point to be
that Obama meets the requirement for the government program.
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This brings us to second distinction. We just said that although an assertion of
(1) would, in normal circumstances, implicate that Obama has exactly one daughter,
there are circumstances in which this implicature would not arise. Grice (1989,
p. 37 f) calls implicatures of this type “generalized conversational implicatures.” He
differentiates them from what he calls “particularized conversational implicatures,”
which arise only in specific conversational contexts. For instance, if we are at a party
and you ask me what time it is, you may interpret my assertion of
(3) The guests are leaving.
As indicating that it is already late, even if asserting (1) normally does not engender
this suggestion.
It is fair to say, though, that most attention in the literature has gone to a sub-
typology of conversational implicatures which is based on the various types of
expectations—each brought about by the overarching expectation of cooperativeness
—that the implicatures exploit. For instance, the aforementioned implicature of (1)
is said to be of a scalar type, because we can represent numbers (e.g., numbers of
children) on a scale, and the expectation of informativeness then requires that we
go as far out on that scale as is warranted by our evidence. So someone’s assert-
ing (1) implicates that she knows, or has good evidence for believing, that Obama
has exactly one daughter. By contrast, someone asserting that
(4) Kate Middleton gave birth to a son and she married Prince William.
Is offending the expectation that we report events in an orderly fashion, which in
this instance means: in the order in which they occurred. Thus, the obviously wrong
implicature generated by an assertion of (1)—that the event mentioned first also
happened first—is said to be of an order type.
Scalar implicatures have given rise to a further sub-typology, this one being based
on the different scales that can underly the production of these implicatures. The
main subtypes are the quantificational implicatures, which involve a scale of quanti-
fiers (e.g., some–many–most–all); the gradable adjective implicatures, which exploit
some scale of adjectives that can apply to differing degrees (e.g., soft–audible–loud–
blaring); the ranked ordering implicatures, which involve orderings (like beginner–
intermediate–advanced); and the cardinal number implicatures, which involve some
cardinal number scale, as in our example (1).
This paper will focus on the typology which starts by branching off the conversa-
tional and conventional implicatures and which then has the further branches for the
conversational implicatures described in the previous two paragraphs. This typology
has been mainly defended on the basis of a priori considerations, more specifically
on what are sometimes called “linguistic intuitions.” However, such intuitions are
known to be not always reliable. Indeed, while the said typology is still part of
mainstream pragmatics, parts of it have been contested. For instance, some authors
deny that sentences like (1) carry the “exactly n” reading as a matter of implicature,
claiming that, rather, the “exactly” reading is part of the semantics of numerals (see
Scharten 1997 and Breheny 2008). And Bach 1999 has argued that the belief in the
existence of conventional implicature rests upon a myth.
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Bach’s arguments have in turn been challenged (e.g., Potts 2005) and in any event
my aim is not to question the reality of any part of the aforementioned typology.
Rather, I am interested in the metaphysical status of the various types that occur in
it. It has often been said that we do not just want scientific theories to be predictively
accurate, but also want them to inform us about what, deep down, underlies the
phenomena (e.g., Psillos 1999). And that requirement can be satisfied only if these
theories “carve nature at its joints,” that is, only if their core concepts are natural ones
(Lewis 1983). Against this background, the question I am asking is whether the above
typology latches on to some independent, fundamental reality. Do, for instance, so-
called order implicatures constitute a natural class of implicatures? More generally,
are all types of implicatures natural? Or better perhaps, if Lewis (1983) is right that
naturalness permits of degree, are they all equally natural?
To address these questions, we need some understanding of what it takes for a
concept to count as natural. It has been argued that a concept is natural if it figures in
one or more laws of nature (e.g., Putnam 1983). But this is problematic, given that it
is hard to say what makes a regularity a law of nature (or otherwise) without making
reference to natural concepts (Douven and van Brakel 1998). To characterize natu-
ralness of concepts, it is actually more helpful to turn to recent work on conceptual
spaces, in which a criterion for distinguishing natural from nonnatural concepts has
been proposed that is backed by a considerable amount of experimental evidence.
We will construct a conceptual space later on, and will then go into details. For
now, it suffices to say that a conceptual space is a one- or multidimensional metric
space, where the dimensions represent fundamental qualities that items can have
to varying degrees and with respect to which they can be compared to each other.
Distances in such spaces are supposed to be inversely related to similarities: the
greater the distance between (the representations of) two items in a given space, the
more dissimilar the items are in the respect represented by the space. For example,
CIELAB space is a three-dimensional Euclidean color space, and distances in the
space are meant—and have been shown—to predict accurately how similar people
will judge different shades to be: the closer two shades are in CIELAB space, the
more similar they tend to appear to human observers (Fairchild 2013). Many other
conceptual spaces are known in the literature, and although the best-known ones
all pertain to perceptual concepts (next to color spaces, such as CIELAB, there are
vowel spaces, odor spaces, taste spaces, etc.), more recently conceptual spaces have
been developed formore abstract concepts, includingmoral, epistemic, and scientific
concepts.
What makes conceptual spaces especially valuable is that they allow us to repre-
sent concepts geometrically, as regions in some given space. Thereby, the study of
concepts becomes both formally rigorous and empirically testable. For instance, the
concept of redness can be thought of as a region in CIELAB space, which means we
can carry out all sorts of mathematical operations on it—likemeasuring its volume—
and at the same time use it for conducting all sorts of experimental work (e.g., con-
cerning the nature of vagueness: see Douven et al. 2013; Decock and Douven 2014;
Douven and Decock 2017; Douven et al. 2017; Douven 2018).
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If concepts are regions in conceptual spaces, is any region in any conceptual
space a concept? “Concept” is, to a high degree, a term of art, and so we are free
to answer this question in the positive. However, the more worthwhile question is
whether any region represents or could represent a natural concept. And it takes little
imagination to appreciate that now the answer is definitely negative. In color space,
there are infinitely many regions that contain all the colors in the rainbow. Surely
such regions represent gerrymandered rather than natural concepts.
Now that we can think of concepts formally, can we also distinguish formally
between those regions that represent or can represent natural concepts and those that
can not? Gärdenfors (2000, p. 71) proposes a topological criterion, which he calls
Criterion P: A natural concept is a convex region of a conceptual space,
where a regionR is convex if and only if, for any pair of points x, y ∈ R, if z ∈ xy
then z ∈ R. As Gärdenfors (2000, p. 70) explains, Criterion P can be thought of as
a principle of cognitive economy, given that “handling convex sets puts less strain
on learning, on your memory, and on your processing capacities than working with
arbitrarily shaped regions.” He also cites important empirical work on color naming
which shows that color concepts like blue, red, green, and so on, which we tend to
regard as natural color concepts, all form convex regions in CIELAB space (see also
Jraissati and Douven 2018). Douven (2016a) presents further empirical evidence for
Criterion P, showing that the concepts bowl and vase come out as convex in the
appropriate shape space.
Whereas Criterion P is a plausible necessary condition for natural concepts, it is
debatable whether it is also sufficient.1 Gärdenfors (2000, p. 70) already expressed
doubts on this point, and Douven and Gärdenfors (2018) argue explicitly that further
conditions are needed to single out the natural concepts. However, in addressing the
question of whether all types of implicatures are equally natural concepts, we will
content ourselves with considering whether the various types of implicatures, when
represented in a conceptual space we are about the construct, satisfy Criterion P. If
some fail to do so, that is an indication that they are not natural concepts. And if
some or all do satisfy the criterion, that is at least some evidence for holding that
they are natural concepts.
To build the requisite conceptual space for representing types of implicatures, we
need input data. The data we are going to use are taken from a study reported in
Douven and Krzyżanowska (2019). We briefly describe the data in the next section,
and then go on to construct a conceptual space in Sect. 3.
1There has been some discussion about whether Criterion P is even necessary. See Gärdenfors
(2018) and references given there.
148 I. Douven
2 Input Data
Douven and Krzyżanowska (2019) were interested in three questions, all related
to the semantics–pragmatics interface. First, they sought to investigate empirically
whether ordinary speakers’ responses to true but supposedly pragmatically infelic-
itous sentences—true sentences that generate a false implicature—are in line with
linguists’ and philosophers’ ideas about how semantic and pragmatic aspects of lan-
guage are to be sorted. Specifically, they were interested in whether people reliably
distinguish between the truth and the assertability of sentences in a way that accords
with mainstream thinking in linguistics and philosophy.
Second,Douven andKrzyżanowska (2019)were interested in possible differences
in responses brought about by the various types of implicatures. For instance, might
people systematically deem true sentences generating false conventional implicatures
more unassertable than true sentences generating false conversational implicatures?
Might the different types of conversational implicatures be evaluated differently in
this respect?
And third, they were interested in individual differences among participants. Pre-
vious research (Spychalska, Kontinen, and Werning 2016) had suggested that some
people are more inclined to judge the truth values of sentences purely on the basis
of what according to theorists are the semantic contents of those sentences, whereas
other people might base their truth judgments also, at least to some extent, on the
sentences’ pragmatic aspects, so that they might be more inclined to judge a true
sentence with a false implicature as false.
To investigate these questions, Douven and Krzyżanowska used materials con-
sisting of the 24 items listed in Table1 together with a great variety of filler items
which were meant to conceal from the participants the purpose of the study. The test
items were meant to generate six types of false implicatures, where each type was
instantiated by four different sentences: quantificational implicatures (items 1–4);
gradable adjective implicatures (items 5–8); ranked ordering implicatures (items 9–
12); cardinal number implicatures (items 13–16); temporal order implicatures (items
17–20); and conventional implicatures (items 21–24).
In both studies reported in Douven and Krzyżanowska (2019), the participants
were divided into three groups, where participants in one group were asked about the
items’ truth, participants in a second group were asked about the items’ assertability,
and participants in the remaining groupwere asked about the items’ believability (the
questions about believability were related to a secondary research goal, which we
leave aside here; see Douven 2010, 2016b, and Douven and Krzyżanowska 2019).
The difference between the two studies was that participants in the first were always
asked to give yes/no answers, whereas participants in the second study were asked
to indicate on a 7-point Likert scale the extent to which they agreed that an item was
true/assertable/believable.
As for the first research question, neither study revealed any significant differences
among the responses from the three groups (nor were there significant differences
between the two studies). Figure1 presents the proportions of positive responses from
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Table 1 Items used in the studies reported in Douven and Krzyżanowska (2019)
1. Some patches are blue.a
2. Some roses are flowers
3. Most patches are red.b
4. Most laptops are computers
5. The tiger finds the boy’s cereal moderately sweet.c
6. The female basketball player Margo Dydek (7 ft 2 in / 2.18m) was tall for a woman
7. Bill Gates is relatively rich
8. On the North Pole, winter temperatures are somewhat cold
9. In the UK, people over the age of 85 have the right to retire
10. In principle, all American citizens over the age of 25 have the right to vote in federal
election
11. In the UK and the US, children under the age of 15 are prohibited from buying hard
drugs
12. In the US, people who earn more than $200,000 a year are obliged to pay taxes
13. Alfred Hitchcock made two movies
14. President Obama has one daughter
15. In the last Olympic games, the US won four medals
16. At the height of its power, Great Britain owned 12 ships
17. The tiger looks for the bread in the toaster and the boy puts a piece of bread into the
toaster.d
18. Princess Diana died in a car accident and she divorced Prince Charles
19. The man comes up with a bogus answer and the boy asks how the load limit on
bridges is determined.e
20. Kate Middleton gave birth to a son and she married Prince William
21. Although Prince William had fallen in love with Kate Middleton, the 2014 Winter
Olympics will be in Russi
22. Harry Potter and the Sorcerer’s Stone was a box office hit, therefore Obama is the
president of the US
23. Although Obama won a second term as president, dolphins are mammals
24. Mitt Romney lost the 2012 presidential election, therefore U2 is a rock band
aShown with a series of only blue patches. bShown with a series of only red patches. cShown with
a comic strip in which a tiger is seen finding a boy’s cereal extremely sweet. dShown with a comic
strip in which a boy first puts bread in a toaster and then a tiger looks into the toaster. eShown with
a comic strip in which a boy first asks the question and then the man answers it
the first study, which shows how close the responses from the three groups were to
each other. The graphs of the mean responses from the second study, not shown here,
are virtually indistinguishable from those shownhere; seeDouven andKrzyżanowska
(2019). So, as far as these results go, it hardly appears tomatterwhetherwe ask people
to judge the truth, believability, or assertability of a sentence that is true according
to standard semantics but that generates a false implicature. More generally, Douven





















Proportions of positive responses
Fig. 1 Proportions of positive responses per item from the first study in Douven and Krzyżanowska
(2019); labels refer to the numbering of items in Table1
however useful from a theoretical perspective perhaps, is reflected in how ordinary
speakers tend to evaluate sentences like those in Table1.
As stated above, Douven and Krzyżanowska (2019) were also interested in pos-
sible differences in responses due to the various types of implicatures generated by
their materials. Just eye-balling the results in Fig. 1, it appears that proportions of
positive responses tend to be in the same range for each type separately, but not so
much across types. In line with this, Douven and Krzyżanowska’s analysis revealed
a significant effect of type of implicature on the responses. They again obtained the
same result for the responses from their second study. Hence, the answer to their
second question was positive.
For the third question—whether participants can be split into logical responders
and pragmatic responders—they looked at the correlations between the responses
for any pair of items. If a division between logical and pragmatic responders exists,
then at a minimum one would expect these correlations to be rather high: some
participants—the supposedly logical responders—would then tend to judge all items
in Table1 to be true, while others—the supposedly pragmatic responders—would
tend to judge all those items to be false. But that turned out not to be the case. Figure2
is reproduced from Douven and Krzyżanowska (2019) and shows the correlations
among the “truth” responses from the first study; the correlations from the second
study were essentially the same. It is clearly visible that, whereas both the responses
to the quantificational items and the responses to the conventional items correlate
amongst themselves, they do not even moderately correlate with most of the other
































Fig. 2 Correlations among “truth” responses from the first study in Douven and Krzyżanowska
(2019); labels refer to the numbering of items in Table1
items, nor do the responses to those other items tend to correlate even moderately
among themselves.
Given that in no interesting respect were there significant differences between the
two studies reported by Douven and Krzyżanowska, we in the following consider
only the data from the first study.
3 Building an Implicature Space
In Sect. 1, wementioned that, whereasmost conceptual spaces to be found in the liter-
ature are for perceptual concepts, there is nothing that prevents us from constructing
spaces for other types of concepts, as is witnessed by some recent proposals for
modeling abstract concepts spatially. Here, I am going to make a further such pro-
posal, to wit, a proposal for constructing an implicature space. I am not aware of any
previous attempts to create such a space, but the idea of a conceptual space for the
representation of implicatures certainly makes sense.
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At least, the idea makes sense prima facie—there is a concept of conventional
implicature, a concept of order implicature, and so on—but one must always reckon
with the fact that trying to construct a conceptual space leads nowhere. To see how
this may happen, it is first to be noted that conceptual spaces are typically con-
structed by means of a dimensionality-reduction technique, the one most commonly
used being multidimensional scaling (MDS). In an MDS procedure, we construct
a spatial representation of a set of items, taking as input similarity judgments, or
confusion probabilities, or correlation coefficients, pertaining to those items. There
is no guarantee, however, that the resulting representation will be any good. Specifi-
cally, what we aim at in an MDS procedure is a space which (i) is low-dimensional,
ideally, with no more than three dimensions; (ii) has good fit, which in this context
is expressed in terms of stress, where lower stress values indicate more faithful rep-
resentations of the similarities/confusion probabilities/correlations related with the
items we are trying to represent; and (iii) has interpretable dimensions, in that we
can associate each dimension with some fundamental attribute the items can be said
to have to some degree. An outcome of an MDS procedure may fail to satisfy some
or all of these criteria.
The items we are going to use to construct an implicature space are the ones given
in Table1, and the specific input data are the correlations among the responses to
those items reported in Douven and Krzyżanowska (2019) and briefly described and
depicted in the previous section.
To start building our space, we must first turn those correlations into distances.
There are many options for measuring such distances, but the most common ones
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with p = 〈x1, . . . , xn〉 and q = 〈y1, . . . , yn〉. For k = 1, this yields the so-called
city-block or Manhattan metric, and for k = 2, the more familiar Euclidean metric.
It is generally held that the Euclidean metric is appropriate for measuring dis-
tances between similarity ratings (confusion probabilities, correlations) when the
“dimensions” underlying those ratings are integral in the sense that they cannot be
experienced independently of each other (for instance, one cannot separately expe-
rience the hue and the saturation of a shade). If, by contrast, the relevant dimensions
are separable (i.e., not integral), then the city-block metric is generally considered
to be the right choice (see, e.g., Torgerson 1958; Garner 1962; Shepard 1964; and
Nosofsky 1986).
In the present case, it is not immediately clear which, or how many, dimensions
are going to be necessary to faithfully represent our items, supposing we can obtain
a faithful representation at all. Thus, in particular, it is not clear whether we should
expect the dimensions to be integral or separable. For that reason, we derive distances
from the correlation coefficients both via the Euclidean metric and via the city-block
metric, and then carry out MDS procedures for each separately.
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Fig. 3 Stress values for
MDS solutions with 1 to 10
dimensions, both for the

















Once distances are derived—in the present case done via the dist function that
is part of the base R language (R Core Team 2017)—one faces a further choice, to
wit, whether to apply metric or nonmetric multidimensional scaling. The former tries
to represent objects geometrically in a way which preserves as faithfully as possible
the distances between those objects in the distance matrix that is given as input. By
contrast, the latter tries to represent objects geometrically in awaywhich preserves as
faithfully as possible the ordering of the distances between those objects according
to the distance matrix; so, the smaller the distance between objects according to
the matrix, the closer they are in the geometric representation, though no linear
mapping of matrix distances onto distances in geometric space is aimed for. When
distances derive from subjective assessments, nonmetric multidimensional scaling
is generally recommended (Bartholomew et al. 2008, pp. 56–62). Given that, in our
case, the distances do come from subjective assessments—people’s responses to the
items in Table1—nonmetric multidimensional scaling will be used in the following.
Specifically, we conduct theMDS procedures using the function metaMDS that is
included in thevegan package forR. All configurations are centered and rotated to a
principal axes orientation (see Borg and Groenen 2010, Sect. 7.10). MDS procedures
are conducted for 1–10 dimensions and their stress levels are compared. The various
stress values for the outcomes are shown in Fig. 3. We see immediately that we can
obtain better solutions for the city-block distances than for the Euclidean distances.
According to Johnson (2008, p. 205), in MDS we look for stress values less than 20.
This criterion is met already by the two-dimensional solutions.
There is a second type of plot commonly used to assess the goodness-of-fit of
an MDS solution, the so-called Shepard plot, in which input and output distances
are plotted against each other. Figure4 shows such plots for the best two- and three-
dimensional MDS solutions, so plotting the city-block distances among the correla-
tions (the observed dissimilarities) against the city-block distances in the solutions.
We see that, in both cases, the fit is excellent, with an R2 value of .98 for the two-
dimensional solution and of .99 for the three-dimensional one. Especially in the latter
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Non-metric fit, R2 = 0.981
Linear fit, R2 = 0.915
Shepard plot for best 2D MDS solution
















e Non-metric fit, R2 = 0.994
Linear fit, R2 = 0.96
Shepard plot for best 3D MDS solution
Fig. 4 Plot of distances among correlations against distances in best MDS solution




































Best 2D MDS solution
Fig. 5 Two-dimensional MDS solution for the city-block distances; different categories of items
are differently colored
case, the plotted points are grouped very tightly around the monotonically increasing
line corresponding to perfect fit (for the nonmetric case). The actual solutions are
displayed in Figs. 5 and 6.
So far, the best solutions satisfy two out of the three criteria (i)–(iii) mentioned
above: they are low-dimensional, and they have excellent fit. How about the third
criterion, that of having interpretable dimensions? While coming up with an inter-
pretation of the dimensions of an MDS solution is often challenging (see Douven
2016a), it seems doable in the present case, at least for the first two dimensions (the
only two, if we are happy to go with the two-dimensional solution).
From much of the pragmatics literature one comes away with the impression that
utterances either are or are not infelicitous, depending on whether they generate a
false implicature, as if that were a categorical matter. That seems as wrong, however,
as the suggestion, also encountered in some of the same literature, that an utterance
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Fig. 6 Different viewpoints on the three-dimensional MDS solution for the city-block distances
either does or does not generate an implicature. The two wrong suggestions may
well be related: failure to observe that utterances can be more or less felicitous may
stem from a failure to observe that implicatures can be stronger or weaker.
Consider, for instance, an example fromDouven (2012). In the example, a graduate
student tells her supervisor,
(5) You have published some papers that I really like.
The supervisor can see two different possible explanations of why the student uttered
this sentence.One is that the studentwanted to convey that she read someof his papers
and liked all of those; the other is that she read some or all of his papers and liked
some of those she read and some not so much. The supervisor may think the first
explanation tops the second and therefore infer that the student did not read all of
his papers. However, the point the example is meant to illustrate is that because of
the presence of an alternative explanation of why the student uttered (3), and an
alternative that is close in explanation quality to the first explanation, the inference
can only be guarded, so that, as a result, the implicature is only a weak one. Put
differently, if it should turn out that the student read all of her supervisor’s papers,
an utterance of (3) would at most be minimally infelicitous.
Once this is observed, it is not too speculative to think that the first dimension
represents something like degree of felicitousness (or conversely, degree of poten-
tiality to mislead one’s audience). Consider the four items most to the right in the
two-dimensional space (6, 10, 12, 18), and compare them with the quantifier items
(1–4) and the conventional items (21–24): All eight of the last items strike one as
being much more infelicitous than the first four items. And all of the cardinal num-
ber items (13–16) do strike us as being more infelicitous than, for instance, item 6,
but not quite as infelicitous as the quantifier or conventional items. More generally,
that felicitousness is a matter of degree should be uncontroversial and is directly
related to the claim made in Douven (2012) that implicatures can vary in strength.
The latter claim was defended in terms of explanation quality—an implicature can
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be part of the best explanation of why the speaker said what she said in the context
in which she said it, but the extent to which the best explanation stands out as being
the best can vary, and can have a significant impact on people’s willingness to infer
the truth of that explanation, as has recently been verified experimentally in Douven
and Mirabile (2019).
Some support for this suggestion also comes from considering that item 18, which
mentions Princess Diana’s death first and her divorce second, carries basically no
risk of misleading anyone about the order of the events, given that a divorce requires
a person to be alive. Here, semantics (the meanings of “divorce” and “death”) and
world knowledge simply prohibit the implicature of the “wrong” temporal order
to arise from an utterance of item 18. This is different for temporal order items
17 and 19: both suggest a temporal order of the events that is perfectly possible given
the meanings of the terms involved and general knowledge about the world but that
happens to be contradicted by the comic strips the sentences pertained to. Perhaps
temporal order item 20 does not fit this interpretation quite as well, given that, in
the context of the British royal family, it seems rather improbable, a priori, that the
wife of a successor to the throne becomes a mother, or even becomes pregnant, while
being unmarried. On the other hand, as the saying goes, the times they are a-changin’.
The strict split between conventional and conversational implicatures, mentioned
in Sect. 1, may in fact be due to another false dichotomy. Against the widespread
assumption that an implicature arises either due to the conventional meaning of some
term or due to context plus the assumption of speaker cooperativeness, some authors
have pointed out that there can be differences in the frequencies with which contexts
occur that give rise to this or that implicature, and these differences may have an
effect on the degree to which an implicature comes to be felt as being part of the
meaning of a given expression. Hopper and Traugott (2003, Sect. 4.3) refer to this
process as “semanticization,” citing the following characterization of it:
[I]f some condition happens to be fulfilled frequently when a certain category is used, a
stronger association may develop between the condition and the category in such a way that
the condition comes to be understood as an integral part of the meaning of the category.
(Dahl 1985, p. 11)
Given that the frequency with which the condition may be fulfilled in contexts in
which an expression is used may vary, one would suppose that the situation that the
condition is understood as part of the meaning of the expression is a limiting case,
and that the strength of the association between condition and expression can vary.
To make this more concrete, compare, for instance, items 1, 8, and 22. It is
difficult to imagine a context in which use of the word “therefore” does not suggest
an inferential relationship between the clauses it connects. Helping us indicate the
presence of such a relationship seems to be the only use we have for the word.
So, it is felt as being part of the meaning of “therefore” that there is an inferential
relationship between the connected clauses, even if for theoretical reasons it may
still be better to attribute this suggestion to pragmatics—specifically, “therefore”
generating a conventional implicature—than to semantics.
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At the other extreme, looking at item 1, it is very easy to conceive of contexts in
which we do not at all intend “some” to have a “not all” reading. Suppose I utter,
(6) John is going to organize a party, and knowing him, he’s going to play loud
music. Some people in the neighborhood will be annoyed.
I may utter these sentences without having any evidence, and without meaning to
imply, that not all people in the neighborhood are going to be annoyed by the loud
music at John’s party. What I know for sure is that some people are going to be
annoyed, but while I am not in the stronger epistemic position to assert that all people
are going to be annoyed, I do not wish to suggest that that is not an open possibility.
And my audience, reasonably supposing that I have not surveyed all people in the
neighborhood on this matter, also will not likely take me to be suggesting as much,
and so will not likely be misled.
Finally, consider item 8. In virtually all contexts, we will take “somewhat cold”
simply to mean “not extremely cold.” On the other hand, on our best current the-
oretical analyses of gradable adjectives (such as “cold”), these implicitly refer to
standards, and such standards are known to be sensitive to contextual variation. Con-
sider a discussion in which a group of adventurers are planning an expedition, where
it is already decided that the expedition is going to be to some extremely cold place.
Then the modifier “somewhat” in an utterance of item 8 might be appropriate in the
context of their conversation if they had just been considering places to go where it
is even colder than at the North Pole in the winter. (I am assuming, for the sake of the
example, that such places exist, which I have not verified.) Even in that context, we
may presume, none of the adventurers would want to deny that winter temperatures
at the North Pole are extremely cold.
Perhaps similar considerations apply to the cardinal number items (13–16). Recall
the context, from Sect. 1, where it would be entirely appropriate to assert that Obama
has one daughter. Or consider this exchange:
Quizmaster: “Name one country that won at least four medals in the last Olympic games.”
Candidate: “France won four medals.”
Such contexts may not be very common, but they are also not extremely rare. (As for
the item about Hitchcock, that may not have been well chosen, given that especially
a younger generation may have little familiarity with Hitchcock or his movies.)
Based on the above considerations, and given that the conventional items are
all near the bottom of the scale constituted by the second dimension, the quantifier
items all at the top of that scale, and the degree modifier items as well as the cardinal
number items are in between, my best guess concerning the second dimension is that
it represents something like context-sensitivity or degree of semanticization.
In short, the proposed interpretations of the first two dimensions are degree of
felicitousness (or degree of misleadingness) and degree of semanticization, respec-
tively. It appears harder to come upwith an interpretation of the additional dimension
for the three-dimensional solution and we leave this as an open issue here. It is to
be emphasized that because the MDS procedures were conducted on the basis of
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relatively sparse data, any interpretation of the dimensions is at best an exploratory
hypothesis, to be confirmed in follow-up research, ideally involving a richer set of
materials.
4 Naturalness
We finally come to the question concerning naturalness: Are the concepts associated
with the various types of implicatures natural ones? We did much of the necessary
stage-setting in the previous section, due to which we now have available an impli-
cature space (or two, if we like), which will make answering the aforementioned
question much easier. After all, as was remarked in Sect. 1, in the conceptual spaces
framework the notion of naturalness has a precise meaning, or at least the framework
provides a precise criterion for naturalness, viz., convexity. (It will be recalled that
a region is convex if and only if, for any pair of points lying in the region, the line
segment connecting them lies in its entirety in the region as well.) As mentioned,
there is a wealth of evidence supporting this criterion; for instance, in color space, we
find only shades of red between any pair of shades of red, and not also (say) shades
of blue or green or orange. Does a similar conclusion hold for the various types of
implicatures as represented in our implicature space(s)?
We start by considering again the two-dimensional solution shown in Fig. 5. We
observe that, in this solution, the quantifier items (1–4) are tightly grouped together,
as are the cardinal number items (13–16) and the conventional items (21–24). The
same is true for three of the four gradable adjective items (5, 7, 8), the outlier being 6.
One reason why this may not be very surprising is that the first three items all con-
cern so-called degree modifier phrases (“X is relatively/moderately/somewhat Y ”),
whereas the outlier involves a comparison class phrase (“X is Y for a Z”). In the
pragmatics literature, these are commonly distinguished, and so it might have been
better if Douven and Krzyżanowska had kept them separate in their work; they might
for instance have included four items of each subtype among their materials. In any
case, the types seem to trigger somewhat different pragmatic inferential mechanisms:
degree modifier phrases implicate that the utterance would be false, or at least further
from the truth, were the modifier omitted, while comparison class phrases implicate
that the utterance would be false, or at least further from the truth, if the comparison
class were not mentioned or were replaced by the normally implicit default compar-
ison class (“Trump is rich for an American president” implicates that he is not rich
tout court, or not rich for an American, generally speaking).
Theremay be an even simpler explanation for the outlier. The assertion thatMargo
Dydek was tall for a woman will normally generate the implicature that she is not tall
for a person (when the men are included in the comparison class), which is false in
the present case. But while thereby an assertion of item 6 would normally generate a
false implicature, and so would normally be misleading, Douven and Krzyżanowska
could only assume their participants to see the falsity of the implicature by adding,
in parentheses, the height of Margo Dydek (everybody knows Bill Gates, and knows
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Fig. 7 Two-dimensional MDS solution with convex hulls added
that he is rich, but not so many will have heard of Margo Dydek). However, with the
basketball player’s height being explicitly mentioned in the sentence, even if only
parenthetically, the risk of generating a false implicature is automatically reduced
to zero: the sentence, while somewhat awkwardly formulated perhaps, will have no
tendency to mislead anyone into thinking that Margo Dydek was not tall for a person
(being over 2 m, as the sentence asserts her height is, counts as tall by any reasonable
standard). In retrospect, then, this was probably a poorly chosen item in Douven and
Krzyżanowska’s materials.
At first blush, the picture appears to be more troubling for the ranked ordering
items (9–12) and the temporal order items (17–20). In neither group do the items
seem to hang together very tightly. More importantly still, they do not appear to form
convex regions in the space. Whereas, as just mentioned, we do not find shades of
blue or green among the shades of red in color space, fromFig. 5 it looks as though the
ranked ordering items and the temporal order items are interspersed. (The fact that
both types refer to some kind of ordering could lead one to believe that maybe these
items form actually only one type of implicature, whichmight then be represented by
a convex region. But that would be a mistake: the orderings have nothing essentially
in common, ranked ordering implicatures implicitly referring to some scale, and
temporal ordering implicatures explicitly referring to different points in time, even
if the points in time can remain unspecified.) This becomes easier to see still when
we add, as is done in Fig. 7, the convex hulls for the different types of implicatures
to the MDS solution. (The convex hull of a set of points is the smallest convex set
encompassing all points in the set.)
The three-dimensional MDS solution scored better on stress than the two-
dimensional one, and it might be that all types of implicatures do form convex
regions in three-dimensional space. This is almost the case, but here, too, the ranked
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Fig. 8 Three-dimensional MDS solution with convex hulls added
other convex hulls are cleanly separated from each other). This can be seen somewhat
from Fig. 8, although it is only really clear if one rotates the figure in Mathematica,
the software that was used to produce the plots.
So, we might be inclined to conclude that either ranked ordering implicatures or
temporal order implicatures (or both) fail to constitute a natural concept, or at any
rate not one as natural as the other types of implicatures. I doubt, however, whether
that conclusion would be warranted. Specifically, I doubt whether we should assume
that all alleged ranked ordering items and all temporal order items in Douven and
Krzyżanowska’s materials generate the implicatures they were supposed to generate.
When considering an interpretation of the first dimension of the implicature space
(or spaces), we already noted that some conjunctions that relate events in the wrong
temporal order will nonetheless not lead hearers to make any false inferences about
that order. That is simply because some events can only occur in a given order, for
logical reasons, or probably more often for reasons of how the world is organized,
whether physically, biologically, legally, socially, or in some other respect. In partic-
ular, item 18, about Princess Diana, will not have led anyone to believe, even if only
for a moment, that she first died in a car accident and then had a divorce. And rerun-
ning the whole MDS procedures described in the previous section but now leaving
item 18 out does produce a space in which all types of implicatures form convex
concepts.
This is not necessarily to say we should put all the blame on item 18. Some of the
ranked ordering items may not have been as happily chosen either. For instance, it is
conceivable that item 12, about Americans earning over $200,000 a year having to
pay taxes, may for some of Douven and Krzyżanowska’s participants not even have
generated a weak implicature to the effect that Americans earning less are exempt
from paying taxes. That is because the item is easily interpretable as making an
assertion about a specific income group with no intention to suggest anything about
any other income group, or so it seems.
More generally, at this point it is probably best not to make too much of the
apparent clash of the temporal order and ranked ordering implicatures in the two-
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and three-dimensional spaces, and rather to take the finding as motivating further
research, with a richer set of materials, which is at the same time better geared to the
specific purpose of constructing a conceptual space.
5 Concluding Remarks
The main question addressed in this paper was whether the various types of implica-
tures postulated bymodern-day pragmatics constitute natural concepts. The question
is an important one insofar as serious scientific theories are supposed to feature pre-
cisely such concepts. To answer this question, some preparatory work had to be done,
mainly in the form of constructing an implicature space.We followed a common pro-
cedure for constructing such spaces, noting however that there was no guarantee that
the procedure would work. But we were lucky and ended up with a two-dimensional
implicature space that met all criteria by which conceptual spaces are commonly
judged. We also obtained a three-dimensional space that appeared to fit the input
data even better, although here we had some difficulty interpreting all three dimen-
sions (a problem that might be overcome by gathering further data and rerunning the
analysis).
Examination of where in our space (or spaces) the items that had served as input
were located showed a tight within-type clustering of most of those items. More
importantly still, items belonging to the same type tended to span convex regions in
that items belonging to one type lay mostly not between items belonging to some
other type. While this is not proof that the various types of implicatures correspond
to natural concepts—given that convexity is only a necessary criterion—it is at least
some first evidence that they do correspond to such concepts indeed.
Admittedly, there were some violations of the convexity criterion. The results
might in fact lead one to speculate that temporal order implicatures do not constitute
a natural class, or not a highly natural one (if naturalness comes in degrees). One
might even be able to back this speculation up theoretically, by pointing out that there
may not be a one-to-one relation between respecting temporal order in a sentence
and risk of misleading one’s audience by uttering that sentence, given that the latter
may be prevented by world knowledge even if the sentence relates events in the
wrong order. But, as noted in the previous section, this speculation is probably best
not taken too seriously at the moment, given that our results were based on relatively
sparse materials, which on top of that were not chosen with anMDS-kind of analysis
in mind.
What we have, then, is a proof of principle that implicatures can be represented
in a conceptual space, and that this can help answering an important theoretical
question about them. That is good news for researchers interested in experimental
pragmatics, as conceptual spacesmake it easy to generate empirical predictions about
which factorswill determine the classification ofwhichever items are representable in
them. And it is equally good news for advocates of the conceptual spaces framework,
who are constantly looking forways to generalize their framework to domains beyond
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those of perceptual concepts. But to see exactly how much research on implicatures
can benefit from the current approach, more empirical work is called for, along the
lines hinted at at various junctures in this paper.2
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Perception, Types and Frames
Robin Cooper
Abstract We present a view of perception as the classification of objects and events
in terms of types in the sense of TTR, a Type Theory with Records. We argue that
such types can be used to give a formal model of concepts and cognitive processing
involving concepts. This yields a view that natural language semantics is based on
our cognitive perceptual ability. The paper provides an overview of some key ideas
in TTR including the important notion of record type. We suggest that record types
can be used to model frames in a way that relates to the Düsseldorf notion of frame
as well as those of Fillmore and Barsalou.
Keywords Frames · Record types · Partee puzzle · Coercion
1 Introduction
We will present a simple-minded view of perception as the classification of objects
and events in terms of types viewed as cognitive resources. The theory of types that
we are using is TTR, a Type Theory with Records, which borrows a great deal from
work in logic and computer science in a tradition initiated by Per Martin-Löf. It
provides a rich type theory, that is, it includes types not just for basic ontological
categories such as entities and functions, but also types of objects such as Tree and
Boy and types of events (or situations) such as Hugging-of-a-dog-by-a-boy. Types
may be complex objects constructed from other types in a type theoretic universe.
We will argue that such types can be used to give a formal model of concepts and
cognitive processing involving concepts. In particular, we will suggest that natural
language semantics is at bottom based on our cognitive ability to perceive objects and
situations in terms of types. To this we have added the ability to reason in terms of
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the types themselves. Thus, for example, we can consider types of situations without
actually perceiving a situation of the type andwe can even consider types of situations
which are impossible.
Among the complex types introduced in TTR are record types which are used to
model types of situations and also propositions. An utterance of the sentence A boy
hugged a dog is true if there is a situation of the typeHugging-of-a-dog-by-a-boy and
false if there is nothing of that type. (This follows the dictum known as “Propositions
as Types” which Martin-Löf took over from intuitionistic logic.) Both the intuition
behind record types and their structure in the formal theory suggest that they can
be used to model frames, both as conceived of by Fillmore and as introduced by
Barsalou. We will develop this correspondence and suggest that this provides one
way of integrating frames into compositional semantics. In exploring this wewill find
relations with work on frames conducted by several researchers in the Düsseldorf
group working on frames.
2 Types and Cognition
Here we will give a brief overview of certain key ideas in TTR. For more detailed
discussion of TTR in general see Cooper (2012, prep), Cooper and Ginzburg (2015).
TTR is a rich type theory: in contrast to the simple type theory used in formal
semantics as developed by Montague (1974), it contains a much richer collection
of types. Whereas Montague has types for what we might call basic ontological
categories such as entities and truth values, TTR includes types of objects like
Tree and of events such as boy-hugs-dog. We will see later that such types may
have a complex internal structure. For discussion of the difference between simple
and rich type theories including a historical perspective see Chatzikyriakidis and
Cooper (2018). TTR is inspired by work in the tradition of Martin-Löf type theory
(Martin-Löf 1984; Nordström et al. 1990). While it has borrowed many tools and
insights from this it does not follow all of the basic tenets of Martin-Löf type the-
ory such as a proof-theoretic constructive approach derived from intuitionism. For
discussion of some of the differences and motivations see Cooper (2017a).
A central notion in Martin-Löf type theory is judgement, a judgement that an
object (or event), a, is of type, T . This is represented in symbols in (1).
(1) a : T
We say that a is a witness for T . In work using TTR we put a cognitive spin on
this notion. Suppose an agent, A, perceives a tree, t . (Here we are thinking of t as
an object in the world, construed naively, that is the physical object with a trunk,
branches and leaves.) We say that perception involves classifying an object as being
of some particular type, that is making a judgement. Thus perceiving t as a tree, A
makes the judgement that t is of type Tree. In symbols we can write this as (2).
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(2) t :A Tree
For discussion of this notation and the theory of type acts that we associate it with
see Cooper (2014). We can think of the type Tree as what Gibson (1979) would call
an invariant: whatever it is that trees share in common that enable us to classify them
as trees. Following Gibson’s terminology we can say that A is attuned to this type
or A has this type as a resource. The idea that attunement is an important notion
for semantics goes back to work on situation semantics (Barwise and Perry 1983),
which is another important source of inspiration for our work on TTR.
Different agents have different type resources available. For example, a bee land-
ing on the tree perceived by A probably does not have the same type Tree as the
human A does. Different species have different perceptual apparatus and cognitive
abilities. Evenwithin a species the resources we have available might vary depending
on our experience. For example, most people have a greater variety of subtypes for
Tree than I do corresponding to different kinds of trees. The idea of linking types
to perception is developed further by Larsson (2013) and is related to the theories
which ground cognition in perception, for example, Barsalou (1999). For an agent
to be able to make classifications corresponding to types there must be patterns of
neural activation corresponding to types which we could think of asmental represen-
tations of types. For some suggestions concerning how such neural representations
might be see Cooper (2017b, 2019).
TTR provides not only types of objects but also types of situations, following a
suggestion by Ranta (1994). Suppose that the boy, Sam, hugs his dog, Fido. The type
of situation in which Sam hugs Fido is represented as in (3).
(3) hug(sam, fido)
We are used to this notation as a logical formula which denotes a truth value. In
TTR, however, we use the notation to represent a type of situation. Nevertheless
we can recover the notion of truth by using the “propositions as types” dictum (see
Chatzikyriakidis and Cooper 2018 for discussion and references). A type (thought
of as a proposition) is true just in case it has a witness, that is, there is something
of the type. The type (3) is a complex type which is constructed from the predicate
‘hug’ and two individuals (‘sam’ and ‘fido’) as arguments.
Suppose, however, that we want a more general type of situation, one where any
boy hugs any dog, that is, the type Hugging-of-a-dog-by-a-boy which we mentioned











This is a graphical notation for a set of fields, which in turn are ordered pairs con-
taining a label and a type. The type Ind is the type of individuals, about which we
say more below. A type like ‘boy(x)’ is a dependent type—exactly which type it
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is depends on the individual you choose in the ‘x’-field. A witness for this record
type is also a set of fields, though in this case the fields consist of a label followed
by an object. A record is a witness for the record type if it contains fields with the
same labels as the type (and possibly more fields with other labels) and the objects
in these fields are witnesses for the corresponding types in the record type. So, for
example, a record of the form (5a) would be a witness for (4) provided that it meets
















s3 : hug(sam, fido)
We can think of records as modelling complex situations in which each field intro-
duces either an object or a situation. Thus we can think of (4) as being the type of
situations in which a boy hugs a dog.
What does it mean for an agent to perceive some situation, s, as being of type (4)?
If situations are to be construed as being part of the world (as in Barwise and Perry
1983) then we might be misled by thinking of a situation as being of the type (4).
After all (4) is a record type and a record, as we have seen, is a pairing of labels with
objects like Sam and situations in which, for example, Sam is a boy or, if you like,
proof objects, such as a part of the world which shows that Sam is a boy. (The term
proof object was introduced by Martin-Löf and shows an important bridge between
a proof theoretic and a model theoretic approach to logic.) While it seems reasonable
(though not entirely uncontroversial) to say that objects like Sam and situations in
which he is a boy are parts of the world, the world does not come conveniently
labelled as would be suggested by a record. We do not wish to claim that the world
consists of records as characterized in TTR. The notation (6a) in TTR is a convenient
graphic display of a set of ordered pairs (the graph of a function) whose first members











b. {〈x, sam〉, 〈cboy, s1〉, 〈y,fido〉, 〈cdog, s2〉, 〈e, s3〉}
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Another intuitive way to think about this is as a labelling of the set1 (7a) which could
be graphically represented as (7b).
(7) a. {sam, s1,fido, s2, s3}
b.
x cboy y cdog e
| | | | |
{sam, s1, fido, s2, s3}
Intuitively, the elements in the set in (7b) are part of the world whereas the labels are
pointers or handles introduced by cognitive processing of the world. Depending on
your metaphysical view, you can consider the set in (7a), as opposed to the elements
of the set either as something existing in the world or a cognitive construct which
assembles those elements into a collection.Onour view, records, at any rate, represent
cognitive objects since they introduce labelling and perception of a situation as one
in which a boy hugs a dog involves breaking down the situation into components
corresponding to the boy, the dog, the “boyness” of the boy, the “dogginess” of the
dog and the “hugging” event involving the boy and the dog.
It might be that we could regard this as perception of a collection of tropes accord-
ing to one or more of the varieties of tropes that have been proposed (Maurin 2016).2
A witness for a type like ‘boy(sam)’ is normally glossed in TTR as a situation which
shows (or proves) that ‘sam’ is a boy. Such a situation is a particular (an “object” in
TTR terms) as required for a trope though it is perhaps not clear that it is abstract in
the right sense for a trope. It appears, at any rate, that it would not be the kind of trope
discussed by Moltmann (2013). For one thing, Moltmann does not consider tropes
as corresponding to common nouns in natural language. For another, there seems to
be a kind of uniqueness of tropes instantiated by particular objects as in the red of the
box whereas on our view given a box b, there could be many witnesses for the type
‘red(b)’, that is, situations which are proofs for the redness of the box. Furthermore
the red of the box would be shared with another box which has exactly the same
shade of red. There is no requirement that a situation which shows that one box is red
also shows another box to be red, although there can be such situations. However,
a situation which shows two boxes to be red would not require that the two boxes
have an identical shade of red. This would, in Moltmann’s terms at least, indicate
that the situation is not a trope. Nevertheless, there is something trope-like about the
situations which witness these types in that they are particulars which instantiate a
specific quality obtained by applying a single predicate to appropriate arguments.
Record types give us a notion of subtyping. We can obtain a subtype of a record
type by adding additional fields to it. Any record of the type with additional fields
will also be of the type with fewer fields because a witness for a record type may
contain additional fields with labels not occurring in any field in the record type.
Thus the intuitive fact that any situation in which a boy hugs a dog is a situation in
which there is a boy is modelled by the subtype relation expressed in (8).
1In general, records correspond to multisets since objects may occur more than once in a record.

















We have talked as if there are situations like a boy hugging a dog on the one hand
and objects like trees on the other, but actually the dividing line between them is not














(Here ‘set(Ind)’ represents the type of sets of individuals.) This represents the intu-
ition that trees have leaves, branches and a trunk. You can either think of this as
an individual or as a situation in which various things hold. Using the type Ind
for “individual” as we standardly do in TTR, following the lead of traditional
model theoretic semantics (cf. Montague’s type e), hides a great deal of complex-
ity which needs attention if we are to take a cognitive approach to perception and
semantics. Perhaps the least you can say is that each agent may have their own
view of what counts as a witness for Ind corresponding to a scheme of individua-
tion (discussed in connection with semantics by, for example, Barwise 1989). For
important work addressing some of the many difficulties involving individuation see
Sutton and Filip (2017).
In this section we have talked about types from a cognitive perspective and in
fact we can think of types as models of cognitive notions like concept, memory and
belief. If we think of a concept as a type we can say that the concept is instantiated
just in case there is a witness of the type. If we think of a memory as a type we can
say that the memory is correct just in case there is or was a witness for the type. If
we think of a belief as a type we can say that the belief is true just in case there is a
witness for the type. This, coupled with the ideas of how types could be represented
on a network of neurons presented by Cooper (2017b, 2019), gives us an admittedly
very preliminary and “armchairish” theory of how concepts, memories and beliefs
could be represented in the brain. It is my hope that this might in the future lead to
a substantial connection between formal work on language and empirically based
neuroscience. It is in this context that I would like to view the discussion of frames
in the next section.
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3 Record Types and Frames
TTR has been used to model frames by Cooper (2010, 2016). This work took the
frame semantics suggested by Fillmore (1982, 1985) leading to the kind of frames
used in FrameNet (https://framenet.icsi.berkeley.edu) as its starting point. However,
the use of frames to analyze the Partee temperature puzzle is strikingly similar to that
proposed by Löbner (2014, 2015) who based his work on Barsalou’s (1992) more
cognitively based notion of frame.
Partee’s temperature puzzle involves explaining why the inference in (10) is not
valid, as it would be if the interpretation of is 90 is “is identical with 90”.
(10) The temperature is 90
The temperature is rising
90 is rising
In order to address this puzzle Cooper (2016) uses the record type (11) corresponding






e : temp(loc, x)
⎤
⎦
We call (11) AmbTempFrame. Any record belonging to this type will contain a
pair of a real number (in the ‘x’-field) and a location (in the ‘loc’-field) such that
the real number is the temperature at the location. In the terminology adopted in
Cooper (2016) we refer to the record type AmbTempFrame as a frame type and we
refer to records that are witnesses for it as frames. As records are used to model
situations (including both states and events) frames correspond to situations and
frame-types correspond to situation types. The basic idea in Cooper (2010, 2016) is
that a temperature rise is a string of two frames, s1s2, such that s1, s2 :AmbTempFrame
and s1.loc = s2.loc and s1.x < s2.x . This is a very simple theory of temperature rises.
One might, for example, object to holding the location constant in view of sentences
like (12).
(12) The temperature rises as you go south
Cooper (2016) suggests, however, that all locations are relative, even those we con-
sider to be fixed locations on the Earth when we consider them from an astronomical
perspective, so we could think of the location in (12) as being the relative location
“around you”. One might object also to having a string of just two frames corre-
sponding intuitively to two temperature readings over time. The idea of strings is
adapted from Fernando’s (2004, 2006, 2008, 2009, 2011, 2015) work on a string
theory of events, where a finite string can be regarded as a finite number of obser-
vations of a continuous world. The question arises whether the temperature should
be rising between the two frames or whether it would still count as a rise even if the
temperature was lower at some point between the two frames. The fact that examples
like (13) can be true despite temperature dips during the night suggests that we can
allow for temperature falls during a rise.
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(13) The temperature rose during the week
AmbTempFrame can be related to a directed graph similar to those discussed by
Kallmeyer and Osswald (2013), Kallmeyer et al. (2017) in connection with frames.
We let the labels in the record type be labels on the edges and the types be labels on the
nodes. In the case of types constructed with a predicate we use the predicate to label
a node with edges labelled ‘argn’ corresponding to the arguments of the predicate.








This would indicate that ambient temperature has three attributes: a real number
(here labelled as the attribute ‘x’), a location and a constraint (here labelled as the
attribute ‘e’) that the real number is the temperature at the location.
Both the record type (11) and the directed graph (14) could be coded in terms of
hybrid logic in the manner suggested in Kallmeyer et al. (2017) as in (15).
(15) 〈x〉(l1 ∧ Real) ∧ 〈loc〉(l2 ∧ Loc) ∧ 〈e〉(temp ∧ 〈arg1〉l2 ∧ 〈arg2〉l1)
One of the anonymous referees offers a different way of relating TTR frames and
Düsseldorf frames (DF). This involves thinking of the attributes in DF as functions
from entities to entities in TTR. What appears below is my own adaptation of the
referee’s suggestion and the referee (anonymous, though he or she is) should not be
held responsible for it. The suggestion involves first recasting the TTR frame type
suggested in (11) in a neo-Davidsonian version, something that I think can be a good
idea in many respects although it has not be explored to any extent within TTR. My











The referee’s idea is that then the labels in fields with basic types stand in for values
in DF and the predicates in the types labelled ‘c1’ and ‘c2’ correspond to attributes
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which label edges in the DF graph. Thus we would obtain (17), again a modification






This certainly gives us a more intuitive looking Düsseldorf frame. Also the repre-
sentation of this in hybrid logic, given in (18), corresponds more closely to the use
of hybrid logic by Kallmeyer et al. (2017).
(18) e ∧ State ∧ 〈TEMP〉(x ∧ Real) ∧ 〈LOC〉(loc ∧ Loc)
A possible disadvantage with this, though, is that the relationship between the record
type and the directed graph is less direct than in the first suggestion that we presented.
This discussion raises the interesting question of whether a general relationship
could be shown between TTR and hybrid logic andmore specifically between frames
modelled in terms of records and record types and frames as modelled by Kallmeyer
and Osswald (2013), Kallmeyer et al. (2017). Then it is interesting to consider
whether the particular linguistic analyses offered in the two approaches to frames
can be intuitively represented in both TTR and DF.
For example, it is not obvious to me that the following analysis could be easily
reconstructed in DF, although I would be happy to be convinced otherwise. The
basic idea in Cooper (2010, 2016), although the analyses in the two papers differ in
details, is that temperature and rise correspond to predicates not of numbers but of
frames of the type AmbTempFrame and for this reason the offending inference in the
Partee puzzle does not go through. This leads us to distinguish between nouns and
verbs which correspond to properties of individuals on the one hand and properties
of frames on the other. The way that this distinction is made in Cooper (2016) is
represented in (19) where dog and run correspond to individual level properties and
temperature and rise frame level properties (modelled as properties of records).






e : dog(r .x)
]






e : temperature(r .x)
]






e : run(r .x)
]






e : rise(r .x)
]
However, things are not quite so straightforward. Consider the putative inference in
(20) which apparently is an instance of the Partee puzzle involving individual level
properties.
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(20) The dog is nine
The dog is getting older
Nine is getting older
The conclusion drawn byCooper (2016) is that expressions corresponding to individ-
ual level properties can have a coerced interpretation where they correspond to frame
level properties.3 Thus in addition to (19a) we can obtain a coerced interpretation of







e : dog_frame(r .x)
]
A record is a dog frame just in case it is of the type (22a). For example, it may be of















This allows for frames of types other than (22b) to count as dog frames. The only
requirement on a dog frame is that it contain an individual which is a dog.What other
information we put into the frame may vary with whatever we are interested in when
creating the frame. For many objects age is a relevant issue and we can imagine that
among our resources is the type (23a) (which requires an individual with some age)































(For the notion of merge in TTR (represented by ‘∧. ’ see discussion in Cooper 2019;
Cooper and Ginzburg 2015.) Thus (23a) could be thought of as a resource which
could be used in a general coercion procedure for taking individual level properties
to frame level properties involving a frame type including age information.
This, perhaps, points to a rather different notion of frame than we have in either
Fillmore’s or Barsalou’s work where we get the impression that frames might be
a fixed non-dynamic part of our cognitive furniture. This appears to be the case
3The terminology “individual/frame level” here is meant to suggest a parallel with the well-known
distinctionwhich is drawnbetween individual, stage andkind level predicates and coercions between
them, originally due to Carlson (1980). Frames represent an additional kind of object which can be
an argument to predicates in natural language.
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despite Barsalou’s interest in ad hoc categories. Barsalou (1991), for example, sees
ad hoc goal-derived categories as important in providing the mapping from frames
to world models. Thus while categories are created on the fly, the frames seem less
dynamic, even if they are learned over time. Here, however, in talking of coercion
we are considering creating frames on the fly. It seems reasonable to say that some
of the frame types we have available are a permanent part of our general cognitive
resources. However, it also seems reasonable to say that other frame types can be
created ad hoc for the purposes at hand and that our ability to do this is exploited in
cases of coercion.
4 Conclusion
Wehave discussed a simple-minded theory of the perception of objects and situations
couched in terms of a theory of types which takes inspiration from Martin-Löf type
theory. As part of this we introduced the notion of record type as corresponding to
types of situations like boy-hugging-dog situationswherewe do not require particular
individuals to be involved in the situation. We also suggested that such record types
could correspond to types of individuals and raised (but did not solve) issues of
individuation which relate to those which have been discussed by Sutton and Filip.
We suggested that such record types can be used to model frame types and that
they relate to both the Fillmorean notion of frame and that put forward by Barsalou
togetherwith linguistic developments of this notion carried out inDüsseldorf.Despite
the fact that the origins of our notion of frame came from Fillmore, the fact that we
take a cognitive view of our type theoretic analysis perhaps makes them appropriate
for Barsalou’s notion.
We discussed work on the Partee puzzle using such frames which seems similar
in spirit to Löbner’s recent work using frames to analyze the same puzzle. We also
pointed out that the techniques we are using seem to have a correspondence to
techniques used by Kallmeyer and colleagues, although more detailed investigation
would be required to show a general relationship.
Finally, we suggested that the Partee puzzle is not limited to a restricted number of
frame level properties but that individual level properties seem to be able to be coerced
into frame level properties. This suggests that the frames that we have available as
cognitive resources are not necessarily stable but apparently can be created ad hoc
to meet requirements at hand. This is perhaps an aspect of frames that was discussed
neither by Fillmore nor Barsalou.
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Conceptualizing Eventualities
An XMG Account of Multiplicity
of Meaning in Derivation
Marios Andreou and Simon Petitjean
Abstract In this paper, we tackle the issue of multiplicity of meaning in deriva-
tion using Frame Semantics and eXtensible MetaGrammar (XMG). We use corpus
extracted data to identify the range of readings -al derivatives exhibit and identify
prominent constraints on the types of situations and entities -al targets. These con-
straints have the form of type constraints and specify which arguments in the frame
of the verbal base are compatible with the referential arguments of the derivative.
The introduction of these constraints into the semantics of an affix allows one to
predict and generate those readings which are possible for a given derivative and,
at the same time, rule out those readings which are not possible. Finally, as a proof
of concept, we model these constraints using XMG, and check whether the output
resulting of this XMG description is consistent with the range of readings observed
in the corpus.
Keywords Derivation · Polysemy · Constraints · Frame semantics · Extensible
metagrammar
1 Introduction
More often than not, the products of derivational processes are interpreted in more
than one way. This multiplicity of meaning is particularly evident in deverbal nom-
inalizations (Lieber 2004; Lieber and Andreou 2018; Rainer 2014; Andreou and
Petitjean 2017; Plag et al. 2018). Derived words that are based on the suffix -al,
for example, may denote either situations (e.g. removal “the act of removing”) or
entities (e.g. rental “the thing one rents”).
In this paper, we focus on deverbal nominalizations with the suffix -al that are
based on causation events. Causation events have a rich bipartite structure which
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ball
shape round
Fig. 1 Partial frame for ball
captures complex relationships between situations (events and states) and entities.
This complex structure allows one to identify and test constraints that might affect
the types of arguments which -al targets.
The aim of the paper is threefold. First, to best describe the behavior of -al on
causation events and, thus, capture the multiplicity of meaning exhibited by -al
nominalizations. Second, to identify prominent constraints on the types of situations
and entities -al targets. This will allow us to inform the discussion on the way one
can greatly reduce overgeneration of readings. In particular, the identification of
constraints will be a contribution to the literature on the way one can predict and
generate those readings which are possible for a given derivative and, at the same
time, rule out those readings which are not possible (Lieber 2004; Booij 2010;
Rainer 2014; Andreou and Petitjean 2017; Plag et al. 2018). Third, to best model
these constraints using XMG.
Our approach is based on the framework of Frame Semantics as developed in
Petersen (2007), Kallmeyer and Osswald (2013), and Löbner (2013, 2014, 2015).1
A frame is a general format of mental representations of concepts which is also
applicable to linguistic phenomena. It is a recursive attribute-value structure that
provides information about the referent of the frame. Attributes are applied to a
given possessor in a frame structure and assign a value to it.2 To provide an example,
Fig. 1 gives the partial frame for ball in the form of an attribute-value matrix.
The referent of the frame in Fig. 1 is ball. The attribute-value matrix illustrates
that ball has an attribute shape and that this attribute assigns the value round to the
referent of the frame. Thus, the shape of the referent of the frame, i.e. ball, is round.
Word formation in Frame Semantics is generally treated in terms of referential
shifts (Löbner 2013; Plag et al. 2018). In particular, reference is shifted from the
original referent to a new referent. For example, as we will see in the analysis, the
suffix -al can target particular arguments of the base verb and shift reference from
the original referent (i.e. causation event) to a new referent (e.g. theme). As recently
shown by a number of studies on nominalizations (Lieber 2004, 2016; Kawaletz
and Plag 2015; Andreou and Petitjean 2017; Plag et al. 2018), not all arguments of
the verb can be targeted by affixation. The identification of prominent constraints on
1Frames also figure in works on Lexical Functional Grammar (Bresnan 2001), Head-Driven Phrase
Structure Grammar (Pollard and Sag 1994), and Sign-based construction grammar Sag (2012).
Fillmore’s frames (Fillmore 1982) are used in the FrameNet project (Fillmore and Baker 2010).
In the present paper, we will use Frames as defined in the work of Petersen (2007), Kallmeyer
and Osswald (2013), and Löbner (2013, 2014, 2015), which is inspired by the work of Barsalou
(1992a); Barsalou, (1992b); Barsalou (1999).
2Attributes will be given in small capitals and values in italics.
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the types of arguments that can be targeted by a particular affix is still an open issue
and has implications for the way we describe, model, and implement a particular
derivational process in XMG.
What is XMG? XMG (eXtensible MetaGrammar, Crabbé et al. (2013)) is a
modular and extensible tool used to generate various types of linguistic resources
from an abstract and compact description. This description, the metagrammar, relies
on the concepts of logic programming and constraints. XMG comes with a system of
dimensions, allowing one to separate the different levels of linguistic description (e.g.
syntax and semantics), and providing dedicated languages adapted to the structures
the user wishes to generate. In this work, the dimension we used is the <frame>
dimension, proposed in Lichte and Petitjean (2015), where semantic frames can be
described using typed feature structure descriptions.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows: In Sect. 2, we describe and analyze
the behavior of -al nominalizations in context. Thiswill allowus to identify prominent
constraints on the types of situations and entities that can be targeted by -al. In Sect. 3,
weprovide an analysis of themultiplicity ofmeaning exhibitedby -al nominalizations
in XMG. Section 4 concludes the paper.
2 Data and Analysis
In this paper, we follow the classification of VerbNet (Kipper-Schuler 2006) that
is inspired by the classification of Levin (1993) and we focus on the suffix -al on
causation events. In particular, we examine the following verb classes: put verbs
(e.g. bury), remove verbs (e.g. remove), banish verbs (e.g. recuse), deprive verbs
(e.g. deprive), send verbs (e.g. transmit), contribute verbs (e.g. betroth), verbs of
future having (e.g. bequeath), equip verbs (e.g. redress), get verbs (e.g. procure),
obtain verbs (e.g. retrieve), amuse verbs (e.g. arouse), verbs of change of state (e.g.
disperse), free verbs (e.g. acquit), addict verbs (e.g. dispose), and base verbs (e.g.
construe).
We chose to work with causation events since these verbs have a rich bipartite
structurewhich captures complex relationships between situations and entities. Thus,
by using causation events as a testbed we can identify constraints on the types of
situations and entities -al targets. In particular, we can ask the following question:
Are all situations and entities able to be targeted by -al affixation or are there general
constraints on the types of arguments -al targets?
A typical causation event comes with a bipartite structure that comprises a cause
and an effect (Kallmeyer and Osswald 2012; Plag et al. 2018). It involves a
relationship between situations and entities in which a particular entity (e.g. an orig-
inator in the sense of (Borer 2014)) causes another entity (i.e. a theme) to go from
an initial situation to a result situation (Lieber 2004; Levin 1993; Rappaport Hovav
and Levin 2008). The following two attribute-value matrices illustrate this state of
affairs. Figure 2 gives the structure of a change of state verb such as renew and
Fig. 3 illustrates the structure of a verb of change of possession such as bequeath.



















Fig. 2 Change of state verbs
Figure 2models that renew comeswith a bipartite structure that comprises a cause
(i.e. activity) and an effect (i.e. change-of-state). In particular, renew involves a
relationship between the participants agent, patient, and instrument, in which the
agent causes the patient to go from an initial state to a result state.
Another example which shows that causation events generally involve two sub-
events, a cause and an effect, is given in Fig. 3 which models a future having verb
such as bequeath. This verb describes caused possession of the kind ‘x causes y to
have z’, in which x is the agent, y is the recipient, and z is the theme (Goldberg 1995;
Jackendoff 1990; Rappaport Hovav and Levin 2008). Thus, Fig. 3 models this state
of affairs as a relationship between an agent, a theme, and a recipient, in which there
is an initial situation in which the agent has possession of the theme, and a result
situation in which the recipient has possession of the theme (Andreou and Petitjean
2017).
Let us now present the findings of our study with respect to possible readings
of -al nominalizations. We use data from the Corpus of Contemporary American
English (COCA, (Davies 2008)). Among the readings we find in causation events,
the most productive are the event and result readings. (1) includes event readings and
(2) provides result readings.
(1) Event reading
a. One can perhaps gain a further glimpse of this sort of process of construal
in a 1979 conversation of Serra, Annette Michelson, and ClaraWeyergraf.
Michelson began the interview by asking Serra how and when he came to
filmmaking. (COCA ACAD 2015)























Fig. 3 Verbs of change of possession
b. This results in delays in the disbursal and utilization of funds—especially
at the Gram Panchayat level. (COCA ACAD 1998)
c. If it is morally unacceptable to repatriate even a convicted illegal alien
criminal, then it is all the more unacceptable to repatriate someone who
“merely” has crossed the border illegally. This undermining of alien
removals is behind the constant protests demanding to “stop deportations
now.” (COCA MAG)
(2) Result reading
a. Introverts proved more able to focus on the task of color identification
while disregarding the emotional content and had significantly better reac-
tion times. Concludes Haas: Introverts, who exhibit a higher resting state
of arousal, “don’t need the same kind of outside entertainment.” (COCA
MAG 2010)
b. At the same time as it emerged that Fitzroy was terminally ill with ‘a rapid
consumption’, Henry learned ofMargaret Douglas’s betrothal to Thomas
Howard. (COCA MAG 2013)
c. Smith, 54, is the nephew of a slain American president. As a younger man,
he was the defendant in a salacious Palm Beach rape trial that ended in
his acquittal, though not before the nation devoured stories of late-night,
alcohol-fueled carousing that included then-Sen. (COCA NEWS 2014)
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In the examples in (1), the nominalization lexicalizes the event denoted by the verb.
This type of nominalization is also referred to as ‘transpositional’ in that the nominal-
ization ‘transposes’ (recategorizes) the word from verb to noun without altering the
sense of the verbal base. Thus, construal, disbursal, and removals can be paraphrased
as “event/process of construing”, “event/process of disbursing”, and “event/process
of removing”, respectively.
In the examples in (2) the nominalization has a result reading3 in that it lexicalizes
“the outcomeof verb-ing”. Thus, arousal, betrothal, and acquittal can be paraphrased
as “the (result) state of arousing”, “the outcome of betrothing”, and “the outcome of
acquitting”.
Observe that in both (1) and (2), contextual cues may guide us to a particular
reading. For example, the process of construal flags a transpositional eventive reading
and a higher state of arousal guides us towards a result state reading.
One may also find -al nominalizations that lexicalize the inanimate theme, that
is, “the thing verb-ed, the thing affected by verb-ing”. Consider the examples in (3).
(3) Inanimate theme
a. Planning for andpursuing invoices is necessary in any case.After renewals
are paid in July or August (or the first two months), September (or the
third month) is a good time to start setting up projection reviews for these
resources. (COCA ACAD 2015)
b. The room was technically full of locals, people from Bianca’ s life before
she headedWest, friendswhocrossed the bridge searching formore afford-
able rentals in Williamsburg or Long Island City. (COCA FIC 2015)
c. In any case, your best bet is to roll the money into a traditional IRA;
otherwise, you’ ll get a big tax bill. Smaller withdrawals from the IRA,
on the other hand, will likely be taxed at a lower rate. (COCA MAG)
In (3), we observe that renewals are “the things one renews (e.g. subscriptions)",
rentals are “the things that someone rents (e.g. a house, an appartment)”, and with-
drawals are “the things one withdraws (i.e. money)".
A closer inspection of the data in (1)–(3) reveals that the suffix -al can manipulate
the frame of a verb and target certain arguments of it. In particular, it can target the
causation event argument, the result situation argument, and the theme argument.
Thus, the referent of a form derived by -al can be identified with some of the argu-
ments of the verbal base, but not all of them. Observe, for instance, that the referent
of -al derivatives is never the agent, the recipient, the cause, the effect or the initial
situation.
In what follows, we undertake the nontrivial task of identifying possible con-
straints on the types of entities and situations -al targets.
As far as entities are concerned, there seems to be a constraint on the animacy of
the referent of -al nominalizations. In particular, the referent of -al nominalizations
3The examples b. and c. are bounded, in that they happened in the past. For more on aspect in
nominalizations the interested reader is referred to Lieber and Andreou (2018).
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cannot be [+animate]. This explains why we find inanimate theme readings but not
agentive readings.
In what follows, we test this constraint on animacy. Consider the following
examples:
(4) a. Agentive reading
The path down to the sea is shaded by lemon groves. There is also an
elevator to the private beach, where a saltwater pool, sun decks, a bar
and seaside restaurant, along with a well-equipped gym and boat rentals,
await. (COCA MAG 2001)
b. Instrument reading
If I hadn’t read the article in your magazine, my precious dogs would
be in continued danger. Enclosed is my renewal. Thanks for the great
information. (COCA MAG 2003)
c. Asset reading
The farmer who owned the barn had asked - and received - a thousand
dollars in rental. (COCA FIG 2004)
Although the examples in (3) are not primary readings of -al nominalizations,
they can, nevertheless, inform the discussion on the constraint on animacy. In (4-a),
boat rentals has an agentive reading. This seems to militate against the hypothesis
that the referent of -al nominalizations cannot be [+animate]. On closer inspection,
however, the context suggests that the referent of boat rentals is inanimate. It is the
company that rents boats. In any case, this reading is highly lexicalized. In (4-b),
renewal is interpreted as an instrument since it is the participant in the renew event
that is manipulated by the agent, and with which an intentional act is performed. In
our example, it is the form of renewal of subscription. Thus, the referent of renewal
is inanimate. Finally, the argument that seems to be lexicalized in (4-c) is the asset
argument, that is the value of something. In our example, rental lexicalizes this
argument since its reading can be paraphrased as “the amount of money one has to
pay for renting the barn”. To sum up, the examination of secondary readings of -al
nominalizations confirms the hypothesis that there is a constraint on animacy on the
referent of -al forms.
Let us now turn to situations. Is there a constraint on the types of situations that can
be targeted by -al? As mentioned above, the structure of causation events typically
includes the causation event argument, a cause, an effect, an initial situation, and a
result situation. In our data, there are no cases in which the cause, the effect or the
initial situation are targeted by -al. As shown in (1) and (2), -al nominalizations in our
data give rise only to transpositional eventive readings and result situation readings.
Let us elaborate upon the latter reading, i.e. result situation. The result situations
described by the various subclasses in our data are not homogeneous. In particular,
verbs such as arouse describe a change of emotional state, verbs such as bequeath
describe a change of possession, and verbs such as remove describe a change of
location. Are all these situations able to be targeted by -al?
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Our data suggest that the only result situation that is compatible with -al is the
result state. The only example in which we identified a different reading is given
below:
(5) In a burial in Gyeongju, South Korea, archaeologists uncovered armor of a
fifth-century A.D. warrior and his horse, as well as dozens of serving vessels
used in traditional burial rituals. (COCA ACAD 2009)
This reading involves the put verb bury which describes a change of location. The
use of burial with the reading of result location (e.g. tomb, grave), however, is
highly lexicalized and only used in archeology. Thus we can safely conclude that
the referential argument of -al forms is not compatible with arguments of the type
location.
The identification of these constraints allows one to comment on the way one
can handle multiplicity of meaning in derivation. In the relevant literature (Lieber
2004; Booij 2010; Rainer 2014; Andreou and Petitjean 2017; Plag et al. 2018),
there are two approaches to multiplicity of meaning in derivation. Under the first
appoach, i.e. monosemy, more concrete meanings of affixes derive from a general
highly underspecified meaning that is capable of taking into account all possible
readings of an affix.
Applying the monosemy approach to -al consists in reducing the multiplicity of
meaning by identifying meanings that are shared by all -al derivatives. As follows
from the analysis of our data, -al derivatives denote (a) eventualities (e.g. event
‘transpositional’ readings), and (b) entities (e.g. inanimate theme readings). Thus,
the abstract core meaning of -al can be characterized as ‘eventuality or entity having
to do with X’ (with ‘X’ denoting the base).
Monosemy approaches to the semantics of derivation are confronted with two
problems. The first problem is that it is very hard to establish a unitary meaning for
an affix. In particular, the aim of monosemy approaches is to reduce multiplicity of
meaning by postulating a unitary abstract meaning. Forms derived by -al, however,
denote both eventualities and entities. Thus, the disjunction ‘eventuality or entity’
that is needed in order to capture themultiplicity of meaning of -al derivatives reveals
that the desirable underspecified meaning of affixes cannot always be reduced to a
single unitary meaning.
The second problemwith themonosemy approach to the semantics of derivation is
(massive) overgeneration. As we saw earlier, the abstract meaning for -al informs us
that -al forms denote both eventualities and entities. What kind of predictions follow
from the abstract meaning ‘eventuality or entity having to do with X’? This particular
formulation of the abstract meaning of -al leads one to expect that -al derivatives
could in principle denote all entities and all eventualities. Our data, however, suggests
that not all entities and not all eventualities can be denoted by -al derivatives. For
instance, the referent of an -al derivative may be the inanimate theme (e.g. money in
the case of withdrawal) but not the agent.
Under the second approach, i.e. polysemy, there is multiplicity of meaning in
word formation patterns. Given the architecture of Frame Semantics, the multiplicity
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of readings exhibited by -al nominalizations can be captured with the use of an
inheritance hierarchy of lexeme formation rules (Riehemann 1998; Koenig 1999;
Booij 2010; Bonami and Crysmann 2016; Plag et al. 2018). Inheritance hierarchies
allow one to generalize over derived formations and capture shared characteristics
between them as we show in Fig. 4.
Figure 4 gives the inheritance hierarchy of lexeme formation rules (‘lfr’) for
deverbal nominalizations (‘v-n’) in -al. This hierarchy involves two dimensions,
namely phonology (phon) and semantics (sem). The first dimension, i.e. phonology,
is shared by all -al nominalizations. In particular, all -al nominalizations have the
phonology / 1 +al/. Boxed numerals such as 1 are called tags and are used in feature
structures to indicate structure sharing, that is, to show that the respective values are
identical. In Fig. 4, this means that the value of the first part of the phonology of the
derived lexeme is identical to the value for the phonology of the base. The second
part of the phonology of the derived lexeme is, of course, contributed by the affix,
i.e. /al/.
Although -al nominalizations are based on the same phonological pattern, their
semantics differs. The semantic dimension in the inheritance hierarchy in Fig. 4
captures the different readings exhibited by -al forms. In accordancewith the analysis
suggested by our data, when the reference of a form in -al is identified with the event
argument (‘evt’) of the base, we get an eventive ‘transpositional’ reading and when
it is identified with the result state argument (‘r-st’) of the base, we get a result state
reading. In a similar vein, a theme reading arises when the reference of an -al nominal
is identifiedwith the theme argument (‘thm’) of the base, an instrument readingwhen
it is identified with the instrument argument (‘inst’) of the base, and finally an asset
reading when it is identified with the asset argument (‘ast’) of the base. The lowest
level of Fig. 4 shows that -al forms inherit their characteristics from both dimensions,
i.e. phonology and semantics. In particular, all -al forms share the same phonology,
but their semantics differs.
In this section, we identified the range of readings available to -al forms and
described the way this range could be accounted for under the monosemy and pol-
ysemy approach. In the next section, we will use the type constraints we identified
in this section, in order to predict and generate those readings which are possible for
an -al form and, at the same time, rule out those readings which are not possible.
3 XMG Implementation
The XMG compiler is a tool which has already been used to generate a wide
range of linguistic resources, focusing on different levels of linguistic description,
such as syntax and semantics, or even interfaces between them. Syntactic resources
developed with XMG are tree-based grammars such as Tree Adjoining Grammars
(Crabbé 2005; Kallmeyer et al. 2008; Gardent 2008 for instance) or Interaction
Grammars such as Perrier (2007). Other types of resources include lexicons of
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fully inflected forms, which were generated from morphological descriptions as in
Duchier et al. (2012), or frame-based semantic descriptions. In this work, even
though we are interested in both morphology and semantics, we will only focus on
the description of the semantics. On the morphological side, the description is trivial
as it only consists in combining a verb and a given affix.
An XMG implementation is a program (called metagrammar) composed of a set
of classes, which are reusable abstractions. A class describes a partial linguistic struc-
ture, which is in our case the frame for a given class of verbs. Classes can be reused
by other classes (imported), to add information to the partial description. This is what
will be done by the classes modeling derivations: they will import the descriptions of
the verb frames and augment them by defining the semantic reference corresponding
to one reading of the derivation. The descriptions shown in this article mainly consist
of typed feature structures. By using unification variables in their description, the
feature structures are combined to describemore complex frames. AnXMGprogram
is non-deterministic: it uses underspecification and disjunction, meaning that every
class can describe zero, one or more structures. When the metagrammar is processed
by the XMG compiler, all the structures described in the classes are computed and
written into an output file (using the XML or JSON format).
The implementation that we present aims at generating the frames corresponding
to all the attested readings for the derivations. For space limitations, below we focus
on two classes, namely, verbs of change of possession and verbs of change of state.
The proposed analysis can, nevertheless, be extended to additional verb classes in a
similar and straightforward manner.
We first need to describe the frame given in Fig. 3, by means of a XMG class

























where the first lines define the set of unification variables which can be used within
the class (declare) and outside of it (export).These variables can be matched with
any value or structure described in the metagrammar (a feature structure, the value
for a specific attribute, a syntactic node, etc). <frame> means that the description
belongs to the Frame Semantics dimension. The structure described in the frame
dimension, labeled by ?X0, is a straightforward translation of the one in Fig. 3, with
the addition of information on animacy, where all variables ?X0,...,?X7 stand for the
boxed numbers from 0 to 7 . The only variable which can be accessed outside of
the class is ?X0 (cf. export ?X0). In the same fashion, we define the class of verbs
of change of state shown in Fig. 2.
class renew
export ?X0













result−state: ?X7[result_state, patient:?X3] ]]
}
}
To define the scope-over relation mentioned earlier, we can use a new abstraction
(a class we will name al_nominal). This class, as its name suggests, models the
semantics of -al derivatives, which for the purposes of this first example are based
















With import rent[] we make the structure defined in the class rent available in the
current class, togetherwith its variables (we can refer only to the foreign variable ?X0
in the current class as only this variable is exported by rent). The operator > is used to
specify an additonal constraint on the frame: the left operand is a frame and the right
operandmust be one of the values of its attributes. Here, we use the reflexive transitive
closure of this operator, >∗, which means that there must be a path (as it would be
in a graph representation4 of the frame) from the root ?X0 to the semantic reference
?Ref. Concretely, the compiler will try to generate structures where the reference is
identified with another label, starting with the whole frame (?X0), and then exploring
all of its subparts, recursively. This is comparable to functional uncertainty in LFG
as defined by Kaplan and Maxwell (1988), even though we believe it to be more
general:whenusingonly theoperator>∗, the referencewill be able to unifywith every
possible subpart, totally independently from the attributes composing the path. As in
the solution proposed by Krieger et al. (1993) to implement functional uncertainty,
type constraints are essential: they will be the main way for us to control which
subparts can be identified with the semantic reference.
As said previously, with this description, all possible subparts of the feature struc-
tures are possible candidates to be identifiedwith the reference, and as a consequence,
readings such as initial state (which should be ruled out) are also generated when
this first version of the metagrammar is executed.
In this first implementation we modeled an approach to multiplicity of meaning
which is close to a version of the monosemy approach under which there are no
constraints on types, and showed that it leads to massive overgeneration. In the next
section we focus on the second approach to multiplicity of meaning: polysemy.
An open question is how we can model the polysemy approach in XMG and
constrain possible readings. We suggest that there are two ways to tackle this issue.
First, via a fully specified (and explicit) rule, which will replace the scope over
relation in the previous class al_nominal:
{?X0=?Ref | ?X2=?Ref | ?X7=?Ref}
4An attribute-value matrix can be seen as a directed graph in which every attribute-value pair is an
edge labeled by the attribute and pointing to the node representing the value.
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where | and = are respectively the disjunction and the unification operators, ?X0,
?X2 and ?X7 respectively correspond to the boxed numbers 0, 2 and 7 of Fig. 3, and
?Ref is a variable representing the semantic reference.
Under this approach, possible readings are considered as generalizations over
already attested derivatives. Thus, agent, recipient, and initial state readings are ruled
out since they are not part of the possible readings in the fully-specified-rule; the rule
models readings that are already attested in -al derivatives. However, this implemen-
tation is totally specific to a given class of verbs, here the one described in the class
rent. More XMG code would have to be written for the derivation of other verb
classes, where the reference would be identified with different unification variables.
In our case, we used consistent variable namings in the class renew (the variables
corresponding to the attested readings are also ?X0, ?X2 and ?X7), making it eas-
ily compatible with this implementation, but it would not be as straightforward for
frames with different numbers of features. For example, for a verb class where the
-al nominalization has four different readings, a different XMG class with four alter-
natives of variable unifications would have to be used.
Another way to model the polysemy approach in XMG is the introduction of an
underspecified rule with constraints on types. Only the types of the feature structures
will determine if one reading should be valid or not, which means that we do not
need to provide explicitly the set of variables that may be unified with the semantic
reference. In the case of our verb classes, the referent of an -al nominal can have
three possible types: causation, result state, or entity.
?X0 >∗ ?Ref;
{ ?Ref[result_state] | ?Ref[causation]
| ?Ref[entity, animacy:[inanimate]] }
Here, the first line is once again the scope over relation, but of course, in this case,
only the structures where no type constraint is violated will eventually be generated.
In the second line, we express the fact that the referent of an -al derivative can
have any of the three types previously stated. In the case of an entity, only the theme
should be a possible referent. We, therefore, add information about animacy (here,
inanimate), whichmakes the reference of -al derivatives incompatible with frames of
type animate, such as the agent and the recipient. This is in accordancewithfindings in
the literature on possible constraints on animacy (seeKawaletz andPlag (2015) on the
suffix -ment). When the referent of an -al derivative is a state, the type result_state is
given to prevent unificationwith the initial state frame (of type initial_state). Thisway,
agent, recipient, and initial state readings are ruled out because frame unification only
succeeds if types are compatible. The type constraints (for example incompatibility
of event and entity) are also specified in the metagrammar. This is done globally,
meaning that the type constraints will apply to all the structures described in the
metagrammar. The constraints defining our type hierarchy are introduced by the
keyword frame−constraints as follows:




state event −> −,
eventuality entity −> −,
derived−lexeme −> lexeme,
ment−lexeme −> derived−lexeme,
lexeme eventuality −> −,





causation activity −> −,
causation change_of_possession −> −,
causation change_of_state −> −,
change_of_state change_of_possession −> −,
experiencer −> entity,
stimulus −> entity,
experiencer stimulus −> −,
initial_state result_state −> −,
initial_state −> state,
result_state −> state,
animate inanimate −> −,
animate −> animacy,
inanimate −> animacy,
animacy eventuality −> −,
animacy entity −> −,
entity −> animacy:animacy,
animacy lexeme −> −
}
Three types of constraints are used here, all using the −> operator, which can be
read as an implication. Subsumption constraints, such as causation −> event, mean
that an atomic type (here causation) is a subtype of another type (event). The effect
of this constraint is that a frame cannot have the type causation without having the
type event as well. An incompatibility constraint, such as causation activity −> −
means that a structure cannot have both of the two given types: here, a frame can-
not be of type causation and of type activity. Finally, feature constraints, such as
entity −> animacy:animacy ensure that all the structures having a given type have a
given feature. In our case, structures of type entity will all have an attribute animacy
of type animacy. The set of type constraints defines the type signature of the meta-
grammar.
This implementation is directly compatible with the verbs described in the class
renew, and does not depend on the naming of the variables used in the frame
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description. Therefore, an XMG abstraction describing verbs from another class,
even if it is written by another linguist who uses different naming conventions, can
be combined with the al_nominal class. Of course, for verb classes in which readings
are not limited to the same types (causation, result_state and inanimate entity), new
XMG abstractions for -al nominalization would have to be written. In these new
XMG classes, only the type constraints would differ, and they could be directly
reused for all other verb classes with similar behaviors.
4 Conclusion
In the present paper, we tackled the issue of multiplicity of meaning in derivation
by offering a detailed analysis of -al derivatives. We used corpus extracted data to
identify the range of readings available to -al derivatives and to establish possible
constraints on the types of arguments -al targets. Finally, we modeled these con-
straints using XMG.
In a nutshell, we showed that the referent of an -al derivative can be identified
with certain types of situations and entities, but not all of them. This has implications
for the way we model multiplicity of meaning in derivation, since it shows that it
is not always possible to reduce the meaning of a particular affix to a single unitary
meaning.
Our XMG implementation corroborates the idea that the introduction of con-
straints into the semantics of an affix allows one to predict and generate those read-
ings which are possible for a given derivative and rule out other readings which are
not possible. These constraints have the form of type constraints and specify which
arguments in the frame of the verbal base are compatible with the referential argu-
ment of the derivative. The introduction of type constraints rules out certain readings
because frame unification only succeeds if types are compatible.
In the present paper, we focused on -al derivatives. The next step is to apply
the proposed analysis to the modeling of other affixes as well. This will allow us
to identify which constraints are specific to particular classes or affixes, and which
constraints are shared across classes or affixes. For example, the suffixes -ance, -
ment, and -ure show similar characteristics to the suffix -al, in that the referent of
forms derived by these affixes is never [+animate]. They differ, however, from one
another with respect to other characteristics. For example, -ance, -ment, and -ure
are compatible with the location argument of the verbal base, whereas -al is not,
and -ure is not compatible with the instrument argument of the verbal base, whereas
-ance, -ment, and -al are. The main advantages of the metagrammatical framework
will become more obvious as the linguistic resource grows: for example, inheritance
will help sharing information across classes with similar behaviors.
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Operationalizing the Role of Context
in Language Variation: The Role
of Perspective Alignment in the Spanish
Imperfective Domain
Martín Fuchs, María Mercedes Piñango, and Ashwini Deo
Abstract We present a cognitively grounded analysis of the pattern of variation that
underlies the use of two aspectual markers in Spanish (the Simple-Present marker,
Ana baila ‘Ana dances’, and the Present-Progressive marker, Ana está bailando
‘Ana is dancing’) when they express an event-in-progress reading. This analysis is
centered around one fundamental communicative goal, which we term perspective
alignment: the bringing of the hearer’s perspective closer to that of the speaker.
Perspective alignment optimizes the tension between two nonlinguistic constraints:
Theory of Mind, which gives rise to linguistic expressivity, and Common Ground,
which gives rise to linguistic economy. We propose that, linguistically, perspective
alignment capitalizes on lexicalized meanings, such as the progressive meaning, that
can bring the hearer to the “here and now”. In Spanish, progressive meaning can
be conveyed with the Present-Progressive marker regardless of context. By contrast,
if the Simple-Present marker is used for that purpose, it must be in a context of
shared perceptual access between speaker and hearer; precisely, a condition that
establishes perspective alignment non-linguistically. Support for this analysis comes
from a previously observed yet unexplained pattern of contextually-determined vari-
ation for the use of the Simple-Present marker in Iberian and Rioplatense (vs.
Mexican) Spanish—in contrast to the preference across all three varieties for the
use of the Present-Progressive marker—to express an event-in-progress reading.
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1 Introduction
Successful linguistic communication occurs when a speaker utters an expression and
a comprehender recognizes the specific meaning that the speaker intended to convey
by uttering that expression. If all markers in a linguistic system were in a strict
one-to-one correspondence to a meaning, linguistic communication would always
be unambiguous. However, that is rarely the case; linguistic markers usually make
more than one type of contribution to the composed sentential meaning, leading
to different readings of the expressions of which they are part. That is because the
markers’ associatedmeanings are encoded in such away that they demand interaction
with a context in order to be properly composed with the other meanings in the
expression (e.g., Lewis 1980; Kaplan 1989).
From a communicative perspective, the interaction between linguistic meaning
and nonlinguistic context is manifested as a tension between how much meaning
is predictably associated with a marker (i.e., lexicalized) and how much meaning
must be retrieved from the contextual information in the communicative situation.
While the former leads to expressivity—the requirement that all intendedmeaning be
linguistically encoded—, the latter leads to economy—the possibility thatmeaning be
inferred from the shared history of the interlocutors and the properties of the physical
environment where communication takes place at a given time. This tension appears
to be rooted in fundamental human cognitive biases: on the one hand, speakers want
to be able to convey specific meanings to their hearers; on the other hand, they want
to do so by uttering the least amount of linguistic information, relying instead on
the contextual properties that constrain the hearer’s interpretation. How are lexical
meanings structured such that this tension is resolved, leading to the fast-paced,
seemingly transparent, communication process that is typically observed?
Wepropose that this question can be addressed by investigatingmeaning variation;
that is, the systematic ways in which a marker shifts its connection to a meaning
across members of the same speech community. We hypothesize here that meaning
variation for a given marker ultimately results from specific communicative and
cognitive pressures in interaction with the contextual demands of that marker. We
focus on grammatical aspect, a component of the grammar that is subject to variation
and ultimately diachronic change (Dahl 1985; Bybee et al. 1994, i.a.); specifically,
on the Imperfective aspectual domain in Spanish.
The Spanish Imperfective aspectual domain is a good test case for analyzing
the properties that determine meaning variation given that it is expressed by the
Present-Progressive marker and the Simple-Present marker, two markers that convey
two readings—the event-in-progress and the habitual—in a two-by-two system.1,2
1In this paper, we explore the Imperfective domain in the Present tense, but we assume that the
conclusions thatweput forth also hold in a similarway for the imperfective andprogressivemeanings
in the Past and Future tenses.
2These markers are also able to express a continuous reading when they are combined with lexically
stative predicates, such as in Ana vive en Bogotá (‘Ana lives in Bogotá’) or as in Ana está viviendo
en Bogotá (‘Ana is living in Bogotá’). We leave this reading aside for the purposes of this paper.
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The alternations between these two markers also manifest a shared semantic struc-
ture between the two meanings that participate in this aspectual domain, in which
the progressive meaning is a subcase of the more general imperfective meaning
(Kurylowicz 1964; Comrie 1976; Deo 2009, i.a.).
In previous work (Fuchs et al. 2020) we have shown that in Spanish, contrary to
traditional assumptions (e.g., Marchand 1955; Bertinetto 2000), these two markers
are not in free variation, and that when it comes to the expression of the event-in-
progress reading, their use appears to be governed by contextual constraints. Here,
we present a theoretical model of that variability that is cognitively rooted in the
communicative factors involved in those contextual constraints and in the structure
of the subsystem(s) to which those communicative factors belong. This model gives
rise to an account whereby the recognition of a progressive meaning implicates the
alignment of the hearer’s perspective to that of the speaker. We argue that this align-
ment can be obtained both by linguistic and by non-linguistic means, and we show
that the tension between the use of the Present-Progressive marker and the Simple-
Present marker in Spanish to convey an event-in-progress reading is a direct result
of whether the alignment of the speaker’s and the hearer’s perspectives was already
introduced by non-linguistic means, or whether it needs to be encoded linguistically.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the distri-
bution of the Present-Progressive marker and the Simple-Present marker in Modern
Spanish. Section 3 presents the formal structures we are assuming for the progres-
sive and the imperfective meanings, together with their communicative implications,
and a proposal for a unified meaning structure of these two meanings that allows
for the observed systematic variation in their use. Section 4 presents the previously
reported data in Fuchs et al. (2020) on the markers’ context-modulated behavior
in three Spanish varieties for the event-in-progress reading. Section 5 presents the
analysis based on the data introduced in §4. Section 6 concludes the paper.
2 On the Spanish Present-Progressive and Simple-Present
Markers
Spanish has two markers that express the Imperfective aspectual domain in the
Present: the periphrastic Present-Progressive marker in (1a), constituted by the verb
estar ‘to be’ plus the gerund V + -ndo, and the syncretic Simple-Present marker in
(1b) (Yllera 1999; NGRAE 2009, i.a.).
(1) a. Ana est-á fum-ando (ahora).
Ana be-PRS.3.SG smoke-PROG (now)
‘Ana is smoking now’
b. Ana fum-a ahora.
Ana smoke-PRS.3.SG now
‘Ana is smoking now’
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In (1) these markers are supporting an event-in-progress reading; that is, their contri-
bution to the sentential meaning leads to the interpretation that the event described
by the predicate is unfolding at reference time. However, both of these markers can
also convey a more general imperfective meaning, that, for instance, can give rise
to a habitual reading; that is, their contribution to the sentential meaning leads to
the interpretation that the event described by the predicate has regular instantiations
over some interval of time, as in (2).
(2) a.  Ana  est-á   fum-ando todos los  días.
Ana be-PRS.3.SG smoke- PROG all the days.
‘Ana is smoking every day’
b. Ana fum-a    todos los  días.
Ana smoke-PRS.3.SG all the days
‘Ana smokes every day’
The sentences in (1) and (2) show that, given different discourse or situational
contexts, both the Present-Progressive marker and the Simple-Present marker can
each alternatively convey an event-in-progress or a habitual reading. This situation
raises at least two questions: (1) How are these different readings connected such
that this alternation can obtain? (2) If contextual constraints are involved in the
observed distribution of the markers, what specific contextual factors are modulating
the variation? The answer to these questions is the focus of the next two sections.
3 The Meaning of the Progressive and the Imperfective:
A Communicative Perspective
Aspect is said to be the grammatical category that expresses how a situation extends
over time; from a communicative viewpoint, we can conceive it as a part of the way
in which speakers and hearers experience and schematize the world. This experience
gets encoded in linguistic devices both lexically and grammatically (e.g., Vendler
1957; Verkuyl 1972; Comrie 1976).
Imperfective aspect denotes a property of a situation whereby the situation is
understood as continuing throughout some interval of time. In language-neutral
terms, for a sentence to have imperfective aspect, it necessarily and sufficiently
needs to present the Subinterval Property; that is, if a predicate P is true at some
interval I, it follows that the predicate P is true at all (relevant) subintervals of I.
Both the event-in-progress and the habitual readings of the Spanish Imperfective
aspectual domain show the Subinterval Property. The sentence radical (smoke(Ana))
in both sentences in (1), repeated here as (3), holds of every relevant subinterval of
the reference interval (i.e., now in those sentences).3 In the case of the sentences in
3We understand sentence radicals to be predicates of eventualities with their arguments saturated.
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(2), repeated here as (4), the sentence radical in both sentences holds at all relevant
regular subintervals of the interval under consideration, which is a superinterval of
the reference interval.
(3) a.  Ana  est-á   fum-ando (ahora). 
Ana be-PRS.3.SG smoke-PROG (now)
‘Ana is smoking now’
 Ana fum-a    ahora. b.
Ana smoke-PRS.3.SG  now 
‘Ana is smoking now’
(4) a.  Ana  est-á   fum-ando todos los  días.
Ana be-PRS.3.SG smoke- PROG all the days.
‘Ana is smoking every day’
b. Ana fum-a    todos los días. 
Ana smoke-PRS.3.SG all the days
‘Ana smokes every day’
Deo (2009, 2015) provides a unified account of the progressive and the imperfective
meanings that allows for the availability of the event-in-progress and habitual read-
ings. Under this account, the progressive and the imperfective meanings are encoded
as two distinct operators that apply to predicates of eventualities denoted by sentence
radicals. This proposal treats the meaning of the progressive operator as a subset of
the meaning of the imperfective operator (see also Kurylowicz 1964; Comrie 1976,
i.a.). Both operators involve a universal quantifierwhose domain of quantification is a
regular partition of an interval; i.e., a set of collectively exhaustive, non-overlapping,
equimeasured subsets of some set, against which the instantiation of a given predi-
cate is evaluated regarding its distribution over time. The notion of instantiation of
a predicate over regular partitions of an interval captures the intuition of a regular
distribution over time that obtains with utterances with imperfective aspect. Key to
this analysis is that the measure of the regular partition, which determines the value
of each cell of the partition, is a free variable with a contextually-determined value.
The different readings that each meaning presents are thus the result of different
values in different contexts.
The contrast between the two operators emerges from differences in their respec-
tive domains of quantification: while in the case of the progressive operator, the
domain of quantification is a regular partition of the reference interval (that is, the
predicate stands in a coincidence relation4 with regular subintervals of the reference
4The coincidence relation is defined as follows: “a predicate of events stands in the coincidence
relation with an interval i and a world w if and only if P is instantiated in every inertial alternative
of w within i or at some superinterval of i” (Deo 2015: 11). Inertia worlds are understood as in
Dowty (1977); i.e., as the worlds that continue beyond i in ways that are compatible with the regular
course of events until i. Inertia worlds thus allow the coincidence relation to avoid the Imperfective
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interval), in the case of the imperfective operator, the domain of quantification is a
regular partition of a superinterval of the reference interval (that is, the predicate
stands in a coincidence relation with regular subintervals of a superinterval of the
reference interval). Thus, the progressive meaning behaves as a subset of the imper-
fective meaning: the reference interval is always a subinterval of a superinterval of
itself. The formal representations for each of these operators, taken fromDeo (2015),
are given below:
PROG : λPλiλw .∀j[j ∈ Rci → COIN (P, j,w
IMPF : λPλiλw .∃j[i ⊆ini j ∧ ∀k [k ∈ Rcj → COIN (P, k,w)]]
)]
The progressive operator combines with a predicate of eventualities P and an interval
i and returns the proposition that every cell j of a regular partition of i coincides
with P. The imperfective operator, on the other hand, combines with a predicate of
eventualitiesP and an interval i, and returns the proposition that there is some interval
j that continues i such that every cell k of a regular partition of j coincides with P.
Here we argue that the subset organization dependent on the relation between a
reference interval and a superinterval thereof has communicative implications that are
observable in specific usage patterns, such as the ones described in §2. Specifically,
we propose that the interval structure that underlies both operators constitutes a
unified conceptual structure whose variables are the interval under consideration and
the measure of the regular partition.5 The interactions between these two variables
give rise to the event-in-progress or the habitual readings of the differentmeanings. In
what follows, we discuss each meaning and their communicative implementations.6
In the case of the progressive, the domain of quantification is the reference interval.
When the hearer comprehends a progressive sentence with an event-in-progress
reading, such as the sentences in (1), the marker triggers the representation of an
interval, the reference interval, as we see in Fig. 1.
This interval is constituted by regular partitions, as we observe in Fig. 2. What
the operator demands is that every cell j be of a regular partition of i.
At this point, what is left for the hearer’s parser is tomap the associated proposition
P to every cell j of a regular partition of that interval i in that world of evaluation w,
making it coincide with them, as it can be seen in the visual representation and the
formula in Fig. 3.
Paradox. Throughout the remainder of the paper, this is the definition of the coincidence relation
assumed. We simplify its presentation for reasons of space.
5The status of a ‘conceptual structure’ for this meaning structure manifests our deeper claim that
this unified meaning is not a linguistic device, but a substructure of a larger nonlinguistic cognitive
system to which language has access through imperfective and progressive markers.
6The incremental presentations of the communicative implementations of the meanings of the
progressive and the imperfective are not a claim about their processing. They are simply visual
devices that illustrate the meaning structure to which the markers have access.
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Fig. 1 The progressive meaning from a communicative perspective (1/3)
Fig. 2 The progressive meaning from a communicative perspective (2/3)
PROG : λPλiλw.∀j[j ∈ Rci → COIN (P, j,w)]
Fig. 3 The progressive meaning from a communicative perspective (3/3)
Therefore, a sentence such as (1a), Ana está fumando ahora, ‘Ana is smoking
now’, would be represented from a communicative perspective as in Fig. 4, where
the sentence radical (Smoke(Ana)), (S(A)), is mapped to every cell of a regular
partition of the reference interval.
In the case of the imperfective, the domain of the quantifier is a superinterval of
the reference interval. This allows for the appearance of the habitual reading. From
the perspective of communication, when a hearer receives an imperfective sentence
with a habitual reading, it not only triggers the representation of an interval i—the
reference interval—, but also of the associated superinterval j, as it can be seen in
Fig. 5.
Just like the reference interval, this superinterval is constituted by regular parti-
tions, as we observe in Fig. 6. What the operator demands is that every cell k be of
a regular partition of j.
Fig. 4 The representation of Ana está fumando ahora ‘Ana is smoking now’ from a communicative
perspective
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Fig. 5 The imperfective meaning from a communicative perspective (1/3)
Fig. 6 The imperfective meaning from a communicative perspective (2/3)
The role of the hearer’s parser in this case is to map the proposition P to every cell
k of a regular partition of that superinterval j in that world of evaluation w, making
it coincide with them. This is presented in Fig. 7.
Accordingly, from a communicative perspective, a sentence such as (2b), Ana
fuma todos los días, ‘Ana smokes every day’, is represented as in Fig. 8. In this case,
the sentence radical (Smoke (Ana)), (S(A)), is mapped to every cell k of a regular
partition of j.
IMPF : λPλiλw.∃j[i ⊆ini j ∧ ∀k [k ∈ Rcj → COIN (p, k,w)]]
Fig. 7 The imperfective meaning from a communicative perspective (3/3)
Fig. 8 The representation ofAna fuma todos los días ‘Ana smokes every day’ froma communicative
perspective
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IMPF :
IMPF :





w.∀j[j ∈ Rci → COIN (
P, k,w
P, j,w )]
Fig. 9 The meaning structure of the imperfective domain: the imperfective (above) and the
progressive (below)
In Fig. 9 below, these two readings of the Imperfective aspectual domain—the
event-in-progress and the habitual—emerge from the same meaning structure: a
predicate of events coincides with every cell of a regular partition of an interval.
They differ only in the components of the meaning structure that each reading makes
salient: while the habitual reading makes salient both levels within the structure (the
reference interval and a superinterval thereof), the event-in-progress reading makes
salient the reference interval alone.
4 The Markers of the Spanish Progressive Are not in Free
Variation: Implications
In previous work, we report experimental evidence consistent with the possibility
that the Present-Progressive and the Simple-Present markers are not in free variation
when conveying an event-in-progress reading, and that the choice of marker is in
fact contextually determined (Fuchs et al. 2020). In this section, we summarize those
results. The data pattern that is presented in that paper serves as a clear test case for
our communicative analysis and for testing the implications of a unified conceptual
structure for both the progressive and the imperfective meanings of the Imperfective
aspectual domain.
Fuchs et al. (2020) reports data from a sentence acceptability judgment task. A
total of 114 participants from three different Spanish dialectal varieties rated on a
1-to-5 Likert scale context-sentence pairs that induced an event-in-progress reading
with either the Present-Progressivemarker, the Simple-Presentmarker, or the Simple-
Past marker (used as a baseline condition). Target sentences were preceded either
by a context that indicated that speaker and hearer had equivalent perceptual access
to the event described by the predicate (Rich Context) or by a context that indicated
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that the speaker and the hearer did not share perceptual access to the event (Poor
Context). Shared perceptual accesswas operationalized as visual perceptual access:
both participants in the discourse situationwere observing the event that the predicate
in the target sentence described. An example of each type of context is presented in
(5) and (6) respectively.
Rich Context
(5) Ana llega a su casa de trabajar y va a buscar a su hijo a su habitación. 
puerta, la abre, y ve al hijo sentado en el escritorio. Antes de
que ella diga nada, el hijo le dice:
‘Ana comes home from work, and goes to her son’s room to look  
knocks on the door, opens it, and sees him sitting at his desk.




(6) Ana llega a su casa de trabajar y va a buscar a su hijo a su habitación.
Golpea la puerta, pero el hijo no contesta. Sin que ella llegue a abrir la puerta,
‘Ana comes home from work, and goes to her son’s room to look for him.
She  knocks on the door, but her son does not answer. Before she gets to open
el hijo le dice:
the door, her son tells her:’
Each of these contexts was then followed by a target sentence that the participant
had to rate, which presented either the Present-Progressive marker (7a), the Simple-
Present marker (7b), or the Simple-Past marker (7c).
(7) a.  Est-oy   haci-endo  la  tarea.  
be-PRS.1.SG do-PROG the homework
‘I am doing homework’
b. Hag-o   la tarea. 
 do-PRS.1.SG the homework. 
‘I am doing homework’
c. Hi-ce la tarea. 
 do-PST.1.SG the homework  
‘I did homework’
The study was originally designed to test two competing hypotheses regarding the
variation between these markers to express an event-in-progress reading: a free alter-
nation hypothesis, which argued that the markers could be used interchangeably
regardless of the type of context, and a context dependent hypothesis, which stated
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Table 1 Participants’ ratings means and standard errors by condition (dialect * aspectual marker
* context)
Iberian Spanish Rioplatense Spanish Mexican Alt. Spanish
Rich Poor Rich Poor Rich Poor
p. prog 4.78 (0.03) 4.74 (0.03) 4.68 (0.05) 4.66 (0.05) 4.51 (0.06) 4.46 (0.06)
s. present 4.18 (0.11) 3.70 (0.09) 3.90 (0.11) 3.43 (0.08) 3.57 (0.12) 3.51 (0.12)
s. past 2.16 (0.08) 2.15 (0.09) 2.67 (0.08) 2.57 (0.08) 2.67 (0.09) 2.63 (0.08)
that the choice ofmarkerwas conditioned by properties of the contextual information.
We proposed that marker use was context-dependent, and that its locus of variation
was shared perceptual access to the event between the speaker and the hearer.7
The three varieties of Spanish probed were Mexican Altiplano Spanish (Mexico
City), Iberian Spanish (Madrid), and Rioplatense Spanish (Buenos Aires) with
similar participant distributions: 39 (20 female) Iberian Spanish speakers; 38 (21
female)RioplatenseSpanish speakers, and37 (21 female)MexicanAltiplanoSpanish
speakers.8 The rationale for testing different varietieswas that the Imperfective aspec-
tual domain could be partitioned by these markers in different yet predictable ways
in each of the dialects.
A summary of the results in terms of the participants’ ratings means by context,
aspectual marker and dialect is given in Table 1. Standard errors are indicated in
parentheses. Conditions where there are significant differences are bolded.
In all three Spanish varieties, the Present-Progressive marker is the preferred form
to express an event-in-progress reading regardless of contextual information, while
the Simple-Past form is disallowed from expressing an event-in-progress reading
7With respect to the Simple-Present marker, we tested the prediction associated with the context
dependent hypothesis. According to this hypothesis, when the situational context presents infor-
mation that shows that speaker and hearer share perceptual access to the event described by the
predicate, the Simple-Present marker should get significantly higher ratings than when the infor-
mation in the situational context does not indicate that speaker and hearer share perceptual access
to the situation at issue.
Regardless of the issue of context-dependence, we expected the Present-Progressive marker
in every dialect to obtain ceiling ratings, as the Present-Progressive marker exhibits the event-in-
progress as its most salient reading. Our analysis argued that this occurred because the Present-
Progressive marker was unambiguous in conveying an event-in-progress reading. That analysis,
however, was incomplete in that it did not take into account the habitual reading of the Present-
Progressive marker, such as the one in (2a), Ana está fumando todos los días ‘Ana is smoking every
day’, whose existence evidences that the locus of the variation is not necessarily presence/absence
of ambiguity in marker-meaning correspondence, but something else that relates the structure of
the meaning itself (i.e., the progressive) to its communicative implications.
The model we present here accounts for the presence of ambiguity by arguing that while the
Present-Progressivemarkermay be preferentially lexically associatedwith the progressivemeaning,
given the shared conceptual structure described in §3, it also has the potential to access the other
readings. It does so by allowing modification of the measure of the regular partition—and, in this
way, referring to a superinterval of the reference interval–, thus achieving a habitual interpretation.
Unfortunately, more extensive discussion of these cases is beyond the scope of this paper.
8For details on the procedure, see Fuchs et al. (2020), §4.2.
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Fig. 10 Participants’ means by context condition, aspectual marker and dialect
across the board. With respect to the Simple-Present marker, in at least Rioplatense
and Iberian Spanish, the acceptability of the marker appears to be modulated by
contextual information. When the speaker and the hearer share perceptual access to
the event described by the predicate, participants judge the use of the Simple-Present
marker as significantly more acceptable than when the speaker and the hearer do
not share perceptual access to the event. In the case of Mexican Altiplano Spanish,
the Simple-Present marker is dispreferred with respect to the Present-Progressive
marker regardless of contextual information.9 A graph of the participants’ ratings by
contextual information, marker and dialect is presented in Fig. 10.
These results show that the use of the Simple-Present marker to convey an event-
in-progress reading is restricted by context in at least two dialects of Spanish—
Rioplatense and Iberian Spanish. Therefore, the data show that the markers do not
alternate freely, and provide support to the context dependent hypothesis. While
the Present-Progressive marker is the preferred form to convey an event-in-progress
reading across the three dialectal varieties and regardless of contextual information,
the Simple-Present marker is context-dependent and its acceptability is modulated
by the assessment that participants make of the shared perceptual access between
speaker and hearer conveyed in the preceding context. We also observe that this
context-dependence is subject to dialectal variation: while Rioplatense and Iberian
Spanish showcontext-dependence in their use of theSimple-Presentmarker,Mexican
AltiplanoSpanish presents a distribution inwhich this contextual distinction becomes
irrelevant, and the only mean to achieve the event-in-progress reading is linguistic;
that is, the use of the Present-Progressive marker.
9For a detailed explanation of why the dialects differ, and how this variation is constrained by a
unidirectional diachronic grammaticalization path from Progressive to Imperfective, see Fuchs et al.
(2020), §2.2., and §6.
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5 Analysis: The Psychological Roots of Shared Perceptual
Access
The pattern described in §4 shows that the distribution between the Present-
Progressive marker and the Simple-Present marker in the expression of the event-in-
progress reading is not haphazard, but governed by contextual constraints; namely,
by whether the speaker and the hearer share perceptual access to the event described
by the predicate.
In this section, we present an analysis of this contextual factor that is couched in
terms of general communicative and cognitive constraints. Our proposal is based on
the notion of perspective, understood as the information that is perceptually avail-
able for a given individual from a particular point of view in space (Roberts 2015:
3). This perspective, moreover, is doxastic in that it is understood to be the set of
worlds compatible with an individual’s beliefs at that time in that world. From a
communicative perspective, we consider that grammatical aspect not only reflects
the point of view of the speaker, but it is also able to manipulate it, in a process that
we call perspective alignment. In this process, which we consider to be one of the
general goals of communication, the speaker intends to align the hearer’s (doxastic)
perspective to her own; that is, she intends to make the worlds compatible with the
hearer’s beliefs more like the worlds compatible with her own beliefs.
We propose perspective alignment as the resolution of the well-known tension
between linguistic economy and linguistic expressivity during communication (Zipf
1949). We take these two factors to be epiphenomenal: manifestations of different
kinds of knowledge. On the one hand, linguistic economy reflects a speaker’s expec-
tation about the hearer that, given their shared history, their minds’ perception and
schematization of the world are the same. This expectation allows the speaker to
make her utterances shorter, containingmore lexical itemswith underspecifiedmean-
ings. Linguistic economy is thus a manifestation of the Common Ground, the shared
context between interlocutors during a given linguistic communicative act (Stalnaker
1978, 2002; Roberts 1996/2012 i.a.). It is the speaker’s expected common ground
with the hearer that allows for linguistic economy.
Linguistic expressivity, on the other hand, reflects the speaker’s knowledge that
the hearer is a separate individual and that consequently their minds may overlap but
are not identical and are not necessarily experiencing and schematizing the context at
issue in the same manner. From a linguistic communicative perspective, this knowl-
edge amounts toTheory ofMind (Wellman1990;Gopnik 1993; deVilliers 2007, i.a.).
This understanding compels the speaker to encode linguistically all of her intended
meaning, leading to linguistic expressivity.
Under these two notions, linguistic economy appears as speaker-oriented, while
linguistic expressivity appears as hearer-oriented. Thereby lies the communicative
tension that clarifies the objective of linguistic communication: the bringing of the
hearer to the point of view or perspective of the speaker. And this, in a nutshell, is
what perspective alignment seeks: the optimization of Common Ground and Theory
of Mind constraints between speaker and hearer during the communicative act.
214 M. Fuchs et al.
We argue that, linguistically, perspective alignment can be achieved by lexicalized
meanings, such as the progressive meaning, that bring the hearer to the “here and
now”. The progressive meaning makes salient the reference interval in the shared
meaning structure (described in §3)—thus conveying information about the “here
and now”—, and in doing so, it brings the perspective of the hearer closer to that of
the speaker.
Under this analysis,when intending to convey a progressivemeaning in a language
with two distinct markers whose alternation is contextually determined—such as
present-day Spanish—, the speaker has either the choice of relying on non-linguistic
contextual information and use the Simple-Present marker or the choice of using the
Present-Progressive marker. In order to felicitously utter a sentence with a Simple-
Present marker that conveys a progressive meaning, the speaker needs to know that
the hearer has perceptual access to the situation described by the embedded propo-
sition. This condition—shared perceptual access—constraints the interpretation to
the reference interval, satisfying the requirements of the progressive meaning, and
brings about perspective alignment by non-linguistic means. If the speaker cannot
know whether the hearer has perceptual access to the situation described by the
embedded proposition, perspective alignment is not met non-linguistically, and the
Present-Progressive marker must be used instead. In this way, perspective alignment
can be provided both non-linguistically (by contextual information) or linguistically
(by the use of the Present-Progressive marker).
This is what the pattern uncovered in Fuchs et al. (2020) ultimately shows: that the
acceptability of theSimple-Presentmarker to convey aprogressivemeaning increases
in Rioplatense and Iberian Spanish, but only when the situational context expresses
that there is shared perceptual access to the event between speaker and hearer, guaran-
teeing non-linguistically speaker-hearer perspective alignment. Conversely, in cases
in which the information given in the situational context does not indicate that there
is shared perceptual access to the event between speaker and hearer, and perspective
alignment is not provided non-linguistically, the acceptability of the Simple-Present
marker decreases significantly. In these cases, the speaker needs to assume that the
hearer can only rely on linguistic information to comprehend the intended meaning
that she wants to convey, and resort to the Present-Progressive marker. In sum, the
Simple-Present marker can be used to convey a progressive meaning only when the
communicative goal of perspective alignment is achieved independently.
Finally, even in rich contexts, where perspective alignment is non-linguistically
guaranteed, we observe that the Present-Progressive marker gets higher ratings than
the Simple-Present marker. We account for this pattern by invoking a key property of
language: lexicalization as a means to faster processing. The Present-Progressive
marker, by its preferred reference interval interpretation (progressive), has in a
way lexicalized perspective alignment.10 By contrast, the use of the Simple-Present
marker to reach perspective alignment demands the incorporation of non-linguistic
10We claim that this is true not only for the sentences in which the Present-Progressive marker
conveys a progressive meaning, but also for sentences such as (2a), Ana está fumando todos los
días ‘Ana is smoking every day’, where the Present-Progressive marker does not express an event-
in-progress reading, but a habitual one with a temporal contingency. In these cases, perspective
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information, which ultimately needs to be integrated into a unifiedmeaning structure.
As comprehension progresses, such real-time integration of linguistic and contex-
tual information is arguably computationally costlier. And it is the avoidance of
this cost what finally leads speakers to systematically prefer Present-Progressive-
marked utterances. An extreme version of this situation is shown by the Mexican
Altiplano Spanish variety, in which the Simple-Present marker is dispreferred to
convey a progressive meaning even when the context provides perspective alignment
by non-linguistic means.
6 Summary and Conclusions
Here we have provided a cognitively grounded approach to non-linguistic context
modeling, and an account of how contextual factors interact with linguistic informa-
tion in the process of sentence meaning comprehension. We have capitalized on a
pattern previously reported (Fuchs et al. 2020), which shows that across two varieties
of Spanish the acceptability of the Simple-Present marker to convey a progressive
meaning is modulated by whether or not the speaker and the hearer share perceptual
access to the situation described by the proposition at issue.
We have shown that this contextual factor can be captured by appealing to a core
communicative goal: perspective alignment. This communicative goal is taken to
be the optimization of the tension between linguistic economy—rooted in Common
Ground—and linguistic expressivity—rooted in Theory of Mind. The connections
with deeper cognitive capacities render shared perceptual access not a primitive,
but the non-linguistic operationalization of this generalized communicative objec-
tive, perspective alignment. As the data show, shared perceptual access is neces-
sary whenever the linguistic marker cannot bring about perspective alignment on its
own. Such is the case of the Spanish Simple-Present marker when it is conveying
progressive meaning. By contrast, when the linguistic marker is the Spanish Present-
Progressive marker, it can signal perspective alignment on its own. In doing so it
presents two communicative advantages: (1) it makes communicative success more
predictable, and therefore efficient, since its use is now less context-dependent, and
(2) it demands less computational resources: it saves the processor the cost of inte-
grating the linguistic content and the non-linguistic contextual information that it
would otherwise need to achieve a felicitous interpretation. These communicative
advantages predict in turn an asymmetry in preference between the Simple-Present
and the Present-Progressive markers in favor of the latter. This prediction is borne
out by the variation pattern: across three Spanish dialectal varieties, the Present-
Progressive marker is preferred over the Simple-Present marker to convey the
progressive meaning regardless of context. This preference is particularly telling
alignment also obtains even though theongoingness of the event is not at issue; that is, the perspective
of the hearer is also brought closer to that of the speaker even if the event is not unfolding at reference
time. We leave the analysis of these cases for further research.
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in the case of the Mexican Altiplano variety. In this variety, the Simple-Present
marker no longer shows context sensitivity effects, suggesting that theSimple-Present
marker is no longer able to participate in the achievement of perspective alignment
even when the main components of this communicative goal are independently (non-
linguistically) provided by the shared perceptual access to the event between speaker
and hearer. On the assumption that the Mexican Altiplano variety, like the other two
varieties, showed these context effects at some previous point in its diachrony, the
absence of context effects in the variety’s modern instantiation suggests the reso-
lution of a competition for the signaling of perspective alignment between the two
markers; a competition that the Present-Progressivemarker won. As it turns out, such
a pattern is not idiosyncratic to Spanish. It is instead consistent with the well-attested
cross-linguistic diachronic pattern of encroachment of Present-Progressive markers
over the aspectual domain originally covered by Simple-Presentmarkers (e.g., Bybee
et al. 1994; Deo 2015).
Altogether, the approach to context structure presented here is consistent with a
view of a relation between grammar and meaning that is mediated by generalized
nonlinguistic communicative goals, such as perspective alignment, that can be lexi-
cally harnessed, that are at play during real-time language comprehension, and that
link individualized usage patterns with the behavior of dialectal varieties and with
generalized cross-linguistic patterns of change.
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A Frame-Based Analysis of Verbal
Particles in Hungarian
Kata Balogh and Rainer Osswald
Abstract The verbal particle in Hungarian raises a number of intriguing issues for
any theoryof the syntax-semantics interface. In this article,we aimat a formal account
of the semantic contribution of various verbal particles in Hungarian and we show
how the semantic representation of the clause canbe compositionally derived.Wewill
concentrate on the four frequent particles meg-, le-, el- and fel-. Our approach makes
use of a formalized version of Role and Reference Grammar and the framework of
decompositional frame semantics. In particular,wegive a formal representation of the
boundary-setting function of the verbal particle in terms of decompositional frames
which builds on a scalar change analysis. We furthermore analyze the interaction
of the particle with resultative adjectives and provide a formal model of how their
syntactic representations drive their frame-semantic composition.
Keywords Verbal particles · Hungarian · Scalar change · Decompositional frame
semantics · Role and Reference Grammar.
1 The Verbal Particle in Hungarian
The verbal particle in Hungarian raises a number of intriguing issues for any the-
ory of the syntax-semantics interface. In its default position immediately preceding
the verb (1a), the verbal particle stands in complementary distribution with other
verbal modifiers such as resultative predicates (1b), bare nouns and infinitival com-
1Abbreviations: acc ‘accusative’, ill ‘illative’, iness ‘inessive’, past ‘past tense’, pl ‘plural’, poss
‘possessive’, supess ‘superessive’, subl ‘sublative’, vptcl ‘verbal particle’.
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plements.1 (Moreover, the immediate preverbal position can host the narrow focus




















‘Anna painted the fence green.’
Hungarian verbal particles vary considerablywith respect to their origin (e.g. Forgács
2004) and their semantic contribution (e.g. Kiefer and Ladányi 2000).2 Several par-
ticles express directionality (e.g. le- ‘down’, ki- ‘out’) while others, including the
frequent particle meg-, are more difficult to classify on the basis of their lexical
meaning. In the following, we will focus on interpretational aspects of the four ver-
bal particles meg-, le- (‘down, off’), el- (‘away’) and fel- (‘up’), which, together
with ki- (‘out’) and be- (‘in’), constitute the six oldest verbal particles in Hungarian
(cf. Szoltész 1959). The overall goal of this article is to give a formal account of the
semantic contribution of these particles, and to show how the semantic representation
of the clause can be compositionally derived.
In a particle-verb combination, the verbal particle may contribute its original
lexical meaning, as, for instance, directionality in the examples in (2), or the particle
















‘Anna suddenly ran away.’
The directional meaning is mostly present in combination with verbs of motion as
shown in (2). In this case, the verbal particle is often characterized as terminative
(Kiefer and Ladányi 2000, pp. 25f; É. Kiss 2008). The example in (1a) illustrates
the non-directional meaning contribution of the particle when combined with a non-
motion verb such as fest (‘paint’). In such cases, Kiefer and Ladányi (2000) analyze
the verbal particle as a “functor” that changes the Aktionsart of the predicate, e.g.,
by expressing a boundary condition. The introduction of an end or result condition
is a frequent example of Aktionsart formation.
Traditionally, meg- has mostly been regarded as a pure aspectualizer or perfec-
tivizer signaling perfective aspect and, thereby, determining the viewpoint aspect,
as illustrated by the contrast between (3a) and (4a). In more recent studies, meg- is
often taken as a delimiter (e.g., Bene 2009), signaling telicity (e.g., Kardos 2016)
2For more information on the historical development of the verbal particles in Hungarian see e.g.
Szoltész (1959) and Pátrovics (2002).
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and, thus, relating to the Aktionsart (lexical aspect) of the predicate (e.g., Kiefer
2009; Kiefer and Németh 2012). The particle meg- is exclusively used in this way
(4a), and the other particles discussed in this article can all be used in this way as




















































‘Peter (has) washed/mopped the floor.’
The choice of the particle seems to be sensitive to the fine-grained semantic class
of the base verb, at least to a certain extent. For instance, similar to the case of
le-fest (‘paint sth’), the particle le- combines with a number of other verbs which
express a surface oriented incremental change such as le-töröl (‘wipe down’), le-
söpör (‘sweep’) and le-arat (‘harvest’). Moreover, particle verbs of this group can
co-occur with a resultative phrase, in which case the verbal particle occupies the











‘Anna painted the fence green.’
Other classes of verbs, including verbs of creation (e.g. meg-ír ‘write’, fel-épít ‘build
up’), allow for either a particle or a resultative phrase in the preverbal position, but
reject the co-occurrence of the two. Yet others, including verbs of performance and
perception of performances (e.g. el-énekel ‘sing’, meg-hallgat ‘listen to’), seem not
to allow for a resultative phrase at all.
Irrespective of the fact that the verbal particle affects theAktionsart (lexical aspect)
of the predicate, the syntactic position of the particle can have an influence on the
aspectual interpretation (viewpoint aspect) of the utterance. The immediate preverbal
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positionof the particle is associatedwith a perfective interpretation.The inverse order,



















‘Anna was painting the fence, when Peter arrived.’
In (6), the presence of the particle still indicates an intended result state while the
postverbal position of the particle signals that the viewpoint aspect is progressive.
As mentioned above, the locative or directional meaning component of the parti-
cle, if available, is largely restricted to base verbs that denote movements or spatial
positions. In these cases, Kiefer and Ladányi (2000) analyze the verbal particle as a
predicate of location or direction and É. Kiss (2008) argues that the verbal particle
has a terminative role and signals the end position of the moving theme as in (2a).
The latter analysis seems problematic in view of examples like (2b), where the par-
ticle does not signal a final location or terminativity but the (deictic) direction of the
movement.
Another possible function of verbal particles is to signal the inception or inchoat-
ion, i.e. the beginning of an event (or state). The particles meg-, el- (‘away’) and fel-
(‘up’) can contribute this meaning component. Examples are el-alszik (‘fall asleep’),
meg-szeret (‘get to love’) and fel-zúg (‘begin to buzz’). In (7), the base verb zúg
(‘buzz’) denotes the production of a humming sound. The verbal particle fel- in (7b)














‘The engine starts to buzz.’
Similarly, the particle verbs el-alszik (‘fall asleep’) and meg-szeret (‘get to love’)
refer to the inchoation of an activity/state of sleeping and a state of loving. However,
these predicates slightly differ from the one in (7b). As Kiefer and Ladányi (2000)
point out, both el-alszik and meg-szeret can be modified by the adverbial lassan
















3The inverse order can also be triggered by other means: Narrow focus and negation are required
to appear in the immediate preverbal position, causing the verbal particle to appear postverbally. In
these cases, the viewpoint aspect of the clause remains neutralized or ambiguous.
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This suggests that some preparatory phase is present in the case of el-alszik and
meg-szeret. We propose an analysis for both (7b) and (8a) representing inchoation
as referring to the initial part of the activity/state contributed by the base verb. The
difference in the possibility of adverbial modification of el-alszik and fel-zúg can be
explained by differences in the temporal extension of this initial part.
2 Scalar Analysis and Frame-Semantic Representation
In Sect. 3 below, we propose a formal semantic analysis of the data discussed so
far that combines a scalar analysis of the verbal particle with frame-based semantic
representations of the lexical items involved. The purpose of the present section is
twofold: First, we briefly review the scalar approach, which has been put forward
as a general framework for the analysis of aspectual properties in the verbal domain
by Filip (2008), Rappaport Hovav (2008), Kennedy and Levin (2008), and Beavers
(2008), among others, based on the work of Krifka (1998) and Hay et al. (1999).
Second, we introduce decompositional frame semantics as a representational means
that integrates frame semantics with lexical decomposition and formal semantics. In
particular, we will show how changes along a scale can be represented in frames.
The basic idea of the scalar approach is that gradual changes expressed by verbs
or verbal constructions can be uniformly characterized as monotonic changes along
an ordered set of degrees with respect to a certain dimension of measurement. Under
this analysis, telicity comes about by boundaries on the scale, which can be inherent
to the scale or imposed on it by the context. An early focus of the scalar approach
was the analysis of deadjectival degree achievements such as widen and dry. The two
verbs differ in that the scale associated with widen is open while the one associated
with dry is closed, which has consequences for their default aspectual interpretation
(Kearns 2007).
The scalar viewpoint has been fruitfully applied to the analysis (Kagan 2013,
2016; Zinova 2017). A common assumption of these approaches is that the prefixes
determine a dimension of measurement on the basis of a scalar structure given by
the base verb and, possibly, its direct, oblique, or prepositional object.
First applications of the scalar approach to the analysis of verbal particles and
telicity in Hungarian are given in Kardos (2012, 2016) and Csirmaz (2012). As
indicated in the previous section, the distinction between atelic and telic uses of
deadjectival degree achievement verbs in Hungarian is marked by the presence of
a verbal particle or another boundary-setting element in preverbal position. The
contrast between (3a) and (4a) illustrates this for the intransitive verb szárad (‘dry’),
which is related to the adjective száraz (‘dry’). The simple past tense use without a
verbal particle shown in (3a) describes the process of drying, i.e., of gettingdrier. If the
particlemeg- is added, the resulting verb is telic and describes the accomplishment of
getting dry; cf. (4a). This pattern carries over to transitive verbs such as fest (‘paint’)
andmos (‘wash’), which can be used to denote activities as well as accomplishments.
When combined with a direct object that encodes a quantized predicate (cf. Krifka
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1998), the presence or absence of a verbal particle (or a resultative expression)
determines the interpretation as an activity (atelic) or an accomplishment (telic),
respectively. This contrast is illustrated in (3b) versus (4b) and in (3c) versus (4c).4
According to the descriptive analysis of Kardos (2016), the verbal particle (or a
resultative expression) encodes an event-maximalization operator in the sense of
Filip (2008) which goes along with the presence of a closed scale. That is, the
particle in preverbal position imposes a bound on the event denoted by the verb. In
the formal representations presented below, this corresponds to the existence of a
final event stage in which the maximal value of the associated scalar attribute holds
at the relevant event participant. For instance, in the final stage of a drying event
described as telic, the affected object is characterized as having maximal dryness (or
zero moisture).
The formal semantic framework employed in the following makes use of decom-
positional frames (Kallmeyer and Osswald 2013; Osswald and Van Valin 2014). A
crucial assumption of frame semantics is that attributes (features, functional relations)
play a central role in the organization of semantic and conceptual knowledge and
semantic representation (Barsalou 1992; Löbner 2014). Frames are thus inherently
structured representations whose semantic components (participants, subevents etc.)
can be recursively accessed via attributes. Another aspect of the presented approach
is that semantic computation can be understood as the incremental construction of
(minimal) framemodels based on the input, the context, the lexicon, and background
knowledge, while composition is basically realized by frame unification under con-
straints.
A standard decomposition structure like the one shown in (9) for transitive break
(cf., e.g., Levin and Rappaport Hovav 2011) can be represented as an event frame
of type causation which has a cause component of type activity and an effect
component of type change-of-state, which in turn has a result component of type
broken.
(9) [[x ACT] CAUSE [BECOME [y BROKEN]]]
Moreover, the participants x and y are represented as the effector of the activity
and the patient of the result component, respectively. The overall frame structure
is graphically depicted in Fig. 1a.
Formally, we define frame structures as base-labeled feature structures with types
and relations as introduced in Kallmeyer and Osswald (2013). Structures of this
type arise as canonical models of certain attribute-value descriptions. For example,
the frame structure in Fig. 1a is the canonical model of the (closed) attribute-value
description in (10).5 The attribute-value matrix shown in Fig. 1b can be seen as a
notational variant of this description.
4As noted by Kardos (2016, pp. 4ff, 28ff), verbs of consumption and creation behave somewhat
differently in that they may receive a telic interpretation even without a verbal particle if the direct
object has quantized reference.
5The corresponding open (or unlabelled) description, which lacks the leading label e, can be seen
as a one-place predicate that is either true or false at the nodes of a frame structure.
































Fig. 1 Frame representation and attribute-value matrix
(10) e · (causation ∧ CAUSE activity ∧ CAUSE EFFECTOR  x ∧
EFFECT change-of-state ∧ EFFECT RESULT broken ∧
EFFECT RESULT PATIENT  y)
Attribute-value descriptions have a straightforward translation into expressions of
first-order predicate logic. The respective translation of (10) is given in (11), with e,
x and y used as free variables (or constants) and with the additional requirement that
all attribute relations (written in small caps) are functional.
(11) ∃e′∃e′′∃s(causation(e) ∧ CAUSE(e, e′) ∧ EFFECT(e, e′′) ∧ activity(e′) ∧
EFFECTOR(e′, x) ∧ change-of-state(e′′) ∧ RESULT(e′′, s) ∧
broken(s) ∧ PATIENT(s, y))
The structure in Fig. 1a can then be characterized as the minimal model of (11) in the
usual sense of first-order predicate logic, under the assumption that attribute relations
are functional.
The formal framework just sketched has no directmeans to encode universal quan-
tification. In order to be able to represent the implicit quantification over subevents
(or subintervals) involved in the characterization of a scalar change, we therefore
extend the framework by allowing frame types as values of attributes. To this end,
we introduce nominals (names, constants) for frame types into the description lan-
guage, which means to treat frame types as “first class citizens” of the frame models.
More formally, we assume that every (open) attribute-value description can give rise
to the name of a frame type, which is notationally indicated by enclosing the descrip-
tion in double lines. For example, ‖causation‖ and ‖broken ∧ patient : phys-obj‖
are names of frame types. Frame types are related to their instances and to each other
by the relations is-instance-of (inst) and is-subtype-of (subtype), respectively. For
instance, ‖causation‖ is-subtype-of ‖event‖ is assumed to be true.
In order to characterize an event with respect to its progression of incremental,
ongoing changes, the event is assumed to have an attribute prog(ression) whose
value specifies the type of the change in question. Processes of drying can then be
characterized as having an attribute progwhose value is the type ‖becoming-drier‖.
More precisely, the type in question is ‖becoming-drier ∧ entity x‖, where x is the
entity that is drying. This frame type is to be seen as a shorthand for themore complex


















Fig. 2 Frame-semantic representation of a complex type of incremental-change
type shown in Fig. 2, which provides an explicit decomposition of the underlying
change of state: Events of the type in question are events of type incremental-change
of an entity x such that the moisture value at the fin(al) stage (of x) is lower than
moisture value at the ini(tial) stage.
Characterizing an event e by prog  T is meant to express the fact that every
(appropriate) event segment e′ of e (e′ segm e) is an instance of the type T (e′ inst T ).
That is, the following constraint schema is required to be valid:
(12) e · prog  T ∧ e′ segm e → e′ inst T
It is this schema that makes explicit the universal quantification over subevents
encoded by prog. Note that (12) applies only to event segments which are refer-
entially introduced. That is, the schema is applied “on demand”.
3 Semantic Analysis of Verbal Particles
A central pattern of our analysis is that verbal particles in Hungarian, and other
lative-marked verbalmodifiers, can turn activity (or process) descriptions into accom-
plishments by adding a boundary condition to the event frame associated with the
verb.6 Following the outline sketched in Sect. 2, the boundary information is imposed
by syntax-driven frame composition on a scale or dimension of change component
within the event.
The frame representation of the drying process and the effect of adding meg-
is sketched in Fig. 3. The process is modeled as a progression characterized by an
6Turning atelic events into telic ones is a rather frequent function of the verbal particle in Hungarian.
Note, however, that this function is not always present. As É. Kiss (2008) and Kiefer and Németh
(2012) point out, there are particle verbs denoting a static (and hence inherently atelic) event;
moreover, duplication of the verbal particle signals iteration (as non habitual repetition), which is
atelic as well. In the former group, the base verb is either a perception verb or a verb expressing
spatial position. In these cases, the verbal particle contributes directionality.































































Fig. 3 Frame-semantic representation of combining meg- with szárad (‘dry’)
incremental decrease of moisture. The value of prog is the frame type which char-
acterizes the subevents of the progression. The particle meg- adds a final attribute
to the progression frame, and the constraint shown in (13) picks out the type of the
final value from the progression structure.7
(13) final : stage ∧ prog ‖final‖  T  final is-of-type T
A further constraint enforces the extremal value of the scalar attribute in the final
stage.
The above proposal can be directly applied to the analysis of verbs expressing
an incremental change. Compare again the sentence without verbal particle in (3b),
repeated as (14a), with the sentence in (4b) with the particle le- (‘down, off’) in its




















‘Anna painted the fence.’
The base verb fest (‘paint’) denotes an event of type active-progression which goes
along with an incremental change of the theme. More precisely, as indicated by the
frame representation shown in Fig. 4, the base verb fest expresses an action by the
actor x , affecting the theme y by incrementally putting more and more paint on
7φ  ψ is short for ∀x(φ(x) → ψ(x)), where φ and ψ are one-place predicates.









































Fig. 5 Frame representation of le-fest ‘paint’ (bounded)
the surface of y. In this incremental change of the surface, for each arbitrary part of
the progression it holds that at the final stage of that part the surface is covered more
than it was at the initial stage of that given part. In (14b), by comparison, the verbal
particle le- (‘down’) contributes the final stage, turning the event into a bounded
event (Fig. 5).



























Fig. 6 Frame representation of le-arat ‘reap/harvest’











‘The farmer reaped the wheat.’
The base verb expresses an activity of removing the theme (wheat) from an unspeci-
fied location z such that its coverage will incrementally decrease. This is represented
in the frame type shown on the right of Fig. 6: the value of the act attribute is the
remove-activity with the origin z, which is identical to the patient of the initial
and final stages of the change. Similarly to the previous examples, the verbal particle
signals the final stage at which the coverage of z is zero (or minimal). Note that in
the above example, the theme of the main event is not identical to the patient of
the incremental change. Although less frequent, there are examples of reap/harvest



















‘At the border of Devecser, the first energy plantation was reaped on Friday
[…]
(Magyar Nemzet Online, 30 November 2012)
The examples of the inchoative function of the particles meg-, el- and fel- men-
tioned in Sect. 1 are partially in line with the observations made about the inchoative
use of the Russian prefix za- as presented by Zinova (2017). The inchoative func-







Fig. 7 Frame representation of fel-zúg ‘begin to buzz’
tion of the verbal particle is compatible with base verbs expressing a state, activity
or process. We represent this use as expressing an event of type inchoation with a
post(erior) attribute whose value is the posterior event of the inchoation, i.e., a
state/activity/process of the type denoted by the base verb; cf. Fig. 7.
4 Semantic Composition and the Syntax-Semantics
Interface
As to the modeling of the interaction between syntax and semantics we apply the
framework of Role and Reference Grammar (RRG; Van Valin and LaPolla 1997;
Van Valin 2005). RRG is a surface oriented grammar, developed from a typologi-
cal perspective and explicitly concerned with the interplay of syntax, semantics and
pragmatics. The layered structure of the clause inRRGaims to capture universal char-
acteristics of clause structure in natural languages, while language specific features
are expressed via a range of constraints. The layered structure reflects the distinction
between predicates, arguments, and non-arguments. The core layer consists of the
nucleus, which specifies the (verbal) predicate, and the syntactic arguments. The
clause layer contains the core as well as extracted arguments. Each of the layers can
have a periphery where adjuncts are attached to; cf. Fig. 8 (where ‘RP’ stands for
referential phrase).
The heart of the grammatical system of RRG is a bi-directional linking algorithm
between the syntactic and the semantic representations of the sentence, reflecting
both processes of production and comprehension. The interaction of syntax and
semantics is furthermore influenced by discourse-pragmatics (the focus structure of
the utterance) and language-specific constructional schemas. In our analysis we rely
on a formalized version of RRG, following Osswald and Kallmeyer (2018), in which
tree nodes can carry features. This allows for the elimination of the PRED node,
which has no other function than marking the element as predicative, and which can
be simply represented by the feature [pred+]. Features can also be used to establish
the link between syntactic elements and the corresponding semantic representations.
We propose different structural representations for the verbal particle and the
resultative predicate. The main difference is that the latter construction is analyzed
as a nuclear cosubordination (cf. Van Valin 2005), which corresponds to complex
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predicate formation, while the particle is taken as a modifier of the verbal nucleus;
cf. Fig. 9. By this distinction we argue against a uniform account of the semantic
contribution associated with the preverbal position as proposed by É. Kiss (2008),
who claims that the verbal particle in this position functions as a resultative, termi-
native or locative secondary predicate of the theme argument. This proposal seems
to be too restrictive since verbal particles do not necessarily introduce a secondary
predicate. Consider, for instance, the particle-verb combination in (17), for which









‘Anna has sung a song.’
Based on similar observations, Bene (2009) argues that the verbal particle merely
functions as a delimiter rather than as a secondary predicate. In our analysis,we aim to
make this distinction explicit by analyzing the construction of a resultative adjective-
verb combination as a nuclear cosubordination with two predicative elements and
the particle as a modifier of the verbal nucleus.
In the formalized version of RRG introduced in Osswald and Kallmeyer (2018),
the syntactic inventory, whose elements are subject to compositional syntactic oper-
ations such as substitution and adjunction, consists of elementary trees in the sense
























Fig. 9 Structures for resultative predicates and verbal particles
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tary trees encode full argument projections. They are specified in a modular way in
the so-called metagrammar (Crabbé et al. 2013). The metagrammar is basically a
declarative system of tree descriptions about node dominance and precedence which
allows one to define classes of grammatically relevant tree constraints. These classes
can then be combined to generate the elementary trees as minimal models of the
constraints. It is thus the level of the metagrammar where important grammatical
generalizations about the elementary constructions of a language are expressed.
























































































The tree fragment in (18b), together with its semantic contribution, describes a struc-
ture with the actor argument in the preverbal field and the theme argument in the
postverbal field. The tree fragment in (18c) and its associated semantic contribution
describes the verbal particle in its default position and its semantic contribution as
adding a boundedness condition to the event. The fragment in (18d) describes a resul-
tative adjective in the preverbal position contributing a final stage s (boundedness
condition) in which a secondary predicate holds.
8In the illustrations, ≺∗ stands for precedence, ≺ for immediate precedence, edges by solid lines
stand for immediate dominance, and the dashed lines for dominance.














































FINAL :stage ∧ PROG ‖EFFECT FINAL‖  T
 FINAL is-of-type T
Fig. 10 Interaction between syntax and semantics for sentence (14b)
Let us apply the proposed analysis to the example in (14c). Figure 10 illustrates
the interaction between syntax (in terms of RRG) and frame semantics for particle-
verb combinations like le-festette (‘vptcl-painted’). The verb festette contributes an
event e′ with a progression componentwhile the verbal particle contributes a bounded
event e with a final stage. The equation e  e′ states that these two components
both contribute to the same event rather than expressing two separate events. The
constraint shown at the lower right of Fig. 10 corresponds to the constraint in (13)
and ensures that the final stage of the bounded event and the final stage of the effect
of the incremental progression must be of the same type. At the end of the derivation,
the semantic composition leads to the representation illustrated in Fig. 5.
As shown in example (1b), repeated as (19), resultative predicates also function











‘Anna painted the fence green.’
The combination of the preverbal resultative predicate and the verb is analyzed as a
nuclear cosubordination with both NUC elements being predicative. The resultative
predicate zöld-re (‘green-subl’) in its default position also indicates boundedness
(telicity), and being predicative it provides a secondary predication of the theme: in
the final stage of the changing theme its color is green. The constraint on the final
stages is the same as before; cf. Fig. 11.
Verbal particles can also co-occur with resultative predicates, which poses fur-
ther interesting questions for the syntax-semantics interface. If the particle and the
resultative predicate co-occur in a neutral sentence, they cannot both be preverbal. In
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this case, the particle occupies the immediate preverbal position while the resultative






















The analysis of (20a) is in line with the analysis of the previous sentences. The parti-
cle and the verb form a modified nucleus (le-festette) that forms a complex predicate
with the resultative predicate (le-festette zöld-re) by nuclear cosubordination. The
final derivations for the examples in (19) and (20a) lead to the same semantic rep-
resentation, in accordance with our intuitions; cf. Figs. 11, 12, and 13. Note that
the progression component, that is, the representation of the incremental change, is
the same in all three cases. Examples (19) and (20a) differ from (14b) in that the























































FINAL :stage ∧ PROG ‖EFFECT FINAL‖  T
 FINAL is-of-type T
Fig. 11 Interaction between syntax and semantics for example (19)
9The linearization in (20b) is grammatical in case the resultative predicate gets a contrastive topic
intonation. In this article, we only consider neutral sentences.



































































e  e′  e′′
FINAL :stage ∧ PROG ‖EFFECT FINAL‖  T
 FINAL is-of-type T














Fig. 13 Derived semantics for (19) and (20a)
5 Summary
The main goal of this article was to propose a formal account of the semantic con-
tribution of various verbal particles in Hungarian and to sketch how the semantic
representation of the clause can be compositionally derived. We did not aim at a
full-fledged descriptive characterization of all the possible particle-verb combina-
tions in Hungarian but concentrated on frequent functions and their formal semantic
characterization. While the previous analyses mentioned in Sect. 1 offer adequate
insights to the various meaning contributions of the Hungarian verbal particles, they
leave open the question of the precise semantic representation and the compositional
mechanisms involved. Furthermore, we argued that the characterization of É. Kiss
(2008) of the particle as a secondary predication is too strong. Kiefer and Ladányi
(2000) and Kiefer (2009) provide a wide coverage descriptive analysis but lack
a well-defined formal characterization. They introduce nine productive Aktionsart
formations by verbal particles, but without specifying their semantic representa-
tion formally. We presented a formal, compositional analysis of some of their basic
descriptive insights. We focussed on frequent cases of the telicizing function of ver-
bal particles and sketched a representation of the inchoative meaning contribution.
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The use of the framework of decompositional frame semantics proved useful for
this purpose as it provides a formal tool for a fine-grained representation of the
event structure of the predicate and for the Aktionsart-effects of modified and com-
plex predicates. The semantic characterization of verbal particles in our analysis is
close to the analysis of Kardos (2016), among others. The main contribution of our
approach is an explicit semantic and syntactic representation and a compositional
model.
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On the Fictive Reading of German
Steigen ‘Climb, Rise’: A Frame Account
Thomas Gamerschlag and Wiebke Petersen
Abstract Fictive motion, i.e., the figurative stative use of verbs of motion, has
attracted much attention in cognitive linguistics as a paradigm case for how basic
dynamic concepts are exploited figuratively in concept formation (Langacker 1986;
Matsumoto 1996;Talmy2000;Matlock 2004a, b inter alia). In this paper,wepresent a
case study of the fictivemotion reading of theGermanmovement verb steigen ‘climb,
rise’ and explore how it can be related to the various dynamic readings of the verb. In
our account of steigen, which builds on Gamerschlag, Geuder & Petersen’s (2014)
analysis of the dynamic readings of the verb, we contrast the different readings in
terms of frames, i.e., recursive attribute-value structures in the sense of Barsalou
(1992) and Petersen (2007/2015).
Keywords Fictive motion · Verbs of motion · Stative reading of dynamic verbs ·
steigen/rise · Frame analysis
1 Introduction
In fictive motion, verbs of motion are applied to describe a stative scenario in which
the subject referent usually is a stationary, non-moveable entity. In the most typical
cases, the subject refers to some kind of pathlike entity such as a road or a line while
the original theme, the moving participant of the literal use of the verb, remains
unrealized. A German example of the fictive motion use of some verbs is given in
(1) below. As can be seen, fictive motion uses serve to highlight spatial properties of
the subject referent: laufen ‘run’ combines with the modifier quer ‘diagonal’ and a
directional PP which specify the location of the scar and its orientation in relation to
the cheek. Moreover, springen ‘jump’ plus PP identifies the eye as a region where
the scar is interrupted, while landen ‘land’ locates the final part of the scar in the
eyebrow when combined with the PP in (1).
T. Gamerschlag (B) · W. Petersen
Heinrich-Heine-Universität Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf, Germany
e-mail: gamer@phil.hhu.de
© The Author(s) 2021
S. Löbner et al. (eds.), Concepts, Frames and Cascades in Semantics,
Cognition and Ontology, Language, Cognition, and Mind 7,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-50200-3_12
239
240 T. Gamerschlag and W. Petersen
(1) Eine […] Narbe lief quer über seine eine Wange. Sie sprang über sein
a scar ran diagonally across his one cheek it leapt over his
Auge und landete in seiner Augenbraue.1
eye and landed in his eyebrow
Ascar randiagonally across oneof his cheeks, leapingover his eye and landing in
one of his eyebrows.’
In German, both manner of motion verbs as well as directed motion verbs allow for
fictive readings. In (1), laufen ‘run’ and springen ‘leap/jump’ are verbs encoding
manner, whereas landen ‘land’ refers to a downward motion which ends up on some
surface. Additional examples of fictive readings of path verbs are given below. For
instance, in (2), the verbs überqueren ‘cross’ and abbiegen ‘turn off (the road)’ are
applied to highlight properties of the course of the road.
(2) Die Straße überquert den Fluss und biegt dann in Richtung Flughafen ab.
the road crosses the river and turns then in direction airport particle
‘The road crosses the river and then turns in the direction of the airport.’
Likewise, steigen ‘rise’, which originally denotes a dynamic change in height of a
moveable object, refers to an upward slope of the terrain in (3).
(3) Der Weg steigt […] langsam auf eine Höhe von 4450 m.2
the trail climbs slowly to a height of 4450 m
‘The trail climbs slowly to a height of 4450 meters.’
The verb steigen, variously translated as ‘climb’, ‘rise’ and also ‘step’, is highly
polysemous. It exhibits a use as a manner of motion verb in addition to a purely
directional reading and an “intensional” (figurative) use, as well as a fictive motion
reading as in (3). We consider the meaning of steigen as a representative example
of a complex array of different verb senses and the way they are systematically
interrelated. These different senses will be illustrated in Sect. 3 after a concise
overview of previous approaches to fictive motion in Sect. 2. In Sect. 4, we will
give a short summary of Gamerschlag et al.’s (2014) frame approach to the dynamic
readings of steigen. After a closer look at the fictive motion use of the verb in Sect. 5,
we will present a frame analysis of this reading in Sect. 6. In Sect. 7 the fictive
motion use of steigen is compared to the intensional use. Finally, in Sect. 8 we will
indicate how the sketch of our frame analysis of fictive motion can be extended and
elaborated on in various ways.
1Example taken from the novel Der fünfte Spieler by Blue Balliet, Aufbau Digital 2011.
2www.bhutan-travel.de/index.php/trekking-in-bhutan/mittelschwere-treks/18-trekking-in-bhutan/
184-jhomolhari-trek (accessed 5 June 2019)
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2 Previous Accounts of Fictive Motion
Given the confinements of this paper, it is not possible to do justice to all the work
that has been done in regard to fictive motion phenomena in the past decades.
The recognition of fictive motion as such and its relevance to language, concept
formation and cognitive processing is a merit of cognitive linguistics. The term
‘fictive motion’ goes back to work by Leonard Talmy, starting out from the 70’s,
developing over the following decades and resulting in insights such as the typology
of fictivemotion presented inTalmy (2000). Though alternatively referred to by terms
such as ‘abstract motion’ (Langacker 1986) and ‘subjective motion’ (Matsumoto
1996), the phenomenon is characterized by a well-defined empirical base which
also allows for cross-linguistic comparison. The central claim of cognitive linguists
that fictive motion involves the mental simulation of movement or scanning along
a path has been corroborated by psycholinguistic research which builds on results
from various kinds of experiments. Matlock (2004b) and more recently Matlock
and Bergmann (2014) and Hütte and Matlock (2016) give an excellent overview
of experimental research on the phenomenon, including their own work. Different
kinds of experiments such as narrative understanding tasks and studies based on
drawing and eye movement provide evidence that fictive motion goes along with a
conceptualizer simulatingmotion.Matlock (2004b) also shows howassumingmental
simulation as part of the concept of fictive motion readings can account for a number
of linguistic properties such as the spatial characteristics of the subject referent
and the co-occurrence of temporal expressions. In spite of all their insights on the
phenomenon, cognitive analyses usually refrain froma formal representation, thereby
lacking a level of explicitness necessary for a deeper understanding of fictive motion.
Instead, much of the discussion in the cognitive linguistics realm centers around the
question of how fictive motion fits into accounts of metaphor and metonymy. For
instance, Kövecses (2015) argues against an analysis of fictive motion in terms of
conceptual metaphor, since an account of this type would involve an incomplete
mapping, leaving components of the dynamic source, such as the moving entity,
without a corresponding element in the static target. More recently, stative readings
of dynamic verbs have attracted some attention in formal semantics. In his analysis
of the stative uses of motion verbs, Gawron (2009) provides an elaborate account
of spatial change as opposed to temporal change in which he focuses on so-called
“spreading motion” referred to by extent verbs such as widen and cover. Following
Gawron’s ideas, Koontz-Garboden (2010) and Deo et al. (2013) propose accounts of
stative uses of dynamic verbs in which the time scale/axis underlying the dynamic
use is replaced by a spatial scale/axis. Although these time-to-space transfer analyses
elegantly explain a number of properties of stative uses including the co-occurrence
of variousmodifiers, they do not explicitly address fictivemotion constructions of the
type illustrated above. It is not clear, therefore, how these approaches would account
for the range of modifiers that show up as a result of the dynamic origin of fictive
motion. In the following sections, we will present a first sketch of a frame analysis
of the fictive reading of steigen which deals with the range of co-occurring modifiers
and the way they are linked to the dynamic source of fictive motion.
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3 The Four Major Readings of Steigen ‘Climb, Rise, Step’
Due to its complex polysemy, the German verb steigen ‘climb, rise, step’ is
particularly interesting in regard to the question of how the fictive motion use is
embedded in the meaning array of a basically dynamic verb of motion. Gamerschlag
et al. (2014:116) distinguish the four major uses illustrated in (4).
(4) steigen
Die Ziegen steigen auf’s Dach / vom Dach (herunter).
the goats climb onto.the roof from.the roof (down)
‘The goats are climbing onto the roof / (down) from the roof.’
Der Ballon steigt höher und höher / *tiefer und tiefer.
the balloon climbs higher and higher deeper and deeper
‘The balloon is climbing higher and higher / *deeper and deeper.’
Die Temperatur steigt von 3 auf 10 Grad / *von 3 auf 10 Grad.
the temperature rises from to degrees from to degrees
‘The temperature is rising from 3 to 10 degrees / *from 10 to 3 degrees.’
a. as a verb of manner of motion
b. as a verb of directed motion
c. as an intensional verb of change along a property scale
d. as a static verb of “fictive motion”
Das Gelände steigt von 750 auf 761 Meter […]3 / *von 761 auf 750 Meter.
the terrain climbs from to meter from to meter
‘The terrain climbs from 750 to 761 meters / *761 to 750 meters.’
The readings illustrated in (4a) and (b) are literal dynamic uses of the verbwhich refer
tomovement in space.Theycanbedifferentiateddue toacoupleof asymmetries.First,
steigen as a verb ofmanner ofmotion (henceforth steigenmm) requires the use of limbs
for the kind of motion referred to. Therefore, only animate subject referents with a
suitable anatomy are permitted, such as Ziegen ‘goats’ in (4a). It is important to note
that steigenmm is not confined in regard to the direction of motion. As can be seen in
(4a), PPs specifying upward as well as downward motion are admissible. Directional
steigen (henceforth steigendir) as in (4b)doesnotmakereference toaparticularmanner
of using one’s limbs. By consequence, the subject referents of steigendir can refer to
freely suspendedentities suchasBallon ‘balloon’ in (4b).However, steigendir canonly
denote upwardmovement as shown by the non-admissibility of a modifier specifying
a downward path. This asymmetry in regard to admissible directional complements
correlates with their omissibility:While directional PPs can be left out with steigendir
they cannot be omitted with steigenmm.
The example in (4c) illustrates a figurative use of steigen which abstracts away
from spatial motion while referring to abstract “motion” along a scale, such as
3https://www.suedkurier.de/region/bodenseekreis-oberschwaben/heiligenberg/Neues-Wohnen-
und-Arbeiten-in-Heiligenberg;art372476,8460587 (accessed 5 June 2019)
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the temperature scale introduced by the subject. Following the formal analyses by
Montague (1973) and Löbner (1979, 1981) among others, we will refer to this use
as ‘intensional steigen’ (henceforth steigenins). Characteristically, this use involves a
total change of the subject referent over time, as opposed to the partial change of the
subject referent in the literal readings in the first two examples in (4), in which the
subject referent only changes with respect to a single dimension, namely its spatial
location. Like steigendir, steigenins can only express an increase along the respective
scale but never a decrease. In spite of its abstractness, steigenins refers to a true
dynamic change within a particular value space. By consequence, it can be grouped
together with the two literal meanings given in (4).
In contrast, the fictive motion use of steigen (henceforth steigenfict) does not
involve motion interpreted as a dynamic change during the course of the event.
Instead, it refers to a stative spatial scenario in which the subject referent is a
stationary, usually not moveable entity characterized as having some gain in height.
For instance, in (4d) it is specified that the slope of the referent of Gelände ‘terrain’
has a positive difference in height of 500 meters between some non-realized starting
and end point. As with steigendir and steigenins, steigenfict (i) allows for an absolute
use and (ii) can only refer to upward ‘fictive’ motion while downward motion is
excluded, as shown by the non-admissibility of a negative height difference. In this
regard steigen parallels English climb whose fictive motion use is also restricted
to a positive difference in height, thereby relating it more closely to the dynamic
directional use of climb while setting it apart from the manner reading (cf. Fillmore
1982; Jackendoff 1985; Matsumoto 1996).
Note that many speakers seem to have some preference to use steigen in its fictive
use with a verbal particle such as an ‘up(wards)’ rather than choosing the particleless
variant, which is often judged as less felicitous or incomplete. However, the argument
that steigenfict is restricted to a positive gain in height can only be made on the base
of the particleless variant since in the case of the complex verb ansteigen ‘ascend,
move upwards’ one may argue that the upward direction is solely contributed by
the particle, while the verb itself could be analyzed as being indifferent with regard
to the direction of the path. Likewise, the frame account proposed by Gamerschlag
et al. (2014) covers only the (non-fictive) simplex uses of steigen. Since our analysis
of steigenfict directly builds on their approach, we will focus on the fictive use of
steigen without the particle. Nonetheless, a complete understanding of steigenfict
requires a discussion of its relation to the fictive readings of steigen plus particle
which, however, is beyond the limits of this paper.4 In order to not rely solely on
introspection,we have drawn the examples of steigenfict mainly from internet sources,
being well aware of the unreliability of data of this sort.
In the following sections, we will propose an analysis of steigenfict in which
its meaning is derived from that of steigendir, due to similar semantic restrictions.
4The need for analyzing steigenfict in relation to the fictive uses of corresponding particle verbs such
as ansteigen and aufsteigen ‘ascend/move upwards’ was pointed out to us by one of the reviewers.
The same reviewer also stated that according to his/her grammaticality judgements the fictive use
of simplex steigen is in principle unproblematic.
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Starting from the frame representations of the two literal uses in (4), wewill show that
the frames of both steigenfict as well as steigenins result from structural operations
on the frame of steigendir which are necessary to accommodate the frame of the
subject referent. Before going into the details of our analysis, we will first give a
short introduction into the frame model we adopt.
4 Frame Analysis of Dynamic Steigen: Manner
and Directional Reading
4.1 Frames for Objects
The participants of an event denoted by a verb can bemany different kinds of different
objects. Usually, these objects are the referents of nominal concepts introduced
by noun phrases. Following Barsalou’s (1992) idea that conceptual knowledge
is represented by means of frames, which provide an explicit, variable-free, and
cognitively plausible representation format, we assume that nominal concepts are
best captured by frame representations. More precisely, we build on Löbner’s (2011)
theory of nominal concept types and Petersen’s (2007/2015) formalization of frames
according to which frames are defined as recursive attribute-value structures with
the attributes corresponding to mathematical functions. For illustration, the graph
representation of the object concept ‘building with brick walls and gabled tiled roof’
is given in Fig. 1 below.
The central node specifies the referent of the frame, in this case a particular type of
building. The referent is characterized by the attributes branching off the central node:
The mereological attributes roof, walls, and base map the referent to particular
parts of it. In addition, the value of the attribute purpose points to the function of the
building to serve as some kind of shelter. Frames are characterized by their recursive
potential, allowing for zooming into the nodes by expanding them into additional
attribute-value pairs. For instance, the value of roof has the two attributes shape and
material, each of which comes with particular values. Note that the frame graph
in Fig. 1 is kept reasonably simple for the sake of illustration. In principle, frame
representations can be unlimitedly detailed by specifying additional attributes and
their possibly complex values.
In spite of their flexibility, the range of frames is not arbitrary in the model we
adopt. Rather, frames are determined by a type signature that specifies admissible
attributes and the type of values they can take. Type signatures model conceptual
knowledge and express all kinds of learned constraints such as hierarchical relations,
the set of attributes which are adequate for frames of a given type, as well as value
restrictions and value dependencies (cf. Petersen 2007/2015 for details).



















Fig. 1 Frame representation of ‘building with brick walls and gabled tiled roof’
4.2 Steigenmm
When it comes to the frames of verbs, things get more complicated since time and
change come into play. Following Naumann’s (2013) model of verb frames, a verbal
concept can be represented by an overall event frame which represents the global
properties of this event. This frame is static in the sense that it does not change
during the event. Gamerschlag et al. (2014) assume the static event frame (SEF) for
steigenmm in Fig. 2 below.
The frame representation in the figure above expresses the relations of the objects
involved in an event of that sort: steigenmm has a theme and a path argument which
are satisfied by syntactic complements. In the representation, this is indicated by
open argument slots marked by square nodes. Moreover, steigenmm is executed in
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a particular manner characterized by step(s) which are the atoms of its internally
cyclic event structure. Note that although a typical steigenmm-event consists of a
continuous repetition of steps, it can also be instantiated by a single step, as pointed
out by Geuder and Weisgerber (2008).
The static event frame is not satisfactory as the sole representation of a dynamic
event denoted by steigenmm. In order to temporalize frames, they need to be related
more explicitly to event structure. To this end, Naumann (2013) assumes a three-
level model of event representation, which can only be sketched here for reasons of
space (see Naumann 2013 andGamerschlag et al. 2014 for details).5 First, in addition
to the level of static event frames, a level of event decomposition (ED) is required
which refers to the temporal structure of an event. In the case of steigenmm, event
decomposition results in a sequence of atomic step-subevents e1, e2,… as shown in
themiddle of Fig. 3. These subevents are linked to the relevant parts of the static event
frame by a zoom function Z such that each atom consists of a single step executed
by the theme. As a third level, the situation frame-level (SF) at the bottom of Fig. 3
captures the event-related changes of the participants during the course of the event.
In the case of an event structure consisting of atoms, the SF-level provides snapshots
of the entity’s state at the boundary of each atom. For steigenmm this means that the
change of position of the moving entity (i.e., the subject referent) after each step is
specified at this level. Again, the zoom function works as a linking device between
the two levels by mapping boundary events to situation frames.
Given the model introduced above, Gamerschlag et al. (2014) assume the frame
of steigenmm in Fig. 4, which results from expanding the manner component into
a detailed subframe. This subframe provides information on the force constellation
involved by characterizing it as a noticeable, upwards-directed force that is exerted
by legs against a solid antagonist.
Note that the frame in the figure above is not static since it reflects the changing
location of the subject referent captured at the SF level in Fig. 3. Rather, this frame
is some kind of condensed representation that also contains dynamic aspects of
the three-level representation outlined above. This is achieved technically by the
dynamic attribute trace which links the position of the theme of steigenmm to its
path specification. More precisely, trace is an attribute that is projected into this
frame from the event decomposition frame and maps the changing position of the
theme value to the record of its trace in the time span of the event. Because of their
special status, dynamic attributes are indicated by broken lines in the frame graphs.
5Löbner (2017) proposes an alternative account for capturing change of state verbs in terms of
Barsalou frames using first-order comparators. Due to lack of space we cannot discuss his approach
and how it can be adopted for the analysis of fictive motion by mapping a change in time onto a
change in space.


































































Fig. 3 Event structure of steigenmm
4.3 Steigendir
As outlined in Sect. 3, steigendir differs from steigenmm in that it refers to the
movement of a freely suspended object without requiring the use of limbs. At the
same time, steigendir is more restricted than steigenmm since it can only refer to
upward movement. Figure 5 shows the condensed event frame of steigendir.
As can be seen, the rich manner component of the frame of steigenmm is not
present in the frame of steigendir. As a consequence, the selectional restrictions of
steigenmm do not hold for steigendir. Moreover, due to the absence of the step-atoms
of the manner component, the event structure is not cyclic anymore but can rather be
characterized as a continuous phase. As a further contrast to the frame for steigenmm,
the values of path are confined to expressing upward movement. However, apart
from the value restriction of the path-attribute, the frame component referring to
the theme’s changing position and the formation of the path by means of the trace-
function is shared by the condensed frames of both readings. In our analysis, we will
show how the frame of steigenfict can be derived from the frame of steigendir.






















































Fig. 4 Condensed event frame of steigenmm
Fig. 5 Condensed event



























5 Steigenfict: Admissible Modifiers and Subject Referents
Before outlining our account of steigenfict in Sect. 6, we will first have a short look
at the range of admissible modifiers and subject referents found with this reading.
In addition to permitting adverbial modifiers referring to upward motion, steigenfict
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can combine with adverbs specifying properties such as the slope and the shape of a
path, as shown by the examples in (5) and (6).
(5) Der Pfad steigt steil / sanft auf den Gipfel.
the trail climbs steeply / gently to the summit.
‘The trail climbs steeply/gently to the summit.’
(6) Die neu asphaltierte Straße […] steigt kurvenreich auf eine
the newly asphalted road climbs in.serpentines to a
Art Hochplateau.6
kind.of plateau
‘The newly asphalted roadwinds upwards (lit.: climbs in serpentines) to some
kind of plateau.’
Moreover, adverbs such as schnell ‘quickly’ and langsam ‘slowly’ which are
normally associated with temporal properties of dynamic concepts naturally occur
with the fictive use, as shown in (7) below. In addition, evenmodifiers such asmühsam
‘strenuously’ and gemütlich ‘comfortably’, which specify the way a human mover
would experience real motion, are admissible.
(7) Der Weg steigt schnell / langsam / mühsam / gemütlich auf den Gipfel.
the trail climbs quickly / slowly / strenuously / comfortably to the summit
‘The trail climbs quickly / slowly / strenuously /comfortably to the summit.’
Another aspect relevant for the understanding of the fictive motion use is the range of
admissible subject referents illustrated by the examples in (8). As can be seen, subject
referents are not confined to traversable entities such as ‘way’ and ‘road’ in German:
In (8a) and (b) the referents of Arteria ‘artery’ and Rohr ‘pipe’ are not traversable
by humans. However, they still qualify as pathlike entities accessible for mental
scanning. Moreover, in German the subject referents need not even be pathlike,
as illustrated by (4d) in which a subject such as Gelände ‘terrain’ refers to a two-
dimensional space. In our analysis, wewill argue that subject referents of this type are
licensed because they can be conceived of as embedding the path along which fictive
motion can proceed. Likewise, the subject Wald ‘forest’ in (8c) can be interpreted as
a two-dimensional entity referring to a specific area or region. Moreover, as shown
by the examples in (8d) and (e), even subjects denoting three-dimensional entities
are admissible if they provide prominent object sides that restrain possible paths of
fictive motion. In these examples it is the (vertical) surface of the mountains and
the skyscraper which contains the relevant path. Note that three-dimensional objects
of the type illustrated in (8d) and (e) need to have a prominent vertical axis and a
6http://doczz.net/doc/301001/--hilti-foundation (accessed 5 June 2019)
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considerable height ruling out e.g. small objects such as bottles and candles which
prototypically have a prominent vertical but are only of small height.7
(8) a. Die Arteria carotis externa steigt senkrecht nach oben.8
the arteria carotis externa rises vertically upwards
‘The arteria carotis externa rises vertically upwards.’
b. Das Rohrsteigt senkrecht durch das Dach.9
the pipe rises vertically through the roof
‘The pipe rises vertically through the roof.’
c. Der Wald steigt […] bis auf 1‘870 m ü[ber] M[eeresspiegel]10
the forest rises up to 1,870 m above sea level
‘The forest rises to 1,870 meters above sea level.’
d. Das Gebirge steigt in unmittelbarer Nähe der Küste […].
the mountainsrises in immediate proximity of.the coast
auf 4000 Höhenmeter.11
to 4000 meters.in.height
‘The mountains rise up to 4000 meters in height close to the coast.’
e. Das Hochhaus steigt siebzig Meter in die Höhe […].12
the skyscraper rises 70 meters upwards
‘The skyscraper rises 70 meters into the air.’
As already pointed out by Matsumoto (1996), the availability of non-traversable
subject referents is language-dependent. For instance, while English and German
are fairly liberal with respect to non-traversable subject referents, according to
Matsumoto Japanese is more restricted, excluding subjects referring to walls and
fences while allowing for wires and borders to appear as subject referents in fictive
motion constructions. However, as observed by Matlock (2004a), even languages
such as English and German are sensitive to the property of being traversable.
7One reviewer points out that s/he cannot accept three-dimensional subject referents with steigenfict
while subjects denoting some kind of path or plane are fine. We agree with the reviewer that subject
referents of the latter nature are prototypically found with this reading whereas subjects denoting
entities of the formerkindaremore at theperipheryof this use andmayalsovarywith respect to native
speakers’ judgements. However, instances of steigenfict plus three-dimensional subject referents,
whose grammaticality is also in line with our own judgements, need to be taken into account in
a full-fledged analysis of this reading of steigen. Due to the lack of space and empirical data, we
present some tentative frame account of this subtype of steigenfict in Sect. 6 but will refrain from
elaborating on it apart from this sketch.
8Example taken from I. Bergstrand et al. (eds.) 1964. Röntgendiagnostik des Herzens und der
Gefäße, p. 655. Berlin: Springer.
9Example taken from Allgemeine medizinische Zeitung mit Berücksichtigung des Neuesten und
Interessantesten der allgemeinen Naturkunde, issue of year 1835, p. 1507. Brockhaus.
10https://www.ur.ch/_docn/35377/22.pdf (accessed 5 June 2019)
11https://zentralafrika.de/Nationalparks/Mount-Kamerun/ (accessed 5 June 2019)
12Example taken from Hochparterre: Zeitschrift für Architektur und Design, vol. 27 (2014), p. 14.
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According to Matlock (2004a:231f) only “paths ordinarily associated with motion”
allow for “information about the way the mover moved, for instance, quickly, slowly,
erratically, effortfully [...].” Matlock (2004a:231f) illustrates this observation with
the following contrast.
(9) a. The highway crawls through the city.
b. ??The underground cable crawls from Capitola to Aptos.
The construction in (9a) is felicitous because the subject refers to an entity which was
constructed precisely for traveling and therefore is compatible with the particular
manner of motion expressed by crawl, i.e. progressing slowly and laboriously. In
contrast, the example in (9b) is ruled out because a human experiencer cannot be
conceptualized as moving on an underground cable in this manner. Likewise, the
use of climb as a translation of steigenfict is only felicitous in cases of traversable
subject referents since climbing implies the use of hands/feet whereas rise, which
does not contain manner information of this kind, can be applied in combination
with non-travellable subject referents.
Matlock’s constraint is not confined to manner information expressed by the verb.
Analogously, some external modifiers yield awkward results if they co-occur with
subjects associated with non-traversable paths. As shown in (8b) (repeated as (10))
a non-traversable subject referent such as Rohr ‘pipe’ allows for modifiers such as
senkrecht ‘vertical’ which specify the slope of the path. However, modifiers such as
schnell ‘quickly’ and mühsam ‘strenuously’, which relate to a human moving along
a travellable path, are excluded.
(10) Das Rohr steigt senkrecht/ ??schnell / ??mühsam durch das Dach.
the pipe rises vertically/quickly/strenuously through the roof
‘The pipe rises vertically /??quickly/??strenuously through the roof.’
Obviously, the awkward combinations in (10) are ruled out because of some kind
of clash between a non-traversable path denoted by the subject and the concept of a
human moving along a path suitable for motion evoked by the context.
Given the range of modifiers and subject referents in the examples above, it
becomes evident that a proper treatment of instances of fictive motion requires
detailed access to properties of the subject referent. In the following section, we will
show that the flexibility of frame representations allows for explicit reference to the
relevant properties. In particular, we will address the contrastive array of admissible
modifiers in dependence of the travellable/non-travellable distinction.
6 Frame Analysis of Steigenfict
For an approach to the fictive reading of steigen, we begin with the example in (11),
which is a simplified version of the sentence in (3).
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(11) Der Weg steigt […] auf eine Höhe von 4450 m.
the trail climbs to a height of 4450 m
‘The trail climbs to a height of 4450 meters.’
Given the fact that steigenfict is restricted to upward “movement” just as steigendir,
it is plausible to assume that the meaning of steigenfict is more closely related to
steigendir than to steigenmm. Starting from this observation, our idea goes as follows:
If the subject refers to a stationary, non-moveable entity, the literal interpretations
of steigen are both blocked due to a violation of sortal restrictions with respect to
the subject referent. However, in spite of this, the subject referent of steigenfict can
be accommodated by associating it with some suitable part of the existing frames
of the literal readings of steigen. The value of the path-attribute in the frames for
both of the literal readings is an entity that can be conceptualized as being embedded
in the referent of the subject of steigenfict. In this regard, both literal readings are
appropriate for incorporating the stationary subject referent. However, the frame
of steigendir is more suited to accommodate the new subject referent since it (a)
is more explicit by specifying a path with an upward direction and (b) involves
a minor loss of original meaning compared to steigenmm, which would go along
with the deactivation of manner information when combined with a non-appropriate
stationary subject referent. Based on these considerations, we assume the frame in
Fig. 6 as a representation of the example given in (11) above:
Fig. 6 Frame representation
of Der Weg steigt auf eine
Höhe von 4450 m. ‘The trail
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This frame is derived from that of steigendir in the following way: First, the
stationary subject referent is accommodated in the frame as a new theme in which
the path is embedded. A theme suitable for that is, for instance, pathlike itself or
exhibits a prominent surface that can accommodate a rising path. Second, the original
theme (i.e. themover) is blocked from being realizedwhich results in deactivation of
the meaning components related to actual movement and, consequently, in arriving
at the stativized interpretation characteristic of steigenfict. Due to the value restriction
inherited by steigendir, the value of vertical translation is restricted to a positive
value. By consequence, the path can only be conceptualized as having an upward
orientation. In addition, spatial modifiers such as auf 4450 m Höhe ‘to a height of
4450 meters’ further restrict the path value by activating additional attributes such
as height of endpoint. Note that the value of endpoint is shared with the attribute
summit point of the theme. By consequence, the height of the summit point is
identified with the height of the endpoint of the path. Furthermore, it is important
to note that the frame thus specifies a property of the theme, which is at the same
time restricted by a property of the path. Next consider the example in (12), which
is a simplification of the one given in (6).
(12) Die asphaltierte Straße steigt kurvenreich auf ein Hochplateau.
the asphalted road climbsin.serpentines to a plateau
‘The asphalted road winds upwards (lit.: climbs in serpentines) to a plateau.’
As shown in the representation of the sentence in Fig. 7, the modifier kurvenreich
‘winding/in serpentines’ evokes the path attribute shape for which it highlights a
particular value. This attribute is a direct attribute of the path object but its value is
again shared with the shape attribute of the theme. As in the preceding example,
this ensures that some property of the theme is specified by the construction. As a
general rule, we assume that an adverbial modifier of steigenfict is admissible if it
Fig. 7 Frame representation
of Die asphaltierte Straße
steigt kurvenreich auf ein
Hochplateau. ‘The asphalted
road winds upwards (lit.:
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Fig. 8 Frame representation
of Das Hochhaus steigt
siebzig Meter in die Höhe.
‘The skyscraper rises 70
























explicates a value of an attribute of the theme that is restricted by some property of
the path.13
The example repeated in (13) exhibits a non-pathlike, three-dimensional subject
referent.
(13) Das Hochhaus steigt siebzig Meter in die Höhe […].
the skyscraper rises 70 meters upwards
‘The skyscraper rises 70 meters into the air.’
Again, as shown in Fig. 8, the subject referent is accommodated in the frame via
the embedded in-attribute. More precisely, for three-dimensional entities such as a
skyscraper, we assume that the path is embedded in their surface, since it is this
part which is accessible for visual scanning. In addition, (13) is interpreted in such a
way that the vertical translation of the path and the height of the skyscraper
share the same value.
The use of steigenfict with non-pathlike subject referents of the type illustrated
above appears to be highly restricted, requiring entities with a long and very
prominent vertical axis. A better understanding of this combination requires further
research that goes beyond the scope of this paper. Therefore, we consider the
representation given in Fig. 8 to be only a first approximation of an analysis.
So far, the constraint that the adverbial modifier has to be restricted by some
property of the path could be captured in the frame representation by means of value
sharing between an attribute of the path and an attribute of the theme. However, if
one considers the whole array of admissible modifiers such as the adverb langsam
‘slowly’ in (3) repeated in (14) below, it becomes evident that not each instance of
steigenfict can be dealt with in this way.
13Similar restrictions on fictive motion expressions have already been proposed by Matsumoto
(1996:194).
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(14) Der Weg steigt […] langsam auf eine Höhe von 4450 m.
the trail climbs slowly to a height of 4450 m
‘The trail climbs slowly to a height of 4450 meters.’
As argued above, modifiers related to real motion are only licensed if the subject
referent provides a traversable path. We assume that this crucial property can be
captured by means of an affordance attribute understood in the original sense
coined by Gibson (1977, 1979) as denoting “action possibilities provided to the
actor by the environment (Kaptelinin 2013).” In the case of a subject referent suited
for human travel we refer to the relevant attribute as travel affordance as shown
in Fig. 9. The value of travel affordance is complex and licenses travel-related
attributes such as velocity, duration, difficulty, and experience. Moreover, it
exhibits a path-attribute which shares its value with the path-attribute of the root-
node. By consequence, the value of travel affordance varies depending on the
particular instantiation of the value of path.
As mentioned earlier in this paper, experimental research has convincingly shown
that the fictive motion uses of verbs come along with some kind of simulation of
actual motion. Since the affordance component is a representation of “action
























































Fig. 9 Frame representation ofDer Weg steigt langsam auf eine Höhe von 4450 m. ‘The trail climbs
slowly to a height of 4450 m’
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kind of simulation with the value of the path attribute of travel affordance
corresponding to the path that comes about as a result of mental scanning.
For a temporal modifier such as langsam ‘slowly’ in (14), we assume that it can
be integrated into the frame representation as part of the affordance component as a
low value of the attribute vertical velocity, which refers to the speed with which
the height of a mover changes. This attribute-value pair is typically correlated with
a gentle slope, which is an attribute of path.
This correlation between the values of vertical velocity and slope is given
only for some average travel velocity of the mover which is contextually specified.
Of course, one can also think of a high vertical velocity and a gentle slope
or a low vertical velocity and a steep slope. However, this presupposes travel
velocities above or below some contextually specified standard for travel velocity.14
As a general rule for the admissibility of amodifier of steigenfict in terms of frames,
we assume the following.
(15) Amodifierofsteigenfict isadmissible iff it restricts thevalueof thepathattribute
by either specifying a value of an attribute of the path node which is shared
with an attribute of the theme node or by specifying the value of an attribute
of the travel affordance of the theme node. Since the value of the path
attribute is functionally dependent on the value of the travel affordance
attribute, a restriction of the latter by the specification of one of its attribute
values impliesa restriction of the former.Thisdependency often leads to avalue
correlation between an attributeof the pathnodeand an attributeof thetravel
affordance node.
In addition to adverbs specifying velocity, the rule in (15) also allows for experiencer
related modifiers such as mühsam ‘strenuously’ and gemütlich ‘comfortably’ as in
the example repeated below.
(16) Der Weg steigt schnell / langsam / mühsam / gemütlich auf den Gipfel.
the trail climbs quickly / slowly / strenuously / comfortably to the summit
‘The trail climbs quickly / slowly / strenuously /comfortably to the summit.’
Modifiers of this type can be represented as values of the experience attribute of the
travel affordance node. As in the case of adverbs specifying values of velocity,
they are licensed because they can be interpreted as restricting the path. For instance,
an adverb such as mühsam ‘strenuously’ can be conceived as being related to a steep
slope or a particularly meandering, non-linear shape of the path. The way how the
specification of the value of an attribute of travel affordance restricts the path also
14The “gentleness of the slope”/“a slow increase of elevation” as path properties being directly
related to time adverbs such as slowly and likewise Japanese yukkuri ‘slowly’ has already been
observed by Matsumoto (1996:202) with respect to fictive motion. We are grateful to one of the
reviewers for pointing out to us that the alleged relation between velocity and slope does not
necessarily have to hold (from a purely physical perspective). However, in our analysis we will
keep with the prototypical relation between low velocity/gentle slope and high velocity/steep slope
in accordance with observations such as the one made by Matsumoto.
On the Fictive Reading of German Steigen ‘Climb, Rise’… 257
seems to be influenced to some degree by the context. We leave it open here how
the interaction between attribute-value pairs of the path and travel affordance
nodes can be captured in a formally adequate way.
As the attribute travel affordance is naturally restricted to appear with
entities which allow for travel, non-traversable referents do not come with this
attribute. By consequence, modifiers such as schnell ‘quickly’ and langsam ‘slowly’,
which specify a value of an attribute of travel affordance, are excluded if
steigenfict combines with a subject referent not suitable for human travel. As a
result, the set of admissible modifiers found with non-travellable subject referents is
considerably smaller in comparison to the array of modifiers attested in combination
with travellable subject referents.
7 Steigenins
As illustrated by the example repeated in (17), the intensional reading is restricted
to a positive value change, parallel to steigenfict and steigendir.
(17) Die Temperatur steigt von 3 auf 10 Grad / *von 10 auf 3 Grad.
the temperature rises from to degrees from to degrees
‘The temperature is rising from 3 to 10 degrees/ *from 10 to 3 degrees.’
Both, steigenins and steigenfict are figurative readings. However, while the meaning
of steigenfict remains in the same source domain ‘(geometrical) space’, steigenins
typically abstracts away into the domain denoted by the functional noun in subject
position. Based on Gamerschlag et al. (2014) we assume the representation for
steigenins as in Die Temperatur steigt ‘The temperature is rising’ given in Fig. 10
below.
As can be seen, the frame of steigenfict is structurally nearly identical to the one of
steigendir except for the substitution of the position-attribute by the temperature-
attribute. As with steigenfict, we consider this the result of an accommodation process
triggered by a subject noun whose meaning is not compatible with one of the literal
readings of the verb. However, as a contrast to steigenfict, this accommodation process
embeds the meaning of the subject noun in a different way: Since the dimension that
comes with the functional noun can be considered as an abstract value space, it is
the position-attribute which is targeted by this process, such that the geometrical
value space is replaced by the particular abstract value space. Again, we assume
that the value change which takes place during the steigen-event is recorded as a
trace defined in terms of values with a temporal ordering. This trace is an abstract
object which can be understood as a path through the value space determined by the
particular dimension expressed by the functional noun in subject position, such as
temperature or price. As with steigendir and steigenfict, a positive value change is
assured by restricting the values of vertical translation as being (considerably)
greater than zero, with the difference that the values are determined to being e.g.
temperature-values or price-values by the functional noun. Note that our paths






































are paths in an abstract value space. Thus the attribute vertical translation is
not restricted to a spatial vertical difference but rather is a more abstract function
which operates on intervals on the scale in focus (e.g., the temperature scale).
Note that the representation above does not refer to a stative scenario/fictive
change, as a contrast to steigenfict. Rather, steigenins, although abstracting away from
geometrical space, is represented as an “ordinary” change in time resulting in a truly
dynamic expression just like the one expressed by the near-synonymous change of
state verb (sich) erwärmen ‘warm’.
8 Conclusion
In this paper, we have sketched how the fictive motion use of a verb such as German
steigen ‘climb, rise’ can be systematically related to the dynamic readings of the verb
by means of a frame analysis. Based on the observation that the intensional as well
as the fictive motion use share with the directed motion reading the property that
the value change expressed by the verb is restricted to a positive difference, we have
argued that both figurative meanings are derived from the directed motion reading.
Moreover, we have shown that both figurative uses trigger a different operation on
the frame representation of the directional use: While the frame of the intensional
use is derived from the one of the directional use by replacing the position-attribute
with the attribute that is specified by the subject noun, the fictive motion use is
characterized by a deactivation of the dynamic components of the directed motion
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meaning due to the stationary character of the subject referent. In the latter case, the
meaning of the subject is accommodated as an entity embedding the (fictive) path
of motion. The adverbial modifiers attested for this reading were shown to specify a
property of the path related to a value of an attribute of the theme, either via value
sharing or via covariation.
Since we have focused on a single verb of motion in one particular language in
this paper, two strands of further research naturally arise. First, it is necessary to
discuss more motion verbs, especially those which do not have a literal directional
use as opposed to the manner use or vice versa. Additionally, a detailed corpus study
would allow for the investigation of a broader array of modifiers which could serve
as a probe into the precise meaning of the fictive reading. A particularly promising
topic is the interplay between scalarity, telicity and dynamicity. Given that scalarity
is independent from telicity and dynamicity (Fleischhauer and Gamerschlag 2014),
the question emerges whether dynamicity and telicity are related. Usually, telicity is
understood as a change until a specific endpoint/a specific degree on a scale is reached
(e.g. Hay et al. 1999). If this is an adequate notion of telicity, telicity presupposes
dynamicity. However, some change of state verbs, including German steigen, exhibit
fictivemotion uses which allow formodifiers indicating telicity such as the time-span
adverbial in kurzer Zeit ‘within short time’ in (18) below.
(18) Die Straße steigt in kurzer Zeit um 200 Meter
the road rises within short time by 200 meters
‘ The road rises by 200 meters within short time.’ 
The example above can be analyzed as spatially telic in the sense of Gawron (2009)
and Champollion (2017) as an effect of adding the measure phrase um 200 Meter ‘by
200 meters’ whereas it can also be treated as ‘conventionally’ telic to some degree
as indicated by the acceptability of the time-span adverbial in kurzer Zeit ‘within
short time’. One central question to pursue in relation to these two different types of
telicity is which role the simulative component of the representation plays in regard
to the admissibility of the time-span adverbial and its telicity effect.
Second, the availability and flexibility of the fictive use of verbs of motion differs
significantly crosslinguistically. For example, as already shownbyMatsumoto (1996)
for Japanese, the set of verbs available for the fictive motion reading can be confined
in various ways. In particular, only verbs which highlight some aspect of the path
of motion allow for a fictive reading, while verbs denoting the manner of motion
are ruled out from this use. This restriction follows directly from Japanese being
classified as a verb-framed language in which manner verbs cannot combine with
spatial modifiers such as directional PPs and measure phrases. It needs to be clarified
how this generalization can be implemented into the frame account above, which
is not sensitive to this typological parameter. One technical way of addressing this
aspect might be to exclude the value of path from the list of externally specified
arguments for this class of verbs. However, we will leave it as an open question
whether the satellite-versus verb-framed language distinction calls for a deeper
representational asymmetry in both language types.
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generation results in a conceptual relation called c-constitution here, i.e. constitution
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trate the potential and the consequences of a cascade approach to verb semantics. It
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1.1 The Intuitive Notion of “Level-Generation”
Our point of departure is a philosophical theory from as far back as 1970, the year
when the first seminal papers by RichardMontague appeared and triggered the devel-
opment of formal semantics. Goldman’s theory of “level-generation” was the first
general theory of action1 to come up with the idea (and observation) that we consider
ordinary tokens of acts very often as representing more than one type of act. While it
is an almost trivial fact about categorization that one and the same thing can always
be categorized in numerous different ways, Goldman’s theorymakes amuch stronger
claim: His basic mechanism of “level-generation” relates multiple categorizations
of the same doing in systematic ways. Under given circumstances, level-generation
yields a whole tree of categorizations, such that doing a particular thing amounts
to, or constitutes, doing at the same time—in one—a variety of things of different
types. Goldman emphasizes that his notion of level-generation meets a basic intu-
ition, and you will see that it does from just a handful of examples (in (1) in the
box). These examples are to be read as follows: start from the bottom and follow
the ↥ arrows; these symbolize level-generation. Assume that for each example the
given circumstances are such that they allow to read the arrow as “and thereby”, or
“this constitutes”. You can easily imagine (or reconstruct) circumstances that would
support these steps of level-generation. The vertical structures are trees; for the sake
of simplicity, the trees in (1) don’t branch, but you will see below that trees can. The
trees consist of acts by the same agent and they coalesce acts that are all done in
one: x, in one, flips the light switch, turns on the light, lightens the room, wakes the
baby, ruins their night—all done by one little movement of a finger. The same holds
for all other examples of level-generation. Being done in one, all those acts in a tree
happen at the same time.
1In fact, Austin’s speech act theory anticipated Goldman’s multi-level approach, but it was not
applied beyond the special subclass of acts constituted by speech acts. We will give due credit to
Austin’s speech act theory in Sect. 6.1.
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(1) Examples of level-generaon
a. b.
 x  ruins their night x makes y smile
↥ ↥
 x  wakes the baby x  does y a favor
↥ ↥
 x  lightens the room x lets  y  pass
↥ ↥
x turns on the light x  keeps the door open
↥
x flips the light switch
c.
d.




x pays for  z 
x declines  y’s  request
↥
↥
x hands money to y
x says “No” to y
y
e.
x runs a personal record over 100 m
↥
x runs 100 m in 12.3 seconds
These examples all seem natural. Without much reflection, we would agree that in
all these cases the upward arrowmay, under appropriate circumstances, be expressed
as “and thereby” and always means the same; and it is natural to view these examples
as different types of act done in one. It is this intuitive connection between different
ways inwhich—under circumstances—agiven act can be categorized thatGoldman’s
theory of action is about.
Level-generation is an extremely common thing. If we think of it, we realize that
our minds are doing it automatically and inevitably all the time. If somebody does
something concrete, wewill categorize it not just as a basic bodily action like keeping
a door open, handing money to somebody, or pressing a button. We will rather have
our attention on what the person is doing thereby, because what will matter to us
will not be the mere bodily movements, meaningless in themselves, but what they
achieve (or try to achieve). The same applies to our own actions and the ways we
mean them. We don’t mean to exercise our thumb, when we press a button on the
remote control—we mean to turn on the TV. Most, if not all, things we physically
do we do not do just for themselves.
1.2 The Structure of the Chapter
Goldman originally presented his theory as a contribution to philosophical ontology.
He argued that under circumstances like those assumed in the examples, the agent
exemplifies multiple different acts in one. Not every ontologist would follow him;
many would argue that the agent does just one thing which may happen to meet
different descriptions, under circumstances.
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I will re-construe Goldman’s theory not as an ontological theory of action, but as
a theory of the cognitive categorization of action, a view which Goldman actually
supported later in arguing that the notion of level-generation is “a psychological
structure, or the manifestation of a psychological structure” (see (7) in Sect. 2.3 for
the full quote from Goldman 1979). This turn has important consequences. First,
Goldman’s theory is turned into a theory of cognitive representation, and his mecha-
nism of level-generation receives the role of a cognitivemechanism. Second, it makes
the theory immune to the ontological objection that there exist only one doing, not
several distinct ones: the fact that one doingmay, under circumstances, be categorized
in multiple ways, is uncontroversial. Third, the psychological turn makes Goldman’s
theory applicable to linguistic semantics (of a cognitive orientation); as you will
see, it is to be assumed that level-generation is written into the lexical meanings of
probably almost all verbs of action.
In Sect. 2, I will briefly review Goldman’s original theory and its reception in the
philosophical discussion. My own construal of the theory will be made precise; I will
introduce the central notions of ‘cascade’ and ‘c-constitution’ replacing Goldman’s
‘act-tree’ and ‘level-generation’, respectively. Section 3 provides examples and data
that illustrate the relevance of level-generation for verb semantics and verb grammar.
The second part will be concerned with a formalization of c-constitution and
cascades in the framework of Düsseldorf Frame Theory and the application of the
approach to semantics. In Sect. 4, act-cascades will be modeled as trees of first-order
frames that each represent a single type of action (like ‘flip the light switch’ or ‘wake
the baby’). Section 5 will treat in depth an illustrative, more complex example, the
‘write’ cascade. I will discuss the far-reaching consequences of a cascade approach
to action verb meanings for theories of lexical meaning, composition, and reference
in Sect. 6. The chapter will be concluded with a brief reflection of the perspectives
that the multilevel approach to categorization opens up for cognition, semantics, and
life.
2 Level-Generation: Doing Multiple Things in One
2.1 Preliminary: Act-Tokens, Act-Types, and Act-TTs
The upward relation symbolized by the arrow ↥ in the examples represents what
Goldman called level-generation. The first question concerning this notion is: what
kind of thing does it relate. Goldman (1970) distinguishes act-tokens and act-types.
Act-types are common enough: it is types such as ‘open the door’, ‘turn on the
light’, ‘wake the baby’, or ‘decline a request’.2 They can be defined more or less
specifically, for example as ‘open’, ‘open a door’, ‘open (a particular) door’, ‘x open
(a particular) door’ etc. In philosophy, types of act (or action) are often subsumed
2Descriptions of types will be marked by single quotes.
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under the notion of “property”, in semantics, under “types of events”. Act-types
are exemplified/enacted/performed/implemented if someone does something of that
type. The agent then produces an act-token of this type. If Sue does something that
can be described as “open the door”, she produces a token of the act-type ‘open the
door’. An act-token has a determinate agent and occurs at a determinate time.
According to Goldman’s approach, level-generation obtains between act-tokens
in this sense; there is a token of ‘flip the light switch’ that level-generates a token, by
the same agent and at the same time, of ‘turn on the light’, and so on. In Goldman’s
account, two act-tokens are different if they are tokens of different types, and two
tokens are only identical, if they are tokens of the same type; more precisely:
(2) a. “Each act-token is a token of one and only one type (property).” (Goldman
1970: 11)
b. “Two act-tokens are identical if and only if they involve the same agent,
the same property, and the same time.” (Goldman 1970: 10)
Thus, according to him, the tokens in one act-tree are distinct. The conditions in
(2) mean that the relation of level-generation does not obtain between act-tokens as
such, but between acts-as-tokens-of-a-type. For example, (1d) is to be construed as:
a token of the act-type ‘say “No” to y’ level-generates a token of the act-type ‘decline
y’s request’, and this in turn a token of the act-type ‘disappoint y’.
Tokens-of-a-type are a very natural kind of thing. Whenever we talk about acts or
events, we do so while describing them as of one type or another. For example, if we
use aVP for event reference, theVP provides a description of the event referred to and
thereby gives its type. Language cannot refer to acts other than by type description
and semantic and pragmatic means that fix the reference to particular tokens of that
type. This does not only hold for acts and events, but in general for all things we
verbally refer to: we always refer qua type, that is, using expressions that provide a
type description. It may even be argued that this applies beyond language to thinking
in general: we can’t think of things, or even perceive things, without categorizing
them in one way or another.
I will refer to a token-of-a-type as a “TT” for short, and introduce the following
notation:
(3) Definition: For a type T and an entity t, t/T is the “token t of the type T”.
TTs are essentially ordered pairs of an entity and a type such that the entity is of this
type. It follows immediately that two TTs t/ T and t’/ T’ are different if T and T’
are. Goldman himself never speaks explicitly of act-tokens-of-a-type, but always of
act-tokens and of act-types. However, due to the conditions in (2), he implicitly talks
of TTs whenever he talks of act-tokens in the context of his theory. We will keep this
in mind for the following discussion.
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2.2 Goldman’s Theory of Act-Levels
2.2.1 The Multilayered View on Human Action
Goldman’s point of departure is the observation that agents when they act may do
several distinct things in one; they produce a set of several act-tokens. Goldman
emphasizes that these act-tokens are distinct “because”, he argues, “the properties
picked out […] are distinct properties” (Goldman 1970: 12, his italics)—flipping the
light switch is not a token of the same property as turning on the light is a token of,
etc. One crucial difference of the properties distinguished concerns the respective
causal relationships of the types of action: flipping the light switch may cause the
light to go on, but turning the light on does not cause the light switch to be flipped. As
a consequence of the regulations in (2), acts related to each other like in the examples
cannot be identical as they are tokens of different properties. Goldman presents this
argument against the proponents of what he calls the “identity thesis” put forward by
Anscombe (1963) and Davidson (1963), among others hementions [p. 2]. According
to Goldman, there is one doing by the agent that constitutes a combination of distinct
act-tokens of distinct act-types. Our construal of Goldman’s—that he is actually
talking of TTs—avoids the ontological controversy between “unifiers” (Davidson,
Anscombe and others) and “multipliers” (Goldman himself).3
2.2.2 Act Levels and Level-Generation
In Goldman’s theory of action, the act-tokens enacted with a single doing are ordered
in levels. Act-tokens at lower levels “level-generate” higher-level act-tokens of the
same agent at the same time. If an act-token a by agent s level-generates an act-token
a’, then s does a’ “by” or sometimes “in” doing a [pp. 20–1]. Goldman distinguishes
four general types of level-generation. One of them is “augmentation generation”;
I will set it apart from the other three (as Goldman himself does, to a degree) and
turn to it later in Sect. 2.5. I will use original examples from Goldman (1970) in
order to introduce and illustrate Goldman’s types of level-generation. As above, I
use the symbol ↥ for level-generation, but I do not yet apply the notion of act-TTs, as
I want to quote Goldman’s original definitions. A restatement of Goldman’s notions
in terms of TTs will be undertaken in Sects. 2.5 and 2.6.4
3Ginet (1990) devotes a chapter to the question whether or not the acts in an act-tree are identical or
not and comes to the conclusion that “the issue over the individuation of action, though sufficiently
interesting in its own right, is not one on which much else depends. As far as I can see, there is no
other significant question in the philosophy of action that depends on it.” [p. 70].
4In the quotes, I replace the original upper-case letters for variables denoting act-tokens and persons
by lower-case letters, as I want to reserve in this paper the use of upper-case letters for type variables.
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(4) 1. Causal generation
“Act-token a of agent s causally generates act-token a’ of agent s only if
(a) a causes [an event] e, and
(b) a’ consists in s’s causing e.” [p. 23]
Goldman’s examples [p.23]:
‘s flips the switch’      ‘s turns on the light’
‘s shoots the gun’       ‘s kills George’
‘s closes the door’      ‘s prevents a fly from entering the house’.
Among the introductory examples, (1a) and (1b) involve causal generation in all
steps. In order to avoid confusion, it is very important to keep in mind that causal
level-generation does not relate an act a with an event e caused by a, but an act a
with the act a’ of causing such an event. For example, it does not relate the act of
turning on the light with the event of the baby waking up; rather it relates the act
of turning on the light with the act of waking the baby. Unlike the other two types
to follow, causal generation raises the question as to whether the generating and the
generated act happen at the same time. Goldman points out [p. 21] that it is generally
inadequate for two acts a and a’ related by level-generation to state that the agent did
a and then did a’. This holds even if a’ is causally generated and the effect caused
sets in only later than a is done; thus, even if in the case of, say, (1d) y learns of x’s
declining y’s request only several days later, one would not say that x declined y’s
request and then disappointed her. Rather the disappointing act was done when x
declined the request.
Goldman’s examples [p. 25]:
‘s moves his queen to king-
knight-seven’
‘s checkmates his opponent’
‘s breaks his promise’ ‘s does what he ought not to do’
‘s extends his arm out the car
window
‘s signals for a turn’
[(4)] 2. Conventional generation
“Act-token a of agent s conventionally generates act-token a’ of
agent s only if the performance of a in circumstances c (possibly
null), together with a rule r saying that a done in c  counts as a’,
guarantees the performance of a’. ” [p. 26]
















Fig. 1 Goldman’s act-tree for declining the nomination for vice-president
[(4)] 3. Simple generation
“In simple generation the existence of certain circumstances, conjoined
with the performance of a, ensures that the agent has performed a’.”
[p. 26]
Examples [p. 27]
‘s jumps 6 feet 3 inches’ ‘s outjumps George’
‘s comes home after 12:00’ ‘s breaks his promise’
‘s asserts that p’ ‘s lies’
The distinction of types of level-generation reflects the fact that level-generation may
draw on different types of connection between actions: on causal connections, on
convention, or just on the constellation of facts (simple generation).
Goldman uses “act-tree” diagrams for complex level-generational act structures;
the trees are to be read bottom-up. The act-tree in Fig. 1 contains instances of all three
types of level-generation listed in (4).5 The diagram displays six nodes that stand for
act-tokens of different types as labeled. They are connected by arrows indicating the
direction of generation. The numbers indicate the three types of level-generation as
numbered in (4). The tree contains two act-nodes with upward branching generation.
Moving the agent’s head not only conventionally generates indicating a refusal,
but also causally generates upsetting the agent’s glasses. The agent’s declining the
nomination causally generates his disappointing his followers; it also generates in
simple generation breaking a long-standing tradition. The latter constitutes simple
generation because it comes about by the mere circumstances of such a tradition
having obtained for a long time. If an act-token generates two or more others which
do not generate each other, the generated acts are both at a higher level, but the levels
are independent of each other; in particular, they are not the same level. According
5The diagram is adapted from Goldman (1970: 34), with dots replaced by circles, and lines by
upwards arrows. I omit the first step of the act-tree as it consists in augmentation generation.
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to Goldman [p. 31], two acts are “at the same level” if and only if they are distinct but
generated by the same act and generating the same acts. His examples include ‘hitting
the tallest man in the room’ and ‘hitting the wealthiest man in the room’ where in the
circumstances given the tallest man in the room happens to be the wealthiest one. I
will neglect the issue of same-level acts in the following.
Goldman gives the following general definition of level-generation.6 He also
includes the type of augmentation generation which we exclude, but the definition
applies to the three types in (4) just the same.
(5) “Act-token a level-generates act-token a’ if and only if
(i)  a and   a’  are distinct act-tokens of the same agent that are not on the same
level;
(ii) neither a nor a’ is subsequent to the other; neither a nor a’ is a temporal
part of the other; and a and a’ are not co-temporal;
(iii) there is a set of conditions c* such that
(a) the conjunction of a and c* entails a’, but neither a nor c* alone
entails a’;
(b) if the agent had not done  a, then he would not have done a’;
(c) if c* had not obtained, then even though  s  did  a, he would not
have done a’. ”
The condition in (ii) that a and a’ be not co-temporal is in need of explanation.
According toGoldman’s introduction of the term, two acts a and a’ are “co-temporal”
if and only if the agent of a does a “while also” doing a’, as an instance, one might
add, of multitasking. If x turns on the light by flipping the light switch, x does not
flip the light switch while also turning on the light. Thus, condition (ii) bars level-
generation between acts exerted in parallel. It does not preclude that the acts related
by level-generation do not have the same temporal extension—to the contrary, they
necessarily have. “There is a sense […] in which pairs of generational acts are always
done at the same time” Goldman explains [pp. 21–2].
Goldman’s definition captures important basic properties of level-generation7:
6P. 43, italics omitted, Arabic numbering replaced by Roman, upper-case variables by lower case.
7Another general characterization of level-generation is to state that it is a supervenience relation:
the generated act supervenes the generating act. McLaughlin and Bennett (2014) give the following
definition: A set of properties A supervenes upon another set B just in case no two things can differ
with respect to A-properties without also differing with respect to their B-properties. Supervenience
is a very weak correspondence relation, while level-generation is much more specific. To state that
level-generation is a supervenience relation does not mean to say that it is merely supervenience.
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(6) Basic properties of level-generation
a. Generating act and generated act are acts by the same agent.
b. Generating act and generated act have the same temporal extension.
c. Level-generation is a dependence relation:
Generated acts depend on the generating act, and appropriate circumstances,
to come about.
d. The types of the generating act and the generated act are logically
independent:
In principle, when an act of the generating type is exerted, there need not be
an act of the type generated, and vice versa.
Goldman’s definition secures the basic relational properties of level-generation. The
relation of “level-generation is intended to be asymmetric, irreflexive, and transi-
tive” (Goldman 1970: 22). Since it is irreflexive, no act generates itself. Asymmetry
prevents two acts from generating each other. Due to transitivity, if a generates b
and b generates c , then a generates c. As a consequence of transitivity, level-
generation may result in chains, and due to irreflexivity and asymmetry the chains
cannot contain loops. (If loops are not excluded, acts in a loop would generate
themselves and generate their generators.)
Transitivity has two important consequences. First, we may combine a given
sequence of level-generations into one larger step. For example in (1a) we might
skip some of the levels; somebody might warn the agent: “if you flip this switch,
you’ll ruin your night!” Second, it may conversely be possible that a given step be
broken down into several smaller steps. For instance, one might analyze the level-
generation of ‘flip the light switch’ ↥ ‘turn on the light’ into more steps that take into
account what the agent does on the mechanical and the electrical level, like closing
an electric circuit and thereby providing electricity to the bulb in a lamp, heating a
wire and making it radiate light. A fine-grained analysis like this might matter under
circumstances where the attempt to turn on the light by flipping the switch fails.
Asymmetry, irreflexivity, and transitivity hold for generalized level-generation
comprising the causative, conventional, and simple type. It is these logical properties
of level-generation that give rise to tree structures as the one in Fig. 1.
2.3 Critics of Goldman’s Theory
Goldman’s theory was criticized by Castañeda (1979), Bennett (1988), and McCann
(1982), amongother philosophers. The central target of criticism isGoldman’s formal
definition of level-generation quoted in (5). The critics showed by counterexam-
ples that it would apply to cases of act pairs that are obviously not intended to be
included. This criticism is justified, but it fails to invalidate Goldman’s theory of
level-generation; it just shows that Goldman’s attempt at a formal definition did not
achieve an adequate description of level-generation.
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Goldman’s definition in (5) is essentially in terms of logical conditions on two
statements s does a and s does a’ where s’s doing a level-generates s’s doing a’.
Logical conditions, properties, and relations are in terms of truth-values (entailment)
or in terms of extensions of concepts. For example, if a sentence B is always and
necessarily true if sentence A is, then A and B are related by logical entailment: A
entails B. If a concept P is such that it applies to all cases that another concept Q
applies to, then P is in the logical relationship of superordination to Q. By contrast,
conceptual relations concern the conceptual content. For example, the two sentences
Today is Tuesday and Tomorrow is Wednesday logically entail each other, but they
are not the same. There are conceptual meaning relations between them that explain
why they are logically equivalent (both refer to a day, the second sentence to a day
following the one referred to in the first; Wednesdays are related to Tuesdays in the
same way). Logical relations derive from conceptual relations; for example it derives
from the concepts of ‘perceive’ and ‘hear’ that ‘x hears y’ logically entails ‘x perceives
y’. But conversely, no particular conceptual relation derives from entailment. Thus,
Goldman’s condition (5iiia) does not tell us how the categorizations of a and a’ are
conceptually related, for example in theway that a’ of typeA’ is done by exemplifying
some a of type A. Taking a look at the conditions in (5), we realize that (5i) is just
a restricting precondition for the definition, and that the conditions in (5iii) are in
terms of logical entailment (or can be paraphrased as such). The only (probably) non-
logical condition is the restriction in clause (5ii) that a and a’ be not co-temporal; but
this weak constraint is far from capturing the basically non-logical notion of level-
generation. Level-generation, as introduced by Goldman, is a genuinely conceptual,
or as I see it, cognitive relation. In his reply to Castañeda (1979), Goldman explicitly
locates level-generation in the realm of psychology:
(7) “[…] insofar as philosophical theorizing is an attempt to lay bare the
fundamental features of our conceptual scheme [i.e. level-generation, S.L.],
it should not rest content with a “string” of explicit definitions. Our conceptual
scheme is a psychological structure, or a manifestation of a psychological
structure, and it is not the analysis of concepts alone that will facilitate our
understanding of this structure.” [Goldman 1979: 269, my italics]
Given that, Goldman’s definition in (5) fails to capture the real nature of the notion of
level-generation—in fact no definition in terms of logical relations can. A definition
like the one intended in (5) can only provide necessary logical conditions to be met
by level-generation. The critics mentioned were right in pointing out that Goldman’s
attempt at a [logical] analysis of the relation does not provide a sufficient condition;
but this circumstance does not invalidate the underlying intuitive notion of level-
generation that Goldman’s attempt at an analysis was aimed at.
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(8) “[…T]he idea of level-generation, I think, is an intuitive or pre-analytic idea,
implicit within our common-sense framework. […T]he idea of level-generation
is implicit in our use of the phrase, “s did … by doing —,” and in our use of
the phrase, “s did … in doing —.” That it is an intuitive notion is reflected
in the fact that once a few examples of it are given, any ordinary speaker
can readily identify numerous other cases that fall under the same concept.
[…] Since there is a prior notion to be analyzed, we do not want to provide
merely a stipulative definition. We want to provide a definition that captures
our antecedent notion (while also capturing the amplifications of the notion
– e.g., augmentation generation – which I have introduced). But providing
analyses of interesting concepts is always a difficult enterprise. What must be
remembered, therefore, is that the tenability of the intuitive concept should not
depend on the success of any particular analysis.” [Goldman 1970: 38]
It appears uncontroversial to consider the rich analysis of doings like the ones indi-
cated in the examples as “real” in the sense that if an agent acts in a particular situation
and we consider a multilevel conceptualization adequate, then all the act-types, to
us, are “really” enacted in this one doing. Thus, Goldman’s theory of human action
can be considered a contribution to ontology, and metaphysics, of the world as it is
perceived and conceived by human cognitive agents, i.e. of what is real to us.
2.4 Goldman’s Theory of Human Action Applied to Cognitive
Representation
In view of the two quotes cited, I will apply Goldman’s theory to the cognitive repre-
sentation of human action (a construal which was not applied by the philosophical
critics). If, to us, an act constitutes a whole tree of act-TTs, I will assume that our
cognitive representation has this tree structure, composed of representations of the
participating types of act. I assume that level-generation is a fundamental cognitive
mechanism, ubiquitously at work in our cognitive systems. Whenever somebody
acts, we will try to interpret their action at levels beyond the pure doing, and will
thereby come up with a view that, for example, explains the action as the result of
the agent pursuing certain intentions to be accomplished at some level generated;
we will try to relate the action to ourselves as some type of act towards us; we will
often appraise the action as positive or negative in various regards; we will take it
as constituting interaction with ourselves, and so on. All these views amount to the
addition of cascade levels to the doing. Thus, there are quite general level-generations
we may assume, like the following:
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(9) a. x does a/A x does b/  p
’
ursue intention Y’ intentionality
b. x does a/A x does b/ do sth. I like or dislike’ appraisal
c. x does a/A x does b/ direct a/A at me’ interaction
d. x does a/A x does b/ prepare a situation of type S’ sequentiality





In view of such examples, it is hard to imagine thatwe do not level-generatewhenever
we observe the actions of others, or plan and execute our own. Level-generation
as a cognitive process will very often be automatic, not involving any conscious
reasoning.
ConstruingGoldman’s as a theory of cognitive representation of actionwill enable
us below to apply it to semantics—which I take to be part of a theory of cognitive
representations, too, in this case of linguistic meanings. But before we turn to this
aspect, I will restate the basic points of the theory in terms of act-TTs, and also
undertake a slight revision of Goldman’s view of “augmentation generation”.
2.5 Level-Generation and Augmentation Generation
Goldman (1970: 28–30) distinguishes three subtypes of what he calls “augmentation
generation”8,9:
(10) Subtypes of augmentation generation
a. Compound augmentation [our term]
Two or more acts by the same agent and at the same time (“co-temporal”
acts) jointly generate an act of doing all these things in one.
Ex. ‘s jumps’, ‘s shoots’ generates ‘s jump-shoots’ [p. 28]
b. Manner augmentation [our term]
An act generates doing this act in a particular manner.
Exx.: ‘s says “hello” ‘ generates ‘s says “hello” loudly’
‘s runs’ generates ‘s runs at 8 m.p.h.’ [p. 28, 29]
c. Argument augmentation [our term]
An act generates another act distinguished by the specification of an
additional argument.
Exx.: ‘s extends his arm’ generates ‘s extends his arm out the car window’
‘s moves his queen’ generates ‘s moves his queen to king-knight-
seven’ [p. 34]
8For the sake of terminological consistency, I replace Goldman’s original term ‘compound
generation’ by ‘compound augmentation’.
9The term ‘argument’ is used here in a sense also including adjuncts.
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Goldman himself did not seem entirely convinced that augmentation generation is
of the same kind as the other three types of level-generation (cf. his discussion
pp. 28–30). Related to the conceptual level, augmentation in all varieties mentioned
is enrichment of a given act-type concept: the original concept is maintained and a
condition, or circumstance, added such as to form a concept that is more specific.
In ‘extend one’s arm out the car window’, the direction of the movement is added
as a particular circumstance, analogously for manner augmentation; for compound
augmentation, the co-temporal acts constitute the crucial circumstances for each
other.
The application of the augmented concept must be narrower than the application
of the concept augmented. If a concept A+ is an augmentation of a concept A, then
A+ unilaterally entails A, that is, A applies to all cases to which A+ applies, but not
conversely. As we saw in (6d), entailment does not pertain with the other types of
level-generation.
Rather than attempting to subsume augmentation under level-generation, I
recognize the conceptual process as a mechanism of its own, independent of the
phenomenon of level-generation. Augmentation is the well-known, basic, and ubiq-
uitous conceptual process of concept enrichment: a given concept/categorization/type
is enriched by adding conditions. Thereby the extension of the concept is narrowed
down. As a cognitive process, augmentation, or enrichment, is of fundamental impor-
tance. It underlies learning in form of gradual differentiation of a concept; it is
involved in all processes of adding information to existing knowledge representa-
tions, including concepts for categories. In the theory of types such as in Carpenter
(1992), the relationship between a given type and an enrichment of it is established
as “subsumption”, the wider, less rich, type subsumes the narrower, enriched type.
Augmentation is a basic process along with level-generation; it may even be
more general. The definition in (11a) defines the general notion as a relation between
concepts in general; it applies to act-types in particular. The definition is generalized
in (11b) as to cover Goldman’s compound augmentation. (11c) defines the derived
notion of an act-TT a+/A+ being more specific than an act-TT a/A; in the case of
compound augmentation, the relation holds between each component act and the
compound act.
(11) Augmentation
a. A concept A+ is an augmentation of the concept A, or:   
A  properly subsumes A+
A A+
iff A+ is A with conditions added such that there are cases where A
applies, but not A+, while A always applies if A+ applies.
b. For n>1, the concept A+ is an augmentation of the concepts A1, …, An,
A1, …, An A+
iff A+ is an augmentation of each act concept A1, …, An.
c. An act-TT a+/A+ is more specific than an act-TT a/A, iff A A+.
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By referring to the act tokens as “a” and “a+”, it is not implied that they are different
as such. In fact, by the very definition, if a+ is a token of act-type A+, then it also
is a token of all act-types A that subsume A+ . The notation for the act tokens is
chosen for convenience in order to fit in with the distinction of act tokens involved
in c-constitution. We will refer to both, the relation between types and the relation
between TTs, as augmentation.
Augmentation shares certain basic properties with level-generation. (i) By defi-
nition, augmentation preserves all information. Thus, if we apply augmentation to
an act-TT a/A, then the agent of a+/A+ is necessarily the same as the agent of a/A;
the same holds for the act times of a and a+. Note that this also holds in the case
of compound augmentation: the subsumption relation can only obtain between A1,
…, An and A+ if all n + 1 act-types have the same agent and time specification.
Thus, the analogue of (6a, b) applies to augmentation. (ii) Augmentation, too, is an
asymmetric, irreflexive, and transitive relation between act-TTs, and hence gener-
ates tree structures. Applied in the same domain, we can form trees that involve both
augmentation and level-generation. However, there is one fundamental difference
between augmentation and level-generation in the narrower sense: level-generation
requires logical independence, while augmentation involves logical entailment.
I define “cascades” basically as Goldmanian act trees. I introduce a new term
because I want to be able to extend the notion to multilevel representations of things
other than acts.
(12) Act cascades
An act cascade is a tree structure of act-TTs that are related by (causal,
conventional, or simple) level-generation and/or by augmentation.
According to this definition, act-cascades are co-extensive with Goldmanian act-
trees, but they are considered to be not all produced by sub-types of what I call
“level-generation”.
2.6 C-Constitution
2.6.1 The Relations c-by and c-in
Goldman mentions the two options of paraphrasing the downward relationship
between a generated act-TT h/H and its generator l/L, with a by or an in paraphrase:
‘Agent does h/H by doing l/L’ or ‘Agent does h/H in doing l/L.’10 He exempts
augmentation. Goldman does not elaborate on the question as to when one or the
other type of paraphrase is adequate, but there is some discussion in Kearns (2003),
although she does not refer to Goldman’s theory. Kearns discusses in versus by para-
phrases in connection with certain action predicate types, to be discussed in Sect. 3.3
10I will use ‘L’, ‘L1’, ‘L2’, … for lower cascade levels, and ‘H’, ‘H1’, ‘H2’, … for higher levels.
278 S. Löbner
as “criterion predicates”. What I refer to as lower and higher level, she calls ‘host’
and ‘parasite’, respectively. According to her, an in paraphrase expresses that “the
host simply realizes the parasite” [p. 602]; while a by paraphrase expresses that “the
causative parasite is not realized simply in the occurrence of the one action performed,
but requires also a consequential upshot” [p. 615]. It is not clear from her discussion
either, when which of the two paraphrases applies. Still, Kearns’ observation that
the in paraphrase applies when the generating act simply realizes the generated act
seems to be a valid generalization. We would say, for example, in the case of (13)
that the casting of the speaker is the mistake.
(13) All through The Graduate Nichols thought he’d made a mistake in casting me.
[BNC C9U 495]
By contrast, cases of generation where a by paraphrase is adequate seem to not allow
for the equation, in this sense, of generating and generated act:
(14) Our aim is to reduce the number of new HIV infections by giving young
people the facts about AIDS and by encouraging them to think about their
future. [BNC A01 532]
Clearly, giving young people the facts about AIDS is not, in itself, a reduction of the
number of HIV infections, rather it is a possible means, or method, of achieving that.
I conclude that there are two distinct inverse cascade relations that can be described
by using in or by, respectively. These are alternative inverses of the relation of level-
generation. I index the relations with the subscript ‘c’ for the given circumstances
since these relations, like level-generation, only hold under circumstances.
(15) The downward relation c-in
h/H c-in l/L, iff
Under the given circumstances c,
– the agent, in doing l/L, exemplifies an act h of type H;
– doing h/H consists in exemplifying an act l of type L;
– the agent’s doing l/L counts as / amounts to / means exemplifying an act
h of type H.
(16) The downward relation c-by
h/H c-by l/L, iff
Under the given circumstances,
– the agent, by doing l/L, exemplifies an act h of type H;
– doing h/H is effected / accomplished by exemplifying an act l of type L.
A simple intuitive description of the relation between the generating act l/L and the
generated act h/H derives from these definitions; it holds in both cases: Under the
given circumstances, doing L is a way, or a method, to do H.
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2.6.2 The Relation of C-Constitution
Rather than striving for a general formal definition of level-generation, I will apply
the notion to the more concrete three types, causal, conventional, and simple. I will
also introduce a different term, and with it a slightly different perspective: the notion
of level-generation emphasizes the process of creating additional categorizations
for a given act-TT. In the following I will focus rather on the conceptual relation
between the act-TTs, and speak of “c-constitution”. Thus, the following definition
of c-constitution can mutatis mutandis be taken as a definition of level-generation:
(17) The relation c-const
Let l/L and h/H be two acts such that l and h are acts by the same agent that
occupy the same time, but are not co-temporal.
Under given circumstances c, an act l/L c-constitutes h/H
l/L c-const h/H, or l/L h/H
iff one of the following two relations holds:
h/H c-in  l/L –   In doing l/L, the agent exemplifies an act h of type H, or
h/H c-by  l/L –   By doing l/L, the agent exemplifies an act h of type H.
3 Cascades and Verb Classes
In this section, I will apply the cascade approach to verbmeanings, that is, lexicalized
act-TTs. Goldman never did this, although, of course, he used English verbs for
referring to the act-types he discussed. The recognition of the fact that Goldman’s
theory applies toTTs opens theway to consider level-generation as a relation between
act-types, abstracting away of the particular circumstances under which a TT is
exemplified. The cognitive perspective developed here allows us to apply the theory
to lexical verb meanings if we assume, as I do, that these consist in event concepts
that cognitively represent the type of event a verb denotes.
Applying cascade theory to lexical action verb meanings and to certain morpho-
logical and grammatical phenomena will yield ample evidence for the relevance of
the approach to verb semantics. We will start out with the distinction between basic
and non-basic act-TTs and demonstrate that most verbs appear to denote non-basic
act-types.
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3.1 Basic Versus Non-basic Act-Types
The notion of level-generation raises the question whether there is a basic level of
action. Goldman’s (1970) answer is positive. His examples of basic act-types include
the following:







wrinkling one’s nose [p. 18]
Informally, a type of action is basic if it does not require a generating act of a
different type in order to come about. Basic act-types are exemplified immediately,
not by means of level-generation. A convenient test for non-basic act-types is to
check if there are different types of act for implementing it. For example, depending
on the circumstances, an electric light may be turned on by doing various more basic
things, like flipping a light switch, triggering a motion detector, using a smart phone
touch display, or giving a voice command to an electronic device that controls the
light. Thus, ‘turn on the light’ is not a basic act-type. Similarly, if you are working
at a computer, you may bring the cursor on the screen to a certain position by
various methods, including a mouse click, using a mousepad, arrow keys on your
keyboard, or touching the screen, if it is a touchscreen. Even these act-types are not
basic, though; basic are just the simple bodily movements. By the way, none of the
act-types displayed in the act-trees in (1) at the lowest level displayed is basic.
According to Goldman [p. 67], all action is caused by a current want to act
correspondently. Essentially, he defines basic act-types as things an agent would do
if they had the want to do so and were in standard condition with respect to this type
of act, and if the act can be brought about without level-generation. Basicness is
primarily defined for act-types, and derivatively for act-TTs.11
3.2 Verbs of Basic and Non-basic Action
Themeaning of a verb describes a type of situation; for action verbs, it describes a type
of act. The distinction between basic and non-basic act-types therefore immediately
11Due to Goldman’s definition, basic acts are necessarily intentional. They may, however, level-
generate acts that are not intended. This is an important point of the theory, but it will not play a
prominent role in this paper.
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Table 1 100 most frequent English action verbs (verbs of social action are written in italics)
01 say go make take come give look use tell put
11 work leave show ask try call provide keep hold turn
21 bring begin follow help write run set move play pay
31 meet lead allow carry produce talk offer consider suggest let
41 sit continue add change buy speak send decide win describe
51 agree build read reach open spend return draw create sell
61 cause walk accept wait pass lie apply base raise increase
71 report watch learn cover explain claim break support form cut
81 reduce establish join bear achieve seek deal choose fail serve
91 represent kill drive discuss place argue prove introduce pick enjoy
carries over to verbs. If one takes a look at corpus and dictionary data, it turns out
that non-basicness of action verbs is the rule rather than the exception.
Table 1 displays the 100 most frequent English action verbs, among the 156 most
frequent verbs in all. The table was obtained by checking the entries in the online
Oxford Dictionary of English12 (ODE) for the most frequent English verbs in the
online British National Corpus. A verb was counted as an action verb if the first sense
in the dictionary entry has an agentive, non-stative description. It was classified as
non-basic if the definition was in terms of multiple synchronous or sequential action,
if the method was left open, or if a cascade-like definition is given (“do … by doing
---”). In the table, verbs of social action are marked with italics. Social action is
necessarily non-basic, as its social character derives from social rules. For any type
of social action, a generating physical act is required that under circumstances will
count as that type of social action, according to some rule. Thus, concepts for social
act-types always involve conventional generation.13 I classified verbs as social if the
sense description mentions interaction with other persons.
Among the one-hundred action verbs, there is not a single example of a clearly
basic-act verb. One verb might be a candidate: The ODE describes the first sense of
stay as ‘remain in the same place’14; it is a borderline case, however, and the fact that
it seems basic may just be due to it not involving doing anything concrete. Certain
verbs in the listmay appear basic, but they aren’t. For example say is not basic because
saying something involves a complex cascade of actions, starting from the basic acts
of what we do with our articulatory organs in order to produce speech sounds; the
sound productions may or may not constitute productions of linguistic sounds like
vowels and consonants; even if they do, they need not necessarily constitute acts of
12Oxford Dictionary of English: https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/.
13See, for example, Searle (1995) on the distinction of what he calls “brute facts” and “institutional
facts”. The latter form our social reality. They are what they are by social agreement. Constitutive
rules of the form “X counts asY in context C” [p. 28] create the social reality, including social action.
This concept closely resembles Goldman’s notion of conventional level-generation, but Searle does
not refer to Goldman’s work.
14https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/stay, accessed Jan 15 2018.
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ultimately producing ordinary words and grammatical sentences. I will come back
to this special case of action in the brief discussion of Austin’s speech act cascade in
Sect. 5.1. Even a seemingly elementary verb like sit is not basic (as an action verb):
depending on what the agent sits on, a chair, a bike, a swing, etc. the action requires
different physical activities; sit may also mean ‘sit up’ from a lying position, or ‘sit
down’—asking for yet different physical action. Apart from these senses, there is
the transitive use of sit as in sit the child on one’s shoulder. Even if certain verbs
denote action that is closely related to a particular body part, like kick, they are not
necessarily basic, as one can, for example, kick with various parts of the foot, with
one’s shin, one’s knee or thigh—variants of kicking that are executed by different
more basic types of action.
As a result, it appears that theremaybenobasic-act verbs at all among the 100most
frequent English verbs. Are there any basic-act verbs in English, verbs that invariably
denote basic action rather than what is accomplished by some type of more basic
action? The verbs in Goldman’s basic action examples in (18)—extend, move, bend,
shrug, open, turn, pucker, wrinkle—are not in themselves verbs of basic action. In
Goldman’s examples, they are all transitive verbs and their basicness depends on the
choice of a particular body-part as the object argument. For types of object other than
one’s own body-parts (‘move the table’, ‘turn the pancake’, ‘open the door’), there
would be variousmethods of enactment available. Some of the verbs have intransitive
action uses—move, bend, shrug, and turn; among them, shrug is a candidate for a
basic-action verb because to shrug is the same as to shrug one’s shoulder; maybe
intransitive bend is another one.
It is not surprising that there are so fewverbs that denote basic acts. The vocabulary
of natural language serves communication in, and about, our reality, and this is to
a large part social reality. Verbs of action are used in order to describe what people
do. If we were restricted to verbs of basic action, it would be extremely hard, if not
impossible, to describe what people are really doing (try to say that you are writing an
article by reporting the basic physical movements you make to do so—no-one would
understand what you are describing). Quite generally, it seems, we communicate
about what people do on considerably advanced levels of cascading. Verbs like help
supply a good illustration of the ‘abstractness’ of action concepts. Ranking 24 in the
above list, it is central vocabulary. According to the analysis in Engelberg (2005), the
verb means essentially ‘do something for somebody that improves their situation’.
The concept of helping leaves open what the generating action would be concretely;
in fact, an action of almost any type may constitute help in one situation, and the
contrary in another, and the very same act-token may constitute help for one person
and a big problem for another. In social life, improving others’ situation is of utmost
importance; it applies to all kinds of situation in our complex lives; we need general
verbs like this.
For another source on basicness or nonbasicness, one may take a look at Levin’s
(1993) English Verb Classes and Alternations, where a comprehensive collection
of semantic verb classes is compiled and described. There are 49 major classes
distinguished, almost all of them action verbs—not a single class is basic-action.
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3.3 Criterion Predicates
Goldman’s theory of action was not really taken up in semantic theories of verb
meaning.15 There is, though, a small thread of discussion on the semantic analysis
of by gerunds where a two-level view on the meaning of selected types of action
verb is adopted. The discussion starts out with Kearns (2003). Kearns distinguishes
two special classes of action predicates which she dubs “causative upshots” and
“criterion predicates”. Causative upshots are transitive predicates like cure the patient
or convince s.o. [p. 599]; they denote the achievement of some sort of change by
doing something more concrete, e.g. curing someone by administering a certain
treatment, or convincing someone by presenting evidence. Criterion predicates are
often intransitive and not inherently causative; they include predicates such asmake a
mistake, break the law, score a goal, or prove a theorem. As with help, the predicate
requires that something be done that fulfils a given criterion, while the method is
left open; it can be specified with a by or in locution (recall the example in (13)).
For both types of predicate there is, in Kearns’ terms, a “host” and a “parasite”
[pp. 600–1]. The “more abstract” parasite, the causative upshot or criterion predicate,
is denoted by the verb and is implemented, or accomplished, by the “more concrete”
host. For example, the parasite is ‘breaking-the-law’ and the host is a theft; the
parasite is ‘curing-the-patient’ and the host is administering the treatment. Clearly,
Kearns’ hosts level-generates the parasites. Kearns does not mention Goldman’s
work, though. Her analyses are confined to two levels, and to two special classes of
generated act-types.
The two classes of verbswere taken up in Sæbø (2008, 2016). He chooses different
terms for Kearns’ causative upshots (“manner-neutral causatives” in 2008, “method-
neutral causatives” in 2016); hosts and parasites he calls concrete and abstract.
Notably, the “hosts”, or more concrete acts, are not basic in the sense explained
here, at least not necessarily so; they may be high-level act-types. What matters here,
is that the two authors distinguish within one verb meaning different levels of action
related by, in fact, level-generation.
3.4 Means of Explicit Level-Generation
In addition to this lexical evidence for cascade-structure action concepts, there are
numerous lexical and grammatical mechanisms operating on verbs and their lexical
meanings to the effect of generating further cascade levels. Some of them involve
word formation, for example affixation, or conversion from a different word class,
others employ certain grammatical constructions, or types of adverbial. The examples
in the following are chosen for the sakeof illustration; theydonot provide a systematic
15The theory was taken up and developed further in Clark’s (1996) theory of communication where
he introduces the concept of “action ladder”. However, Clark did not apply the notion of level-
generation to verb semantics.
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survey, but represent just the tip of an iceberg. Almost all the cases described involve
augmentation alongwith level-generation. The augmentation of the underlying action
concept iconically corresponds to the augmentation byword formation and/or syntax
at expression level.
3.4.1 Adding a Level of Social Interaction
Many lexical and grammatical processes add a further argument16 to a given action
concept. This amounts to augmentation of the underlying concept, but in addition
c-constitution is involved, on top of the augmentation. I will discuss the addition of
arguments of the type ‘person’; this will inevitably have the effect of cascading to a
level of social interaction.
Many basic types of bodily action are used as non-verbal signals in communica-
tion. For example, the verb expressions smile, frown, raise one’s brows, wink, nod,
shrug, bow, kneel down, fold one’s hands, scratch one’s head, wave one’s hand,
and others can also denote communicative action. They do so invariably if they are
used with a prepositional phrase that adds an addressee: ‘smile/wink/wave/frown at
someone’. German has verb prefixes such as in zu-zwinkern (‘wink at’) or an-lächeln
(‘smile at’) which serve the same effect of enriching the argument structure with an
addressee.17 (19a) is an example that attests the social-level relevance of zuzwinkern.
The concept of zuwinkern has the informal cascade structure in (19b).
(19) a. Mein Lieber, wenn du nicht verheiratet wärst, dann könnte ich dir jetzt zuzwinkern.
[DWDS]
‘My dear, if you were not married, I could now wink at you.’
b. Cascade: ‘zuzwinkern’: ‘zwinkern’ ‘zwinkern’ + addressee ‘zuzwinkern’
German an and zu can also be used as prepositions marking an additional addressee
argument for verbs of communication: schreiben an + accusative NP ‘write to’ or
sprechen zu + dative NP ‘speak to’.
Similar to these cases are applicative constructions (Van Valin and LaPolla 1997:
337–8). Japanese has several such constructions consisting of two verbs. The first
verb is in the gerund -te form and the second a verb of possession transfer, such
as ageru ‘give upward’ and kureru ‘give downward’; the direction component is
metaphorically used for expressing ‘give to superior’ or ‘give to inferior’. A speaker
will always treat the addressee as socially superior and themselves as inferior; there-
fore the beneficiary in the -te ageru construction will typically be the other, and the
agent typically the self or someone related to the self. The complex expression is used
to describe doing a favor.18 The cascade analysis has the first verb as the generator.
16It is not relevant in this context to distinguish syntactically between complements and adjuncts;
we will talk of ‘arguments’ in both cases.
17See Stiebels (1996: 163f) on the prefix an-.
18Martin (1975: 597–601).
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(20) a. Japanese
mado o ake- te age ta
window accusative open- gerund give- past
“I opened the window for you/her/him/them”
b. Cascade:
‘open the window’ ‘open the window’  superior addressee
‘do superior a favor’
Thus, the construction has the structure of a criterion predicate, with the method
specified. A similar construction in Mandarin is discussed in Tsai (2012). It makes
use of the verb gěi给 ‘give’ that is otherwise also used as a standard verb of giving
(Chang 2016: 251–2).19
(21) a. Mandarin (Tsai 2012, p. 5)
gei wo gui- xia!
AFF me kneel- down
‘Kneel down for my sake!’
Van Valin and LaPolla (1997, p. 384) describe beneficiary constructions in Lakhota
with essentially the same semantics. German has a special use of the dative in such
cases20:
(22) German
Er hat ihr die Tür aufgehalten
he has her.dative the door kept open
‘he [has] kept the door open for her’
As witnessed by the translation, English has a for-complement construction with the
same function.
3.4.2 Adding a Level of Achieving a Result
Predicate expressions such as hammer flat or drink empty consist of a verb of action
and a predicative adjective that denotes a resulting state of the object acted upon.
Resultatives of this type denote an action that is generated by an act of the type of the
base verb; for example, hammer flat denotes a cascade of the structure ‘hammer …’
↥ ‘flatten’, and drink empty a cascade ‘drink…’ ↥ ‘ emptyverb ‘. However, the cascade
first requires an augmentation that adds the affected object. Thus, the analysis again
requires two cascade steps:
19Tone diacritics are not given in the source.
20Wegener (1985: 94–6) on dativus commodi.
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(23) a. ‘hammer’ ‘hammer’+ ‘on x’ ‘flatten x’
b. ‘drink” ‘drink’ + ‘from x’ ‘empty x’
Dowty (1979), and many others since, analyzed this type of construction as causative
in the sense that, for example, drink the glass empty means ‘drink from the glass and
[thereby] cause the glass to become empty’ (Dowty 1979: 93). This is reflected by
the analysis in (23) if ↥ is taken as representing the causal type of level-generation.
German has a lot of particle verbs with a resultative particle such as tot- ‘dead’ in
tot-schießen ‘shoot to death’, klein- ‘small, little’ in kleinschneiden ‘cut into small
pieces, chip’ or an- ‘on’ in anknipsen ‘to flick on’; these can be analysed analogously.
Van Valin and LaPolla (1997: 90) mention verbs of killing in Lakhota; they have
the form of compounds with the first part indicating the method of killing, and the
second a verb t’a that means ‘dead / to die’, for example ka-t’a ‘strike to death’ (ka-
‘by striking’), ya-t’a ‘bite to death’ (ya- ‘with the teeth’), yu-t’a ‘strangle’ (yu- ‘with
the hands’). English can generally use the addition to death for level-generating
a predicate of killing. German has a series of verbs of killing with the prefix er-
that does not have much of a lexical meaning on its own, but rather constructional
meaning in this type of verb formation: erschießen (‘shoot to death’), erschlagen
(‘beat to death’), erwürgen (‘choke/strangle to death’), erhängen (‘hang’), erdrücken
(‘crush to death’), and several more.21—The generating act-type fails to be specified
in cases of conversion of adjectives to verbs; the adjective denotes the resulting
state of the object of an unspecified action: empty, fill, smooth, etc. These verbs are
method-neutral predicates in the sense of Sæbø (2016).
3.4.3 Adding a Level of Appraisal
A further type of cascade extension adds an appraisal to the action-verb concept.
German has a productive word formation pattern that derives from almost arbitrary
verbs of action a verb used to express failure; these verbs have been dubbed ‘erratic’
verbs (see Fleischhauer 2016: 293). One variant of the derivation adds the prefix
ver- to a transitive verb and yields another transitive verb (die Hecke verschneiden,
‘cut the hedge in the wrong way’22); a second type adds the same prefix and the
verb is reflexivized as to form an intransitive predication (sich verschneiden ‘cut
in the wrong way’). This derivation adds a cascade level of failure: ‘cut’ ↥ ‘fail’.
Thus, this is another mechanism that produces criterion predicates. The highest level
of the cascade is fairly unspecific, but the cascade as a whole yields the meaning
expressed. English has some erratic verbs with the prefix mis-: misunderstand,
misdirect, mishear, but the pattern is far less productive than the German one.23
21Stiebels (1996: 234–5).
22Stiebels’ example in her discussion of this ver- derivation (1996: 143–51).
23Goldman (1970: 17) mentions erratic ‘misspeak’, ‘miscalculate’, and ‘miscount’ as examples of
act-types that “preclude intentionality”. While the underlying basic act is intentional, it happens to
generate unintended action.
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Other constructions across languages serve the generation of a level of ‘doing too
much’: cf. English overcook, overheat, overpay etc.; Russian uses the prefix pere- in a
similar way (pere-gret’ ‘overheat’).24 Japanese has verb compounds with the second
verb -sugi-ru ‘exceed’, for example nomi-(‘drink’)-sugi-ru ‘drink too much’.25
A two-verb construction in Mandarin with the second verb玩 wán ‘play’ can be
used to express the level-generation of acting for pleasure:
(24) Mandarin (Liu Fan, from the BCC corpus)
ou guàngjiepéngy wán ne
I afternoon go.out with friend go.shopping play prt
‘I go out to shopping with my friend for fun.’
German has a very productive adverb formation that adds -erweise to an adjec-
tive or a present participle stem. This type of adverb is used for evaluating an act,
or more generally an event or a state. Examples include dummerweise ‘stupidly’,
erstaunlicherweise ‘surprisingly’, unnötigerweise (‘unnecessarily’), glücklicher-
weise (‘luckily’), and hundreds more. They correspond to English adverbs in
sentence-initial use.
(25) German (DWDS corpus)
Dummerweise hatten wir keine Schneemäntel angezogen.
‘Stupidly, we hadn’t put on snow coats.’
This type of adverb projects the verb to a criterion-predication level. For example,
adding dummerweise to a verb V, has the effect of [V] ↥ ‘do something stupid’.
3.5 Implicit Level-Generation
It may be worthwhile considering cases of “integrated” augmentation generation
of the types discussed above as they provide a glimpse into the decompositional
structure of certain types of action concept.
Appraisal. One group with an integrated specific evaluation is constituted by verbs
of forbidden action, e.g. lie, steal, trespass, rob, rape, murder, and many others.
These add to the concept of a particular type of action a level ‘do something
forbidden/illegal’. Thus, there is a cascade relationship between ‘kill’ and ‘murder’.
‘Murder’ can project further to ‘assassinate’ if the victim is an important person,
giving rise to elaborate cascades such as ‘shoot’  ‘shoot at y’ ↥ ‘kill y’ ↥ ‘murder
y’ ↥ ‘assassinate y’.
Result. Van Valin and LaPolla (1997) distinguish causative and active accomplish-
ments, and achievements. Causative accomplishments are verbs like kill: the agent
24See Zinova (2016: 146–51) on a frame analysis of the meanings of pere-.
25Martin (1975: 434–8) on the “excessive” construction.
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does something that causes somebody to die. The authors apply the following general
half-formal analysis to this type of action verb [pp. 188–9].26
(26) [do x, [predicate1(x, (y))] CAUSE [BECOME predicate2(x) or (y)]].
This reads essentially as follows: agent x does something of the type predicate1
which causes x or y to change into the condition denoted by predicate2. The first
part of the analysis—do x, [predicate1(x, (y))]—describes an action by the agent x
(that possibly involves another participant y); according to the second part—CAUSE
[BECOME predicate2(x) or (y)]—x’s doing causes x or y to enter the condition
described by the second predicate. The whole formula describes the constitutive
condition for causal generation27:
(27) predicate1(x, (y)) [ x MAKE [BECOME predicate2(x) or (y)]]
Causative achievement and accomplishment verbs with an agent argument are abun-
dant in natural languages. Typically, the generating level of the more basic method
action is not specified.
Signaling. As mentioned above, some action verbs of basic or near-basic level can
be used to denote a social-level act of signaling (smile, frown, harrumph, nod, shrug,
and others). If used in this sense, they incorporate generation of a social level. As
social agents, equipped with the “sense-makingmachines” our minds are, we usually
try to come up with a construal of the acts of others as meaningful beyond the mere
act. The verbs mentioned reflect this tendency by incorporating a higher cascade
level in lexicalized meaning variants.
4 Cascades and Frames
Application of Goldman’s approach to psychology calls for a framework for
modelling cognitive representations. I apply the theory of Barsalou frames as further
developed in the Düsseldorf context of research on the structure of representations.28
The framework is applied to the decompositional analysis of lexical meanings and
26The analysis goes back to Dowty (1979), who relates to McCawley (1968) for the structure of the
analysis.
27In the Dowty formula in (26), ‘CAUSE’ denotes a relation between events: the event denoted
by the first predicate causes the event denoted by the second. In Goldman’s definition of causal
generation in (4.1.b), ‘cause’ is used as an agentive verb: the agent causes an event e. The two uses
of ‘cause’ correspond to two senses of the verb cause. In order to distinguish between these two
senses, I usedMAKE for agentive causation in (27). I am grateful toWilhelm Geuder and Ekaterina
Gabrovska for making me aware of this point.
28TheCollaborativeResearchCenter 991on “The structure of representations in language, cognition
and science”. For representative work on this approach see Petersen (2007), Kallmeyer andOsswald
(2013), Löbner (2014, 2017).
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the modelling of compositional processes, among other things.29 I will characterize
it here very briefly and then propose an integration of cascade structures into the
theory.
4.1 Barsalou Frames
As a working hypothesis, I adopt Barsalou’s Frame Hypothesis, according to which
Barsalou frames constitute the universal format of concept representation in human
cognition.30 It is assumed that lexical meanings are concepts stored in long-term
memory and that compositional meanings are concepts formed as the result of
syntactic and semantic processing, essentially by unification.
According to Löbner’s (2017) formal theory of Barsalou frames, a frame struc-
ture is a coherent network of nodes connected by functional attributes. The nodes
represent individuals in a global universe of discourse. The attributes are functions
that for individuals of an appropriate type return another individual of the same or
another type as value. For example, the attribute size returns the individual size for all
individuals that have size; the attribute mother returns the mother for every animal
with parents; the attribute head returns the head for those things that have a head.
The values of attributes may carry their own attributes; thus, frame structures are
recursive. In a frame, type restrictions may be imposed on the nodes, that is, condi-
tions specifying that the entity represented by the node belong to a certain subset of
the universe. The frame structures defined in Löbner (2017) are first-order in that
the underlying ontology provides a universe of discourse, the set of all individuals,
and the attributes are functions that return individuals to individuals. The universe
does not contain second-order entities such as properties, relations, attributes, or
first-order frames. Frame structures can be translated into an appropriate first-order
predicate logic language (see Löbner 2017: 99–109 for details).
Frames are usually represented by frame diagrams (see examples below), or else
by attribute value matrices. I will use diagrams. There is always a distinguished
central node that represents the individual described by thewhole frame. Frames have
the same double nature as Goldmanian act-TTs: they represent a token of a type. A
frame diagram as a whole provides a type description of the token represented by the
central node; the analogue holds for frames represented by attribute-value matrices.
In the context here, we exclusively deal with frames for actions. Actions are a
particular type of individual in the universe, a subtype of events. All events have an
attribute τ for the time they occupy; therefore every action frame has this attribute on
the central act node. Actions have an agent whence the act node in an action frame
carries an attribute agent. For the current discussion in the context of a theory
of human action, it will be assumed that agents are persons. An action frame may
29See, for example, the contributions by Andreou and Petitjean, Balogh and Osswald, and
Gamerschlag and Petersen in this volume.
30See Barsalou (1992: 21) for the original source, and Löbner (2014) for its application to language.
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τ
Bill wakes the baby
AGENT THEME
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Fig. 2 Cascade formed by two frames
contain more attributes of the act, corresponding to more semantic roles such as
theme, patient, instrument, goal etc.31
4.2 Cascades in Frame Theory
The question arises if cascades are another variant of frames. Löbner (2017) allows
only first-order attributes in frames. The cascade relations c-constitution, c-in, c-by,
and subsumption, however, are essentially and irreducibly second-order, because
they relate types, i.e. whole first-order frames. Apart from that, the upward relations
are not functions. Due to transitivity, a level-generating act-token does not project
to a uniquely defined token it generates. In addition, level-generation may branch
upwards. Thus the cascade relations cannot figure as attributes within first-order
frames. I will integrate them into frame theory as second-order relations between
first-order frames.
Let us consider a simple two-level cascade for illustrating the interplay of frame
representation and c-constitution:
(28) a1/‘Bill turns on the light’ c-const a2/‘Bill wakes the baby’
The cascade diagram in Fig. 2 contains the frames for a1/‘Bill turns on the light’ and
for a2/‘Bill wakes the baby’ at the lower and the upper level, respectively. The two
frames are parallel in structure. They have a central act node that represents an act
of the type indicated by the bold-face type label. In both frames, the action nodes
31For more elaborate verb frames, see for example Kallmeyer and Osswald (2013), Naumann
(2013), Gamerschlag et al. (2014), Löbner (2017), and the contributions to this volume mentioned.
Verb frames that only display attributes for semantic roles and the time τ are a gross simplification
of what the decomposition of lexical verb meanings ultimately calls for. However, one is always
free to reduce frame representations to what is needed in the context of discussion. For the needs
of this paper, case frames will suffice.
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carry the attributes agent and τ. Both frames also have a theme attribute on the
central node, of different nature. As the two frames are related by c-constitution, the
attributesagent and τ necessarily both take the same value in the lower and the upper
frame. The identity of agent and time cannot be expressed by linking the attributes
in both frames to one value node; attributes cannot take values in another frame than
their argument node belongs to. The identity of values can only be accomplished
by assigning the same individuals as values for the two attributes, respectively. The
dashed upward arrow in Fig. 2 stands for the relation of c-constitution between the
two acts.
A structure formed by more than one first-order frame is itself second-order, that
is, a hyperframe. Hyperframe structures are a natural extension of first-order frame
theory. For example, if one is to model scripts with frames, one will have to design
hyperframes that consist of first-order action frames for subsequent acts, connected
in an appropriate way.
5 The Writing Cascade
Wewill now turn to an elaborate example, the cascade for the act-type ‘write by hand’.
It will be used to discuss the consequences that the adoption of the cascade model
to lexical verb meanings has for semantic theory. As a prelude, we will have a brief
look at Austin’s (1962) speech act model. Austin’s analysis anticipated Goldman’s
multilevel theory of action; Goldman mentions it as such in his introduction [p. 8].32
The speech act cascade also prepares the discussion of the writing cascade in the
section to follow because the upper levels of the speech act cascade also appear in
the write [act] cascade.
5.1 Austin’s Speech Act Cascade
Austin’s (1962) analysis of speech acts constitutes a classical example of a cascade.
Austin distinguishes five levels of action in an ordinary verbal utterance (Fig. 3). The
“locutionary” level consists in saying somethingwith a particular sense and reference
in the given context of utterance. Within the locutionary act, Austin makes a finer
distinction into three levels: with the “phonetic act”, the speaker produces speech
sounds; the “phatic act” is “the uttering of certain vocables or words, that is, noises of
certain types, belonging to and as belonging to, a certain vocabulary, conforming to
and as conforming to a certain grammar.” (Austin 1962: 95); the “rhetic act” is “the
performance of an act of using those vocables with a certain more-or-less definite
32A recent work that links Austin’s speech act model to Goldman’s level-generation is Moltmann
(2017). She applies the level approach in particular to the distinction of locutionary and illocutionary
act.
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sense and reference.” [p. 95]. The phonetic act generates the phatic act, and this
in turn the rhetic act. Austin continues [p. 98], “To perform a locutionary act is in
general, we may say, also and eo ipso to perform an illocutionary act”. Austin calls
this level the illocutionary act in order to emphasize that it is done in performing
the locutionary act. He thus explicitly assumes a c-in relation between illocution
and locution. The achievement of the illocutionary act—a promise, an answer to
a question, etc.—only succeeds if complex “felicity conditions” [pp. 25–38] are
fulfilled. Austin discussed these conditions in detail, thereby offering an elaborate
case study of the “circumstances” involved in these cases of level-generation.
Finally, by performing an illocutionary act, the speaker may execute a “perlocu-
tionary act” that consists in causing a particular effect, for example, convincing,
offending, or delighting the addressee. Austin calls it perlocution because it is done
by performing the illocution [p. 108]. “[T]he perlocutionary act always includes some
consequences” [p. 107]. Unlike the lower four levels of a speech act, the perlocu-
tionary act may or may not be intended. The nature of the four level-generations is
a combination of conventional and simple for phatic, rhetic, and illocutionary act;
the level-generation of the perlocutionary act from the illocutionary act is causal; it
does not involve convention [p. 121].
5.2 The Cascade Structure of Writing by Hand
We will now proceed to an example that is suitable to illustrate and discuss central
aspects of applying the cascade approach to verb semantics. Figure 4 displays a
cascade for the concept of writing by hand. This concept essentially constitutes the
lexical meaning of the verb (except for the specification of the lowest level which we
will argue in Sect. 6.1 is not specified in the lexical entry). It is roughly analogous to
Austin’s cascade, but I will elaborate it more, commenting on the single-level frames























H5 frame for illocu onary act
H4 frame for wri ng content
H3 frame for wri ng text
H2 frame for wri ng graphemes
H1 frame for wri ng sth. by hand
L frames for components of h1
AGENT THEME
Fig. 4 The cascade for writing by hand
and their relationships. The writing cascade has a lowest level of three co-temporal
acts: the agent holds a writing implement in their hand, presses its writing part on
some surface, and moves it along leaving a visible trace. Compound augmentation
integrates the three co-temporal acts into the act-type at H1 ‘write by hand’, the first
level that can be called writing, in the sense of producing visible lines and shapes.
For reasons of space, the three frames for the acts of holding, pressing, and moving
along are only represented by their central act nodes. In fact, they share the agent and
the action time among them; they also have the same theme argument (i.e. the pen
or other writing implement); the acts of pressing and moving share the surface as a
third argument. Actually, the process of handwriting is even more complex; usually,
the pen will not be in continuous contact with the surface since writing will require to
lift the pen and move it to a different position on the surface. We neglect this aspect
here.
The higher Levels H1 to H5 consist of action frames that each have an agent
and a product attribute (the attribute arrows are labeled accordingly only in the
highest level). If Level H1 produces perceptible forms of writing on the surface, it
generates Level H2 ‘writegraph’ of producing graphemes. Graphemes, in turn, may
or may not constitute linguistic text: under circumstances, Level H2 generates Level
H3 ‘writetext’. Again under circumstances, writing text constitutes a fourth Level H4
‘writecontent’. Writing verbal content corresponds to the locutionary level in Austin’s
cascade. To this level adds an illocutionary level H5 ‘writeillocution’, for example, an
application, an excuse, a reply, a request, etc. The specific type labels for the agents
will be explained in Sect. 5.4. A perlocutionary level is not assumed to figure in the
concept of writing.
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At each cascade level, the act is embedded in a different context, and each context
comes with different conditions and requirements. The context of Level H1 is the
same as, for example, the context of a drawing activity. The agent needs a surface such
as a sheet of paper and a pen or other implement,maybe alongwith ink, paint, etc. The
agent needs to be able to hold the implement andmove it along on the surface at some
level ofmotor control. The agent determines readability in terms of the size ofwriting,
the visibility of the writing material on the surface, the durability of the product; they
may be concerned with highlighting parts of the writing by different color or style.
The product at Level H1 can be copied or scanned; if properly processed, it can
be stored on an electronic device. At Level H2, the agent bothers about a writing
system and a writing style; they need to command the skill of writing; they will
write legibly or not. The Level 3 agent is concerned with choosing a language, with
orthography and grammar; they need be in sufficient command of the language. At
Level H4, the agent is an author of content, whereby the agent potentially relates to
other content and its authors; for larger texts, the author is concerned with aspects
such as coherence and structure which are crucial for comprehensibility. Obviously,
producing text involves more abilities than just knowing the language. It is at the
illocutionary level H5 that the agent enters social interaction with a reader addressee,
possibly initiating or continuing a sequential exchange; the agent at this level will
choose an appropriate type of text, a style and a tone of expression, which requires
the relevant social skills. At each level, different criteria of successful action obtain.
And each level is motivated and informed by what it serves to level-generate.
5.3 Types of Products and Levels of Manner Modification
Depending on the level, writing brings about different types of product, for example,
lines, letters and characters, words, coherent text, illocutions, etc. This amounts to
different selectional restrictions for each level. Correspondingly, if the verb write
is complemented with a direct object such as whorls, e’s, “mama”, “I’m to the
cafeteria”, a receipt, etc., an appropriate level within the cascade will be selected
for application. If one were to describe the selectional restrictions for the theme
argument of write in a single-level approach, one would run into an inconsistent type
assignment for the product argument.33
33One approach that deals with this problem is the assumption of “dot objects” (see for example
Pustejovsky 2009; Asher 2011). Dot objects are of a composite type, such as physical_object •
information for ‘book’. There is a vague connection between this approach and cascade theory, if
the notion of cascade is extended to objects (see below), but the relationship is too unclear to be
addressed here. The dot-objects approach raises many questions: What is the ontological character
of dot objects—are they one object or more? Which types of object can be combined to form dot
objects? What is the relationship between the elements and the whole? At present, I can state about
that much: there are cases of dot objects that form a cascade, in particular, dot objects of the type
action • action as discussed in Bücking (2014). There are other cases that might constitute cascades
if the notion is generalized as to also cover objects. But there are also cases that clearly do not form
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The level-distinction is equally relevant for the analysis of manner modification.
(29) lists manner modifiers of write that are level-specific; others like slowly or
beautifully may apply at more than one level.
(29) Level-specific manner modifiers of write and the cascade-levels they relate to
H1 swiftly, shakily
H2 small, illegibly
H3 ungrammatically, in Dutch
H4 coherently, consistently, incomprehensibly, redundantly, laconically
H5 urgently, rudely
Without requiring disambiguation or coercion, the verb combines with any-level
modifiers or product specifications. Simultaneous relation to different levels is
possible, such as in the following example:
(30) She used to write her private letters [H4] with two fingers [L] on her typewriter
[L].
5.4 Agencies at Cascade Levels
In Goldman’s theory, the agents of the acts in a cascade are presupposed to be the
same. They are, however, in different roles, a fact that is blurred if one uses the
same generalized attribute agent through all levels as I did in Fig. 2 and the writing
cascade; the difference becomes transparent if one uses instead the more specific
role attributes that actually apply. These are in the case of writing by hand:
(31) Level Agent’s role
L the one who holds the writing implement in hand
the one who presses its writing part on the surface
the one who moves it along on the surface
H1 the scribbler
H2 the scriber
H3 the author of the text
H4 the principal of the content
H5 the performer of a written illocutionary act
Goffman (1979) introduced the notion of “footing” in order to distinguish different
roles that the participants in a verbal communication can take on.34 There are producer
cascades, namely those like plantN • drinkN (for ‘coffee’), of the type source • product, where the
two objects united in the dot type do not temporally coexist. Other cases such as producer • product
(‘Honda’) or institution • printed copy (‘newspaper’) are plain metonymies not requiring a special
ontology. (For a treatment of metonymy in Frame Theory see Löbner 2013: 313 ff.).
34See Levinson (1988) for discussion of Goffman’s notion from a linguistic point of view.
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footings and recipient footings. On the producer’s side, which matters here, Goffman
distinguishes the roles of “principal”, “author”, and “animator”. The principal is
the one on whose behalf an utterance is made, the one who is responsible. The
author chooses the words, the animator produces the verbal signals. In everyday
communication, the three roles are usually enactedby the sameperson. In institutional
settings, however, like press conferences, public speeches, court trials, examinations,
and countless others, the producer footings may be distributed among more than one
person, present or absent; ghostwriters choose the words they don’t utter themselves,
attorneys speak on behalf of their clients, typists type words not their own. In the
diagram of the writing cascade in Fig. 4, the agent nodes are labeled according to
Goffman’s distinctions. Agentship can in principle be delegated down the cascade if
the higher-level agent is in a social position to do so.A lower-level agent is responsible
to their higher-level delegators; ultimately, the principal will be held responsible for
the performance of all the agents involved at the lower levels.
These considerations suggest a generalization of level-generation that allows for
delegation of agencydown the cascade, instead of strict identity of agents. In the realm
of social interaction, delegated agency is a common phenomenon. For example, I
may help somebody by delegating helpful action to a third party; I may pay a debt
by having a third person pay who owes me money; I may break the law by making
my subordinates do something illegal, and so on.
If agency does not split, there is a relation more specific than physical identity
between the agent roles at the different levels—if these agents are not considered just
persons but persons-in-a-particular-role. Let us assume that Erica holds a pen and
moves it along a piece of paper. As such she is already in three roles, implementing
the penholder, the one who presses the pen upon the paper, and the one who moves it
along on the paper. If she produces script, she thereby implements a ‘writer-by-hand’.
The implementation cascades upwards if Erica is successful in writing graphemes,
thereby producing text, content, an illocution. Under the circumstances required,
the agent at a given generator level implements the agent at the generated higher
level. As the implementation is successful only under circumstances, I will talk of
“c-implementation”.
The implementation relation is asymmetric: the writer-of-text implements a
writer-of-content, but not vice versa, since text need not have content. It is also
irreflexive: no role implements itself. And implementation is transitive. Thus, the c-
implementation relation has essentially the same properties as c-constitution, except
for the fact that it is a relation between persons and the roles they implement, rather
than between acts. In analogy to c-constitution, I consider c-implementation as a
relation between TTs, in this case persons under a particular role description, for
example Erica/agent(h1/writeby hand), that is, “Erica in the role of the agent of an
act h1 of the type ‘writeby hand’”.
C-implementation shares with c-constitution the question of grounding. Although
c-implementation goes hand in hand with c-constitution of acts, the grounding of c-
implementation is not just derivative from the grounding of c-constitution. Rather,
for any level of action, including the basic level, taking the agent role means imple-
menting it, for the person who acts. Hence, if l/L is the basic act-TT in a cascade to
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Fig. 5 The two levels of
















perform, the c-implementation chain starts with an additional prior step, taking the
form in (32a), while the corresponding act-cascade is as in (32b):
(32) a. person x c-impl x/agent(1/L) c-impl x/agent(h1/H1) c-impl …
b. l/L c-const h1/H1 c-const …
Figure 5 displays the two levels involved with agency: the person who implements
the agent and the person in the agent role for a specific act. The act level may cascade
further upwards.
We may assume that a person is implemented by a living human, the human by
an organism, the organism by biomass, and so on. This assumption would be in line
with theories that model social entities such as persons as supervenient on biological
entities, and these on chemical entities, etc. The problem of grounding persons is an
ontological problem of its own.
This mismatch notwithstanding, we may consider to generalize the term c-
constitution as to also cover the c-implementation relation. It makes sense to extend
the use of the term in this way: the writer-by-hand under circumstances constitutes
a writer of graphemes, who in turn may constitute an author of text, and so on.
5.5 Objects at Cascade Levels
Goldman’s notion of level-generation does not impose conditions on arguments other
than agents. In view of the writing cascade, we see that it would be inadequate to
assume identity of the products across levels because they exemplify ontologically
different types of object. Extracting the product track from the cascade yields a
multilevel conceptual description of the product on its own. The products are things
of a quality that originates at Level H1, H2, etc. respectively. Again, there is a
relation of constituency: under circumstances, the graphemes constitute text, the text
constitutes content, the content an illocution.
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The difference of description that applies to the products of writing at the levels
distinguished is particularly conspicuous. This will always be the case for object
arguments in action cascades of creating, destroying, or changing things, like bake,
break, or repair. However, objects in any cascade will be in different roles, too,
analogous to the agents in a cascade. Consider the following cascade, imagining
circumstances that would support its formation:
(33) L Amy presses the power button on the TV remote control
H1 Amy turns on the TV
H2 Amy turns on the evening news
H3 Amy starts her daily evening TV ritual
H4     Amy breaks off the on-going conversation with her friend 
H5 Amy annoys her friend
And now consider the role of the TV set at the different levels:
(34) L The TV is a remote-controllable device connected to the particular
remote control.
H1 The TV is in the role of being turned on by the telecommand. It matters
whether or not the TV is in the state ‘on’ or ‘off’; it changes this state
upon receiving the telecommand.
H2 The TV is in a state such that it receives TV broadcast programs; in
particular, it is a device that delivers the evening news. It is a device
of mass media communication.
H3 The TV is in the role of the device that enables Amy to have her daily
evening TV ritual. It serves Amy’s habits in a particular way.
H4 The TV and its program, when watched by Amy, makes it impossible
to continue conversation with her. To Amy, the TV and its program is
something that at this moment is more important than continuing her
conversation.
H5 The TV and its program are a disruptive element to her friend’s
interaction with Amy.
5.6 A Multitrack Notion of C-Constitution
I argued above that the cascade relations are second-order because they are relations
between act-types, and therefore relations between, rather than within, first-order
frames, in the frame-model adopted here. We now see that there is an even stronger
argument for the second-order view: c-constitution between acts necessarily comes
along with c-constitution of agencies and potential further arguments of the acts if
they are shared across levels. These other tracks of c-constitution are conceptual-
ized as roles of the arguments involved. Hence, c-constitution is a multitrack condi-
tion. Figure 6 displays a three-track sub-configuration cascade that would apply
















Fig. 6 Three tracks of c-constituency in a cascade
to the writing example. Notably, the parallel tracks in an action cascade intrinsi-
cally harmonize. To each of them the same circumstances—the “c” parameter of
c-constitution—are relevant, and with them the level-specific contexts. The diagram
highlights the multitude of c-const relations, the three tracks can alternatively be
considered the components of one complex inter-level relation.
6 Reference and Composition
The assumption that action verb meanings are concepts with a cascade structure
has far-reaching consequences not only for a theory of cognitive representation and
decomposition, but also for the theory of reference and composition.
6.1 Meaning and Reference of the VerbWrite
We call activities at all Levels H1 to H5 of the writing cascade “writing”, regardless
if the higher levels are actually achieved. If we refer to a level higher than H1, a
choice of alternative methods at Levels L and H1 is available, such as writing with a
typewriter, or on a computer with a keyboard, on a smart phone with a touch screen
etc. Thus, for present-day English, it is not to be assumed that the cascade in Fig. 4
represents the lexical meaning of the verb, as the lexical entrymust not fix themethod
of writing. That does not mean that the level of the writing method is absent from
the concept; it cannot be absent because it is required for logical reasons (there are
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no higher-level acts without appropriate generating lower-level acts). Thus, I assume
that the lexical meaning of the verb write is the cascade in Fig. 4 with the lowest
level H1 and its generators left unspecified. In general, verbs for non-basic action
eo ipso call for a lexical analysis in form of a cascade. If an unspecified generating
level is addressed, for example by a modification of write with shakily, it is to be
accommodated suitably.
The multilevel structure of the meaning is not a case of polysemy, that is, different
senses on a par with each other. Rather, it is a case of one sense with several compo-
nents, organized into a cascade. Of course, action verbs with a cascade structure
meaning can be polysemous independently, requiring a separate cascade analysis for
each sense.
When the verb write is used referentially, it refers to a whole cascade of act-
TTs. Even if the very token of the verb is used in a way that relates to a specific
level, for example, by specifying a product of a specific level or by applying level-
specific modification, more than this level is concerned. On the one hand, reference
is necessarily downward-complete: reference to a non-basic cascade level ontolog-
ically and conceptually requires generating act-TTs. This holds for all verbs that
denote non-basic action: their cascade-format lexical meaning will contain at least
one generating level, of an act-type which may or may not be specified. Even if
unspecified, generating lower level actions are not of arbitrary type; rather they must
be such that, under the circumstances one is entitled to assume, they level-generate
what is at stake. On the other hand, we will further assume that, if a lower level is
explicitly addressed, it will generate higher levels according to our assumptions about
the circumstances. That does not mean we have to assume that always a complete
writing cascade up to Level H5 is referred to. The circumstances may be such that
they prevent level-generation of certain higher levels. Also, a given specification of
the product argument, say as “whorls”, may preclude level-generation on the object
track and therefore also on the act-track.
In addition to the levels subject to direct reference, we will be ready to generate
further levels of a given TT cascade in our inevitable attempts to make more sense
of what is said, by relating the act to further contexts in which it might matter. Thus,
level-generation is a particularly rich source of conversational implicatures based on
relevance. These cascade extensions will not be found in the lexical entries since
they depend on the circumstances of an individual utterance.
6.2 Cascades and Composition
If we consider semantic meanings to be concepts, for example frame cascades for
verbs of action, and if we are provided with explicit models of these concepts, we are
in a position to ground a theory of semantic composition on decomposition. Semantic
composition can then bemodeled inmore detail andmore precisely. Also, if we know
more about the meanings of words, we can start to model the interaction of semantic
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information with context knowledge. Using the example of the verb write, I will
illustrate some of the general perspectives of semantic composition emerging.
Let us assume we are to interpret a simple sentence with the verb write in finite
use, with a subject and a direct object.
(35)  Martha wrote the statement.
The lexical meaning of the name Martha, when taken as a person name, is a very
simple frame: There is a central referential node typed as ‘person’ with one attribute,
name, that carries the value ‘[Martha]’, basically an English sound and written
form; we may add a gender attribute to the central node with the value ‘female’
if we consider it adequate to assume that bearer’s gender being female constitutes
part of the meaning of the name Martha. The subject DP in (35) specifies the agent
argument of the verb. Now, there are five agent nodes in the writing cascade that
belong to an act typed as some level of writing. In principle, the frame for Martha
can be unified with any one of them. What about the remaining four agent nodes?
They will essentially be taken care of by the c-constitution requirements. In the
simpler case of unsplit agency, Martha implements the agent at all levels, i.e. the
scribbler, the scriber, the author, and the principal at the same time. If we allow
for footing splits, the conditions are more involved: the level-agent is either Martha
herself, or somebody who delegates this level to Martha or someone who Martha
delegates this level to.
In addition to the full five-level readings of write, there is the possibility that the
writing cascade may be implemented only up to a level lower than H5. Thus, there
are three degrees of freedom given for the composition of verb and subject NP: (i)
choice of the overall expansion of the writing cascade up to a level less than or equal
H5; (ii) selection of a level for the agent; (iii) selection of the agent’s role in a footing
structure. This amounts to a vast number of readings on this part alone.
Dealing with the direct object in (35) is less complex because the product is Level
H5, an illocution. In order to be able to select the appropriate level for unifying the
product node with the frame for the statement, we need to know that statements are
illocutions, that is, we need an according frame representation of the noun statement.
As to the remaining four object nodes in the cascade, again the c-const relation will
take care; for any product at a Level n+ 1, the product at Level n must support (i.e. c-
constitute in the generalized sense) the higher-level product type. We may, however,
also have product specifications that leave the type and level open, such as it or that.
Depending on how the reference of the pronoun is determined in the given context,
it might result in selecting a different level than was chosen for the agent. Therefore,
the number of readings due to handling the agent argument potentially multiplies
with the number of levels on account of level-selection for the object specification.
As is natural when one works with frames, I assume that the basic mechanism of
semantic composition is unification.35 Unification is restricted by the condition that
35According to the formal semantics viewof composition, predicate expressions haveopen argument
slots in their meaning to be “saturated” with the arguments. If we apply this view to the cascade
approach, one level will be selected for the agent argument to be saturated and a possibly different
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the type information on the nodes unified be compatible. In the case of level-specific
object specifications or modifiers, this condition accounts for how these “find” their
level to apply to. If there is more than one pair of nodes that fit, there may be more
than one way of unification. We therefore have to accept that semantic composition
is not deterministic. Although this is a bitter pill to swallow for some theoretical
orientations in semantics, this consequence is after all welcome. All the readings
possible are potentially “real”. If there are several readings to a construction, the
compositional theory must predict all of them. Thus, the multilevel approach is on
the one hand considerably more complex, but on the other able to account for the
data more adequately.
The classical model of semantic composition is not a psychologically realistic
model (and never was meant to be). In a realistic approach to semantic processing,
the semantic agentwill not only process linguistic information (i.e. syntactic structure
and lexical meanings), but they will also draw on contextual knowledge during the
process of composition, not only after it is finished (Hagoort et al. 2004). Aiming not
at abstract sentence meaning, but at utterance meaning, i.e. meaning plus reference
in the given context, the composing subject will merge the semantic information as
early as possible with contextual information about the referents. For example, when
faced with the sentence Martha wrote the statement, in a context where they know
who Martha is, what statement is at issue, and which writing footing Martha can
have, they may end up with one possible reading only. It is in this connection, where
the dependence of c-constitution on the circumstances comes to bear crucially. The
c-parameter in every cascade link calls for the inclusion of contextual knowledge in
the compositional process; knowledge of the circumstances is necessary in order to
decide which cascade levels are actually accomplished.
7 Conclusion: Cascades in Cognition, Semantics, and Life
We started out from Goldman’s (1970) theory of level-generation and act-trees.
Taken as the psychological notion Goldman had in mind, level-generation provides
the ground for a novel theory of the cognitive representation of action concepts:
human action is conceptualized in multilevel cascade structures (the occasional basic
acts notwithstanding). The levels of c-constitution are not levels of generality, but
of constituency: lower-level acts constitute higher-level acts, where constituency is
generally dependent on circumstances that make it possible.
In his introduction, Goldman relates his theory of action to the ontological debate
about the question as to whether, say, flipping a switch and thereby turning on the
light is one act or two. The problem dissolves, if one adopts the psychological view
on the matter. From this perspective, Goldman’s theory is not about just act-tokens,
but about act-tokens-of-a-type, i.e. what I dubbed “act-TTs”. There is no doubt
level for the product argument. The other agent slots and product slots are existentially saturated
and imposed type conditions emanating from the c-const relations obtaining to the saturated nodes.
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that, if one does something—one doing—one potentially enacts a whole cascade of
action. All the acts in a cascade really are enacted; they really are as what they are
categorized at each cascade level. This is reality to us as we cognitively construe the
world. For psychology and for the analysis of verbal communication—and thereby
for semantics and pragmatics—this is the relevant notion of reality.
In a second step, we applied Goldman’s multilevel approach to action verb
concepts in natural language. Almost all action verbs denote non-basic action and
therefore cascades of action. Some examples of everyday activities such as writing
or speech acts call for cascaded concepts of as much as six or more levels. Thus,
the repertoire of natural language verb meanings provides ample evidence for a
Goldmanian multilevel view on action categorization. As a theory of the structure
of semantic verb concepts, the cascade approach has far-reaching consequences for
semantic theory.
Linking the cascade theory of action to observations on the meanings of action
verbs is not only an application of the theory; these observations conversely provide
evidence for cognitive theory: if so many lexical verb concepts turn out to be
multilevel, this must be due to the way in which our minds work.
A closer look at the participants in the acts within a cascade revealed that there are
analogous constituency relationships between the respective participants at different
levels. There is a track of stepwise upwards implementation of agency in terms of the
finer-grained level-specific agent roles. A parallel track obtains for other participants
involved through cascade levels. This finding suggests that the multilevel concep-
tualization of human action induces cascades not only for action itself, but also for
agents and objects involved.
Can cascade theory be extended to other types of verb? One natural way of exten-
sion appears to be the generalization of c-constitution in a way that captures the
meaning and relevance of arbitrary events for the options of acting. For example, a
rainfall or a blackout or an insufficient battery stage of our mobile may c-constitute
all sorts of conditions for possible and impossible action. The outcome of level-
generation would be what events and situations mean to us and for our options to
act. In any event, the findings on the multilevel categorization of action, as well as,
derivatively, of roles to act in and roles in which objects may be involved in action
suggest that the conceptualization of actionmay play amore fundamental and central
role in our cognitive system than widely assumed.36
A radical induction from these findings might be this: All human categorization
is, at least potentially, multilevel in the sense of cascade theory. Whatever we cate-
gorize, we categorize at potentially more than one level. This is owed to the fact
that the bits and pieces of reality, or to be precise: of what is reality to us as human
cognitive subjects always matter in many different contexts. The brief glimpse at
upward cascading mechanisms in the verbal lexicon (Sect. 3.4) gave an impression
of where cascading expands to: in many cases it is a projection into the realm of
social action and interaction; in others, cascading takes categorization to the realm
36For a review of recent trends to the contrary in cognitive theory seeBarsalou (2016): “Increasingly,
researchers appreciate the central roles that action plays throughout cognition,” he concludes (p. 96).
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of appraisal (with respect to personal or socially shared values). This might be taken
as an indication that there be macrolevels across specific action types. Acquiring a
vocabulary of verbs for human action with cascade structure meanings will help the
members of a language community to synchronize their cascade level distinctions for
single types of action as well as for overarching macrolevels. Clark’s (1996) theory
of language use is a detailed study of how conversational interactants synchronize
their multilevel views of the interaction they are engaged in.
The higher levels of an action cascade can be considered as corresponding to
as many respects in which the doing has meaning to us (in a nontechnical sense).
Likewise, persons in roles matter at the level of action that defines this role, and so
do objects involved in action. Conversely, acts, persons, and objects can be viewed
as lacking meaning to us as long as they, for us, do not c-constitute anything at a
higher level. Of course, what carries meaning to a subject is first of all a personal
issue. There are, however, socially established ways of c-constitution that will be
anticipated by persons in social interaction (cf., for example, Searle’s (1995) social
ontology).
An aspect of cascade theory that was not discussed here is the role of cascades
in practical knowledge. The basic levels of cascades, like pressing a button on a
remote control, flipping a switch, touching a symbol on a touch screen, constitute
the methods we learn and then command for doing the higher-level types of action
such as turning on the TV, or the light, or starting an app. In our complex and ever-
expanding knowledge-how about the world we live in, we have learned countless
such cascades from our earliest stages of life on: we have learnt by which methods
to do what. Notably, most of the time, we have no understanding of the underlying
circumstances and causal relations responsible for the possibility of these level-
generations; for all practical purposes, they are just given in our world and part of
it. Level-generation in these cases does not seem to involve any kind of reasoning.
Thus, the observation thatmost of our practical knowledge about the environment has
cascade structure constitutes solid evidence that level-generation, or c-constitution,
is indeed a fundamental brain mechanism, as I assumed above. This view of the role
of cascade formation in the psychology of knowing how and learning by doing is
developed in the contribution by Kalenscher et al. in this volume. That contribution
is about rats, suggesting that cascade theory might apply even to animal cognition.
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Prototypes and Probabilities
Modification and Default Inheritance
Corina Strößner, Annika Schuster, and Gerhard Schurz
Abstract Modification usually decreases the judged likelihood of typicality state-
ments. People judge “Old coyotes howl” as less likely than just “Coyotes howl”. This
paper addresses this so-called modification effect. In order to analyse the effect, we
propose an extended modification model based on the selective modification model
by Smith et al. (1988) and Barsalou’s (1992) frames. In this model we introduce
cross-attributional constraints that explain how a change in one dimension leads to
an alteration of another attribute, especially if the modifier is not typical. Finally,
we discuss data from Connolly et al. (2007) and present new experimental evidence
from an explorative study.
Keywords Modifier effect · Constraints · Frames · Prototype theory ·
Compositionality
1 Prototype Compositionality and Modification
Originating in the work of Eleanor Rosch and her co-authors (Rosch and Mervis
1975; Rosch et al. 1976; Rosch 1978), the prototype theory of concepts influenced
the way psychologists, linguists and philosophers understand concepts enormously.
In its most popular version, prototype theory claims that concepts are associated with
internal typicality orderings. This thesis is well-confirmed and widely accepted. It is
also well-known that human agents are capable of composing concepts. But how can
prototype theory contribute to the understanding of this creative process? Typicality
doesn’t combine in a straightforward way. A typical pet fish is neither a typical
fish nor a typical pet (cf. Fodor and Lepore 1996). Elaborated models of prototype
composition have been developed since the 1980s. Hampton (1987) discusses how
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(b) Effect of modifier “red”
Fig. 1 Modification in SMM, following (Smith et al. 1988, pp. 490, 494)
the typicality ratings of noun constructions like “sports that are also games” are
determined by the importance of the properties for their components. The selective
modification model proposed by Smith et al. (1988), on the other hand, concerns
modifications that are realized in adjective-noun combinations. These are at the
focus of this paper.
The selectivemodificationmodel, henceforth SMM, startswith a representation of
prototype concepts as attribute-value structures, an importancemeasure for attributes,
called diagnosticity,1 and a voting for the values, called salience (cf. Smith et al. 1988,
p. 489).
Modification is understood as a strictly selective process in the SMM, the effect
of which is limited to one attribute. The modifier selects the attribute the adjective
addresses, shifts all votes to its value, and increases the importance of this particular
attribute (cf. Smith et al. 1988, p. 492). Figure1 shows how the modifier “red” for
“apple” operates on the colour attribute: all votes go to “red” and the importance of
colour is increased. The SMM is a very simple but still effective approach to proto-
type compositionality. However, it also has several limitations. The most important
one is the strictness of its selectivity. This strong assumption prevents modification
from altering anything but one attribute. Thus, SMM predicts that all non-modified
properties are inherited. Smith et al. (1988, p. 497) are aware of possible correlations
between attributes, but they defer necessary adjustments to a subsequent cognitive
process.
Connolly et al. (2007) presented experimental evidence that is not compatible
with the predictions of SMM: subjects rate unmodified statements like “Ravens are
black” more likely than modified ones like “Feathered ravens are black”. The judged
likelihood is even lower if the modifiers are not typical, e.g., for “Jungle ravens are
black”, and further decreases if two modifiers are used, as in “Young jungle ravens
are black”. On a scale from 1 (very unlikely) to 10 (very likely) the mean rating
was 8.36 for unmodified sentences (A), 7.71 for typical modifications (B), 6.91 for
non-typical ones (C) and only 6.48 for double modifications (D) (cf. Connolly et al.
2007, p. 11f). Jönsson and Hampton (2012) and Hampton et al. (2011) confirmed
1The term “diagnosticity” is also often used to indicate the specificity of a property. Thus we prefer
the expression “attribute importance”.
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these findings in further experiments. Gagné and Spalding (2011, 2014) observed a
similar effect for meaningless pronounceable modifiers. While the existence of the
effect is uncontroversial, there is a lively debate on its interpretation.
Connolly et al. (2007) claim that their experiment proves that people don’t use
a default to prototype strategy. Typical values are not inherited by subcategories
but rather inferred in post-compositional step, which is largely lead by personal
knowledge (cf. Connolly et al. 2007, p. 15). Jönsson and Hampton (2012, p. 109), on
the contrary, argue that typical properties are inherited.Only in a second step, subjects
decrease their certainty about the typical properties, mostly because of background
knowledge or for pragmatic reasons. Gagné and Spalding (2014) take a third position.
According to them, typical properties are not inherited but inferred from the meta-
knowledge that subcategories resemble the category to some degree but are still
distinct (cf. Gagné and Spalding 2014, p. 1291).
The authors agree in taking their results to be incompatible with the SMM.
To begin with, it is hard to explain why modifications influence typical values of
attributes that are not addressed by the modification. On top of that, the remarkable
difference between typical modifiers and other modifiers is an unexplainable mys-
tery to the SMM (cf. Jönsson and Hampton 2012, p. 111). However, the SMM also
explains some results. The rating of a modified sentence is highly correlated with
the typicality rating of its unmodified counterpart (cf. Jönsson and Hampton 2012, p.
98). The contribution of the head noun to the modification occurs even if the modifier
is not a meaningful word, and thus certainly not learned from experience (cf. Gagné
and Spalding 2014, pp. 1287–1288). In sum, experimental evidence has revealed
three stable effects for a head noun S, its prototypical property P and the modifier M:
1. “S is P” is usually rated as more likely than “M S is P”
2. There is a positive correlation between the rated likelihood of “S is P” and “M S
is P”.
3. The loss in rated likelihood from “S is P” to “M S is P” is smaller if M is typical
for S.
The modification effect doesn’t depend on how central the typical property P is.
Hampton et al. (2011) even produced the effect for properties that are analytically
true, like being a bird for raven.
While a reference to post-compositional adjustments can save the basic idea of
SMM, it also reduces its empirical content and strength. This is why we propose to
enrich the SMM by making use of frames (Barsalou 1992), i.e. recursive attribute-
value structures that allow the specification of constraints between values of different
attributes. This is carried out in the next section. In the third section, we show that an
application of ourmodel to data fromConnolly et al. (2007) shows a stronger decrease
in likelihood in the presence of constraints. We finally present new experimental
evidence we gathered in an exploratory study.
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2 An Extended Modification Model
We understand modification as an asymmetrical composition that is usually realized
in adjective-noun compounds. Depending on the way the modifier interacts with
the head noun, normal modifications can be distinguished from deviant forms of
modification. In a normal modification, the modifier picks a value for a attribute
in the noun frame. Deviant and privative modifications like “stone lion”, on the
other hand, are grammatically like normal modifications but interfere with the noun
in a more drastic way. They often lead to coercion, metaphorical use or to a high
demand for context. When we are confronted with such compounds we have to
reconsider our normal interpretation of the head noun. Understanding of deviant
modifications confronts us with its own obstacles, the reasons for which do not lie in
prototype theory. Our approach is therefore focused on the understanding of normal
modifications.
For our illustration of modification we refer to the frame model of Barsalou
(1992), who claims that conceptual content is best represented in terms of attribute-
value structures. Cross-attributional dependencies are illustrated as constraints, i.e.
as relations between values. A constraint can for example state that a green colour of
an apple indicates sour taste. Barsalou’s frames comprise the attribute-value structure
of SMM and, additionally, they allow the representation of dependencies between
values of different attributes by means of constraints.
Our enriched model of modification states, like SMM, that a modifier specifies
a value of a noun’s attribute and shifts all votes to this value. SMM also claims an
importance boost of the according attribute. Although we readily accept this thesis,
it will not matter in the following discussion. Our focus is on the changed likelihood
of values, i.e. the shift of votes. Thus, we ignore importance measures in this paper.
Our essential extension of the SMM is the constraint thesis, which contradicts the
strict selectivity of SMM: by modification, the selected value collects all votes and
activates constraints to other values. The constraint thesis will be formalised in the
next section. The discussion is based on the minimal model, shown in Fig. 2. We
consider a concept C with two attributes, A and B. The values of A are V1 and V2
with the respective votes v1 and v2. The attribute B has the values W1 with w1 votes
andW2 withw2 votes (Fig. 2a). V = v1 + v2 = w1 + w2 is the number of total votes.
















































(b) Impact constraint V1 to W1
Fig. 3 Constraints
V1 is the value of the modifier, as shown in Fig. 2b , with the new votes v′1 = V for
V1, v′2 = 0 for V2 and the new votes w′1 for W1 as well as w′2 for W2.
Typicality of values and modifiers
The typicality of a modifier has a well-documented influence in all experiments.
The existing literature, starting from Connolly et al. (2007), distinguishes between
modifiers that are typical and other modifiers.2 Wewill refine the notion of typicality.
Drawing on the distributions of votes on an attribute, we distinguish typical values
with a very high proportion of votes from atypical values with a very low proportion
of votes. Values with a medium number of votes are called neutral.
Bringing constraints to SMM
Since the SMM is based on quantitative specifications, especially votes for values, it
is necessary to quantify constraints as well. There are different ways to achieve this.
One possibility to quantify constraints is to specify the proportion of votes thatwill
be given to the target value if the constraining value comes to be known. An example
of such a result constraint is given in Fig. 3a: x with 0 ≤ x ≤ 1 is the proportion of
votes the result constraint from V1 gives toW1. The value x can be interpreted as the
conditional probability of W1 given V1. This allows us to tie on to results in the field
of probability theory.3 If no further constraint is involved, the other votes on B (w2,
w3,…wn) need to be adjusted in a way that reflects their initial proportion, namely
as w′i = wiV · (V − w′1). The strength or impact of the constraint is apparent by the
difference between the initial votes and the new votes.
2They refer to typical modifiers as those properties that were collected in feature lists by Cree and
McRae (2003).
3An elaborated way to model dependencies probabilistically is the theory of Bayesian nets intro-
duced by Pearl (1998). For our basic model, which is based on correlations, Bayesian nets are overly
powerful.





































(c) Reverse constraint and
its influence
Fig. 4 Influence of constraints
An alternative approach are impact constraints that specify the alteration of the
votes by the particular constraint. In the impact representation of a constraint from
V1 to W1, we give a factor y such that 0 ≤ y ≤ 1w1/V , which is multiplied with w1 as
illustrated in Fig. 3b. The new votes for w2, w3,…wn after activating the constraint
from V1 to W1 are calculated as w′i = wi · V−w
′
1
V−w1 . The direction of the constraint is
now apparent in the constraint itself: For positive constraintswe have y > 1,while for
negative constraints y < 1. Neutral constraints with y = 1 can be used to represent
known irrelevance.
The influence of constraints spreads. Any active constraint from V1 to W1 has an
influence onW1’s alternatives. If V1 increases the likelihood ofW1, then it decreases
the likelihood of its alternatives, e.g.,W2, and the other way around. Furthermore, the
constraint from V1 to W1 leads to a constraint from W1 to V1. It can be calculated by
Bayes’ theorem as P(V1|W1) = x ·(v1/V)w1/V . Thus,W1 increases the likelihood of V1 and
decreases the likelihood of V2 if and only if V1 increases the likelihood of W1. This
is illustrated in Fig. 4b, where solid arrows indicate increased likelihoods (positive
constraints) and dotted ones indicate decreased likelihoods (negative constraints).
Constraining constraints
Constraints are restricted. For example, a typical value cannot severely increase the
likelihood of an atypical one. In order to determine the impact of a constraint, we
introduce the factor f that is needed to shift all votes to the constraining value V1,
i.e. to make it maximally probable: f = 1P(V1) . To approach the possible influence
on W1, we rely on P(W1)′ = f · P(W1 ∧ V1) + 0 · P(W1 ∧ ¬V1). For a positive
constraint, we stipulate that P(W1 ∧ V1) is as high as possible. Thus, f = 1P(V1) is
also the maximal positive impact a constraint from V1 can have, of course still with
the limit that P(V1) · f ≤ 1. For calculating the maximal negative constraint we
assume W1 ∧ ¬V1 to be as likely as possible. P(W1 ∧ ¬V1) cannot be larger than
P(¬V1) = 1 − P(V1), i.e. P(W1 ∧ V1) ≥ P(W1) − P(V1).
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Table 1 Possible constraints and their results
Typicality of values v1/V w1/V P(V1) P(W1) P(W1|V1) Maximal votes change
Max Min Gain Loss
Atypical to atypical 3/30 3/30 110
1
10 1 0 +27 −3
Atypical to neutral 3/30 15/30 110
1
2 1 0 +15 −15
Atypical to typical 3/30 27/30 110
9
10 1 0 +3 −27




5 0 +3 −3
Neutral to neutral 15/30 15/30 12
1
2 1 0 +15 −15









9 0 +0.33 −3












Table1 shows how the rules restrict the effect of constraints. The initial votes on
the modifying value V1 play a crucial role. If V1 is rather atypical, i.e. in the first three
combinations, then the constraint can change the new distribution of votes severely.
A typical modifier V1, on the other hand, has only a limited potential to alter the
initial distribution of votes.
Besides the formal considerations, there are conceptual restrictions. Prototype
concepts represent property clusters (Rosch and Mervis 1975; Schurz 2012). Within
the supercategory, typical values of a prototype concepts are positively correlated
with each other. This correlation is not always inherited by the subcategories: Within
the class of vertebrates, a beak is a good predictor of flying-ability but not in the cat-
egory of birds. However, the positive correlation often remains valid, if functionality
is involved. The beat of the heart is causally related with almost all vital properties
of an organism and thus also statistically correlated with them. The typical shape of
a tool is adjusted to its typical purposes. Positive associations between typical values
in a category are frequent. For the formal reasons explicated above, these constraints
should not be expected to lead to a high variability in modifications. However, their
negative counterparts for atypical values are quite effective. Applying “biped” to
“human” has little effect on expectations about moving abilities, while applying
“non-biped” has a crucial influence.
3 Experimental Data
The introduced extended modification model predicts that the occurrence and the
direction of alteration by a modifier is determined by the existence of positive and
negative constraints and that less typical modifiers result in larger changes. We con-
tend that this is the rational way to handle the information one has about noun and
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Fig. 5 Mean ratings without
constraint (NC) and with
constraint (C) by modifier
condition













modifier. We investigated whether people follow this strategy by a further analysis
of the data from Connolly et al. (2007) and in an exploratory study we carried out.
3.1 Constraint Influences in the Data of Connolly et al.
(2007)
If our extendedmodificationmodel is accurate, it should be possible to find influences
of constraints on the likelihood of modified sentences in the original data set by
Connolly et al. (2007).4 Our research group thus examined the original stimuli and
agreed on constraints between modifiers and ascribed properties. A similar idea can
be found in Jönsson and Hampton (2012), where the subjects were asked to justify
higher or lower likelihood ratings of modified sentences. The main reasons given
were pragmatic (e.g., the weirdness of the modified sentences), justifications by
background knowledge about the modifier, or uncertainty about the modified noun.
We determined constraints for 5 B-modifiers, 14 C-modifiers and 21 D-modifiers.
The mean ratings for constrained and unconstrained sentences by question type
are shown in Fig. 5. The decrease in judged likelihood is much stronger for the
constrained sentences. However, this result has to be interpreted keeping in mind
that our post hoc analysis results in different sample sizes (e. g. 350 ratings for the
unconstrained B-condition compared to 50 ratings for the B-constraint condition).
Since modifications do not necessarily decrease, but in some cases may increase
the likelihood of a property (compare “Hamsters live in cages” and “Pet hamsters
live in cages.”), it makes sense to look at the absolute values of the differences to the
baseline conditions A, shown in Table 2. Here, the difference between constrained
4This analysis was made possible because the authors kindly provided us with their original data.
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Table 2 Mean absolute differences from the baseline condition A without and with constraint and
in total
A-B A-C A-D
No constraint 0.78 1.123 1.405
Constraint 1.46 2.3 2.319
Total 0.856 1.535 1.885
Table 3 Results of post-hoc significance test (insignificant results shaded)
A B-NC C-NC D-NC B-C C-C
B-NC 0.010
C-NC 0.000 0.007
D-NC 0.000 0.000 0.996
B-C 0.000 0.175 1.000 1.000
C-C 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.151 0.728
D-C 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.160 1.000
and unconstrained versions is even more obvious: the reduced likelihood is nearly
twice as high for the constrained sentences. Furthermore, there is almost no difference
between the simple (C) and double (D) modification, indicating that constraints have
a stronger influence on the judged likelihood than modification.
The results of t-tests between all groups with Hochberg’s GT2 correction (for
different sample sizes) are shown in Table 3. All groups differ significantly from
the baseline condition A. The differences between constrained and unconstrained
sentences are significant (p < 0.01), except for the constrained B-condition, which
is likely explained by its small sample size. The differences between the C- and D-
conditions are not significant, neither for the constrained nor for the unconstrained
version.5 The results indicate that a more accurate grouping of the sentences would
be between constrained and unconstrained modifications and neglecting the effect
of double modification.
These analyses only allow for tentative conclusions because of the different sample
sizes. But we can see a clear tendency in accordance with the predictions of the
extended modification model: the change in likelihood ratings in the original data
was shown tobemuchmoredistinguished for sentences inwhich the chosenmodifiers
constrain the assigned property.
5Jönsson and Hampton (2012, p. 98) also found insignificant differences between C- and D-stimuli
in post-hoc pairwise comparisons.
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3.2 Experiments
In order to test several of our empirical predictions we designed an exploratory
study with few items and a comparatively small group of subjects. The described
experiment served as a preparation of a larger study, reported elsewhere (Strößner
and Schurz 2020). We tested several question types on four items.
3.2.1 Method
Participants
Subjects were 48 students of the Heinrich-Heine-Universität Düsseldorf, who were
paid for participation.
Material
We used German translations of four items from Connolly et al. (2007). Two of them
were previously judged to have no constraint betweenmodifier and ascribed property
by the members of our research group. For the third and fourth item, the modifiers
were suspected to have a constraint on the typical property. This pre-experimental
classification by the authors was used in order to look whether items with a suspected
knowledge constraint behave differently. Previous studies by (Jönsson and Hampton
2012) have shown that subjects are often aware of subtle dependencies between
modifier and property if they have to justify a lower likelihood rating for the modified
sentence. It has been noted that these justifications could also be made up only after
the rating task rather than really influencing it (cf. Gagné andSpalding 2014, p. 1290).
Moreover, wewere also interested to knowwhether knowledge constraints are purely
subjective or intersubjective. If constraints are purely subjective, then there should be
little differences between the items with constraint and the items without constraint.
In addition to the preclassification by the authors, we also gathered relevance ratings
from the subjects, which will be reported below. The double-modification was only
tested for the two items with presumed non-relevant modifiers. The items are shown
in list 1. The questions types are listed in list 2. Subjects gave ratings on the typicality
and likelihood of the items (question type P and T) as well as on the typicality and
likelihood of the modifier (question type PM and TM). The relevance rating was
gathered with question type RM.
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1. Lambs
A Lämmer sind weiß. (Lambs are white.)
B Flauschige Lämmer sind weiß. (Fluffy lambs are white.)
C Norwegische Lämmer sind weiß. (Norwegian lambs are white.)
D Langhaarige, norwegische Lämmer sind weiß. (Long-haired Norwegian
lambs are white.)
2. Shirts
A Hemden haben Knöpfe. (Shirts have buttons.)
B Baumwollhemden haben Knöpfe. (Cotton shirts have buttons.)
C Kratzige Hemden haben Knöpfe. (Itchy shirts have buttons.)
D Kratzige Leinenhemden haben Knöpfe. (Itchy canvas shirts have buttons.)
3. Limousines
A Limousinen sind lang. (Limousines are long.)
B Teure Limousinen sind lang. (Expensive limousines are long.)
C Preisgünstige Limousinen sind lang. (Inexpensive limousines are long.)
4. Sofas
A Sofas stehen im Wohnzimmer. (Sofas are in living rooms.)
B Bequeme Sofas stehen im Wohnzimmer. (Comfortable sofas are in living
rooms.)
C UnbequemeSofas stehen imWohnzimmer. (Uncomfortable sofas are in living
rooms.)
List 1 Items used in our experiment
P Subjects rated the likelihood of the property for the unmodified and modified
nouns.
T Subjects rated the typicality of the property of the unmodified and modified
nouns.
PM Subjects rated the likelihood of the modifiers for the nouns.
TM Subjects rated the typicality of the modifiers for the nouns.
RM Subjects rated whether the modified attribute is relevant for the target attribute.
List 2 Question types
Design
In the first questionnaire, subjects were instructed to answer how typical they rate
the default property, e.g. being long, for the modified and unmodified nouns, e.g.
limousines, expensive limousines and inexpensive limousines (question type T). One
group of 19 participants rated the items 1 and 3. Another group of 19 subjects rated
items 2 and 4. Both groups also rated the typicality of the modifiers, e.g. being
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expensive and being inexpensive for limousines (question type TM). In the second
questionnaire, the subjects of both groups were asked to rate the likelihood of the
same items (question type P and PM). The likelihood ratings and typicality ratings
were gathered in two separate questionnaires but came from the same subjects. The
unmodified and modified conditions as well as the rating of the modifiers were
mingled but appeared on the same questionnaire. The participants thus saw their own
answers and were potentially able to review and revise them. The last questionnaire
contained relevance ratings (question type RM) for all items and modifiers. Subjects
rated whether the modified attribute is relevant for the target attribute, e.g. whether
the length of a limousine is related to its price. All judgements were given on a scale




In our model, probability plays a crucial role for defining typicality. We thus tested,
whether the typicality ratings and the likelihood ratings are similar. This question is
also important because even in a probabilistic approach, there are different notions
of typicality: Schurz (2012) distinguishes typicality in the wide sense as probability
in the category from typicality in the narrow sense, where a property has also to be
improbable in sibling categories, i.e. highly discriminatory. This second criterion is
what Rosch (1978) terms cue validity. For example, having a heart is only typical in
thewide sense for birds.Having abeak is also typical in the narrowsense.Typicality in
the wide sense justifies prediction of properties from known membership. Typicality
in the narrow sense also allows to infer membership from known properties.
Table4 shows the frequencies of the difference of all typicality ratings compared
to the respective likelihood ratings. The typicality and likelihood ratings were very
similar. In more than half of the pairs, they were even rated exactly the same.
Table 4 Likelihood compared to typicality: cases and percentages
+8 +7 +6 +5 +4 +3 +2 +1 0 −1 −2 −3 −4 −5
2 1 3 8 14 24 37 64 355 77 33 10 5 10
% 0.3 0.2 0.5 1.2 2.2 3.7 5.8 10 55.2 12 5.1 1.6 0.8 1.6
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Paired sample t-tests for the 24 pairs showed that only four pairs were significantly
different.6 The result strongly indicates that subjects preferred a wider notion of
“typical” in the task. This supports our definitions of typicality in terms of probability.
The status of the modifier
The data on the typicality and likelihood of the modifier in relation to the head noun
allowed us to confirm that the B condition modifiers were also considered as typical
by subjects in the German speaking community in comparison to the modifiers in the
C and D condition. The mean values for B modifiers were clearly above 5, while the
C modifiers were clearly below 5 in both, the typicality and the likelihood rating.7
Comparison to Connolly et al. (2007)
Our main goal was to reproduce the modification effect in Connolly et al. (2007)
with a possibility to distinguish between items with and without relevant constraints.
For a better comparability, we converted our data to their 1–10 scale. Table5 shows
the descriptive statistics for likelihood and typicality ratings of the four items in
comparison to theirs. The two tables show themeans and the 0.95 confidence intervals
for the probability question and the typicality rating. If the four items are considered
together, the ratings resemble Connolly et al.’s result. As we already suspected,
the data look quite different if the two relevant and the two non-relevant items are
considered separately. The general loss under likelihood for the non-typical modifier
is almost solely explained by the data for the relevant items limousines and sofa. The
confidence intervals indicate that the differences from A to C (and also from B to C)
are significant for the relevant items but not for the irrelevant ones.
Relevance Correlations
We showed that the extent of the modification effect was predictable from our mod-
ifier relevance assumptions. But to what degree did our assumptions correspond to
the the subjects’ ratings? And to what degree did their subjective relevance ratings
correlate with their individually given likelihoods of the modified statements?
6Subjects rated having buttons to be more probable than typical for itchy shirts (1.211
[0.013, 2.406], p = 0, 048), being long-haired more probable than typical for lambs (0.579
[0.129, 1.029], p = 0, 013), being long more probable than typical for inexpensive limousines
(1.221 [0.091, 2.330], p = 0, 036) and being comfortable less probable than typical for sofas
(−0, 421, [−0, 825,−0, 017], p = 0, 042). Brackets give mean value with 0.95 confidence inter-
vals.
7The lowest mean value of a B modifier was 5.92 [5.33, 6.50] in the likelihood rating of cotton for
shirt. The highest mean value of a C modifier was 3.45 [2.70, 4.28] in the likelihood rating of itchy
for the same item.
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Table 5 Modification effect in comparison to Connolly et al. (2007)
Shirts, Lamb Limousines, Sofas All Connolly et al.
(2007)
(a) Likelihood ratings
N 37 38 75 400
A 8.30 [7.69, 8.91] 8.37 [7.82, 8.91] 8.33 [7.93, 8.73] 8.38 [8.20, 8.56]
B 7.76 [7.14, 8.39] 7.94 [7.36, 8.52] 7.85 [7.44, 8.27] 7.72 [7.51, 7.93]
C 7.49 [6.69, 8.23] 4.62 [3.75, 5.50] 6.04 [5.37, 6.71] 6.89 [6.66, 7.12]
D 7.42 [6.66, 8.18] – – 6.50 [6.27, 6.73]
(b) Typicality ratings
N 38 38 76 400
A 8.15 [7.54, 8.76] 8.27 [7.65, 8.89] 8.21 [7.79, 8.84] 8.38 [8.20, 8.56]
B 7.77 [7.04, 8.51] 7.80 [7.13, 8.46] 7.79 [7.30, 8.27] 7.72 [7.51, 7.93]
C 7.13 [6.38, 7.89] 4.10 [3.20, 5.00] 5.62 [4.95, 6.29] 6.89 [6.66, 7.12]
D 7.13 [6.36, 7.91] – – 6.50 [6.27, 6.73]
Table 6 Mean judged relevance of non-typical modifiers with 0.95 confidence intervals
Limousines Sofas Shirt Lambs Lambs (excl)
N = 38 N = 38 N = 38 N = 38 N = 32
3.53 3.37 0.32 3.00 3.56
[2.51, 4.55] [2.28, 4.48] [0.07, 0.56] [1.92, 4.08] [2.38, 4.75]
Thenon-typicalmodifierswere judged to bemore relevant for the items limousines
and sofas than for shirts. However, for lambs people judged origin to bemore relevant
for the colour than we expected. The item also stood out insofar as many people
suspended judgement on this relevance question, while no subject answered “I don’t
know” in the relevance rating of any other non-typical modification.8 Table6 shows
the relevance judgements for the nontypical modifiers. “I don’t know” answers were
treated as “0” in the column “Lambs” and excluded in “Lambs (excl)”.
Finally we wanted to know whether the differences in the subjects’ likelihood
ratings are related to their individual relevance ratings. We tested this hypothesis for
the non-typical modification. First, we calculated the individual modifier effect by
substracting the judgement of the unmodified condition A from the judgement in the
modified condition, i.e. C-A.9 By that means we determined the modification effects
for each individual and each item. These values were correlated with the relevance
8The differences are probably explained by our research group considering cross value dependen-
cies while the subjects were only confronted with attributes. They might have regarded general
evolutionary tendencies that living environments influence appearance, which we did not consider
because they are not important for this particular values. We came to the conclusion that it is
important to ask for the particular values.
9This was possible because we used a within-design.
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Table 7 Kendall’s τ correlation of relevance and loss in the likelihood rating
Limousines Sofas Shirts Lambs
N = 19 N = 19 N = 19 N = 19
−0.37, p = 0.046 −0.38, p = 0.04 −0.69, p < 0.01 −0.43, p = 0.03
ratings of the 19 subjects. This correlation reflects the influence of subjective con-
straints. Thus we tested whether individually higher or lower modification effects
come with individually higher or lower relevance assumptions. It turned out that the
status of the modifier was correlated to the modification effect. Kendall’s τ revealed
that subjects with larger decreases in the non-typical modification tended to find the
modifier relevant. The correlation and significance is given in Table 7. The correla-
tion is moderate for the items lamb, limousine, sofa and even high for shirts, which
had a low intersubjective relevance score.10
4 Conclusion
In this paper, we proposed an extended modification model with constraints. An
exploratory study with four of the items used by Connolly et al. (2007) revealed the
following tendencies, which largely accord to our assumptions:
• Typicality and likelihood rating
Likelihood ratings are very similar to typicality ratings. This supports probabilistic
approaches to typicality.
• Typical modification
As already suspected from previous studies, typical modifiers lead to a smaller
loss in modification than non-typical ones.
• Valid prior classification for constraints
The items we suspected to have negative constraints were drastically affected by
non-typical modification while the difference to typical modification was negligi-
ble for items without constraints.
The prior predictability of loss by non-typical modification has never been inves-
tigated so far. However, Connolly et al. (2007) already suspected that the distinctive-
ness of modification effects is predictable, asserting that “adding purple to apple is
sure to diminish one’s confidence about its edibility more than adding ripe and less
than adding Martian” (Connolly et al. 2007, p. 14). They take this to be an argu-
ment against prototype compositionality. Though prototype compositionality is not
10In a later larger study with more item, reported in Strößner and Schurz (2020), we were not able
to confirm such high correlations between individual modification effects and individual relevance
assumptions. However, we were able to confirm that the mean relevance score for a modification is
correlated with its mean modification effect.
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as straight forward as composing analytic meanings, we disagree with the conclusion
that prototypes are not compositional at all. People systematically attribute typical
properties to subcategories, even if they are built with meaningless words, as noted
by Gagné and Spalding (2014). Their “different but similar” approach, however,
would predict that all modifications have roughly the same effect. This is, however,
not the case. Our model predicts differences for modifications without constraints
andmodifications with relevant knowledge constraints. Doubters of prototype theory
could argue that the extended modification model includes background beliefs and is
thus not about semantics but about belief revision. This argument depends on a very
narrow view of compositionality. Understood in the sense of Hampton and Martin
(2012) as a process that is not only driven by strict logical intersection but also by
common-sense knowledge, the enriched modification model is a model of prototype
compositionality.
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A Frame-Theoretic Model of Bayesian
Category Learning
Samuel D. Taylor and Peter R. Sutton
Abstract Bayesianmodels of category learning typically assume that themost prob-
able categories are those that group input stimuli together around amaximally optimal
number of shared features. One potential weakness of such feature list approaches,
however, is that it is unclear how to weight observed features to be more or less
diagnostic for a given category. In this theoretically oriented paper, we develop a
frame-theoretic model of Bayesian category learning that weights the diagnostic-
ity of observed attribute values in terms of their position within the structure of a
frame (formalised as distance from the frame’s central node). We argue that there are
good grounds to further develop and empirically test frame-based learning models,
because they have theoretical advantages over unweighted feature list models, and
because frame structures provide a principledmeans of assigning weights to attribute
values without appealing to supervised training data.
Keywords Category learning · Bayesian categorisation · Frames · Weighted
Naive Bayesian model · Frame-theoretic constraints
1 Introduction
Bayesian models of categorisation typically assume that there is both an input to
categorisation—the stimulus to be categorised—and an output from categorisation—
the (cognitive) behaviour of the categoriser (Kruschke 2008). But in order to count
as cognitively adequate, the model must also represent the cognitive processes that
mediate between input and output, and take these representations to be informative
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about the hypothesis space over which Bayesian inference operates. There are a num-
ber of possible candidates that could be sourced from cognitive scientific theories—
e.g. prototypes, bundles of exemplars, or theory-like structures (Carey 1985; Lakoff
1987; McClelland and Rumelhart 1981; Nosofsky 1988; Rehder 2003). However, it
has become standard practice to assume that Bayesian models operate over represen-
tations of unstructured lists of features; e.g. feature list representations (Anderson
1991; Sanborn 2006; Goodman et al. 2008; Shafto et al. 2011).
In this paper, we introduce and motivate frames as a candidate for the repre-
sentations that mediate between (sensory) input and behavioural output, and as the
representational format over which Bayesian inference operates in a Bayesian model
of category learning. In other words, we introduce frame-theoretic representations
(attribute-value structures) as the representational format of the data observed and
operated on by the model. Our argument is that the resulting frame-theoretic model
of Bayesian category learning is a theoretical improvement on feature list mod-
els, because our model can make fine-grained discrimination between competing
categories without basing the weighting of attribute values on supervised training
data. This is the case because frames—as the representational format of the input
to our model—are not mere unordered lists of features, but, rather, are recursive
attribute-value structures organised around a central node. For example, instead of
three features such as fur, black, and soft, frames represent how these features are
related by defining each feature as the value of some attribute i.e., that fur has (at
least) two attributes colour and texture, and that the values of these attributes are
black and soft, respectively. As such, frames can be interpreted as assigning attribute
values more or less weight depending on properties defined in terms of the structure
of frames themselves. As a rough heuristic, our model proposes to weight attribute
values as more or less diagnostic depending on whether or not they appear more cen-
trally within a frame. In other words, our model takes a feature’s ‘path distance’ from
the central node to determine the diagnosticity of that feature for a given category.
As an example, suppose that the fur, black, and soft values appeared in a frame
for a cat. Since, black and soft are values of attributes of fur, and fur is the value
of an attribute of cat, a parameter based on distance from the central node would
rank black and soft lower than fur. By incorporating this diagnosticity weighting in
our model, we develop a frame-theoretic model of Bayesian category leaning that
introduces constraints on the most probable categories in terms of the diagnosticity
of the observed features of entities being categorised.
The structure of this paper is as follows. In Sect. 2, we consider weighted Bayesian
models of categorisation and argue that there is space to introduce a model that
weights the relative diagnosticity of observed features that is not based on labelled
training data. Then, in Sect. 3, we introduce a frame-theoretic representation of
observed data and categories (e.g. the input and output of a categorisation model),
in which frames are recursive attribute-value structures (Barsalou 1992; Barsalou
and Hale 1993; Löbner 2014; Petersen 2015; Ziem 2014). Building upon this claim,
we argue that the informational-structure of frames can be used to introduce a con-
straint on the relative diagnosticity of information encoded within a category and/or
set of categories, where diagnosticity can be defined partly by properties of frame
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structure (distance from the central node). Finally, we outline how feature list mod-
els of Bayesian category learning can be extended to operate over frames. On our
frame-theoretic approach, the information-structural constraints of themodel’s frame
representational-input influences the conditional probability of possible sets of cate-
gories by weighting the diagnosticity of the features of entities being categorised.We
consider possible challenges to our model and possible future developments, before
concluding that our model is better suited to describe and explain the unsupervised
process of categorisation than comparable feature list based alternatives.
2 Weighted Bayesian Models of Categorisation
Categorisation is the cognitive process of representing given (natural) domains
according to relevant features or properties. These features can be distinguished
by our sense modalities—e.g. when we categorise objects in terms of their shape,
size, or smell. But these features can also be distinguished by their informational
content—e.g. when we can categorise foods in terms of their social role or nutri-
tional content, or when we can categorise animals in terms of their ecological niches
or taxonomic group (Shafto et al. 2011). In Bayesian models, categorisation occurs
as the result of the model probabilistically grouping together sets of objects with
shared features (e.g. yellow, curved). For instance, in the domain of, say, fruits,
yellow and curved objects will have a relatively higher probability of being cate-
gorised together than all yellow objects, since other yellow fruits differ widely in
their other properties (shape, size etc.), meaning that a clustering of all yellow fruits
would yield a category with a below-optimal similarity of features. In this way,
Bayesian models of categorisation explain how objects or sets of objects come to be
categorised as one type or another (Anderson 1991; Tenenbaum 1999; Fei-Fei and
Perona 2005; Wu et al. 2014 amongst many others).
An important question for Bayesian models of categorisation, however, is how
models should represent input feature spaces, and, furthermore, how the represen-
tation of feature spaces influences the process of Bayesian categorisation. On many
approaches toBayesian category learning, feature inputs are represented as unordered
lists of features (Anderson 1991; Sanborn 2006; Goodman et al. 2008; Shafto et al.
2011). And, on this approach, Bayesian categorisation proceeds by making the most
probable categories those categories that group input stimuli together around a max-
imally optimal number of shared features. But, unless weights are added to lists of
features in some principled way, this approach can be criticised for failing to provide
an account of the relative importance of the features around which categorisation
occurs. For example, on this approach the features of colour, shape, texture, genus,
and region of first domestication all count as equally relevant for the differenti-
ation of, say, bananas and oranges. And this seems counter-intuitive, because the
representation of certain features—say, colour and shape in the case of bananas
and oranges—appears to be more important for categorisation and so should have a
bearing on what is taken to be the maximally optimal grouping of shared features.
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In order to resolve the problem of uniformly diagnostic features, weights have
been added to Bayesian models of categorisation, which make different features
more or less diagnostic for specific categories. Such weighted models, however, face
the challenge of finding a principled way to assign weights to individual features.
For example, Hall (2007) makes use of a “decision tree-based filter method for
setting [feature] weights,” where feature weights are estimated by constructing an
unpruned decision tree and looking at the depth at which features are tested in the
tree (Hall 2007, p. 121). Similarly, Wu et al. (2014) assign weight values to features
by allowing the model to construct an unpruned decision tree that can be used to
estimate each feature’s dependence onother features (Wuet al. 2014, pp. 1675–1676).
These example models—and many others like them—have contributed to a growing
literature that aims to improve the performance of naive Bayesian models while
retaining their simplicity and computational efficiency. Notably, however, models
which assign weights to features do so on the basis of, for example, frequency of
features for categories, where categories are established via supervised learning.
It follows that theweighting schemas implementedby frequency-based approaches
are derived from periods of supervised learning; that is, they are schemas that are
dependent upon the input of supervised training data (Wu et al. 2014, p. 1676). In
principle, there is nothing wrong with the application of such supervised training-
based weighting schemas. However, the simplicity and tractability of models based
on naive Bayesian assumptions is attractive (Pham 2009), especially if such models
can be used in unsupervised learning tasks. This is the challenge that we take up
in this paper. We develop a model that maintains the independence assumptions of
naive Bayes, whilst assigning weights to features without appealing to weighting
schemas derived from a period of supervised learning. The price to pay for this is
that one must enrich the data that is input into the model. We do this by taking the
input data to be in representational format of frames and not of feature lists. Our
justification for this move is set out in Sect. 3, where we argue that there is support
for the view that human cognition is structured around richer structures than lists
of features and, therefore, that the data made available to learning models ought to
be enriched. Furthermore, we argue that the hierarchical structure of frames allows
models to assign weights to attribute values in frames.
In the remainder of this paper, we develop a Bayesian frame-based model of cate-
gory learning. Our model will assign weights to features in virtue of the information
structure of the feature spaces observed by the model.1 In doing so, we drop the
assumption that the input feature spaces over which Bayesian models operate are
themselves flat and uniformly diagnostic for all categorisation tasks. Our claim is
that the relative diagnosticity of features for categories can be captured by enriching
the representational format of the data observed by the model. Such an enrichment,
we claim, makes explicit how the probability of a system of categories can be cal-
1Many Bayesian models category learning already presuppose that observed features have an infor-
mational structure that makes them more or less diagnostic for a given category, because they
introduce certain features—e.g. colour—without making explicit that other features must also be
observed; e.g. they introduce the feature colourwithout making explicit that the feature shapemust
also be observed.
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culated not only from features (the values of attributes in our terms), but also from
the structure of the data itself (such as the path distance that attribute is from the
central node). The end result, therefore, is that certain, observed features—e.g. the
features colour and shape in the group of observed features colour, shape, texture,
genus, and region of first domestication—will have more of an influence on the
probability of categorising the observed data as one category or another—e.g. as
banana or orange.
To be clear, we accept that the evaluation of our model will ultimately be empir-
ical, whereby the model is compared to actual human performance in the course
of experimental testing. However, the contribution of this paper is the theoretical
development of a model that shows promise as an improvement on current models
of Bayesian category learning, since it derives relative feature diagnosticity in an
unsupervised manner.
3 Frames
According to Barsalou (1992), frame representations capture the general format of
cognition. As attribute-value structures, frames represent both the “general prop-
erties or dimensions by which the respective concept is described (e.g., color,
spokesperson, habitat ...)” and the values that each property or dimension takes
in any given instantiation “(e.g. [color: red], [spokesperson:EllenSmith], [habi-
tat: jungle] ...)” (Petersen 2015, p. 151). Thus, “a frame is a representation of a
concept for a category which is recursively composed out of attributes of the object to
be represented, and the values of these attributes” (Löbner 2014, p. 11). For Barsalou,
an attribute is “a concept that describes an aspect of at least some categorymembers”;
and values are “subordinate concepts of an attribute” (Barsalou 1992, pp. 30–31).
And, thus, a picture emerges of frames as representations of categories that encode,
at the attribute level, general properties, dimensions, or aspects of the category in
question; and, at the value level, the values taken by specific instantiations of the
category in question.
Frames, then, are constituted of attribute-value pairings, where for “every attribute
there is the range of values which it can possibly adopt” and “The range of possible
values for a given attribute constitutes a space of alternatives” (Löbner 2014, p.
11). For example, an attribute such as colour maps entities to colour values (e.g.,
[colour: red]), and an attribute such as shape maps entities to geometrical values
(e.g, [shape: round]).2 Frames can themselves be represented by directed-graphs,
whereby labelled nodes specify instantiated regions of the value space and arcs
2 There is an open question about how value spaces are learned by individual subjects. We shall not
answer this question here, although we find it plausible that individual subjects have access to value
spaces as the result of “hyperpriors” determined by the subject’s biological phylogeny, biological
and social ontogeny, and sociocultural embedding (cf. Clark 2015; Newsome 2012).
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Fig. 1 Lolly frame
(Petersen 2015)
specify attribute designations of regions in the value space (see Fig. 1).3 Importantly,
however, frames cannot be reduced to simple lists of features, because:
[...] it is not possible to simply replace the nodes in the frame definition by their labels, since
two distinct nodes of a graph can be labeled with the same type. E.g., we could modify the
lolly-frame in [Fig. 1] so that the stick and the body of the described lollies were produced in
two distinct factories, where one is located in Belgium and one in Canada. (Petersen 2015,
pp. 49–50)
Two questions arise, the answers to which are important for justifying our model:
(i) Why should we assume that the frames are the representations that mediate
between (sensory) input and categorisation of that input (as opposed to feature lists)?;
(ii) What benefits do frames have as such input over feature lists?
Our simple answer to (i) is that the construction of feature lists implicitly assumes
a richer relation between features, which is made explicit when we construct frames.
Take the frame in Fig. 1. As a feature list, one could represent part of this information
with the following features has a stick, has a body, body is red, stick is green.
For the latter two in particular, the alternative would be to list two incongruent
colour features red and green (resulting in potential contradiction). Yet, given that
featuresmust bemore fully specified in this way, such lists of features simultaneously
assume an attribute-value structure andmake the structure invisible to anymodel that
attempts to form categories on the basis of those features. (Bear in mind, that for
a categorisation model, the features has a stick, has a body, body is red, stick is
greenmay as well be represented as f1, f2, f3, f4, since the fact that two features share
‘stick’ and two features share ‘body’ as part of their labels is not something that a
model based on feature lists can access.) Therefore, there is a very real sense in which
providing feature lists as data input sells itself short by both implicitly assuming a
3Frames can also be represented as attribute-value (AV) matrices (cf. Carpenter 1992; Petersen
2015).
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richer structure to the data, but also not allowing any learning model to access that
structure.
With respect to (ii), our claim is that the reason why frames are useful and rele-
vant to categorisation is that they can be used to constrain information. In the first
place, frames provide constraints on the range of values at any given node, because
“information represented in a frame does not depend on the concrete set of nodes. It
depends rather on how the nodes are connected by directed arcs and how the nodes
and arcs are labelled” (Petersen 2015, p. 49). In other words, if we assume that
frames are the category representations that mediate between (sensory) input and
behavioural output, then it follows that categories must have a structure that relates
the general properties, dimensions, or aspects of a category to the possible values
that such general properties, dimensions, or aspects can take. For example, if the
value of colour is given as square—e.g. [colour: square]—then it is clear that the
established ‘category’ is, in fact, no category at all (square is not a possible colour
value). Thus, it follows that even where a notional ‘category’ contains attribute-value
pairs, it may still follow that the ‘category’ in question is impermissible because some
of the attributes are assigned infelicitous values.
A second way in which frames constrain information derives from the fact that
they are recursive (the value of one attribute can itself have attributes). The cen-
tral node (graphically, the double-ringed node) indicates what the frame represents
(i.e., lollies in the case of Fig. 1). Attribute-value pairs ‘closer’ to the central node
encode relatively important, but general, information about the represented object.
And attribute-value pairs ‘further’ from the central node encode relatively less impor-
tant, but more specific, information about the represented object (because they are,
e.g., values of attributes of values of attributes of the central node). For example, in
Fig. 1 the ‘closer’ attribute-value pairs specify what physical structure and compo-
nent parts the lolly in question has; and the ‘further’ attributes specify the colour and
producer of these components. It follows, therefore, that those attribute-value pairs
that are closer to the central node are more likely to be diagnostic of the category into
which the object represented should be sorted. Thus, we can conclude that, at least as
a rough heuristic, frames with more uniform ‘closer’ attribute-value pairs will rep-
resent more likely categories than frames with less uniform ‘closer’ attribute-value
pairs (even if the latter has more uniform ‘distant’ attribute-value pairs), because the
former categories will be more effective in organising (sensory) input according to
more ‘central’ properties.4 For example, looking again at the lolly frame in Fig. 1, a
category containing only red things that may or may not have bodies and sticks will
be a less probable category than one which contains objects of different colours that
all have bodies and sticks.
In an important paper, Shafto et al. (2011, p. 5) observe that standard approaches
to modelling category learning appeal to a ‘single system model’ of categorisation
4The question of what attribute-value pairs are the most diagnostic for any given (sensory) input or
object is an empirical question which we would like to pursue further. Such empirical research is
usually undertaken by considering typicality judgements or typicality rankings (Djalal et al. 2016;
Rips 1989).
336 S. D. Taylor and P. R. Sutton
(although the aim of their paper is to develop and motivate a more sophisticated
cross categorisation model). They define a single system model of categorisation
as a model that “embodies two intuitions about category structure in the world: the
world tends to be clumpy, with objects clustered into a relatively small number of
categories, and objects in the same category tend to have similar features.” So a single
system model “assumes as input a matrix of objects and features, D, where entry
Do, f contains the value of feature f for object o” (Shafto et al. 2011). For the single
system model, therefore, “there are an unknown number of categories that underlie
the [input],” but the objects that are categorisedwithin the same category “tend to have
the same value for a given feature” (Shafto et al. 2011). As a result, the ultimate goal
of the model is to infer—by means of establishing groupings within D according to
shared features—likely set of categories,w ∈ W , where the process of categorisation
occurs as the result of a trade-off between two goals or constraints: “minimizing the
number of [categories] posited and maximizing the relative similarity of objects
within [each category]” (Shafto et al. 2011).
Such models, and the model we develop here, make independence assumptions
regarding feature spaces (value spaces for attributes, in our terms). For example,
that the colour of the body of a lolly is independent from the manufacturer of the
body. Single system models of categorisation proceed by partitioning the hypothesis
space—e.g. the objects in the input matrix, D—according to more or less probable
sets of categories, w. Finally, the posterior probability of hypotheses given the data
(p(w|D)) is calculated, where this posterior probability is influenced by the extent
to which objects grouped into categories share features (are homogeneous) (Shafto
et al. 2011, p. 6).
Replacing feature lists with frames amounts to making the input matrix D richer.
When the input matrix specifies frames and not merely feature lists, the structure of
frames can be used to define parameters for a categorisation model. Here, we inves-
tigate the possibility of exploiting the fact that frames are hierarchical. Graphically,
each node can be measured in terms of path distance from the central node. Added to
the fact that attributes are functional, this allows us to define, as a rough heuristic, the
relative diagnostic strength of an attribute value from that value’s distance from the
central node. Hence, by including in D weighted values, where weights are derived
from frame structure, Bayesian inference operates over a richer information set.
Consider the simple feature list matrix for four witnessed objects a, b, c, d and
four features fur, feathers, brown, black in Table1. If we assume that, even as
feature lists, these features can be grouped into classes, which we label colour and
layer, the joint probability distribution for the data can be given as shown in Table2.
The possible groupings of objects into categories for this sample already numbers
15. Four such are given in (1) with the additional information of how these groupings
relate to the features of objects.





fu ∧ br = {a}
fu ∧ bl = {b}
fe ∧ br = {c}





fu = {a, b}
fe ∧ br = {c}
fe ∧ bl = {d}
w8 =
{
fu = {a, b}
fe = {c, d} w15 =
{
fu ∨ fe ∨ br ∨ bl = {a, b, c, d}
(1)
However, the number of possible sets of categories increases exponentially with
the number of objects. This presents a categorisation challenge. Given a huge number
of hypotheses for categorising a set of objects, the options must be whittled down.
Bayesian approaches to categorisation can do this by calculating the maximum prob-
ability for some set of categorieswi , given the data D, namely: MAXwi∈W [p(wi |D)]
(such that these probabilities can be updated in the light of new data). (Other alterna-
tives include Markov Chain Monte Carlo Variational Bayesian methods.) For exam-
ple, Shafto et al. (2011), following Anderson (1991), argue that this probability
depends on the prior probability of assigning objects to categories (in a set of cate-
gories w) and the probability of the data given a set of categories.
We adopt Shafto et al.’s (2011) use of two parameters and the way in which they
contribute to calculating p(w|D, α, δ)5:
p(w|D, α, δ) ∝ p(w|α) × p(D|w, δ) (2)
In (2), p(w|α) contains the parameter α which sets the extent to which the number
categories should be minimised. p(D|w, δ) contains the parameter δ which sets the
extent to which features of objects within categories should be similar (i.e., that
memebers of categories should have the same feature/attribute values).
Table 1 Distribution of skin covering and colour features (simulated)
a b c d
fur 1 1 0 0
feathers 0 0 1 1
brown 1 0 1 0
black 0 1 0 1
Table 2 Joint probability distribution: fL ,C (l, c)
layer (L)
fur feathers
colour (C) brown 0.25 0.25
black 0.25 0.25
5Our model differs from theirs, however. See Appendix 1.
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As a simple example of how these parameters work, take the data in Table1. If the
α parameter is set to maximally minimise the number of categories, then maximising
p(w|α)would selectw15 in (1); namely, a singleton set of one category that includes
all objects so far observed. If, however, the parameter δ is set to maximise feature
harmony within categories, then maximising p(D|w, δ) would select w1 in (1);
namely, a set of categories that contains as many categories as there are ways to
distinguish objects by their features.
Such feature list models have been implemented for categorisation tasks (Chater
and Oaksford 2008; Shafto et al. 2011). However, notice that for some data sets,
although we would intuitively categorise some entities together, unweighted feature
lists provide an insufficient amount of information to distinguish between competing
hypotheses. Take, once more, the data in Table1. No matter how one sets parameters
such as α and δ in a feature list based Bayesian categorisation model, the probability
value for w8 in (1) could not differ from the value for w9 in (3):
w9 =
{
br = {a, c}
bl = {b, d} (3)
The reason for this is because even if we grant that a model can be set up to see
brown versus black and feathers versus fur as two distinct comparison classes, the
flat nature of feature lists does not allow for (observed) relations between features
to be expressed, which, were they articulated, could be used to inform judgements
regarding probable sets of categories. In other words, as has been recognised, feature
lists must, at the very least, be weighted in some principled way. The problem is that,
in an unsupervised learning task, it is difficult to justify the selection of one feature
over another.
Given frames as input data, however, suchweightings can be definedbyparameter-
ising the structure of frames themselves. In other words, with frames, a categorisation
model can be defined that can distinguish cases such as w8 and w9. This is made
possible because frames introduce a hierarchy between feature values in virtue of the
fact that some values are values of attributes of other values. For the case in hand,
for example, black and brown could be observed to be values of a colour attribute,
such that colour is an attribute of the values fe and/or fu.6 That is to say the data in
Table1 could license the attribute-value structure shown in Fig. 2.
6In this paper, we are making the assumption that fur/feather-based categories are preferable. We
take this to be reasonable on common-sense grounds. However, we also accept that there may be
cross-cultural variation in the kinds of feature-based categories preferred. For example, it may be
the case that individuals in certain cultures—e.g. Yucatec-speaking cultures—prefer material-based
categories, while individuals in other cultures—e.g. English-speaking cultures—prefer shape-based
categories (Lucy and Gaskins 2001). The kinds of cross-cultural differences that may be apparent
in categorisation tasks cannot be dealt with adequately in this paper due to lack of space. Still, it
is worth noting that our model—like any other Bayesian model of category learning—could be
supplemented with further constraints to account for such differences in categorisation tasks. Such
supplementation would first have to be justified in the light of ongoing debates about the relation
between language, culture, and thought (cf. McWhorter 2014; Lucy 1992a, b).
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Fig. 2 Attribute-value
structure for data in Table1 w V1 V2
Table 3 Distribution of fur layer and colour features relative to distance (simulated)
a b c d
〈fur, 1〉 1 1 0 0
〈feathers, 1〉 0 0 1 1
〈brown, 2〉 1 0 1 0
〈black, 2〉 0 1 0 1
Our proposal is that, in general, the importance of the similarity of feature values
of objects within categories is proportional to how ‘close’ these feature values are
to the central node measured by (minimum) path distance. The intuitive idea is that
properties of objects within the same category tend to be similar, at least in terms
of type, when these properties are more diagnostic of the category in question (see
Sect. 3). Take the frame from Petersen (2015) in Fig. 1. The type of value for the
body and stick attributes will be very similar across different lollies. Indeed, if
something had, e.g., lolly properties but no stick, one might judge it to be a sweet,
not a lolly. However, the shape, colour, and producer for each lolly component may
vary to a greater extent without giving one cause to judge, e.g., that two differently
coloured objects belong to different categories qua lolly or not a lolly.
Using unweighted feature lists alone, one cannot formally capture that similarity
between values is more important for more central nodes. With frames we can.
Given that we will not here be exploiting further properties of frames, data sets can
be minimally changed to include a distance measure. For the frame in Fig. 2, for
example, V1 measures a distance of 1 from the central node. V2 measures a distance
of 2. (For more complex frames, this means that there may be multiple values that
measure the same distance.7) This requires a fairly minimal adjustment in how data
sets are represented. The data in Table1, for example, will be represented as in
Table3. The adjustment made is that we now represent features as pairs 〈f, d〉 where
f is a feature (e.g. brown or feathers) and d is a measure of distance such that d ∈ N.
This change is not trivial. Enriching the data set could be seen as some kind of cheat,
i.e., by providing more information that guides the process of forming categories.
However, as we argued in Sect. 3, such structure is often implicit in feature lists, even
if it invisible to the learning model. In our model, we make this implicit information
available.8
7We assume, in cases where a node is connected to the central node along multiple paths, that this
is calculated as the minimum distance.
8It should be stressed that we lose a lot of information by compressing frames in this way. However,
we do this for simplicity and do not rule out that retaining more information in frames may be
required in future developments of this model.
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A full specification of our model is given in Appendix 1. In brief, we calculate
the value for p(w|α) from the sum of the entropy of the set of categories in w with
respect to the assignment of objects to categories inw, weighted by α. In other words,
in terms of the average amount of information required to determine which object a
category is in, given a set of categories. A w with only one category will minimise
entropy (no information is required to knowwhich category an object is in because all
objects are in one category). This translates into a high value for p(w|α). Depending
on the value of α, a w with many categories will have comparably higher entropy
(especially if the categories are evenly distributed/of similar size). This translates into
a comparably lower value for p(w|α). Values of p(D|w, δ) are calculated from the
δ-weighted entropy of each categorywith respect to the features of objects within that
category. If all objects within each category have the same features, then entropy will
be minimised (one would need no information to know which features an object has
given the category it is in). This translates into a high value for p(D|w, δ). If objects
in the same category differ with respect to their attribute values, then, depending on
the setting for δ, this probability will be lower.
The difference between our model and one based on feature lists, therefore, is that
unsupervised feature list models do not have a principled way to weight similarity
with respect to some features more heavily than similarity with respect to others. For
feature list models, given the data set in Fig. 1 and w8 and w9 from (1) and (3), for
example, p(w8|D, α, δ) = p(w9|D, α, δ) for all settings of α and δ. However, our
frame-based model can discriminate between these two sets of categories. Objects
in categories in w8 have the same attribute values at distance 1 from the central node
(viz. fe and fu), but different attribute values at distance 2 from the central node (viz.
br and bl). In contrast, objects in categories in w9 have different attribute values at
distance 1 from the central node (viz. fe and fu), and the same attribute values at
distance 2 from the central node (viz. br and bl). (See Appendix 1 for details.)9
3.1 Challenges and Future Developments
Refining the model to discriminate between subkinds/superkinds. This kind of
model opens up an intriguing avenue for further research: we could define levels
of granularity for categorisation by manipulating the function which underpins δ.
For example, relatively coarse-grained categorisation would prioritise similarity of
object features only for nodes that are small distances from the central node. This
9We do not claim that there is no other way to do this. For example, possible sets of categories,
formed from unweighted feature list input, could be ranked according to other principles such as
simplicity inwhich sets of categories are preferred if theyminimise similaritieswithin categories and
maximise differences between categories (Chater 1999; Pothos and Chater 2002). Indeed, it is an
open and interesting question whether our model ends up approximating the results of a simplicity-
driven strategy, or, if not, whether both a frame based input and a simplicity-driven categorisation
strategy could be combined in some way. We leave the comparison between our model and others
for future work.
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V1.1 = wings V2.2 ∈ [x1,x2, ..xn]
V2.1 ∈ [y1,y2, ..yn]
V1.2 = feath V2.3 ∈ [br,bl, ...]
V1.3 = beak V2.4 ∈ [br,bl, ...]
V2.5 ∈ [hooked,flat, ...]
Fig. 3 (Partial) Frame for bird
Fig. 4 Partial frame for
shoe
might, for example, cluster birds together andmammals together. If, however, δ is set
to push towards similarity of values in ‘further out’ nodes, then distinctions between
categories would be more fine grained. This could, for example, allow for the bird
category to be partitioned into species of birds. The reason for this is that there is a
general tendency for birds to be similarwith respect to values closer to the central node
(e.g. feathers,wings,beak etc.), but dissimilar with respect to less central values.
For example, beaks, wings, and feathers may differ with respect to shape, size, and
colour. The basic idea is shown in Fig. 3. If values at distance 1 from the central node
are enforced to be similar (V1.1, V1.2, and V1.3), but values at distance 2 can differ
(V2.1–V2.5), then we would expect birds to be categorised together. However, if the
setting for δ was such that values at distance 1 and at distance 2 were enforced to be
(more-or-less) similar, we would get a categorisation of, say, different bird species.
An interesting avenue for further research is whether or not our model, which is
a single system model in the sense of Shafto et al. (2011), could be used as a cross
categorisation model by manipulating the function that underpins the δ parameter.
Distance may be insufficient as a measure. Our model has limitations as a result of
our simplistic adoption of distance from the central node as the basis for justifying
the weighting of certain attribute values over others, namely, for some cases, such
a coarse measure is unlikely to get the right results. For example, take a frame for
shoes such that one wishes to discriminate high-heeled shoes from loafers. In such a
case the height of the heel is surely a highly diagnostic factor. However, as indicated
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by Fig. 4, other, far less relevant factors, such as the colour of the heel will appear at
the same distance from the central node. Developments of our account will therefore
have to investigate if there are other features of frames that can be parameterized
in a categorisation model to capture such cases. For example, an extra feature of
frames that we have not discussed here are constraints between values. For example,
finding out the height of a shoe’s heel may be highly informative as to other attribute
values (such as the shape of the upper, the (un)likelihood of shoelaces etc.). One
possible extension would therefore be to enrich the model with a parameter based
upon numbers of constraints a node has linking it to other nodes. (The colour of a
heel will be less likely to constrain other values than the height of the heel.)10
Necessity of empirical verificationof themodel.We submit that our frame-theoretic
model of Bayesian category learning is an important theoretical development in
one crucial respect: the model incorporates weights on the relative diagnosticity of
attribute-value pairs without having to index such weightings to properties discerned
from a period of supervised learning. In other words, our model provides an unsu-
pervised way of introducing weights on the relative diagnosticity of attribute-value
pairs, such that one need not train the model on a data set already imbued with cate-
gory distinctions. However, we also accept that, in this paper, we have only been able
to make explicit a theoretical difference between our model and comparable alter-
natives. It follows that our model—if it is to be taken as an accurate representation
of human performance in categorisation tasks—must be empirically tested. That is,
experimental methods must be employed to compare the categorisation performance
of our model with the categorisation performance of other available models. In this
way, our model must be comparatively evaluated according to how well it accounts
for a given set of data relating to human performance, so that it can be empirically
demonstrated that our model better explains human performance than its rivals. We
therefore plan to test our model empirically in future research.
4 Conclusion
Although a number of representational formats have been exploited to account for
the input to Bayesian categorisation models, it remains unclear which is best suited
to modelling human categorisation. On the received view, Bayesian inference is
taken to operate over input in the form of object-feature list matrices. Although
such models have made progress, we have argued here that they only have sufficient
discriminatory power because they tend to implement weighting schemas based on
supervised learning (weights are derived from exemplars of categories provided in a
period of supervised (or semi-supervised) learning).
Our central contribution has been to introduce and exploit frames as the represen-
tational format of the input to Bayesian models of category learning. Frames have a
richer informational-structure than do feature lists, and so can be used to determine
10Such an enrichment would amount to dropping many of our independence assumptions, however.
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the weighted diagnosticity of the information encoded within a category. As a result,
the frame-based model we developed can discriminate between competing sets of
categories without having to define weights based on samples of data labelled with
categories. In other words, we have given a theoretical basis for a Bayesian categori-
sation model that, in principle, can approximate weighted naive Bayesian models
without a period of supervised learning or weakening the independence assumptions
of such models. This follows because the structure frames inherently have (and fea-
ture lists lack) can be used to define such weights directly from training data that is
not tagged with categories to be learned.
Our adoption of frames as representations of data input and category output
extends and consolidates the enlightened Bayesian paradigm, which looks to devel-
opments in the cognitive sciences to inform Bayesian modelling techniques (Chater
et al. 2011; Jones and Love 2011). As postulates of cognitive scientific theories,
frames are already a well-established representational architecture (among many
others, see Barsalou 1992; Löbner 2014; Ziem 2014). However, until now, the theo-
retical benefits of frames had not been made explicit within the context of Bayesian
models of category learning. By arguing that frames allow for the development of a
more intuitively discriminatory model of category learning based on enriched input,
we hope to have shown one way that an account of categorisation based upon the
mathematical ideals of Bayesianism can still be subject to principled representa-
tional constraints. Although we accept that more work is needed to spell-out the
evolutionary and practical relationship between Bayesian inference and (mental)
representations in the broader domain of cognitive development, we think that our
frame-theoretic approach to Bayesian category learning serves as a welcome further
step on the path to developing a mechanistically-grounded and formally rigorous
picture of cognition.
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Appendix 1: A Frame-Based Bayesian Categorisation Model
Our model is based, like other single system models, on the calculation of
p(w|D, α, δ) from the joint probability distribution over w, D, α, and δ (elements
of the model). We use the same formula (reprinted here with an M label on p to
indicate the probability function based on this joint distribution):
pM(wi |D, α, δ) ∝ pM(wi |α) × pM(D|wi , δ) (4)
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Table 4 Definitions for elements of the frame based Bayesian categorisation model
O = {o1, ..., on} A set of observed objects
C = {c | c = ∅, c ⊆ O} A set of categories
W = {w |w = ∅, w ⊆ C} A set of sets of categories
F = {f | f ⊆ O} A set of attribute values (i.e. a set of predicates of objects)
ι = f : F → N>0 A function from attribute values to their distance from the
central node
A = {〈f, n〉 | f ∈ F, n = ι(f)} A set feature-distance pairs (i.e. a set of distance indexed
features)
D = {〈o, X〉|o ∈ O, X ⊆ A} The data: a set of tuples such that for each object, there is a
set of feature-distance pairs
α ∈ [0, 1] The small categories preference parameter
δ = f : N>0 → R The similar features preference parameter. A function from
distance measures to real numbers
We maintain the small categories preference parameter α, but the similar features
preference δ, on our model, sets the preference for how strongly distance from the
central node affects the overall similarity score for a set of categories. Definitions of
elements of themodel are given in Table4. Categories are sets of objects and category
schemas are sets of categories. The data input for the model consists of frames, here
simplified to objects paired with attribute values and a distance of this value from
the central node. Distance from the central node forms the basis for the weighting of
attribute values determined by δ.
We assume, for simplicity, that for any set of categories, w, no object is in more
than one category and every object is in a category. (Sets of categories completely
partition the domain of objects.) In other words, as given in (5), for a set of objects,
O , for each w, we have a distribution over the categories ci ∈ w (the probability
function is accordingly labelled O, w, we suppress O in most of the following since
we will not consider cases for multiple O sets).
∑
ci∈w
pO,w(ci ) = 1 (5)
The prior probability of a category c relative to a set of categories w is calculated
as the number of objects in the category divided by the number of objects so far
observed:
For each c ∈ w, pO,w(c) = |c|w|O| (6)
Other distributions occur at the level of nodes in frames. Each node has a set of
possible values (e.g., red, green etc., for colour, and feathers, fur, scales etc. for
covering). We say more about such distributions in Appendix 1.2.
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Table 5 The effect of α on calculating the prior p(w|α) for the data in Table3 restricted to w1 and
w15
α
1 0.5 0.1 0
p(w1|α) 0.20 0.3 0.47 0.50
p(w15|α) 0.80 0.6 0.53 0.50
1.1 The α Parameter
The intuitive idea behind the calculation of pM(w|α) is that w should minimise
entropy over the object space (minimise the average amount of information required
to identify in which category in w an object belongs). This is given in (7). If alpha is
set to 1, then the probability is proportional to the inverse log of the entropy of w. If
α = 0, then, assuming a base-2 logarithm, for all w ∈ W , pM(w|α) ∝ 20 (i.e. ∝ 1),
thus all w ∈ W would receive the same prior.11 In other words, there would be no
preferential effect of reducing (or increasing) the number of categories.






pw(ci ) × log2(pw(ci ))
))
(7)
As an example of how α operates, consider four objects a, b, c, d and a space
of two category sets w1, w15. If w1 = {c1 = a, c2 = b, c3 = c, c4 = d} and w15 =
{c5 = {a, b, c, d}}, then, for varying vales for α, we get the results in Table5 (values
given to 2 decimal places).
1.2 The δ Parameter
The intuitive idea behind the calculation of p(D|wi , δ) is that, with respect to the
values for an attribute, each category should minimise entropy (weighted by distance
the attribute is from the central node). In other words, minimise the average amount
of information it takes to decide which properties an object has if it is in a particular
category.
Given that each d ∈ D is a tuple of an object and a set of attribute value-distance
pairs, calculating pM(D|w, δ) turns on calculating, for each category c in w, the
probability that the objects in c have some particular value for the relevant attribute.
Let |f j |ck ,w,D be the number of times the attribute value f j occurs as a value in category
ck ∈ w for a data set D. Let |ck |w,D be the number of objects in ck ∈ w. pw,D(f j |ck)
is, then:
11The actual probability is calculated by dividing by the sum of the values given in (7) over all
w ∈ W .
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pw,D(f j |ck) = |f j |ck ,w,D|ck |w,D (8)
namely, for a set of categories w, the total number of times objects in ck ∈ w have
value f j , divided by the total number of objects in ck . This forms a distribution for
any set of attribute values that are the mutually exclusive values of some attribute
(e.g., a distribution over feathers and fur, and a distribution over black and brown
in our toy example).
The entropy values for attribute value spaces, given a category, are weighted
depending on the distance d the feature is from the central node. This weighting is
set by δ, which is a function from d to a real number in the range [0, 1]. The weighted
entropy value for a category is, then, the sum of the weighted sum of the surprisal
values for each attribute value, given a category, also weighted by δ. The weighted
entropy value for a set of categories w is the weighted average of the entropy values
for each category in w (relative to pw(c)). So, for all w ∈ W :





〈f j ,n j 〉∈π−2(D)
(
pw, f,c(f j |ck ) × log2(pw, f,c(f j |ck )) × δ(n j )
))
(9)
Intuitively, pM(D|w, δ) is a measure on how well the data is predicted by each w
(weighted by δ). This value will be 1 if every piece of data (an object and its attribute
values and distances) falls into a totally homogenous category with respect to the
objects it contains. This is because the average amount of information to determine
the attribute values of members of each category is 0. As categories get more and
more heterogeneous, the value of p(D|w, δ) will get lower. This is because the
average amount of information need to determine the attribute values of members of
each category is high.
For example, for the data inTable3, sowith four objectsa, b, c, d, and alsowith the
four category setsw1, w8, w9, w15, ifw1 = {c1 = {a}, c2 = {b}, c3 = {c}, c4 = {d}},
w8 = {c5 = {a, b}, c6 = {b, c}}, w9 = {c7 = {a, c}, c8 = {b, d}}, and w15 = {c9 =
{a, b, c, d}} and attribute values are as displayed in Table3, then we get the impact
of altering the δ function as given in Table6 (values given to 2 decimal places).
Since w1 contains only singleton categories, the probability of the data given w1
Table 6 The effect of δ on calculating the likelihood p(D|w, δ) for the data in Table3 for w1, w8,







p(D|w1, δ) 1 1 1
p(D|w8, δ) 0.5 0.71 0.84
p(D|w9, δ) 0.5 0.5 0.5
p(D|w15, δ) 0.25 0.35 0.42
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is 1 no matter how δ(n j ) is defined, since for all attribute values and all categories
pw1, f,c(f j |c) equals 1 or zero (so the weighted entropy value is 0 and 20 = 1). The
worst performing is w15, since this contains only one category so heterogeneity
for features is high (this is mitigated a little when δ(n j ) is defined to decrease the
homogeneity requirement for attribute values with larger distances from the central
node).
We now turn to the the comparison between w8 and w9 (which is important for
our toy example). In the case where δ(n j ) = n0j (i.e. where δ(n j ) is always equal to
1), there is no weighting towards the importance of similarity of values with respect
to being close to the central node. This gives us the same result as would be given for
a simple unweighted feature list. In other words, given some things that are furry and
black, furry and brown, feathered and black, and feathered and brown, the model has
no preference towards grouping furry things together and feathered things together
over grouping black things together and brown things together. When δ(n j ) = n−1j ,
the result is that entropy is weighted to be halved for values at a distance of two
nodes away from the central node. When δ(n j ) = n−2j , the result is that entropy is
weighted to be quartered for values at a distance of two nodes away from the central
node. This translates into an increasing preference for no entropy at the inner most
nodes and an allowance of higher entropy at further out nodes.
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Extremes are Typical. A Game
Theoretical Derivation
Robert van Rooij and Thomas Brochhagen
Abstract In this paper we argue that a typical member of a class, or category, is an
extreme, rather than a central, member of this category.Making use of a formal notion
of representativeness, we can say that a typical member of a category is a stereotype
of this category. In the second part of the paper we show that this account of typicality
can be given a rational motivation by providing a game-theoretical derivation.
Keywords Typicality · Representativeness · Extreme · Game theory
1 Typicality: Prototypes Versus Stereotypes
In cognitive psychology, a typical representative of class X is normally called its
prototype. At least since the work of Rosch (1973) in psychology, a prototype of a
category is standardly seen as an item that is most similar to all other members of the
category: a central member of the category. It is standardly assumed that category
membership is a graded affair, and that goodness-of-exemplar judgments depend on
similarity to the prototype.
But is a typical member of a category really a central member of this category?
A simple Google search seems to question this view. The man that comes up very
prominently when one does a simple Google search of a typical, or real man is
Rambo. Whatever one can say of Rambo, he is not an average man. Very similar
pictures of real tall men, and real scientists give rise to similar conclusions.
Our Google search should obviously not be taken too seriously, but it is in line
with many experimental findings in cognitive psychology of what we think of typical
examplars. First, Hampton (1981) found that at least for abstract categories, central
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tendencies are not a good predictor of goodness-of-exemplar judgments. Second,
Barsalou (1985) showed that ideals, rather than central exemplars, are better deter-
minants of category goodness in goal-based categories such as ‘foods to eat on a
diet’ (food with zero calories) and ‘ways to hide from the Mafia’. Lynch et al.
(2000), Palmeri and Nosofsky (2001) and Burnett et al. (2005) found that ideals,
or psychological extreme points, may define category goodness even in natural cat-
egories.1 These studies also show that sometimes categorization can be based on
ideals, and that people judge the ideal rather than the average members as the typical
ones. Perhaps more interesting for this paper is the finding that when categories were
learned in relation to alternative contrast categories, extreme members were counted
as typical (cf. Ameels and Storms (2006)), and people were best able to categorize
based on such ideals (cf. Goldstone et al. (2003)). This all suggests that if we want to
model what it means to be a ‘real’, or typical, X , one should not just pick an average
exemplar of type X .
If Rambo is not a prototypical man, he is certainly a stereotypical one. The Oxford
English Dictionary defines a stereotype as a ‘widely held but fixed and oversimplified
image or idea of a particular type of person or thing’. The so-called ‘social cognition
approach’ to stereotypes (e.g. Schneider et al. (1979)), rooted in social psychology,
views a social stereotype as a special case of a cognitive schema. Such schemas are
intuitive generalizations that individuals routinely use in their everyday life, and entail
savings on cognitive resources. Hilton and von Hippel (1996) define stereotypes as
‘mental representations of real differences between groups [. . . ] allowing easier and
more efficient processing of information. Stereotypes are selective, however, in that
they are localized around group features that are the most distinctive, that provide
the greatest differentiation between groups, and that show the least within-group
variation.’ Thus, according to Hilton and von Hippel (1996), stereotypes are rather
extreme representatives of a class.
Within social psychology, McCauley et al. (1980) have defined the following
measure of how stereotypical x is for class X : P(x |X)P(x) . An easy proof shows that
this measure behaves monotone increasingly with respect to log P(x |X)P(x |¬X) ,
2 meaning
that the x with the highest value for the former notion also has the highest value
for the latter notion. The latter notion goes back to Turing, and has been called the
weigh of evidence of x for X by Good (1950). The same notion has been called the
1Of course, Plato already thought of universals as represented by ideals (the Forms).
2To show this, note first that P(x |X) − P(x) behaves monotone increasingly with P(x |X) −
P(x |¬X).
P(x |X) − P(x) = P(x |X) − [(P(x |X) × P(X)) + (P(x |¬X) × P(¬X))]
= P(x |X) − [αP(x |X) + (1 − α)P(x |¬X)], with 0 ≤ α ≤ 1
= (1 − α)P(x |X) − (1 − α)P(x |¬X)
= β[P(x |X) − P(x |¬X)],with 0 ≤ β ≤ 1.
Obviously, P(x |X)P(x) behaves monotone increasingly with P(x |X) − P(x), just as P(x |X)P(x |¬X) behaves
monotone increasingly with P(x |X) − P(x |¬X). Given the nature of logarithmic functions, the
latter, in turn, behaves monotone with log P(x |X)P(x |¬X) .
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representativeness of x for X by Tenenbaum and Griffiths (2001). Adding things
up, it all suggests that typical, or representative, members of their classes, are, in
fact, their stereotypes, members that provide the greatest differentiation between the
classes.
2 Typicality and Structured Meaning Spaces
Gärdenfors (2000) proposes that primitive categories (or natural properties) are
always formed in contrast to alternative contrast categories in a priori given con-
ceptual spaces. He suggests that—perhaps as a result—these basic categories are
typically convex sets. A set X is convex if and only if for two arbitrary members x1
and x2 of X , any xi that is somewhere between x1 and x2 is also a member of X .
Gärdenfors claims that for primitive categories, the relevant conceptual spaces give
rise to Voronoi tessellations. A Voronoi tessellation not only partitions a structured
space into convex sets, it also has prototypes at the center of each convex set. Here
is a typical example:
Two of the main examples discussed by Gärdenfors are colors and tastes. He
claims that the color space and the phenomenological taste space give rise to Voronoi
tessellations. We would like to question, however, whether the most typical colors
and tastes are the central members, as proposed by Gärdenfors. First, consider one-
dimensional spaces closed on at least one side. In linguistics (e.g. Kennedy and
McNally (2005)), the meanings of contrastive adjective pairs such as ‘open’ and
‘closed’, ‘dry’ and ‘wet’ and ‘full’ and ‘empty’ are based on such one-dimensional
spaces. The endpoints of such meaning spaces, however, will always be marked
linguistically, by absolute adjectives, and thus be typical representatives of the classes
such (absolute) adjectives denote. Second, inspection suggests that the focal points
of the colors in the color space are not in the center. Below is a picture of the
representations of colors as the full color spindle.







This picture strongly suggests two things: (i) that colors can be thought of as
convex sets in the color space, and (ii) that the prototypes of the colors are (except
for gray) always at the edges of the color spindle, and thus not in the center of the
convex sets. Indeed, Regier et al. (2007) found that the best examples of English’
white and black, respectively, are the lightest and darkest chips of a chart of colors.3
Similarly, the so-called ‘color emotion wheel’ (from Sacharin et al. (2016), though
not shown here), suggests that the color pixels which give rise to the highest emotions
are on the edges of the color spindle (or circle, in this case). That picture also suggests
that the pixels of the highest emotional value of the three basic colors red, blue and
green, are as far away from each other as possible.
Finally, according to Henning (1916) the phenomenal gustatory space should be




3A reviewer suggests that white and black are not real colors. This reviewer moreover suggests
that ‘true’ colors only sit along the rim of the middle disc of the color spindle. All ‘true’ colors are
maximally saturated, and only these should be considered. We are somewhat surprised about this
suggestion. We agree that ‘real’, ‘true’, or stereotypical, red is red with full saturation, but we don’t
see any reason why we should limit the color space to full saturated colors to begin with. To us, this
should be the result of an analysis, not the beginning.
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Again, it seems that the basic tastes are convex regions of the relevant meaning
space, and that their typical representatives are at the edge of the taste space, and far
away from each other.
Bickerton (1981) already proposed that ‘simple’ expressions can only denote
connected, or convex, regions of cognitive space, andhypothesized that the preference
for convex properties is an innate property of our brains. Perhaps this is the case. Still,
we would like to delve somewhat deeper and provide an analysis where convexity of
meanings doesn’t have to be stipulated, but can be explained. The goal of this paper
is to provide rational motivations for why standard meanings give rise to convex sets
and why typical representatives are as far away from each other as possible.
Linguists like Jakobson (1941) and Martinet (1955) long observed that natu-
rally occurring vowels in languages over the world are always far away from each
other in the acoustic space available for vowels. Liljencrants and Lindblom (1972)
showed that one can explain this linguistic ‘universal’ by adopting a principle of
maximal perceptual contrast. Likewise, Regier et al. (2007) show that a model that
categorizes the color space based on maximization of similarity within category and
dissimilarity across categories gives rise to surprisingly accurate predictions for the
predicted colors, and gives rise to categories as convex sets. Abbott et al. (2016) show
that in trying to predict the focal colors, or the best examples of named color cat-
egories across many languages, a model making use of Tenenbaum and Griffiths’s
(2001) notion of representativeness mentioned above outperforms several natural
competitors such as models based on likelihood or on prototypes thought of as cen-
tral members. Although very appealing, we feel that these explanations need to be
based on the idea that language is used for communication between agents. This is the
starting point of Lewis’s (1969) analysis of meaning making use of signaling games.
In this paper we seek to motivate why meanings tend to be convex and why extreme
exemplars of these meanings, or categories, are considered to be representative by
making use of such signaling games.
Jäger (2007) and Jäger and van Rooij (2007) introduced so-called sim-max
games, signaling games using an Euclidean meaning space with a similarity-based
utility function. They show that by using a simple learning dynamic the evolved
equilibria of these games give rise to descriptive meanings which are convex sets.4
For sim-max games, it is shown as well that with uniformly distributed points in
the meaning spaces, the imperative meanings derived from the equilibria will be in
the center of their descriptive meanings, and can be thought of as prototypes. As
argued above, we indeed want an explanation of convex meanings, but now with
typical representatives as extremes.5 Zuidema and de Boer (2009) observed that
Liljencrants and Lindblom (1972)’s explanation of naturally occurring vowels as
extremes in the acoustic space in terms of maximal contrast makes game theoretical
sense in a noisy environment. In this paperwewould like to provide a game theoretical
4Elliot Wagner (p.c.) has shown, however, that this does not hold in general, if a more standard
evolutionary dynamic is used.
5One might think that the problem can be solved by adopting a non-flat probability distribution. As
observed by Franke (2012), however, this won’t do.
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explanation of a phenomenon involving maximal contrast as well. But there is an
important difference: whereas in phonology the contrast involves the signals, in our
case the contrast involves the meanings of the signals. For simple one-dimensional
meaning spaces, Lipman (2009) already provided such a game theoretical derivation,
not making use of similarity or confusability at all. Surprisingly enough, his analysis
even explains convexity. Unfortunately, we don’t see how to extend his derivation to
more complex spaces. Franke (2012) does explain the preference for extreme points
in multi-dimensional spaces.6 However, he does so by doing it, so to say, in terms of
a derived preference for extremes in one-dimensional spaces. What we would like to
do is, we think, more ambitious: to explain the preference for the extremes in one go.
We think that something like this is required to provide a natural explanation of the
preference for extremes in complex spaces where the dimensions are not obviously
made up of previously given dimensions that are independent of each other. Such
a dependence of the dimensions we find, for instance, in the color space which
Gärdenfors (2000) takes to be consisting of a set of integral dimensions.
3 Extremes and Iterated Best Response
One way to understand why languages exhibit the properties they do is by analyzing
them in the context of cooperative social reasoning. That is, by taking the idea
seriously that language is used for communication between interlocutors, and that
these interlocutors will reason about each other’s linguistic choices to reach mutual
understanding (e.g., Lewis, 1969; Grice 1975; Parikh 1991; Rooy van 2004; Benz
et al. 2005). To illustrate how such a process of mutual reasoning may naturally lead
to convex meanings with extreme typical representatives, this section sketches out
the predictions of the Iterated Best Response (IBR) model (Franke 2009; Franke
and Jäger 2014) on these matters.
At its core, IBR aims to explain linguistic outcomes in a Gricean fashion: as
outcomes of mutual reasoning about rational language use. Formally, patterns of
language use can be represented by mappings from messages (utterances) to states
(meanings) in the case of receivers, ρ : M → T ; and by mappings from states to
messages for senders, σ : T → M . Plainly put, these are comprehension and pro-
duction strategies that tell us how two interlocutors behave. That sender and receiver
are rational means that, given (their beliefs about) another interlocutor’s behavior,
they will try to maximize communicative success. If, e.g., the sender believes the
chances of the receiver interpreting utterance m1 correctly to be higher than those
of utterance m2, she will send the former. Letting R and S be the set of all receiver
and sender strategies, the set of best responses to a sender/receiver belief is defined
as follows:
6Explaining convexity is not aimed for in Franke (2012).
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BR(σb) = {ρ ∈ R | ∀m : ρ(m) ∈ argmaxt∈T EUR(t, m, σb)}; (1)
BR(ρb) = {σ ∈ S | ∀t : σ(t) ∈ argmaxm∈M EUS(t, m, ρb)}, (2)
where σb and ρb are the receiver’s, respectively the sender’s, beliefs about her inter-
locutor’s behavior and EU (t, m, ·) codifies the expected utility of either interpreting
a message m as t or sending a message m in state t (see below).
Equations (1) and (2) may look unwieldy at first glance, so let us unravel them
before moving on. A belief about a sender/receiver strategy is an expectation of how
this sender/receiver will act given a state/message. Beyond the fact that they are
beliefs about another agent’s behavior, these are just mappings from states/messages
to messages/states as well. A best response to an interlocutor’s (expected) behavior
is the strategy that will ensure the best payoff from an interaction with such an
interlocutor: the one with the highest expected utility. There might be many ways
to use language that maximize utility conditional on a particular belief σb or ρb; the
sets BR(σb) and BR(ρb) collect them all.
Having identified the set of best courses of action given a belief about an inter-
locutor’s behavior, we still need to distill from them how an agent should act.
For convenience, we write the resulting strategies as behavioral ones. In words,
a sender’s strategy σ is the one that sends a message m in state t if there is a best
response σ ′ ∈ BR(ρb) that sends it. Otherwise, message m is not sent in t . Formally,
σ(m | t, ρb) = 1/|{m ′ | σ ′(m ′) = t; ∧ σ ′ ∈ BR(ρb)}| if there is a strategy σ ′ ∈ BR(ρb) such
that σ ′(t) = m, and otherwise 0. Analogously for ρ(t |m, σb), with the additional
proviso that if a message is not believed to be sent at all, the receiver will pick an
interpretation at random (cf. Franke and Jäger 2014).
As a final ingredient, we need to specify what sender and receiver care about.
Assuming that interlocutors have no preferences over messages and that all they care
about is faithful information transfer, utility can be captured by a single function that
tracks how closely sender state and receiver interpretation match; e.g., δ(t, t ′) = 1
iff t = t ′ and otherwise 0. We then have





′′)σb(m | t ′′)δ(t
′, t); (3)




′|m)δ(t, t ′). (4)
In words, the expected utility of sending/interpreting message m given state t is
just the average of our communicative success given our beliefs about our interlocu-
tor’s linguistic behavior. That is to say, expected utility gives us the average payoff
we expect when producing or comprehending, conditional on our beliefs about our
communicative partner. As stated in (1) and (2), best responses are made up of those
strategies thatmaximize expected utility; those that guarantee the best outcome based
on what we care about.
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All of this is just to formally capture the idea that a message is sent only in
states in which it is believed to have the highest chances to be understood; and that,
analogously, a receiver interprets a message as the state that she believes is most
likely to be conveyed by it. If there are many optimal choices, players pick randomly
from them. If a choice has to be made but none is optimal they pick at random from
the entire pool of actions at their disposition. From here, we just need to consider the
consequences of nesting beliefs to arrive at pragmatic reasoning: reasoning about
the reasoning (and so on) of others to inform our linguistic choices. Formally, a
level-n + 1 reasoner in IBR is defined as acting upon the belief that her interlocutor
is of level-n with reasoning levels starting at n = 0. Put differently, we have that
σn+1(· | ·, ρn) and ρn+1(· | ·, σn).
Beliefs about an interlocutor’s strategy at level 0 are usually constrained or biased
in someway to start the reasoning chain. If just any belief were permitted,meaningful
inferencewould seldomget off the ground (cf. Sect. 1.2 Franke 2009). Let us consider
a simple case in which the sender has seen how the receiver interprets messages and
the receiver is aware of this. For instance, she has seen the receiver interpret the
utterance tall woman as an entity of a particular height and small man as an entity of
another height. As we shall see, we need not constrain this receiver strategy beyond
requiring that it associates each message with a distinct information state. Mutual
awareness of this arbitrary separating strategy suffices to lead to the adoption of
convex strategies with extreme typical representatives as long as extremes are salient.
Saliency could be cashed out in different ways: It may be that extremes are focal
points that draw the attention of reasoners due to their psychological noteworthiness
relative to other states ( cf. Schelling 1980; Mehta et al. 1994); or it might be
that extremes confer a functional advantage and attract the reasoners by virtue of
their drive to maximize expected utility. The latter might happen, e.g., if perception
is noisy in that states that are near to each other are easily confused. This would
make extremes attractive in virtue of their special position at the edge of a space,
making them the least confusable (see, e.g., Franke et al. 2011, Gibson et al.
2013, Franke and Correia 2018 for other proposals where noise, or error, has been
argued to play an explanatory role). Abstracting away from the details of particular
noise signatures, their consequences can be captured by a graded utility function
that is inversely proportional to a distance measure over the state space under the
assumption that coordinating on extremes confers a higher utility than coordinating
on less extreme points. We background the details of this function because these two
general conditions are sufficient to illustrate our argument. In which way extreme
points are salient is ultimately an empirical issue. At this stage proposing a particular
function seems too strong a commitment in light of these unknowns.
With these notions at hand, consider the case of four heights, T = {1, 2, 3, 4}, and
two messages, M = {m1, m2}. Figure1 illustrates how mutual reasoning can lead to
convex strategieswith extreme typical representativeswhen reasoningover two initial
receiver strategies ρ0. Intuitively, a level-1 rational sender strategy against a belief of
her interlocutor’s behavior, σ1(· | ·, ρ0), will first ensure that messages sent in a state
correspond to correctly interpreted messages; t1 → m1 and t3 → m2 in the upper
example of Fig. 1; and t2 → m2 and t3 → m1 in the lower one. Second, remaining
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ρ0 σ1(· | ·, ρ0) ρ2(· | ·, σ1) σ3(· | ·, ρ2)
t1 t1
m1 t2 m1 t2 m1
m2 t3 m2 t3 m2
t4 t4
t1 t1
m1 t2 m1 t2 m1
m2 t3 m2 t3 m2
t4 t4
Fig. 1 Illustration of IBR-sequence for two separating initial receiver strategies ρ0. Depicted out-
comes correspond to endpoints of the reasoning process
states will be associated with messages whose interpretation is closest to them. In
the upper example in Fig. 1 state t2 lies in between ρ0’s interpretation of m1 and m2,
so it is associated with both. A (level-2) receiver who reasons about such a message
allocation will naturally associate her messages with the interpretations that are
most rewarding: the extremes. Subsequent sender reasoning leads to the association
of remaining states such that the state space is partitioned into convex regions. As
noted above, this may, e.g., be a consequence of reasoned noisy perception or that of
a particular graded utility function. More iterations will not change the sender and
receiver strategies anymore. They are in equilibrium.
Just as in Lewis, (1969), we can ascribe two types of meanings to a message in
these equilibrium pairs: its descriptive meaning is the set of states in which this mes-
sage is sent and its imperative meaning is the response to thismessage by the receiver.
Just as in standard sim-max games, descriptive meanings are now convex sets. But
whereas imperative meanings in Jäger (2007) and Jäger and van Rooij (2007) were
central points, i.e., prototypes, now they are extreme points, i.e., stereotypes.
This outcome is not limited to one-dimensional spaces such as this ordering of
heights. Instead, it obtains in any discrete space with a distancemeasure, should there
be at least as many extreme points as messages. For instance, the color spindle, the
taste space, or any discrete subset of a multi-dimensional interval. In any such space,
mutual reasoning will iteratively lead to a rational receiver’s association of (at least
some) messages with extremes. A rational sender follows suit by uniquely identify-
ing extremes with these messages, as well as by improving the space’s tessellation
with respect to these associations. This process continues as long as the receiver
has not yet associated each message with an extreme, being driven by the improved
partition each round of back-and-forth reasoning provides. In the end, mutual reason-
ing bottoms out with convex sender strategies with extreme typical representatives
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Fig. 2 Illustration of IBR-sequence in a two-dimensional space. Labeled nodes in the left-hand
picture depict an initial receiver strategy ρ0. The resulting convex sender strategy σ1(· | ·, ρ0) corre-
sponds to the four regions enclosing each node. Labeled nodes in the right-hand picture correspond
to ρ2 and regions enclosing them depict σ3
for receiver strategies. Figure2 sketches out how convex descriptive meanings and
extreme imperative ones result from mutual reasoning in such a space.
In the previous sectionwementioned that best examples of named color categories
are well-predicted by a model based on the following measure of representativeness,
log P(x |X)P(x |¬X) , which is very similar to a measure used to define stereotypicality. It is
interesting to observe that our game-theoretical analysis predicts that the impera-
tive meaning of messages in equilibrium are the most representative ones for their
descriptivemeanings. To show this, one has to think of P(t |m) and P(t |¬m) either in
terms of sender strategies or in terms of receiver strategies. In the former case, one can
interpret P(t |m), for instance, as the probability that t is the actual state if m is sent.
However, it is easier to think of P(t |m) and P(t |¬m) in terms of receiver strategies.
In that case, P(t |m), for instance, is just ρ(t |m, σb), with ρ and σ as the equilib-
rium receiver and sender strategies, respectively. Once one assumes that senders and
receivers use a quantal instead of a maximizing best response function,7 in the upper
example of Fig. 1, for instance, t1 and t4 maximize log
ρ(t |m1,σb)
ρ(t |¬m1,σb) and log
ρ(t |m2,σb)
ρ(t |¬m2,σb) ,
respectively, and are thus predicted to be the most representative states for m1 and
m2. In other words, they are the stereotypes of the (descriptive) meanings of the
7The need for quantal best response is due to a technical complication resulting from the use
of maximizing expected utility: it often causes the measure of representativeness to be unde-
fined. To see this, notice that the most representative, or stereotypical, state for message m would
now be argmaxt∈T log ρ(t |m,σb)ρ(t |¬m,σb) . But as illustrated in, for instance, the upper example of Fig. 1,
ρ2(t1|m2, σ1) = 0, meaning that the denominator of ρ2(t1|m1,σ1)ρ2(t1|¬m,σ1) is 0, which makes the fraction
undefined. This problem is solved if we make sure that for no t and m it ever will be the case that
ρ(t |m, σ ) = 0. This is what comes out if we assume that instead of being expected utility maximiz-
ers, senders and receivers choose probabilistically modeled by quantal response functions (QRFs).
These functions are motivated by the idea that (perhaps due to observation errors) decision makers
sometimes make mistakes in choosing their best action. These functions are popular in behavioral
economics and are gaining popularity in linguistics as well, as they more readily connect rational
language use models with empirical data (see, e.g., Franke et al. 2011; Frank and Goodman 2012;
Franke and Jäger 2016).
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messages. This result is not limited to our simple example using a one-dimensional
meaning space, but generalizes to more-dimensional spaces: stereotypes follow from
(boundedly) rational language use.
4 Conclusion and Outlook
In this paper we followed Gärdenfors and others in the assumption that (simple)
properties denote convex sets in conceptual spaces, but argued that typical repre-
sentatives of categories are (many times) extreme rather than central members of
such categories, i.e., stereotypes. Moreover, we provided a rational motivation for
convexity of meaning and of stereotypes as typical representatives making use of
game theory.
We believe that these motivations are interesting for more general linguistic rea-
sons. For instance, it is not uncommon to believe that generic sentences like ‘Birds
fly’ and ‘Sharks are dangerous’ express typicalities and it is well-known that gener-
ics are excellent tools to express and generate stereotypes. In Rooij van and Schulz
(2020) an analysis of generic sentences is proposed based on contingency, a measure
of representativeness adopted from causal associative learning theory that behaves
monotone increasingly with the measures of stereotypicality and representativeness
discussed in this paper. This suggests that we could provide a game theoretical moti-
vation for generic language use as well. There is at least one complication, though.
Whereas we thought of stereotypes as members of a category, for Rooij van and
Schulz (2020) it is crucial to think of stereotypes as sets of perhaps mutually incon-
sistent features. In the future we would like to see how crucial this distinction is.
In this paper—just as in Jäger (2007) and others—we have fixed the number of
messages that play a role in the game beforehand, which determined the number of
cells in the resulting partition of the meaning space in equilibrium. Intuitively, that
should not be the case: in how many cells the meaning space will be partitioned
should be an outcome of the game as well, depending on the structure of the meaning
space and the utility of each partition. Corter and Gluck (1992) defined a notion of
category utility to derive Rosch’s so-called ‘basic-level’ categories. It is interesting
to observe that this notion is closely related to the notions of ‘representativeness’,
‘contingency’ and ‘stereotypicality’ discussed above. In the future we would like to
explain natural partitions of different types of meaning spaces, making use of this
notion of category utility.
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Grading Similarity
Carla Umbach and Helmar Gust
Abstract There are numerouswords across languages expressing similarity or indis-
tinguishability. In this paper, three types of similarity expressions in German and
English are compared—ähnlich/similar, so/such, and gleich/same. They differ in a
number of respects, one of them being gradability: While ähnlich/similar are grad-
able, so/such as well as gleich/same are not. The analysis in this paper starts from the
analysis of German so as a demonstrative expressing similarity (instead of identity)
to its demonstration target (Umbach and Gust 2014). It is suggested that the meaning
of the three types of similarity expressions is based on a common similarity relation,
while differences in meaning are provided by constraints referring to the selection of
dimensions of comparison and preconditions of usage. The focus of the paper is on
gradability and on the question of what it means for a pair of items to be more similar
than another pair. An analysis in the spirit of Klein (1980) is presented accounting
for the fact that ähnlich/similar are gradable while neither so/such nor gleich/same
are. The formal framework makes use of representations based on attribute spaces
and classifiers, where representations may be of different granularity.
Keywords Similarity · Sameness · Dimensions of comparison · Direct reference ·
Gradability
1 Introduction
There are numerous words across languages expressing that items are similar or
indistinguishable in some sense, for example in German and English ähnlich/similar,
so/such, and gleich/same. It seems reasonable to assume that the common core of the
meaning of these words is a relation of similarity, which is considered in Cognitive
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Science as “… an organizing principle by which individuals classify objects, form
concepts, and make generalizations” (Tversky 1977, p. 327). Still, there are signifi-
cant differences between similarity expressions, one of thembeing gradability:While
ähnlich and similar are gradable, so and such as well as gleich and same are not, see
(1)–(3).1
(1) (speaker points to Berta’s haircut):
       a. Anna hat auch so einen Haarschnitt / *… mehr so einen Haarschnitt als
        Claire.
b. Anna has such a haircut, too. / *… more such a haircut than Claire has.
(2) a. Annas Haarschnitt ist dem von Berta ähnlich. / … dem von Berta ähnlicher
  als der von Claire.
b. Anna’s haircut is similar to Berta’s haircut. / … more similar to Berta’s
haircut than Claire’s haircut is.
(3) a. Annas Haarschnitt ist der gleiche wie Bertas./ *… mehr der gleiche wie
Bertas als der von Claire.
b. Anna’s haircut is the same as Berta’s haircut. / *… more the same as Berta’s
haircut than Claire’s haircut is.
The starting point of this paper is the analysis of the German demonstrative so
in Umbach and Gust (2014) arguing that German so as well as, e.g., Polish tak
and English such are similarity demonstratives, that is, demonstratives expressing
similarity (instead of identity) to the target of the demonstration (see Sect. 2).
The similarity analysis is spelled out with the help of multi-dimensional attribute
spaces defining similarity as indistinguishability with respect to, basically, a set of
dimensions of comparison.
German ähnlich and English similar express similarity, too. But while so and such
are demonstratives, ähnlich and similar are two-place predicates, andwhile similarity
as denoted by so and such is reflexive,2 it will be shown that this is not the case for
ähnlich and similar. The most challenging difference, however, is gradability, which
will be in focus in this paper.
Considering their scale structure, ähnlich and similar are clearly not open scale—
increase of similarity is not open-ended.But at the same time they resist common tests
for being upper-closed (see Kennedy and McNally 2005). For example, combina-
tion with vollkommen/completely yields heavily marked results. Intuitively, however,
there is a maximum for ähnlich and similar which is expressed by the adjectives
gleich and same, see (4).
1There is mehr so (‘more so’) in the sense of eher so (‘rather so’) which is, however, a hedging
construction instead of a comparative, as is evident from the fact that the standard parameter is wie
instead of als: Anna hat mehr/eher so einen Haarschnitt wie Claire/*als Claire (‘Anna has more
such a haircut as/than Claire.’).
2For similarity expressed by so and such it holds that ∀x∈D.sim(x,x).
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(4) a. Anna hat ???einen vollkommen ähnlichen / ok den gleichen Haarschnitt wie
Berta.
b. Anna has ???a completely similar haircut to Berta / ok the same haircut as
Berta.
In this paper, we start from the idea that the meaning of the three types of simi-
larity expressions—so/such, ähnlich/similar, and gleich/same—is based on a single
similarity relation. Differences in meaning are characterized in terms of additional
constraints. The research questions addressed in this paper will be
(i) What are the distinctive characteristics of the three types of similarity
expressions?
(ii) What kind of gradable adjectives are ähnlich and similar? How to explain that
ähnlich/similar are gradable while neither so/such nor gleich/same are?
(iii) What does it mean for two items a and b to be more similar than c and d? How
to implement the gradability of ähnlich/similar?
In this paper, we will consider only nominal phrases (ignoring e.g., ähnlich
aussehen/look similar and also ähneln/resemble; for resemble see Meier 2009) and
we will only consider anaphoric/deictic uses (ignoring reciprocal constructions like
Anna and Berta are similar, see footnote 11 in Sect. 3). Since theGerman andEnglish
expressions under consideration are close in meaning and distribution they will be
analyzed in parallel.
This paper is organized as follows: In Sect. 2, the similarity analysis for so/such
will be outlined as far as required in the subsequent sections. In Sect. 3, differences
in distribution and meaning between the three types of similarity expressions will
be explored. In Sect. 4, an analysis will be suggested accounting for the gradability
of ähnlich/similar which is inspired by Klein (1980). Formal details are provided in
the Appendix.
2 Similarity Demonstratives
There is a class of demonstratives found across languages modifying verbal, nominal
and/or degree expressions, for example German so/solch, English such, Polish tak
and Turkish böyle (see König and Umbach 2018). Some of them are uniform across
categories, like German so and Polish tak; others are restricted to particular syntactic
categories, like English such. In (5), German so and English such modify a noun.
(5) (speaker points to a table):
        a. So einen Tisch hat Anna auch.
b. Anna has such a table, too.
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In Umbach andGust (2014), demonstratives like so/such are called similarity demon-
stratives and are analyzed in a framework spelling out similarity as indistinguisha-
bility with respect to given dimensions of comparison. This section provides a
summary of the analysis and a brief overview of the formal framework. Details
are provided in the Appendix.
The analysis starts from the common idea that the target of the demonstration is
an individual or event. But while standard demonstratives like this denote identity
between the demonstration target and the referent (as is in-built in Kaplan’s 1989
system), similarity demonstratives denote similarity rather than identity. Accord-
ingly, so/such include a deictic component and a similarity component which jointly
create sets of items similar to the target of demonstration. For example, so ein
Tisch/such a table in (5) denote a set of tables similar to the table pointed at. This
analysis entails that so/such are directly referential in the sense of Kaplan, which will
be one key point in distinguishing so/such from ähnlich/similar and gleich/same in
Sect. 3.
Similarity depends on dimensions of comparison.3 The selection of the rele-
vant dimensions is another key point in comparing the three varieties of simi-
larity expressions. In the formal framework (Gust and Umbach 2015, Gust and
Umbach to appear), dimensions of comparison define multidimensional attribute
spaces and are equipped with measure functions mapping individuals to points
in those spaces. Dimensions and measure functions are two components of what
is called a representation. The third component is a set of classifiers, which
are predicates on points in attribute spaces. They can be seen as defining a
“grid”4 where points within a cell are indistinguishable. Classifiers derived from
basic ones by logical operations provide coarser (by disjunction) or finer gran-
ularity (by conjunction), which will be essential in devising a gradable notion
of similarity in Sect. 4.2. Slightly simplifying, a representation F is defined as
a quadruple including a domain D, an attribute space F, a measure function
μ: D F and a set of classifiers P*, F = 〈F, μ, P∗, D〉 (see Appendix, Definition
2).
Similarity is defined as a three-place relation combining two individuals to be
compared and a representation, sim(x, y, F), such that two individuals are similar
relative to a representation if and only if the points in the attribute space they are
mapped to are indistinguishable relative to the given set of classifiers (Appendix,
Definitions 3 and 4). Similarity defined in this way is an equivalence relation.5
Consider, for example, the phrases so einen Tisch/such a table in (5). The semantic
interpretation is shown in (6). Let us assume, for the sake of the example, that relevant
dimensions of comparison are height, material, legs, and extras, and that tables
are “measured” by the function in (7). Now suppose that the table the speaker points
3Without taking dimensions of comparison into account, similarity runs the risk of being trivial,
which is nicely demonstrated in Goodman (1972).
4The term “grid” is not to be misunderstood as implying a distance-based notion of similarity.
5Counter-arguments (going back to Tversky 1977) against defining similarity as an equivalence
relation cannot in general be maintained, see footnote 23 in Sect. 4.2.
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at is mapped to 〈55 cm, metal, 4, {}〉 and the set of classifiers is such that points
within a range of height:40–60; material:{metal, plastics}; legs:2–4; extras:{}
cannot be distinguished. Then (5) is true iff Anna’s table is mapped to a point within
this range.6,7,8
(6) [[so ein Tisch / such a table]] =  λx. table(x) & SIM(x, t, ℱ)
(7) μ
table
: D HEIGHT × MATERIAL × LEGS × EXTRAS 
where μtable (x) = μheight (x), μmaterial(x), μlegs(x), μextras (x)   
and HEIGHT: +
MATERIAL: {wood, metal, plastics, …}
LEGS: {1 … 10}  
EXTRAS: {extendable, height -adjustable, coating …}
→
According to the similarity analysis, demonstratives like so/such create classes of
similar items, e.g. similar tables. There is some evidence that in the nominal and
verbal case (though not in the adjectival case) these similarity classes constitute ad-
hoc kinds (see Umbach and Gust 2014). Anderson and Morzycki (2015) present
an alternative analysis claiming that demonstratives like German so, English such
and Polish tak are pro-kind expressions, adapting Carlson’s (1980) kind-referring
analysis of such. The final results of the two accounts are fairly close (in the case
of nominal and verbal phrases). However, Umbach and Gust not just postulate that
there are kinds denoted by so phrases, but in addition show how these kinds emerge,
namely by similarity. Moreover, by referring to a common similarity relation, this
framework offers a basis to compare different types of similarity expressions, which
is the topic in this paper.
Finally, it is important to note that the notion of similarity in this framework is qual-
itative (property-based), unlike that in Gärdenfors’ (2000) conceptual spaces which
6Note that this approach does not classify objects as tables but instead creates subsets of similar
tables.
7Regarding ex. (6), there are two options to interpret adnominal so/such: Either so/such are consid-
ered as modifiers of the indefinite determiner, or they are considered as modifiers of the nominal
(and have been moved into the prenominal position). The first option yields the interpretation in
(a) and the second the one in (b). Since the resulting quantifiers are identical and in German the
prenominal position is licensed for solch (‘such’)—ein solcher Tisch ‘a such table’—wewill analyze
so/such in this paper as nominal modifiers, as in (b) and (6). This option facilitates comparison with
ähnlich/similar and gleich/same because they occur as nominal modifiers, too.
a. [[so/su
[[so/such
ch  ein/a ]] = λP. λQ. ∃x. SIM (x, t, ℱ) & P(x) & Q(x)     
 [[so/such  ein/a ]]  ([[Tisch/table]]) = λQ. ∃x. SIM (x, t, ℱ) & table(x) & Q(x) 
b. Tisch/table]] = λx. SIM (x, t, ) & table(x) 
[[ein/a ]] ([[so/such Tisch/table]])  = λQ. x. SIM (x, t, ) & table(x) & Q(x)
8On a related note, in ex. (6), German so, but not English such, may modify verbal and adjectival
expressions:
[[so tanzen ‘dance like this’]] =  λe. dance(e) & SIM (e, t, F )
[[so groß ‘this tall’]] =  λx. SIM (x, t, F(height)) where F(height) is meant to restrict the
representation to the height dimension.
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is quantitative (distance-based) (see Sect. 4.2).9,10 Even more importantly, unlike
Gärdenfors’ conceptual spaces, multi-dimensional attribute spaces in the Umbach
andGust framework are integrated into referential semantics bymeans of generalized
measure functions mapping referents to points in multi-dimensional attribute spaces.
Note that this is just a generalization of degree semantics (e.g. Kennedy 1999) from
the one-dimensional to the multi-dimensional case.
3 Three Types of Similarity Expressions
In this section the three types of similarity expressions—so/such, ähnlich/similar and
gleich/same—will be compared focusing on semantic characteristics (for lexical and
distributional data see Umbach 2014). First, ähnlich/similar as well as gleich/same
are relational adjectives comparing two individuals. The second argument may be
explicit (Ann’s car is similar to Berta’s car) or anaphoric (Ann’s car is similar).11 In
contrast, so/such are demonstratives (to be used deictically as well as anaphorically).
Even though the target of the demonstration (or antecedent) is not identical to the
referent of the phrase—the referent of such a table is not (necessarily) identical to the
table pointed to—it would be misleading to think of so/such as expressions relating
two distinct individuals. This is obvious when considering reciprocal readings which
are licensed by ähnlich/similar (as well as gleich/same), but not by so/such (Anna
and Berta have similar cars/*have such cars). Instead, these demonstratives create
an ad-hoc set of items similar to the target—a set of tables similar to the table pointed
to—which is then used to introduce a novel discourse referent (note that so/such are
incompatible with definite determiners, *so der Tisch/*such the table).
Furthermore, while ähnlich/similar as well as gleich/same are predicates denoting
pairs of individuals and may vary across indices, so/such are demonstratives. They
refer directly to the target pointed at and block indexical shift (Kaplan 1989). This is
shown in (8): (8a) is clearly true. But even thoughAdamandBen both drive a Porsche,
9Voroni tesselations are restricted to distance-based accounts with prototypes.
10Sassoon (2013) investigates the meaning of multidimensional adjectives such as healthy and
sick. She suggests a classification by the way dimensions are combined presupposing that for each
dimension there is some standard. Conjunctive adjectives require entities to reach the standard in
all of their dimensions while disjunctive adjectives require the same for some dimensions. Compar-
atives are analyzed by means of counting dimensions. Sassoon’s account is directed at the issue
of dimension integration. Questions of similarity and indistinguishability do not play a role in her
account.
11We ignore reciprocal and NP-dependent occurrences, as in Anna has similar dogs./Anna and
Berta have similar dogs, see Beck (2000) on the meaning of different.
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(8b) is false because the counterfactual index is irrelevant to the target of the demon-
stration—the speaker is still pointing to the old VW. In contrast, ähnlich/similar (as
well as gleich/same) are evaluated at the counterfactual index, and thus (8c) is true.12
(8) (Adam and Ben both drive a Porsche cabrio. Chris has an old VW. The speaker
points to the car parked in front of the garden gate.)
a. (scenario 1: Adam's car is parked in front of the gate) 
Ben hat auch so ein Auto/Ben has such a car, too. true
true
b. (scenario 2: Chris' car is  parked in front of the gate) 
Wenn Adam vor dem Tor parken würde, hätte Ben auch so ein Auto./ 
If Adam were parked in front of the gate, Ben would have such a car,
too.  
c. (scenario 2: Chris' car is parked in front of the gate)
Wenn Adam vor dem Tor parken würde, wäre Ben’s Auto dem Auto vor dem Tor
ähnlich. /  
If Adam were parked in front of the gate, Ben’s car would be similar to the one in 
front of the gate.
false
Another difference between the three types of similarity expressions is given by the
selection of the dimensions of comparison. In the case of so/such, dimensions are first
of all determined by the lexical meaning of the noun—dimensions to be considered
for something to be a table or be a bike. Other dimensions can be relevant as long as
they relate to properties suited to create a subkind of the kind corresponding to the
noun.Take the nounbike. For something to be such a bike it has to be similar to the bike
pointed at in relevant bike dimensions. Theremay be additional dimensionswhich are
not specific for bikes, surfacing in properties like rusty or dented. But properties like
bought last year from her neighbor or fantastic would not qualify for comparison.
This is why the namely continuations in (9a) and (b) are unmarked whereas in (c)
and (d) they are clearly bad. In the case of so/such, dimensions of comparison are
not restricted to those determined by the lexical meaning of the noun, but they must
not relate to indexical (in a broad sense) or evaluative properties, because indexical
and evaluative properties are unsuited to create subkinds (experimental evidence is
described in Umbach and Stolterfoht in prep., see also König and Umbach 2018,
Sect. 5).
12Regarding ex. (8b), it could be objected that, in German, an equative construction would yield a
true proposition—Wenn Adam vor dem Tor parken würde, hätte Ben auch so ein Auto wie das vor
dem Tor. (‘If Adam were parked in front of the gate, Ben would have a car like the one in front of
the gate.’). This effect is due to the fact that so in equatives is not a demonstrative but instead a
correlative and does not refer at all.
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(9) a. Anna has a mountain bike. Berta has such a bike, too (namely a mountain
bike).
b. Anna’s bike is rusty and dented. Berta has such a bike, too (namely a rusty
and dented one).
c. Anna has a bike bought last year from her neighbor. Berta has such a bike,
too (#namely one bought last year from her neighbor).
d. Anna has a good bike. Berta has such a bike, too (#namely a good one).
Selection of dimensions is different in the case of ähnlich/similar. Consider the
example in (10). First, while so/such phrases are perfect as kind-denoting terms in
generic sentences, ähnlich/similar phrases are not, see (10a, b). Secondly, changing
the (unacceptable) generic sentences in (10b) into the episodic sentence in (10c)
reveals a clear difference in meaning: so ein Geschenk/such a present is something
rare and valuablewhich can reasonably be considered as showing appreciation for the
guest. A Panda bear serves this purpose, but an old manuscript or painting would do
as well. In contrast, ein ähnliches Geschenk/a similar present need not be valuable,
but it has to be similar to a Panda bear. When asked, what a similar present could
be, informants mention tigers, rhinos, crocodiles etc. This is strong evidence that
the ähnlich/similar version of similarity selects dimensions made salient by the
antecedent.
(10) (The prime minister received a Panda bear from the Chinese government.)
          a. So ein Geschenk zeigt die Wertschätzung des Gasts./
                 Such a present demonstrates appreciation for the guest.
b. # Ein ähnliches Geschenk zeigt die Wertschätzung des Gasts. /
    # A similar present demonstrates appreciation for the guest.
c. Ein ähnliches Geschenk brachte ihm im Vorjahr Kritik im eigenen Land
        ein. /
    A similar present evoked protests in his own country last year.
In the case of gleich/same, there is a type and a token interpretation (Nunberg 1984).
(11) may mean that Anna and Berta drive cars of the same type, or that Anna
and Berta share a car (token).13 The token interpretation yields referential identity,
x = y, but the type interpretation is, first of all, just similarity—being indistinguish-
able with respect to dimensions given by the lexical meaning of the noun. Different
from so/such and ähnlich/similar, additional dimensions are blocked for gleich/same.
Suppose that Anna drives a Ford Fiesta. Then the same car on a type interpretation
has to be a Ford Fiesta. But even if Anna’s car is rusty and dented, the same car could
13There are prescriptive efforts to restrict German gleich to type readings and require token readings
to be expressed by selb, but German speakers don’t follow this rule. That does not imply, however,
that there is no differences between gleich and selb, just that the rule is not descriptively correct, see
Umbach (2019). Moreover, there are reasons to assume that the parallelism between German gleich
and English same breaks down when it comes to type identity, in that same is closer to selb than to
gleich.
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be spotless. Obviously, non-car-specific dimensions like conditions of usage are irrel-
evant. Moreover, while such a car may deviate from the values of the antecedent in
some dimensions—e.g. by having two instead of four doors—the same car has to be
exactly like the antecedent in every car dimension.
(11) Anna fährt das gleiche Auto wie Berta. /
          Anna drives the same car that Berta drives.
We will assume that for every noun there is a lexically associated canonical set of
dimensions (called N-related dimensions). They are provided by criteria of applica-
tion—what it means to be a table—and are not to bemistaken for criteria of identity.14
Our hypothesis on the selection of dimensions of comparison is this15:
(12) (i) so/such require a subset of the N-related dimensions to be considered
and allow for additional dimensions as long as they are suited for kind-
formation (see above). (Leeway in the values of measure functions
depends on the given set of classifiers).
(ii) ähnlich/similar require a set of dimensions made salient by the
antecedent.
(iii) gleich/same (type reading) require all and only N-related dimensions to
be considered and measure functions to yield the same values: μ(x)=μ(y).
(Since the token reading denotes referential identity, dimensions are
irrelevant.)
Let us finally consider reflexivity. In the example in (13) so eine Feuerwehr/such a
fire brigade in (a) is anaphorically related to the previously mentioned team of fire
fighters, which is the team the mayor intends to praise. So the referent of the so/such
phrase is identical to the antecedent. When so/such is substituted by ähnlich/similar,
as in (b), the mayor seems to praise a fire brigade different from the successful team,
which appears strange in this context. A similar effect is foundwith gleich/same—(c)
again gives the impression that there is another fire brigade (for (d) see below).
14Gupta (1980) postulates that nouns provide criteria of identity determining the way objects are
counted (in addition to criteria of application). His famous example is
(a) Easyjet served 10 million passengers last year.
(b) Easyjet served 10 million people last year.
(a) can be true and (b) false at the same time because one person may count as two passengers on
two different flights. Barker (2010) argues against this idea, attributing the effect to the fact that
deverbal nominals like passenger may (but need not) give rise to a per-event reading in addition to
the regular per-individual reading. The slightly absurd dialog below confirms Barker’s position:
On a flight to Bilbao in June 2017.
Flight attendant A: Look at seat 12a. This is the same passenger that flew to Barcelona in April
2016.
Flight attendant B: No, it is the same person but not the same passenger.
15Regarding ex. (12iii). Type identity of gleich may in addition be limited to mass produced entities
and clones (Stephanie Solt p.c.).
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(13) (Mayor Friedmann expresses his gratitude towards the fire fighters, pointing out
that it is a great achievement of the team that the fire did not flash over to the
adjacent buildings. He says:)
a. Wir in der Gemeinde freuen uns, dass wir so eine Feuerwehr haben! /
We are happy to have such a fire brigade in our community!
b. Wir in der Gemeinde freuen uns, dass wir eine ähnliche Feuerwehr haben! /
We are happy to have a similar fire brigade in our community!
c. Wir in der Gemeinde freuen uns, dass wir die gleiche Feuerwehr haben! /
We are happy to have the same fire brigade in our community!
d. Wir freuen uns, dass wir die gleiche Feuerwehr wie die vor 10 Jahren haben! /
We are happy to have the same fire brigade as the one 10 years ago!
(13a) clearly shows that in the case of so/such similarity is reflexive. (13b) shows that
in the case of ähnlich/similar reflexive pairs are excluded. But we started out from
the idea that the three varieties of similarity expressions are based on one common
similarity relation—it would be unintuitive to have an irreflexive similarity relation
sim’ in addition to the ‘regular’ reflexive one.More importantly, (13c) shows the same
effect as in (13b): there seem to be two distinct fire brigades. It would be absurd,
however, to claim that gleich/same are not reflexive. We will therefore postulate
distinctiveness as a precondition of usage (due to the two-place character of the
lexical items).16
Postulating distinctiveness as a precondition yields the required result for
ähnlich/similar. Note, however, that in the case of gleich/same the distinctiveness
effect is slightly different from what was found for ähnlich/similar. (13c) is strange
only of there is no different description of the fire brigade available. But if the mayor
earlier in his speech mentioned the fire brigade the community had 10 years ago, he
could refer to the actual one by “the same fire brigade [as 10 years ago]” in the sense
of token identity (suppose the group of fire fighters did not change), see (13d). So
gleich/same do not require distinct referents but instead distinct senses—Arten des
Gegebenseins—as in Frege’s distinction between sense and reference. The sentence
The morning star is the same star as the morning star is decidedly odd whereas The
morning star is the same star as the evening star is fine, which led Frege to distin-
guish sense and reference (Frege 1892). Accordingly, (13d) is fine because although
the fire brigade referent is identical to the one 10 years ago (on the token reading)
there are two different senses—fire brigade now, fire brigade 10 years ago.
Therefore, while ähnlich/similar presuppose distinctiveness of referents,
gleich/same—on the token reading!—require distinctiveness of descriptions, orways
of identification. The type reading of gleich/same, on the other hand, requires that
referents are distinct, which is trivial because otherwise itwould not be a type reading.
16In Umbach (2014) ähnlich was said to carry a distinctiveness constraint, thereby explaining that
additive particles appear redundant with ähnlich but not with so (… Berta has such a car, too./?? a
similar car, too). But distinctiveness was wrongly conflated with irreflexivity in that paper.
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Summing up, all of the three variants of similarity expressions can be analyzed
as being based on a single similarity relation, sim(x, y, F). Their differences are due
to differences in selecting dimensions of comparison and in different preconditions
of usage.
(14) a. [[so/such]] = λP λx. sim(x, t, F
F complies with (12) (i)
b. [[ähnlich/similar]] = λP λy λx. sim(x, y, F
) & P(x) where t is the target of demonstration
) & P(x) where x y and F complies
with (12) (ii)
c. [[gleich / same]] =
type reading: λP λy λx. sim (x, y, F)& P(x) where x y and F complies with
token reading: λP λy λx. x=y & P(x)
(12) (iii) 
where x and y are given  
by different ways of identification
and
Two remarks: First, we do not touch upon the issue of constraints on determiners
due to reasons of space, (see Umbach 2014). Secondly, the precondition of usage in
(b) may be formulated as a presupposition. This is not possible in (c) because way of
identification is an intensional notion, which is not (yet) available in the similarity
framework (see Appendix).
4 Gradability of ähnlich/similar
This section focuses, first, on the question of how ähnlich/similar compares to other
gradable predicates, and what it means for two items to be more similar than some
other two items. In the second part of this section, cognitive models of similarity are
considered from the point of view of gradability, and the basic ideas of the model
suggested in this paper are introduced (technical details are given in the Appendix).
Finally, we will give a tentative answer to the question of why ähnlich/similar are
gradable but neither so/such nor gleich/same are.
4.1 What Does It Mean to Be More Similar?
For relative gradable adjectives, the truth of the positive form depends on the relevant
comparison class—Anna is tall may be true when comparing Anna to her classmates
and false when comparing her to her basketball teammates. Absolute gradable adjec-
tives do not require comparison classes because theymake use ofminimal ormaximal
degrees of the gradable property—The door is closed is true only if it is maximally
closed, and false if it is ajar (cf. Kennedy and McNally 2005). So unlike relative
adjectives, absolute ones include a lower or upper bound (or both).
Neither ähnlich nor similar admit reference to overt comparison classes, see (15a).
The examples improve slightly when referring to a relativizing state of affairs, see
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(15b). Examples are unmarked when referring to dimensions of comparison (15c),
which is no surprise since similarity generally requires dimensions.
(15) a. ??? Für ein ärmelloses Sommerkleid ist Annas Kleid dem von Berta
     ähnlich. /
                  ??? For a sleeveless summer dress Anna’s dress is similar to Berta’s dress.
b. (?) Dafür dass es aus den Sechzigern stammt, ist Annas Kleid dem von
        Berta ähnlich. /
        (?) Taking into account that it is from the sixties Anna’s dress is similar to
        Berta’s dress.
c. Im Hinblick auf Schnitt und Material ist Annas Kleid dem von Berta
        ähnlich. /
        Anna’s dress is similar to Berta’s dress with respect to cut and fabric.
Maxima can be linguistically indicated with the help of degree modifiers like voll-
ständig and completely. As noted earlier, neither ähnlich nor similar admit these
modifiers.17 In fact, the combinations vollständig ähnlich and completely similar
appear inconsistent, see (16a). Intuitively, if two items are similar, they do not fully
agree in their properties, and if agreement is complete, the items are no longer called
ähnlich/similar but instead gleich/same. So there is an upper bound, a maximum at
which two items cannot possibly be more similar than they are. But this maximum
is denoted by gleich/same, on either a token or a type reading, see (16b).18
(16) a. ?? Anna fährt ein vollkommen ähnliches Auto wie Berta./
                  ?? Anna drives a car completely similar to Berta’s.
     b. Anna fährt das gleiche Auto wie Berta. /
        Anna drives the same car that Berta drives.
The intuition that gleich/same denote maximal similarity is based on the idea that
the more features two items share, the more similar they are.19 It is important to
note, however, that this is one of two opposite perspectives. If there is a fixed set of
features, then two items are more similar than two other items if they share more of
these features.20 If, on the other hand, the set of features is variable, then two items
17Corpus research for completely similar in COCA (more than 500 million words) returned three
tokens; vollständig ähnlich in DEWAC (more than 1 billion words) returned only one token. A few
more were found for vollkommen ähnlich und völlig ähnlich, the latter including a famous subtitle
of a drawing showing Leibniz in Park Herrenhausen saying
Leibniz behauptet, daß nicht zwei Blätter einander völlig ähnlich seien.
Leibniz claims that no two leaves are completely similar.
http://www.akg-images.de/archive/Leibniz-behauptet--da%C3%9F-nicht-zwei-Blatter-einander-
vollig-ahnlich-seien-2UMDHUKPV6X.html
18As one reviewer noted, this behavior is analogous to open intervals since the margin is not
contained but we can come arbitrarily close.
19We use an informal notion of ‘feature’ here, like ‘property’, or ‘dimension + value’.
20This is the perspective in Tversky (1977).
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may be similar w.r.t. a reduced feature set, even if they were not similar in the original
set. Take lens resolution in a camera, which is responsible for the details that can be
distinguished. If lens resolution is given, similarity can only be increased by changing
the facts in the world. But if lens resolution is decreased similarity is increased in
the sense that two items may be similar even if they were not similar in the original
resolution (while facts in the world did not change). The second perspective is the
one taken in the next section.
Considering gleich/same from this perspective, both the token and the type reading
entail maximal discriminating capacity in the following sense: The type reading
implies similarity, i.e. indistinguishability, in any representation spanned by N-
related dimensions regardless how fine-grained it might be, and the token reading
implies similarity in any representation at all (i.e. including accidental properties).
4.2 Gradability and Granularity
In Cognitive Science, models of similarity are either distance-based or feature-based.
Distance-based models, for example Gärdenfors’ (2000) Conceptual Spaces, start
out from distances between points in a geometrical space representing objects of the
domain in question. Similarity is determined by distance—the closer the points are
(in a given metric) the more similar are the corresponding objects. Similarity is an
intrinsic component of geometric representations and is exploited, e.g., in defining
convexity.
In a distance-based model the notion of distance provides a “degree” of similarity.
In degree-based accounts of gradability the meaning of the comparative, say, taller,
is given by comparing degrees—a is taller than b iff a’s height exceeds b’s height.
The positive, tall, is defined on top of the comparative by making use of a threshold
provided by a comparison class (e.g. Bierwisch 1987; Kennedy 1999)—a is tall iff
a’s height exceeds the threshold of the relevant comparison class.21
The comparative of ähnlich/similar can be straightforwardly defined in distance-
based models via the notion of distance (see, e.g., the comparative semantics for
resemble in Meier 2009). The problem would be the positive. It is hard to imagine
a way to define a predicate similar on the basis of the comparative, because there is
no principled way to determine the threshold—what would be a plausible distance
for two tables to count as similar?
21For a degree-based account of similar/different see also Alrenga (2007).
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The other type of Cognitive Science models of similarity are feature-based ones,
most prominently Tversky’s (1977) contrast model. Tversky argued that there are
empirical findings in conflict with the basic axioms of metric distance functions22:
(a) minimality is problematic in view of results concerning the identification proba-
bility for identical stimuli, (b) symmetry is apparently false—the judged similarity
of North Korea to Red China exceeds the judged similarity of Red China to North
Korea—and (c) triangle inequality is hardly compelling—Jamaica is similar to Cuba
(geographical proximity) andCuba is similar toRussia (political affinity) but Jamaica
and Russia are not similar at all.23
In view of these issues Tversky claimed that “… the assessment of similarity
between stimuli may better be described as comparison of features rather than as
the computation of metric distance between points” (p. 328). He proposed a model
in which similarity between two objects is computed on the basis of common and
distinctive features: Similarity of two objects increases with an increase of common
features and/or a decrease of distinctive ones.24 This idea is modelled by a function
S taking weighted sums of the feature sets A and B of objects a and b to an interval
scale such that sim(a, b) ≤ sim(c, d) iff S(a, b) ≤ S(c, d), where S(a, b) = θ f(A ∩ B)
− αf(A − B) − βf(B − A).25
As before in distance-based models, the notion of similarity in Tversky’s feature-
basedmodel corresponds to a “degree” of similarity, thereby facilitating comparative
statements. And as before, it is hard to imagine a way to define a predicate similar
on the basis of the comparative because there is no principled way to determine the
threshold.
The account of similarity proposed in this paper is feature-based. But instead of
summing up common and distinctive features it makes use of dimensions and of clas-
sifiers determining whether values on these dimensions count as distinct. Similarity
is defined in this account as indistinguishability with respect to given dimensions
and classifiers: Two objects are similar if relative to the relevant dimensions and
classifiers they are indistinguishable (see Appendix). In this account, the positive
form similar is given, and the comparative form, more-similar, has to be defined on
the basis of the positive.
22A metric distance function δ has to comply with
(i) minimality (δ(a, b) ≥ δ(a, a) = 0),
(ii) symmetry (δ(a, b) = δ(b, a)) and
(iii) triangle inequality (δ(a, b) + δ(b, c) ≥ δ(a, c)).
23It has to be mentioned though that these results are highly controversial. Before dismissing
transitivity on the basis of the Jamaica/Cuba/Russia example, one should consider the role of
switching features within the two comparison steps. On symmetry, there is a detailed study by
Gleitman et al. (1996) showing that the alleged asymmetry hinges on the way of presentation.
In Tversky’s original studies presentation was directional (North Korea is similar to Red China.).
As soon as presentation is non-directional (North Korea and Red China are similar) similarity is
found to be symmetric (which was already suggested by Tversky himself). For reflexivity, see the
discussion in Sect. 3.
24When speaking of features, Tversky refers to what we would call dimension + value pairs, that
is properties.
25α, β, θ denote weighting functions and f denotes a nonnegative scale.
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In addition to degree-based accounts, there are so-called vague-predicate accounts
of gradability,most prominentlyKlein (1980). In the latter, the comparative is defined
on the basis of the positive form by making use of different interpretation contexts,
i.e. (tripartite) partitions of the domain determining the extension of predicates. For
example, a is taller than b is true if there is an interpretation context such that a
counts as tall while b does not. The pros and cons of the two approaches have been the
topic of a longstanding debate. One core issue is that degree semantics presupposes
degrees, which are natural with adjectives like tall and old, since these adjectives
are associated with units of measurement. But what would be degrees in the case
of multidimensional adjectives like skillful and good and ähnlich/similar? If you
think of multidimensional adjectives as spanning a multidimensional space, points
in this space may be considered as degrees. But since points in a multidimensional
space lack a natural order, some extra order has to be imposed (as, e.g., in Sassoon
2013, see footnote 10). This seems to suggest that in the case of multidimensional
adjectives, vague-predicate approaches are more natural.
We adapt the idea of vague-predicate approaches by making use of representa-
tions of different granularity. Less granular representations have less discriminating
capacity (pace dimensions and classifiers), and the lower the discriminating capacity
of a representation is, the more items are similar, i.e. indistinguishable. Since the
basic predicate similar is defined relative to a representation, the comparative will
also be relative to a representation. We define the comparative in the following way:
Two items a and b are more similar than two items c and d in a representation F if and
only if there is a less granular representation F ′ such that a and b are similar in F ′ while c
and d are not (Appendix, Definition 6, see also the remark on lens resolution at the end of
Sect. 4.1).
Comparing this account to the Kleinian vague-predicate account, there are two
points to be noted: First, one major characteristic of the Kleinian account is the elim-
ination of degrees. However, the representations employed in defining a comparative
of the similarity predicate include points in attribute spaces, which are in some sense
analogous to degrees, thereby raising the question of why, in the similarity-based
account, degree-like entities still play a role.26 The answer is straightforward: Klein
assumes predicates denoted by the positive forms, e.g. tall, to be given. The similar
relation, in contrast, is not assumed to be given, but instead defined via representa-
tions. So points in attribute spaces are already required when defining the predicate
denoted by the positive forms ähnlich/similar, independent of the definition of the
comparative.
On a related issue, while Klein’s account presupposes a natural order on the items
in the domain, e.g., w.r.t height, there is no natural order of similarity—being similar
is in general relative to a representation. The requirement for Kleinian interpretation
contexts to be consistent with the order on the domain can be seen as a grounding
requirement: Interpretations must comply with the given structure of the world.
Representations are the counterpart to interpretation contexts, raising the question of
26Many thanks to the reviewer who pointed out this question.
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whether there is a grounding requirement for representations. In fact, there is such a
requirement built into the similarity framework bymeans of a consistency constraint:
Classifiers have to be consistent with the results of the predicates they correspond to
(Appendix, Definition 2).
So from a broader perspective, both representations and Kleinian interpretation
contexts are grounded in factual matters. The Kleinian account directly refers to
orderings in the domain—this is why interpretation contexts need not themselves be
ordered. In the similarity account, representations have to be ordered, thereby lifting
the Kleinian order requirement to the level of representations.
Let us finally come to the question why the ähnlich/similar variety of similarity
expressions is gradable while neither so/such nor gleich/same are. It turns out that the
explanation is straightforward, in both cases referring to the need of a less granular
representation in defining the comparative.
In the case of so/such, representations other than the actual one are inaccessible
because so/such are demonstratives instead of content words and thus have to be
evaluated in the actual context. Since representations are clearly part of the context,
they are part of what cannot be shifted in the case of demonstratives.
In the case of gleich/same, maximal discriminative capacity is required—
type identity entails indistinguishability in any representation spanned by the N-
related dimensions, token identity entails indistinguishability in any representa-
tion whatsoever. In either case, defining a comparative making use of less granular
representations is ruled out.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, three types of expressions were compared that express similarity in
some sense—so/such, ähnlich/similar and gleich/same—starting from the observa-
tion that ähnlich/similar are gradable but neither so/such nor gleich/same are. Their
semanticswas compared on the basis of a common similarity relation revealing differ-
ences in, e.g., the selection of dimensions of comparison and the status of reflexive
pairs. The similarity relation is spelled out as indistinguishability in amathematically
precise framework of representations combining multi-dimensional attribute spaces
with classification functions. A predicate more-similar was defined in a Kleinian
style making use of representations of varying granularity. The definition predicts
gradability of ähnlich/similar but not of so/such and gleich/same.
Thepaper provides a semantic analysis of three closely related types of expressions
which have, if at all, been considered only in isolation. Moreover, it can be seen as a
contribution to a long-standing debate on sameness and indistinguishability in natural
language (see, e.g., Nunberg 1984, 2004; Lasersohn 2000; Barker 2010).
Future research will extend the analysis to include demonstratives like dieser/this,
the notorious contrast between German derselbe and der gleiche and the contrast
between English same and identical, and also include expressions of difference.
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Appendix: Granularity in Multi-dimensional Attribute
Spaces
In the Appendix, the basic mathematical ideas and definitions of the similarity
framework are presented. For more details see Gust and Umbach (to appear).
Domains and Representations
The core of the appendix are sets of representations equipped with a preorder struc-
ture. This preorder implements a concept of granularity andwill be used to construct a
predicatemore_similar based on a similarity relation.We startwith defining a domain
as a subset of the universe together with a set of predicates and non-overlapping sets
of positive and negative examples for each predicate.
Definition 1 Domain
A domain is a quadruple 〈D, _+, _−, P〉 with:
• D a set of individuals/entities (called the carrier of the domain),
• P = {p1, … pn} a set of predicates over D, (a subset of the powerset of D)
• _+: P (D) a function which assigns (a finite set of) positive examples to each
predicate,
for _+(p) we write p+
• _−: P (D) a function which assigns (a finite set of) negative examples to each
predicate,
for _−(p) we write p−
• ∀p ∈ P : p+ ∩ p− = ∅
We view the elements of D as entities to which we have only indirect access via
a (generalized) measure function μ which constructs representations of the entities
in D in an attribute space F much like observables in physics. Attribute spaces are
common structures for representation.27 They generalize vector space approaches
in allowing heterogeneous dimensions equipped with value sets of different scales
(nominal, ordinal, interval, ratio etc.), where value sets may themselves be attribute
spaces.
27Attribute spaces are related to the classical frame approaches (Minsky 1975). Other related
approaches are feature structures which are widely used in linguistic formalisms (Carpenter 1992).
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An attribute space F is given by a set of attributes A = {a1…an}, such that for
each ai in A there is a set of possible values Vai of ai. Elements of D are mapped to
points in Va1× … × Van, the carrier of the attribute space F.
A representation includes an attribute space F, a (generalized) measure function
μ mapping elements of a domain into the attribute space, and a set of classification
functions p* talking about points in the attribute space. These classification functions
(short classifiers) serve as approximations28 of the predicates in P. Moreover, the
extensions of the classifiers will be assumed to be convex. This means that F comes
with a convex closure operator cl and p*must be true on cl(μ(p+)).29 Intuitively, using
the n-dimensional Euclidean space as an example, this means that the extensions of
the classifiers must not have holes, notches or coves in the representation space F.
Definition 2 Representation
A representation = 〈〈F, cl 〉, μ, _*, 〉 of a domain = 〈D, _+, _−, P〉 is given
by
• an attribute space F, with a closure operator cl
(we will write F for 〈F, cl〉 if we are not interested in the closure operator cl)
• a measure function μ: D F,
• a function _*: P {true, false}F (again we write p* for _*(p) and call them
classifiers)30
together with the consistency conditions
• ∀p∈P the extension of p* must be convex in 〈F, cl〉
• ∀p∈P ∀x∈p+: p*(μ(x)) = true
• ∀p∈P ∀x∈p−: p*(μ(x)) = false
From this we get μ(p+i ) ∩ μ(p−i ) = ∅.
As mentioned above, attribute spaces are familiar methods of representation. What
distinguishes attribute spaces and the representations proposed in this paper is the
idea of classifiers on attribute spaces. On the worldy side, a domain includes a set
of relevant predicates p∈P. On the representation side these predicates have coun-
terparts, namely classifiers p*∈P*. By P* we denote the set of all (basic) classifiers:
P* = {p* | p∈P}. These classification functions are required to be consistent with
their corresponding predicates over D; more precisely, they have to agree in truth
value on the set of positive/negative exemplars known for the original predicate (see
Definition 2).
While attribute spaces can provide highly structured representations, classifiers
provide binary features (attributes with possible values in {true, false}). Given a
set of basic classifiers we assume the possibility to construct derived classifiers by
28More precisely: p* z μ approximates p.
29This includes all points in the convex closure of the images of the positive exemplars. For convex
closure operators see Korte et al. (1991). For the concept of convexity in conceptual structures see
(Gärdenfors 2000). Intuitively, the convex closure of a subset X of F is the smallest convex subset
of F containing X.
30where {true, false}F is the set of characteristic functions in F. Additionally we expect that
classification functions come with algorithmic methods to compute these functions.
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Fig. 1 Domains and representations
logical operations: For the logical conjunction this works fine (convex sets are closed
under intersection). For the logical disjunction we have to apply the convex closure
operator cl to the result. For negation this does not work at all. So we do not allow
to define complex classifiers by applying negation to elementary ones. We name the
set of derived classifiers P̃∗ (Fig. 1).
Indiscernibility
Given a system of predicates P we can ask, which elements in a domain D can be
distinguished. There are two reasons why we may not be able to distinguish between
two elements of D:
– Two elements may lead to the same value of the function μ. Then there is no way
to discriminate between the two elements.
– The two elements disagree on μ (so we see them as different), but they agree on
all classification functions in P̃∗.





For x, y ∈ F : x ∼F y ≡ ∀q ∈ P̃∗, q(x) ↔ q(y)
where P̃∗ is the set of all derived classifiers.
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This relation talks about points inF. However, the similarity relationwe are interested
in talks about elements of the domain D. So we have to apply the measure function
first:
Definition 4 Similar
∀x, y ∈ D : sim(x, y,F) ≡ μ(x) ∼F μ(y)
Obviously, Definition 4 defines an equivalence relation on D.
The indiscernibility relation provides attribute spaces with a level of granularity,
facilitating comparison of attribute spaces of distinct granularity which are identical
otherwise.
Granularity and Gradability
For two representations F and F ′ we can ask whether one is more fine-grained than
the other, that is, whether there are entities that can be distinguished in one repre-
sentation but not in the other. Since indiscernability of entities in a representation
depends on the set of dimensions of the corresponding F and of the corresponding
predicates P given inF , granularity of representations depends on these parameters,
too. Maybe there are more constraints we would like to impose on systems of repre-
sentations to make such a system coherent in some sense. But we will not go into
details here.
On representations we can define a reflexive and transitive relation (a preorder),
which relates granularity levels:









is coarser than iff
(a) there is a function f such that 
the following diagram commutes: 
(b) x y F : x y  f(x) f(y)
This means that what is indiscernible in the finer representation cannot be
discriminated in the coarser representation. The strict version < is used such that
F is finer than F ′, or F ′ is coarser than F , if F < F ′ (in a preorder: x < y if x ≤ y
but not y ≤ x).
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Based on our similarity relation sim and the preorder on representations we define
a general relation more_sim(a, b, c, d, F), which is intended to be true if a is more
similar to b than c is to d, with respect to a representation F .
Definition 6 More similar
Given a representation F we define
more_sim(a, b, c, d, ) iff 
(a)  : sim(a, b, )  sim(c, d, ) 
(b)  : sim(c, d, )  sim(a, b, ) 
The widely used 3-place version more_sim(x, y, z, F) in the sense that x is more
similar to z than y can be defined straightforwardly by:
more_sim(a, b, c,F) ≡ more_sim(a, b, c, b,F)
This approach shows how tomodel different similarity situations by selecting suitable
sets of representations.
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Learning Impairments in Rats
with Lesions of Orbital Frontal Cortex
David S. Tait, Ellen E. Bowman, Silke Miller, Mary Dovlatyan,
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Abstract The term ‘cognitive structures’ is used to describe the fact that mental
models underlie thinking, reasoning and representing. Cognitive structures gener-
ally improve the efficiency of information processing by providing a situational
framework within which there are parameters governing the nature and timing of
information and appropriate responses can be anticipated. Unanticipated events that
violate the parameters of the cognitive structure require the cognitive model to be
updated, but this comes at an efficiency cost. In reversal learning a response that
had been reinforced is no longer reinforced, while an alternative is now reinforced,
having previously not been (A+/B− becomes A−/B+). Unanticipated changes of
contingencies require that cognitive structures are updated. In this study, we exam-
ined the effect of lesions of the orbital frontal cortex (OFC) and the effects of the
selective serotonin reuptake inhibitor (SSRI), escitalopram, on discrimination and
reversal learning. Escitalopram was without effect in intact rats. Rats with OFC
lesions had selective impairment of reversal learning, which was ameliorated by
escitalopram. We conclude that reversal learning in OFC-lesioned rats is an easily
administered and sensitive test that can detect effects of serotonergic modulation on
cognitive structures that are involved in behavioural flexibility.
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1 Introduction
The frontal lobes of the human brain are thought to be the ‘seat of being’, providing
functions that are quintessentially human. These include language but also functions
related to having goals, considering consequences, weighing options, abstracting
rules, making plans for the future, and free-will: in short, the frontal lobes hold the
cognitive structures that give rise to the essence of human ‘self’. These are what
Whitehead invoked when he wrote “the life of a human being receives its worth, its
importance, from the way in which unrealised ideals shape its purposes and tinge its
actions. The distinction between men and animals is in one sense only a difference
in degree. But the extent of the degree makes all the difference” (Whitehead 1938,
pp. 37–38).
It is not far-fetched to suggest that a hungry foraging rat has ‘unrealised ideals’
and that these are brought to bear in driving its behaviour and response choice,
which determine future action. Furthermore, the frontal lobes of the rat contribute
to this goal-directed behaviour and, from this, cognitive structures may be inferred.
Therefore, quantifying this behaviour should demonstrate that it is possible, even
if only within a relatively restricted cognitive domain, to measure the extent of
the degree of difference referred to by Whitehead (1938).
Humans can verbalise many mental (cognitive) functions by introspection and
communicate this to others.Without recourse to language, however, cognition cannot
be directly measured, but rather only indirectly inferred from behaviour. The chal-
lenge then becomes that of finding suitable measures of behaviour that reflect the
cognitions of interest in different species in order to take a comparative approach to
understanding the neural basis of cognition. Such an approach has the obvious value
that it could inform our understanding of fundamental properties of cognitive oper-
ations (Miller and Cohen 2001). However, there is an additional potential benefit, in
that it enables the refinement of ‘animalmodels’ of human psychiatric disorders, such
as schizophrenia or depression, in which cognitive flexibility is impaired (Murray
et al. 2008; Kehagia et al. 2010; Murphy et al. 2012; Gilmour et al. 2013; Waltz
2017). In recent years pharmaceutical companies have curtailed investment in, or
abandoned altogether, research in to treatments for mental illness and other funders
are not stepping in to counteract this trend.We recently argued that one of the reasons
for this retreat is that ‘translational research’ has often failed to deliver its promise
but, while limits of ‘animal models’ must be acknowledged, they do have value in
providing an understanding of the neural mechanisms of specific symptoms (Insel
et al. 2012).
Thus, there are multiple good reasons to identify those cognitive structures that
are relevant for human health and wellbeing and are both likely to be evolution-
arily conserved and can be readily measured and quantified in different species.
Escitalopram Restores Reversal Learning … 391
The capacity to behave flexibly is an adaptation that is fundamental for evolu-
tionary fitness and is quantifiable in many different species. This makes studies
of behavioural, and the presumed underlying cognitive, flexibility exemplary for this
purpose.
1.1 How Is Behavioural Flexibility Measured and Cognitive
Flexibility Inferred?
Cognitive structures improve the efficiency of information processing by providing
a situational framework within which there are parameters governing the nature
and timing of information and appropriate responses can be anticipated. In a highly
predictable situation, unanticipated events require flexibility: the cognitive model is
updated so that appropriate responses are generated. However, this updating incurs
a cost, usually measured as additional time or experience required to learn under the
changed conditions.
Most assays of cognitive flexibility exploit paradigms from the early psychology
literature measuring perceptual attentional shifting (examples include theWisconsin
Card Sorting Test (Berg 1948) and the intra-/extra-dimensional (ID/ED) set shifting
task (Lawrence 1949) or response switching (examples include task switching
(Jersild 1927) and ‘learning set’ (Harlow 1949)). Some tests include elements of both
perceptual shifting and task or response switching (see Floresco and Jentsch 2011),
which could be problematic if shifting and switching are separable processes (for
an excellent discussion of this see Ravizza and Carter 2008)). The third paradigm
that is frequently used as a presumed measure of cognitive flexibility is reversal
learning: after one reward pairing has been learned (e.g., ‘A+/B−’) it is reversed (e.g.,
‘A−/B+’). Reversal learning has a long history of use, but it has become increas-
ingly popular, particularly in the last decade, because of the ease with which it can be
measured in different species, making it particularly useful for translational research
(for review, see Izquierdo et al. 2017).
In all of these measures of cognitive flexibility, the assumption is that a cognitive
structure is formed due to the repetition of a particular situational context (i.e., a
stable ‘A+/B−’ association; an attentional focus on a particular stimulus feature; an
effective response strategy). The anticipation of future stability means that when it
is violated (i.e., ‘A+/B−’ becomes ‘A−/B+’; another stimulus attribute is relevant;
an alternative response strategy is more effective), there is a ‘cost’, measured in
retardation of learning, as the cognitive model is updated.
It has long been established that reversal learning is more rapid if the reversal is
a reversion to a previous learned association. Furthermore, reversals are particularly
rapid when they repeat serially (Harlow 1949). The benefit from repeating a reversal
could arise in part from familiarity with the particular stimuli and the task require-
ments and is thus similar to the benefit of over-training (Dhawan et al. 2019).Abenefit
of repeating a reversal could also be due to incorporation into the cognitive structure
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the concept that ‘reversals may occur’ (Izquierdo et al. 2017). In this study, we sought
to tease these apart in the context of lesions of the orbital frontal cortex (OFC). We
selected this particular brain region because it has repeatedly been shown to impair
reversal learning in many different forms (for review see Izquierdo et al. 2017).
In addition, serotonin has been implicated in reversal learning (Boulougouris et al.
2007; Bari et al. 2010; Brigman et al. 2010). Therefore, we investigated the effects
of the selective serotonin reuptake inhibitor (SSRI), escitalopram, on discrimination
and reversal learning in OFC-lesioned rats, and on prefrontal Fos immunoreactivity.
2 Methods
2.1 Animals
Twenty-eight naïve male Lister hooded rats (Harlan, UK) were used. The rats were
pair-housed and maintained on a 12-h light/dark schedule (lights on at 7 a.m.), with a
diet of 15–20 g of standard laboratory chow each day with water available ad libitum.
The initial weight rangewas between 300 and 350 g. At completion of the experiment
the weight range was between 310 and 390 g. All procedures were carried out in
accordance with the UK Animals (Scientific Procedures) Act 1986.
2.2 Apparatus
The apparatus for the task and the basic testing protocol was the same as used during
the rat attentional set-shifting task andhave beendescribed in detail elsewhere (Birrell
and Brown 2000; Tait et al. 2018). In brief, the testing arena was constructed from
large plastic home-cages (69.5 cm × 40.5 cm × 18.5 cm), with internal wooden
runners permittingPerspexpanels to selectively occlude either or both of two adjacent
compartments, occupying one-third of the length of the cage, from the waiting area
(the remaining two-thirds of the length).Within eachof these compartments a ceramic
digging bowl, containing scented digging media, could be placed.
2.3 Surgery
Fourteen rats were anaesthetised with an isoflurane (4% and reduced to 1% to main-
tain anaesthesia) and oxygen mix. 0.06 M ibotenic acid was administered bilaterally
using a 0.5 µl Hamilton syringe with a 30 gauge needle attached, to target the orbital
frontal cortex, at stereotaxic co-ordinates; tooth bar −3.3 mm, AP +4.0 mm, ML
±2.0mm,DV−4.5mm (from skull surface) (0.3µl per site) over 2.5min. The needle
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was left in situ for 3min after administration. Rats were administered a 0.05ml injec-
tion (s.c.) of the anti-inflammatory, carprofen, and a 0.25 ml injection (i.p.) of the
sedative, diazepam, prior to surgery. One lesioned rat died two weeks post-surgery,
and before any testing.
Fourteen rats were administered sterile phosphate buffer instead of ibotenic acid
and were assigned to the control groups.
2.4 Experiment 1: The Effects of Escitalopram on Reversal
Learning
2.4.1 Behavioural Training
Between 10 and 20 days after surgery, 11 rats (lesion group n = 5; control group n
= 6) were tested on the reversal learning task. The rats were first given experience
of digging in ceramic bowls (of the size used for the test) and habituating to the food
reward. Bowls were placed in the home-cage, filled with sawdust and a quantity of
Honey Loops® (Kellogg Company, Manchester, UK). By the following morning, the
foodwas always eaten.On the training day, ratswere placed in thewaiting areas of the
testing cage, and underwent three stages of training. In stage 1, sawdust-filled bowls,
with food bait (half of a Honey Loop) buried in each, were placed in the two smaller
compartments, and the partitions were removed allowing rats to approach the bowls
in turn, uncover and eat both of the cereal pieces. This was repeated for a total of six
trials. If the rat did not uncover the rewards from both bowls within 10 min of being
given access to them, then the partitions were lowered, both bowls were rebaited and
the trial repeated. To ensure that the rats would respond promptly during sessions
when escitalopram would be administered, they were given additional training in the
test. In stage 2, rats were exposed to each of the exemplars that they would encounter
the following day during testing. The exemplars were paired as they would be during
testing, but with odours and media presented separately (see Table 1). Both bowls
were baited with half a Honey Loop, and rats were exposed to each pair twice (sides
switched). The rat was given 10 min to obtain the reward from each bowl as in stage
1 of the training. During stage 3 the rat learned two simple discriminations, in which
Table 1 The list of exemplars used and their pairings. Exemplars are paired to reduce the complexity
of counterbalancing. Medium pairings were chosen to minimise olfactory differences within a pair
The exemplars used
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the bowls had different odours (the sawdust was scented with mint or oregano) or
were filled with different digging media (paper confetti or small polystyrene pieces),
and the rat had to learn which of the two bowls was baited.
The side of the baited bowl was determined pseudo-randomly for each trial, with a
constraint being that there were no more than three consecutive trials with the reward
on the same side. If the rat dug in the correct bowl, the latency to dig was recorded
and that trial was recorded as correct. The trial terminated when the rat returned to
the waiting area of the box, at which point the barrier was lowered and the bowls
re-baited. If the rat dug in the incorrect bowl, the latency to dig was recorded and the
trial wasmarked as incorrect, but the rat was still permitted to continue to explore that
bowl; the trial was only terminated when the rat returned to the waiting area, at which
point the barrier was lowered. For the initial four trials at each stage of the test, the
rat was allowed dig in the correct bowl to recover the reward after an initial incorrect
response; after the fourth trial an incorrect response terminated the trial. Whether
the rat initiated digging in the first bowl encountered or whether he explored both
bowls prior to initiating digging was also recorded. The rat was given up to 10 min
to uncover the reward from the baited bowl; if the reward was not uncovered the
partitions were lowered and the experimenter waited until the rat showed interest
again.
Criterion performancewas six consecutive correct trials (the probability ofmaking
a correct choice 6 times consecutively by chance is 0.015), which could include the
first four trials.
2.4.2 Behavioural Testing
On the first test day, the rat performed two series of three discriminations (Table 2).
Both series consisted of a compound discrimination (acquisition (ACQ)), in which
the rat must learn a novel discrimination between two exemplars of one dimen-
sion, ignoring the exemplars of an irrelevant dimension; a reversal (novel-reversal
Table 2 Within the two
series of discriminations, the
order of exemplar pair
exposure and whether odour
or medium was rewarded in
series 1 or 2 was
counterbalanced, and
matched between groups









Reversal (REV) O2/O1 M1/M2




Reversal (REV) M4/M3 O3/O4
Reversal (BACK) M3/M4 O3/O4
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(REV)), where the exemplars remain the same as in the ACQ, but the correct and
incorrect exemplars are reversed; a second reversal (reversal-back (BACK)), where
the correct/incorrect status of the exemplars is reversed such that the discrimination
is the same as during the ACQ stage. In the second series of three discriminations,
novel stimuli were used, and the dimensional relevance to solving the discriminations
was swapped.
The task advanced to the next stage when the rat had reached criterion (six correct
trials consecutively). The procedure followed was the same for each stage: for the
first four trials, the rat had the opportunity to dig in the correct bowl if it had first
dug in the incorrect bowl. Thereafter, when the rat started to dig in either bowl, the
partition to the other compartment was lowered to prevent access to the other bowl.
The trial was not terminated until the rat returned to the waiting area. If the rat did
not dig within 10 min, the partitions were lowered, separating the rat from the bowls.
The trial was aborted and recorded as ‘non dig’.
Subsequent testing followed the same protocol, although rats did not need to be
trained again for these tests.
2.4.3 Counterbalancing
Order of exposure to the dimensions (i.e., initial rewarded dimension being odour
or medium) and to the exemplars was not fully counter-balanced due to the number
of exemplars and their possible combinations. Exemplars were presented in pre-
assigned pairs (see Table 1) and within each dose, starting dimension and order of
presentation of pairs was balanced. Counterbalancingwasmatched between lesioned
and control rats.
2.4.4 Drug Administration
Rats were administered a 1 ml/kg (s.c.) injection of sterile saline on the two days
prior to the first test. On the day of testing, rats were administered either a 1 ml/kg
(s.c.) injection of sterile saline or a 1, 2, or 4 mg/kg (s.c.) injection of escitalopram
(in sterile saline at 1 ml/kg) 30 min prior to testing. Administration of dose was
counterbalanced according to a Latin square design. Each rat received each dose
once, with the control and lesioned groups matched.
2.4.5 Histology
Rats were transcardially perfused with 4% paraformaldehyde in 0.1 M phosphate
buffer (PB) after anaesthesia with 0.8 ml Dolethal. The brains were sectioned (50
µm) and stained for neuronal nuclei (NeuN) and counterstained with cresyl violet to
map lesion extent, following standard protocols reported previously.
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2.4.6 Data Analysis
Trials to criterion data (excluding non-digs) were analysed by repeated measures
ANOVA (SPSS v 19.0) with dose (4 levels: vehicle, 1, 2 and 4 mg/kg escitalopram),
discrimination series (2 levels: first and second) and stage (3 levels: ACQ, REV
and BACK) as within subject variables, and group (2 levels: control and lesion) as
between subjects variable.
2.5 Experiment 2: Fos Activity After 1 mg/kg Escitalopram
2.5.1 Behavioural Training
Between 10 and 30 days after surgery, eight rats (lesion, n= 4; control, n= 4) were
trained and tested on the reversal learning task. A further eight rats (lesion, n = 4;
control, n = 4) were designated as their yoked controls. As rats were pair-housed,
within each pair, one rat was designated to perform the reversal learning task, and the
other would be its yoked control. The pair were trained and tested simultaneously.
The eight rats that underwent the reversal learning task were trained and tested as
described in experiment 1. The eight yoked controls underwent stage 1 of training
as previously described, but thereafter training was altered. For stage 2 of training,
yoked control rats dug in and obtained a single reward from each of two identical
sawdust-filled bowls, an equal number of times to the reversal learning rat. During
stage 3 of training, the yoked control rat was given access to two identical sawdust-
filled bowls, each containing reward. Each time the reversal learning rat obtained
reward, the yoked control rat was granted access to both bowls to obtain reward from
one of them.
2.5.2 Behavioural Testing
The day after training, the reversal learning rats performed the two series of three
discriminations as described in experiment 1. For the duration of testing, whenever
the reversal learning rat obtained a reward the yoked control rat was given access to
two identical sawdust-filled bowls and allowed to obtain reward from one of them.
2.5.3 Counterbalancing
With only two reversal learning rats in each condition counterbalancing of exemplars
was not possible. Therefore, exemplars were presented in pre-assigned pairs as in
experiment 1 and the order of exposure for all rats was the same.
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2.5.4 Drug Administration
Rats were administered a 1ml/kg (s.c.) injection of sterile saline for two days prior to
testing. On the day of testing, rats were administered either a 1 ml/kg (s.c.) injection
of sterile saline or a 1 mg/kg (s.c.) injection of escitalopram (1 mg/ml in sterile
saline) 30min prior to testing. There were therefore four conditions with two reversal
learning rats and two yoked controls in each: control/saline; control/escitalopram;
OFC lesion/saline; and OFC lesion/escitalopram.
2.5.5 Histology
Rats were transcardially perfused 90 min after completion of testing and brain
sections stained for neuronal nuclei (NeuN) and counterstained with cresyl violet
as for experiment 1. For Fos immunoreactivity, sections were treated initially as for
NeuN, except they were incubated in goat anti-Fos (dilution 1:8000) on a stirrer for
1 night, followed, after a 5 min wash in sterile PBS, by incubation on a shaker for
one hour in rabbit anti-goat biotinylated secondary antibody (vector IgG solution
at 5 µl/ml ADS). After washing in 0.1 M PBS again, sections were incubated on
a stirrer in Vectastain ABC complex (as above) for a further hour. Sections were
then washed in 0.1 M PBS again, and finally immersed in Sigma Fast DAB tablets
for approximately 10 min, with the time being determined by visual inspection of
the tissue. The tissue was removed when background staining was light but neurons
were clearly visible. Sections were washed again in 0.1 M PBS and then mounted
on treated glass slides, air-dried and cover-slipped with DPX. Fos positive neurons
in the prelimbic area of the medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC) and in the OFC were
counted by H. Lundbeck A/S.
2.5.6 Data Analysis
Trials to criterion data were analysed by repeated measures ANOVA (SPSS v 19.0)
with stage (3 levels: ACQ, REV and BACK) as within subject variables, and dose
(2 levels: vehicle and 1 mg/kg escitalopram) and group (2 levels: OFC lesion and
control) as between subject variables. Discrimination series was not used as a within
subject variable: whilst all rats completed the first series of discriminations, not all
rats completed all stages in the second. A mean of the data collected over the two
series was therefore used where rats had completed those stages.
Area-corrected Fos activation counts were analysed by repeated measures
ANOVA with side (2 levels: right and left) as the within-subjects variable, and dose
(as above), group (as above) and behaviour (2 levels: reversal learning and yoked
control) as between-subjects variables.
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Fig. 1 Coronal schematics of the rat brain (adapted from Paxinos and Watson 2006) showing





Lesion placement was visualised in the NeuN/cresyl violet stained sections (Fig. 1).
Approximately half of the lesions were positioned more dorsally, with the other half
positioned ventrally. All lesioned rats showed cell loss in ventral and lateral OFC
regions from bregma +5.00 to +3.50.
3.1.2 Behavioural Testing
Within a test, rats performed both discrimination series equally—there was no main
effect of discrimination series (F(1,9) = 0.8, not significant (ns)), nor was there any
interaction between discrimination series and any other variable. Data are therefore
presented collapsed across discrimination series. There was a main effect of stage
(F(2,18) = 29.6, p< 0.05) and contrasts confirmed that new acquisitions required fewer
trials to criterion than either novel-reversal (F(1,9) = 46.7, p < 0.05) or reversal-back
(F(1,9) = 18.0, p < 0.05). In addition, reversal-back was learned more readily than
novel reversals (F(1,9) = 16.8, p < 0.05) (Fig. 2).
There was a three-way interaction between dose, group and stage (F(6,54) = 4.9, p
< 0.05) (Fig. 3) in the context of no significant main effect of group (F(1,9) = 3.8, ns)
or interactions of dose and group (F(3,27) = 2.4, ns), dose and stage (F(6,54) = 1.3, ns)
or stage and group (F(2,18) = 2.8, ns). To probe this three-way interaction, corrected
ANOVAs (using the error term from the omnibus ANOVA) were performed for each
dose, with stage as within, and group as between-subjects variables.
In the vehicle condition, there was an interaction of stage and group (F2,54 = 5.9, p
< 0.05). Planned contrasts confirmed what is clear from Fig. 3: there was a difference
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Fig. 2 Mean + SEM trials
to criterion from experiment
1 collapsed across group and
dose to show the main effect
of stage. Reversal stages
required more trials to
criterion than the acquisition
(ACQ) The novel reversal
stage (REV) also required
more trials to criterion than
the reversal back (BACK)
Fig. 3 Mean + SEM trials
to criterion from experiment
1 collapsed across
discrimination series.
Lesioned rats were impaired
relative to control rats at the
REV and BACK stages only
after vehicle administration.
Escitalopram at all doses
ameliorate the effects of the
lesion without affecting
control rat performance
(Paxinos and Watson 2006)
between the groups at the REV (F6,54 = 10.6, p < 0.05) and BACK (F6,54 = 7.6, p <
0.05) stages, but not in the ACQ stage (F6,54 = 1.4, ns).
In the three escitalopram conditions, there were no main effects of group, nor any
interactions between group and stage. OFC-lesioned rat reversal performance is only
impaired relative to control rats in the vehicle group: escitalopram administration at
all three doses ameliorates the effects of the OFC lesion on both novel-reversals and
reversals-back.
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Fig. 4 Coronal schematics of the rat brain (adapted from Paxinos and Watson 2006) showing




Lesion placement was visualised in the NeuN/cresyl violet stained sections (Fig. 4).
All lesioned rats showed cell loss in ventral and lateral OFC regions from bregma+
5.00 to +3.50.
3.2.2 Behavioural Testing
Figure 5 shows the number of trials to criterion for each stage at each dose. All rats
completed the first series of discriminations, but not all completed the second series
within the 90-min testing window. Data were collapsed across discrimination series
(acquisition, novel reversal (REV) and reversal back (BACK)) where possible. No
Fig. 5 Mean + SEM trials
to criterion from experiment
2 collapsed across
discrimination series. The
pattern of impairment is
similar to that seen in
experiment 1, with the same
beneficial effect of
escitalopram administration
on reversal performance in
the lesioned rats
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statistically significant effects were found, likely due to variability within the small
sample size, although the visual trend in the data suggests escitalopram is improving
reversal learning in the lesioned rats as in experiment 1.
3.2.3 Fos Expression
Fos positive neurons were counted in the mPFC and OFC. Figure 6 shows area
corrected (count/mm2) Fos counts for mPFC. There was an interaction between drug
and group (F(1,8) = 6.87, p < 0.05): OFC-lesioned rats show greater Fos expression
in mPFC than controls and escitalopram induces a further increase in Fos expression
in rats with OFC lesions. The same pattern was also seen in the OFC (see Fig. 7):
Fig. 6 Mean + SEM Fos count/mm2 in the mPFC collapsed across side (behaving and yoked
rats combined). More Fos activity was recorded in the lesioned rats’ mPFC regardless of behaviour.
Escitalopram increased Fos activity in the lesioned rats (regardless of whether they were performing
a task or yoked control—not shown) without effect in the control rats (* interaction of group and
dose, p < 0.05)
Fig. 7 Mean + SEM Fos
count/mm2 in the OFC
collapsed across side
(behaving and yoked rats
combined). More Fos




activity in the lesioned rats
regardless of behaviour,
without effect in the control
rats
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an interaction between group and dose (F(1,8) = 5.75, p < 0.05) arose because OFC-
lesioned rats show greater Fos expression in surviving areas of OFC than was seen
in the intact OFC of controls. Escitalopram induces a further increase in activation
of remaining OFC neurons in OFC-lesioned rats.
4 Discussion
The aim of this study was to examine the nature of cognitive structures in the rat,
looking specifically at the underlying processes and cognitive structures in reversal
learning. As reported previously (Chase et al. 2012; McAlonan and Brown 2003;
Tait and Brown 2007; Tait et al. 2018), rats with non-selective OFC lesions are
impaired relative to controls during compound discrimination reversal learning. Our
new data demonstrates that this impairment occurs equally in both novel reversals
and reversals returning to a previously learned discrimination. This impairment is
ameliorated by administration of the SSRI, escitalopram, at all doses investigated (1,
2 and 4 mg/kg).
Expression of Fos protein in both themPFC and intact areas of OFCwas increased
in rats with OFC lesions. Escitalopram at 1 mg/kg potentiated this lesion-induced
Fos increase, regardless of the behaviours investigated, but had no effect on Fos
expression in control rats.
4.1 Reversal Learning
Previous investigations of serial reversal learning in rodents have involved consecu-
tive stages requiring alternation of responding, typically requiring a spatial discrimi-
nation (e.g., Béracochéa et al. 2003; Boulougouris et al. 2007; Stalnaker et al. 2007).
Serial discrimination reversal learning using visual stimuli has been reported in
primates (e.g., Clarke et al. 2007) and using olfactory stimuli in rats (Kinoshita
et al. 2008; Schoenbaum et al. 2003). In these studies, stimuli were “simple”, in
that there was one correct and one incorrect with no deliberately embedded irrel-
evant information—i.e, any discriminable feature of a stimulus could be used to
predict that stimulus’ reward status. Our task design adapted the rodent ID/ED atten-
tional set-shifting task, and therefore used compound stimuli—i.e., there was a dual
dimensionality to the stimuli, with one dimension’s features predicting reward status
and the other being uncorrelated with reward status. A compound discrimination
reversal must be more difficult than a simple discrimination reversal due to the addi-
tional requirement to filter out irrelevant information. Impaired performance at these
reversal stages can therefore reflect a reduced ability to either adapt to changes in
stimulus reward status, or to filter out this irrelevant information.
In a typical serial reversal learning task, there are several consecutive reversals,
with the subject required to switch and back and forth. Improvements occur with
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successive reversals. As our task design included a novel discrimination between
four reversal stages, the third reversal is similar to the first (both are novel-reversals),
and the fourth reversal is similar to the second (both are reversals-back). That we
observed no difference in performance between the first and second discrimination
series reversals, but that there is a difference between novel-reversals and reversals-
back, suggests that a learning set did not form. Our data thus demonstrate that novel-
reversals require more trials to learn than reversals-back. This difference likely arises
from the reversals-back being facilitated by familiarity with the particular stimuli,
rather than learning about reversals (whichwould also have benefitted the subsequent
reversals).
4.2 The Effects of OFC Lesions on Reversal Learning
The role of the OFC in reversal learning in rats is well documented (Ghods-Sharifi
et al. 2008; Kim and Ragozzino 2005; McAlonan and Brown 2003; Schoenbaum
et al. 2002, 2003; Murray et al. 2007; Chase et al. 2012; Tait and Brown 2007).
The processes underlying OFC lesion-induced reversal learning impairments are
less clear. We have previously reported that OFC lesions impair reversal learning in
compound discrimination reversal learning (McAlonan and Brown 2003) during a
test of attentional set-shifting, and that this impairment likely does not arise from
perseverative responding to previously rewarded stimuli (Tait and Brown 2007).
However, rats with OFC lesions do not benefit from forming an attentional set—there
was no difference in performance between intradimensional (ID) and extradimen-
sional (ED) shift stages in the OFC-lesioned rat (McAlonan and Brown 2003; Chase
et al. 2012). We have further reported that excitotoxic lesions of the nucleus basalis
magnocellularis of the basal forebrain also impair reversal learning and also result
in no difference between ID and ED shift performance (Tait and Brown 2008). In
these lesion studies where the ID/ED differences are lost, there is no evidence of
a difference between control and lesion group ED shift performances. Instead the
data suggest that the ID/ED difference is lost because of worsening performance
at the ID stage. Whilst the experimental design of these studies preclude drawing
strong conclusions about set-formation, it would be predicted that rats that fail to
form an attentional set would not show a shifting cost at the ED stage—i.e., rats try to
solve the ID and ED shift stages with no a priori dimensional bias, and there should
therefore be no difference in performance between those two stages. These data then
imply one of two possibilities: either OFC lesions and/or basal forebrain lesions
directly impair both reversal learning and attentional set-formation; or impairments
in reversal learning induce impairments in attentional set-formation. To partially
answer this question, we reported that OFC lesions do impair set-formation in rats
independently of reversal learning in a variant of the ID/ED task with multiple ID
stages and no reversal stages (Chase et al. 2012).We cannot yet, however, rule out the
reverse: the possibility that impairments in set-formation result in a reduced reversal
learning ability. However, given that there are considerable data demonstrating OFC
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lesion-induced reversal learning deficits outwith tests of compound discrimination
reversal learning, we are confident to conclude that the OFC-lesion induced deficits
in reversal learning that we report here are a reflection of a fundamental impair-
ment in reversal learning. That OFC-lesioned ratsmay find compound discrimination
reversal learning more difficult than simple discrimination reversal learning because
of an additional reduced ability to disregard the irrelevant information present in a
compound discrimination is a possibility, but unlikely to be the sole source of the
impairment. Furthermore, whilst our task is based on amodified version of the rodent
ID/ED task, it does not contain measures of attentional set-formation or set-shifting
per se, so attempts to draw conclusions on such would be overly speculative.
4.3 The Effects of Escitalopram on Reversal Learning
Increasing the availability of serotonin improves reversal learning in OFC-lesioned
rats, and does so in both novel-reversal and reversals-back.Whilst there is a consensus
that serotonergic (5-HT) manipulations impact reversal learning, reported results
depend not just on the specific manipulation, but also on the form of reversal
learning tested. Tryptophan depletion does not impair spatial reversal learning in
rats (van der Plasse and Feenstra 2008), but inhibition of tryptophan hydroxy-
lase by para-chlorophenylalanine does impair compound discrimination reversal
learning in an attentional set-shifting task (Lapiz-Bluhm et al. 2009). In primates,
5,7-dihydroxytryptamine lesions of OFC impairs visual discrimination reversal
learning—both in simple discrimination serial reversal learning and compound
discrimination reversal learning during an attentional set-shifting task (Clarke et al.
2007). Increasing endogenous 5-HT improves reversal learning in rodents: citalo-
pram, consisting of both the r- and s-citalopram enantiomers, improves proba-
bilistic reversal learning after both acute and sub-chronic dosing regimes (Bari et al.
2010). Whilst an acute administration of 1 mg/kg citalopram impairs, a higher dose
(10 mg/kg) improves, probabilistic reversal learning performance. Lower doses of
escitalopram, being more potent than citalopram, would be expected to produce
similar effects to higher doses of citalopram. Hence, the fact that we report ameliora-
tion of OFC lesion-induced reversal learning impairments at an escitalopram dose of
1mg/kg should not be considered a conflict with the data that show that the same dose
of citalopram impairs reversal learning. Indeed, Bari et al. (2010) discuss evidence
that low levels of citalopram induce different outcomes on PFC 5-HT availability,
which may explain their reported impairment. It has also been reported that vortiox-
etine, a SSRI and serotonin receptor modulator, ameliorates reversal learning in an
attentional set-shifting task in rats subjected to freezing stress (Wallace et al. 2014).
Reversal learning was thought to involve two distinct phases (see Sutherland
and Mackintosh 1971): initially, after the change in the reinforcement contingency
is detected, the response must extinguish; subsequent to a period of responding
randomly, the new association is gradually learned. We recently demonstrated that
this is overly simplistic: responding ‘at chance’ while seeking a solution is unlikely
Escitalopram Restores Reversal Learning … 405
to be governed by responding ‘by chance’ (Dhawan et al. 2019). While reversal
learning paradigms can depend onmodel-free learning, theymay also involvemodel-
based processes (Doll et al. 2012; Izquierdo et al. 2017; Dhawan et al. 2019). In
serial reversal learning tasks, performance improves with each reversal, as if the
animal learns, over-and-above the particular S+/S− attribute, a win-stay/lose-shift
rule, which Harlow (1949) referred to as a ‘learning set’. In the present study, the
rats performed a reversal and then reversed back only once, but already there was a
learning benefit. However, it is unlikely that this benefit arose from learning a ‘win-
stay rule’ because it did not extrapolate to either the first reversal of a subsequent
novel discrimination or the reversal back of that second discrimination reversal.
That neither OFC lesions, nor administration of escitalopram, affects the rela-
tionship between novel-reversals and reversals-back implies that there are similar
processes involved in each form of reversal—or, more specifically, processes that are
affected by OFC lesions and interactions with escitalopram mediate both reversing
and reversing back—and whilst the task is sensitive enough to distinguish between
novel-reversals and reversals-back, it is not sensitive enough to elucidate differences
after OFC lesions and escitalopram administration.
4.4 Fos Activity
The data from Fos expression suggest that there is increased, behaviourally indepen-
dent, activation in both mPFC and OFC after OFC lesions, and that this increased
activity is augmented by escitalopram with no significant effect on control animals.
The Fos expression reported here is similar in pattern to that seen in surviving mPFC
neurons after administration of the atypical antipsychotic, asenapine (Tait et al. 2009),
to rats with mPFC lesions. Specifically, rats with mPFC lesions show increased
activity in surviving mPFC neurons—an effect that is augmented by administra-
tion of asenapine—but that is again behaviourally independent. The similarity of
the activation pattern may suggest that both drugs act through overlapping mecha-
nisms on the mPFC, i.e. escitalopram by increasing serotonin levels and asenapine
by modulating activity of serotonin receptors (Homberg 2012).
The increased mPFC and OFC Fos expression in the rats with OFC lesions was
seen both when they were performing discrimination learning and reversals and also
in yoked controls. Consequently, we can conclude that this expression is not a marker
of activity driven by the cognitive processes underlying discrimination and reversal
learning. It is likely then that there is increased recruitment of PFC neurons resulting
from the lesion irrespective of the cognitive demands on the rats.
In intact rats, therewas similarly no difference in Fos expression in rats performing
the task or their yoked controls. This suggests that the cognitive processes mediated
by these brain regions likely require low levels of activity from a relatively large pool
of available neurons. Thus, our observations of low levels of Fos expression in the
control rats arise because few neurons are activated to a sufficient threshold that Fos
is expressed to a detectable level. In lesioned rats, with fewer PFC neurons, there
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must be increased recruitment of surviving neurons in order for cognition to approach
normal levels—more neurons need to activate to the threshold level where detectable
Fos is expressed because there are fewer neurons to fulfil their respective roles. In
the case of OFC-lesioned rats, this increased expression in a reduced number of
neurons reflects increased neuronal activity that is insufficient to normalise reversal
learning.However, escitalopram facilitates evengreater PFCactivity than could occur
otherwise, and this increased activity is sufficient to normalise reversal learning in
the OFC-lesioned rats. That we observed increased Fos activity in the mPFC of
the OFC-lesioned rats, as well as the OFC, is a reminder that a network of brain
regions underlies complex cognition and behavioural flexibility. mPFC neurons may
be recruited to compensate for the functions that are impaired when the OFC is
damaged. ThemPFC, being adjacent to the OFC, was also damaged to some extent in
most of the lesioned rats. Although this incidental mPFC damage did not result in the
same behavioural profile associated with targeted mPFC, it is possible that this is due
to compensatory elevation ofmPFC activity, as indicated by increased Fos activation,
in the survivingmPFC neurons. In both the case of asenapine-treatedmPFC-lesioned
rats and escitalopram-treated OFC-lesioned rats, behaviourally independent drug-
induced increases in activity in surviving neuronal populations likely facilitate the
cognitive processes that have been impaired by damage, but do not reflect activity
actually driven by the undertaking of those cognitive processes.
The fact that reversal learning can be readily measured in different species, using
species appropriate stimuli and responses, makes it a particularly valuable test for
translational psychopharmacological research (see Izquierdo et al. 2017). Serial
reversal learning is commonly used in non-human animals, often because this is away
to gather ‘additional data’without recourse to lengthy training of newdiscriminations
or the requirement to generate a large number of novel stimuli for testing. However,
serial reversals should be thought of as more complex than simply repetition of the
same thing. Reversing-back benefits from the additional familiarity with the stimuli,
which is also seen if an animal is given additional post-criterion trials of overtraining.
This effect is seen even in the absence of a benefit from the formation of ‘learning set’
(i.e., incorporating into the cognitive structure the concept that ‘reversals can occur’).
We report here no evidence of a learning set following a single reversal/reversed
back: subsequent reversals of new stimuli were not more rapidly acquired, even
while reversing backwas consistentlymore rapid than initial reversing. That notwith-
standing, we conclude that reversal learning in OFC-lesioned rats is both an easily
administered and sensitive test that can detect effects of serotonergic modulation on
cognitive structures that are involved in behavioural flexibility.
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Rat Ultrasonic Vocalizations as Social
Reinforcers—Implications
for a Multilevel Model of the Cognitive
Representation of Action and Rats’
Social World
Tobias Kalenscher, Lisa-Maria Schönfeld, Sebastian Löbner, Markus Wöhr,
Mireille van Berkel, Maurice-Philipp Zech, and Marijn van Wingerden
Abstract Rats are social animals. For example, rats exhibit mutual-reward prefer-
ences, preferring choice alternatives that yield a reward to themselves as well as to a
conspecific, over alternatives that yield a reward only to themselves.We have recently
hypothesized that such mutual-reward preferences might be the result of reinforcing
properties of ultrasonic vocalizations (USVs) emitted by the conspecifics. USVs
in rats serve as situation-dependent socio-affective signals with important commu-
nicative functions. To test this possibility, here, we trained rats to enter one of two
compartments in a T-maze setting. Entering either compartment yielded identical
food rewards as well as playback of pre-recorded USVs either in the 50-kHz range,
which we expected to be appetitive or therefore a potential positive reinforcer, or in
the 22-kHz range predicted to be aversive and therefore a potential negative rein-
forcer. In three separate experimental conditions, rats chose between compartments
yielding either 50-kHz USVs versus a non-ultrasonic control stimulus (condition 1),
22-kHz USVs versus a non-ultrasonic control stimulus (condition 2), or 50-kHz
versus 22-kHz USVs (condition 3). Results show that rats exhibit a transient pref-
erence for the 50-kHz USV playback over non-ultrasonic control stimuli, as well
as an initial avoidance of 22-kHz USV relative to non-ultrasonic control stimuli on
trend-level. As rats progressed within session through trials, and across sessions,
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these preferences diminished, in line with previous findings. These results support
our hypothesis that USVs have transiently motivating reinforcing properties, puta-
tively acquired through association processes, but also highlight that thesemotivating
properties are context-dependent and modulatory, and might not act as primary rein-
forcers when presented in isolation. We conclude this article with a second part
on a multilevel cognitive theory of rats’ action and action learning. The “cascade”
approach assumes that rats’ cognitive representations of action may be multilevel. A
basic physical level of action may be invested with higher levels of action that inte-
grate emotional, motivational, and social significance. Learning in an experiment
consists in the cognitive formation of multilevel action representations. Social action
and interaction in particular are proposed to be cognitively modeled as multilevel.
Our results have implications for understanding the structure of social cognition, and
social learning, in animals and humans.
Keywords Rats · Ultrasonic vocalization · Prosocial behavior · Reinforcement
learning · Cognitive representation ·Multilevel categorization · Cascades
Part I: The Experiments
1 Introduction
Imagine you are passing through a heavy door that separates two parts of your
university building. You notice that a person behind you also wants to walk through
that heavy door. As an act of politeness, you hold the door open for him. Realizing
this, he smiles at you and thanks you for your courtesy.
Why did you engage in such a (mildly) costly act of consideration? There are
many putative reasons that may act in concert to support prosocial actions of this
kind: adhering to the social norm that one should always help each other, following
a generalized reciprocity principle as you may hope that someone else might hold
a door open for you in the future, and working on your reputation as a friendly
person. In addition, it is also possible that your behavior might be reinforced by the
thankful response of the recipient of your help. According to this mechanism, you
might have perceived the social signals emitted by him—his smile and his utter-
ance of thankfulness—as rewarding, and, by consequence, the rewarding nature of
these social signals might have increased the probability of repeating this helpful act
in the future; that is, you will hold open the door for the next stranger again. This
explanation is particularly intriguing as social signals are physical signals that can be
multi-modally detected by the body’s senses (smile: vision; words of thankfulness:
auditory), yet they do not have primary hedonic value in themselves. Nevertheless,
these signals have social significance that can influence, reinforce, and structure
social behavior. In other words, stimuli like utterances and facial expressions can be
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understood on different levels of conceptual meaning: physical, social and motiva-
tional salience that, jointly, is perceived as part of our social world, and thus govern
social behavior.
It is intuitively evident that the ability to attach motivational and emotional signif-
icance to events in the social world is of prime importance for social cognition (Fiske
& Taylor, 1984). However, our understanding of social cognition and its evolution
is still incomplete. One likely reason is that we lack a proper conceptual framework
to comprehend the cognitive, emotional and motivational processes associated with
social stimuli. For instance, it is unclear how the attribution of motivational signifi-
cance to physical stimuli is cognitively and neurally represented, and which features
discriminate a social element from a non-social item. Simply speaking, individuals
are influenced by social stimuli in a different way than by similar stimuli that lack
social significance (e.g., a smile on the face of a display mannequin). However, it is
unknown how individuals disambiguate between social and non-social stimuli, and
how they attribute social and motivational significance to those stimuli.
Human social behavior ismulti-faceted, is notoriously sensitive to cultural, experi-
enced, cognitive, and gender-specific influences, and it is the outcome of a multitude
of different motives. It is therefore imperative to avoid, or, at least, to control for
possible confounding factors when studying social interaction. Although there is a
rich literature on social cognition in the human domain (Fehr & Fischbacher, 2003;
Fehr & Schmidt, 1999; Strombach et al., 2015), the best way to avoid confounding
variations in cultural backgrounds, prior expectations and the tendency to show
socially desirable behavior is to study social behavior in non-human animals. More-
over, we have recently argued in favor of complementing traditional human research
with careful comparisons across species because such comparative approaches may
offer answers to the question as to why humans make social and economic decisions
as they do (Kalenscher & van Wingerden, 2011). Here, we plan to use rats as model
organisms. Rats are highly social animals (Blanchard&Blanchard, 1990; Blanchard,
Flannelly & Blanchard, 1988) with a rich social behavior repertoire, including social
play behavior (rough-and-tumble play; Siviy & Panksepp, 2011; Vanderschuren,
Achterberg, & Trezza, 2016) and acoustic communication through ultrasonic vocal-
izations (USVs; Brudzynski, 2013; Wöhr & Schwarting, 2013). Furthermore, rats
havebeen shown to exhibit prosocial behavior in various contexts andways (Ben-Ami
Bartal, Decety, &Mason, 2011; Hernandez-Lallement, vanWingerden,Marx, Srejic,
& Kalenscher, 2015; Hernandez-Lallement, van Wingerden, Schäble & Kalenscher,
2016, 2017; Oberliessen et al., 2016; Rutte & Taborsky, 2007).
We have recently developed a prosocial choice task (PCT; Hernandez-Lallement
et al., 2015) in which actor rats made non-costly decisions yielding a reward to a
partner rat, or no reward to partner, respectively (Fig. 1a). Our results have shown
that actor rats developed a preference for the both-reward option, yielding a reward
for both the actor and the partner, over the own-reward option, yielding a reward
only to the actor, but not the partner. Remarkably, this behavior was only displayed
if the partner was a real rat, but not if it was a toy rat (Fig. 1b, c). The extent of
prosocial behavior was not uniform across the animals; there was large individual
variability between rats in their mutual-reward preference levels, as indicated by the
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Fig. 1 Prosocial choice task.aDoubleT-maze apparatus for quantifyingmutual-reward preferences
in pairs of rats. The actor rat chooses to enter either a both-reward compartment (both rats receive
identical food rewards), or an own-reward compartment (only the actor receives a reward, but not
the partner). The partner is always directed towards the opposite compartment facing the actor.
Actor’s and partner’s compartments are separated by a transparent, perforated wall, allowing rats to
see, hear and smell each other. b Example choice of one rat. The tally is increased by 1 every trial
the actor rats makes a both-reward choice, and decreased by 1 every trial the actor rat makes an own-
reward choice. Upper panel: actor rat paired with a toy rat. Lower panel: same actor rat paired with
a real partner rat. c Mean percentage of both-reward choices, averaged across all rats and sessions.
d Social bias scores. For each rat, the social bias score represents the percent differences in both-
reward choices between the social and toy conditions. The social bias score can be interpreted as the
added value of both-reward outcomes. The vertical bar represents the upper 95% confidence interval
limit, which was based to categorize rats as prosocial (green dots; social bias scores exceeding the
upper confidence interval limit), and indifferent (grey dots; social bias scores within the confidence
interval limits) **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.001. Adapted from Hernandez-Lallement et al. (2015)
wide distribution of social bias scores (Fig. 1d; the social bias scores represent the
percent differences in both-reward choices between the social and toy conditions and
can be interpreted as the added value of both-reward outcomes).
In a follow-up lesion study, we found that mutual-reward preferences in rats
disappeared after lesions of the basolateral amygdala (Hernandez-Lallement et al.,
2016), a brain structure implicated in emotional processes (LeDoux, 1994; LeDoux,
Cicchetti, Xagoraris, & Romanski, 1990) as well as social and non-social reward
representation (Chang et al., 2015; Janak & Tye, 2015). Our results showed that the
social bias score, indicating the added value placed on mutual reward outcomes,
turned negative in amygdala-lesioned rats (Fig. 2a) because they chose the both-
reward option less often when paired with a real rat than when paired with a toy.
This suggests that, in contrast to sham-lesioned animals, amygdala-lesioned rats
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Fig. 2 Social reinforcement learning in rats is amygdala-dependent. a Lesions to the basolateral
amygdala (BLA) abolish mutual-reward preferences in rats, as indicated by negative social bias
scores. Adapted from (Hernandez-Lallement et al., 2016). b Rats re-acquire both-reward (BR)
preferences across trials in sessions after the compartment-contingency assignment was reversed.
Adapted from (Hernandez-Lallement, van Wingerden, et al., 2017). *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p <
0.001
failed to attach positive value to rewards delivered to partners; hence, the amygdala-
lesioned animals behaved as if they had turned callous to the welfare of other rats
(Hernandez-Lallement, van Wingerden, & Kalenscher, et al., 2017).
To better understand the emergence of mutual-reward preferences in non-lesioned
control rats, we exploited the fact that the task contingencies were frequently
reversed because the both-reward assignment to one of the two actor compartments
was pseudo-randomized across testing days and rats (Hernandez-Lallement, van
Wingerden, et al., 2017). We found that both-reward choices were at chance level in
the first few trials after a contingency reversal, but gradually increased across trials
(Fig. 2b). This finding suggests that rats re-learn which compartment yields reward
to both rats after every contingency change. We hypothesized that such re-learning
can be explained by standard reinforcement learning mechanisms (Sutton & Barto,
2012), with one notable exception. Because the payoff to the actor rat is always
identical after own-reward or both-reward choices and in the partner- and the toy-
conditions, and because the only difference between conditions is the social context,
the reinforcer must be of social nature. Two non-mutually-exclusive mechanisms are
conceivable bywhich social signals, whatever they are, may reinforcemutual-reward
choices (Hernandez-Lallement, vanWingerden, et al., 2017): partner rats might emit
social signals upon reward receipt that are rewarding to the actor rats, reinforcing
the actor’s behavior that yielded reward to the partner. In addition, missing out on
reward might prompt the emission of distress or complaint signals by the partner that
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are aversive to the actor rats, resulting in the avoidance of behaviors associated with
these aversive complaint signals.
To date, it is unknown what kind of signals might serve as social reinforcers.
However, several lines of evidence suggest that putative candidate signals for appet-
itive and aversive social reinforcement are rat USVs. Rats emit USVs in the 50-
kHz range in positive affective states, for example, during rough-and-tumble play
(Knutson, Burgdorf, & Panksepp, 1998; Lukas & Wöhr, 2015), tickling (Ishiyama
& Brecht, 2016; Panksepp & Burgdorf, 2000), or after amphetamine injections
(Burgdorf, Knutson, Panksepp, & Ikemoto, 2001; Engelhardt, Fuchs, Schwarting,
& Wöhr, 2017). By contrast, rats vocalize in the 22-kHz range in negative affec-
tive states, e.g., during threatening situations or fear conditioning (Brudzynski &
Ociepa, 1992; Calvino, Besson, Boehrer, & Depaulis, 1996; Parsana, Li, & Brown,
2012; Sales, 1972).
Rats show a strong, but short-lived orientation response and transient social
approach behavior towards playback of pre-recorded 50-kHz USVs as well as avoid-
ance of 22-kHz USV playback (Wöhr & Schwarting, 2007), and will perform more
instrumental actions to obtain 50 kHz than 22 kHz USV playback (Burgdorf et al.,
2008). Moreover, 50-kHz USV playback (Willuhn et al., 2014) or observing another
rat getting rewarded (Kashtelyan, Lichtenberg, Chen, Cheer, & Roesch, 2014) elicits
dopamine release in the nucleus accumbens, one of the key brain mechanisms for
reinforcement learning (Parkinson, Robbins, & Everitt, 1996). In addition, 50- and
22-kHz signals elicit increases, or decreases respectively, in tonic firing activity
in single neurons in the rat amygdala (Parsana et al., 2012), the very same brain
structure whose integrity is necessary for expressing mutual-reward preferences
in our PCT (Fig. 2a; Hernandez-Lallement, van Wingerden, & Kalenscher, 2017;
Hernandez-Lallement et al., 2016).
Taken together, this evidence is in line with the hypothesis that 50- and 22-kHz
USVsmight serve as candidate signals for appetitive social reinforcement, or aversive
social reinforcement respectively.Moreover, rats engaged in thePCT indeedvocalize,
both in the 22 and 50 kHz domain (unpublished observations). We thus set out to
investigate whether the playback of pre-recorded USVs in the context of the pro-
social choice task setup would be as effective in driving choice behavior as the
putative social signals emitted by partner rats in the full version of the PCT, while
keeping task contingencies as close to the original PCT as possible. Specifically, we
hypothesized that 50-kHzUSVstimuli induce approach behavior and, thus, enhanced
preference for outcomes associated with playback of 50-kHz USV playbacks. We
furthermore hypothesized that 22-kHz USV stimuli are avoided by the rats, resulting
in decreased preference for 22-kHz USV outcomes. In the following, we will present
evidence that USVs, in contrast to similar acoustic stimuli of non-social nature,
indeed have transient motivating properties and can drive spatial preferences linked
to social outcomes as observed in the PCT.
Importantly, we go one step further than merely evaluating the social reinforce-
ment hypothesis (Hernandez-Lallement, van Wingerden, et al., 2017). This hypoth-
esis is useful in describing the cognitivemechanisms underlyingmutual-reward pref-
erences, but leaves open the question how rats cognitively construe a social situation
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characterized by the presence of conspecifics and/or USVs. More specifically, it is
unclear how a rat conceptually links and represents the several stimulus levels—the
USV’s physical dimension (rhythmic oscillations of air compression and deflation),
their emotional level (the putative enjoyment or aversiveness of listening to USVs)
and their motivational level (50-kHz USVs are wanted and prompt action to obtain
them, 22-kHz USVs are avoided and prompt action to evade them) – into a coherent
cognitive representation of a social situation. A promising approach to understand
how rats cognitively construct their socialworld needs to transcend beyond the limita-
tions of traditional reinforcement learning theory, and enter the realm of philosophy.
Therefore, in addition to presenting evidence that rats attribute incentive value to
USV playback, we will conclude this article with a theoretical perspective, inspired
by linguistic theory, on the rat’s cognitive representation of its social world. This
theory addresses the point of multilevel cognitive representation of a social act, and
how this can guide learning about social interaction.
2 Methods
2.1 Subjects
The experiment was approved by German authorities (Landesamt für Natur, Umwelt
und Verbraucherschutz) and conducted according to the European Union Directive
2017/63/EU. Fifteenmale Long-Evans rats (Charles River Laboratories, Calco, Italy)
were housed in groups of three and kept under a reversed 12 h-dark/light cycle
(lights off at 7 am). The housing room was at a constant temperature of 20 ± 2 °C
and a humidity of 60%. Rats received standard rodent laboratory food (Sniff, Soest,
Germany), and water ad libitum. At the start of the experiment, food access was
restricted to keep the animals at 90% of their free feeding body weight. Animals
were randomly assigned to one of two groups differing in the stimulus material (see
acoustic stimuli below): USVType-1 (n = 7) and USVType-2 (n = 8).
2.2 Experimental Setup
The playback experiment aimed to evaluate the effectiveness of playback of pre-
recorded USVs in shaping spatial preferences as observed in the PCT (Hernandez-
Lallement et al., 2015). As such, we employed the same behavioral setup as in the
PCT, but with the following minor modifications. Each side of the maze (front: actor
side; back: partner side) consisted of a start box measuring 31× 20× 40 cm leading
via two doors to separate choice compartments,measuring 30× 30× 40 cm (Fig. 1a).
Thereby, two pairs of facing actor-partner compartments were created (left and right
sides). The outer walls of the maze and the doors leading to the choice compartments
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were opaque whereas the choice compartments themselves were separated from
each other and from the opposite half of the maze by translucent walls containing
an aluminum grid (approximately 80% open) in the lower half to facilitate sound
transmission from the partner to the actor side, or vice versa. Instead of a social
partner, in this jukebox experiment, ultrasonic speakers (UltrasonicDynamicSpeaker
Vifa, Avisoft Bioacoustics, Germany) were placed in each partner compartment to
deliver acoustic stimuli at the vertical level of the actor animal’s head at a distance
of about 10 cm from the grid wall. As in the PCT, food rewards consisting of three
sucrose pellets (45 mg dustless precision pellets, Bio-Serv, Germany) were delivered
though a funnel into the choice compartment after playback of the acoustic stimuli.
2.3 Acoustic Stimuli
Three different types of acoustic stimuli were presented: 50-kHz USV stimuli, 22-
kHzUSV stimuli and background noise corresponding to the respectiveUSV stimuli.
All stimuli were presented with a sampling rate of 192 kHz in a 16-bit format for 5 s.
To determine whether the rat strain used to generate USVs mattered, or general-
ized across strains, we used two different sources of USV stimuli: type-1 stimuli were
USVs recorded from Wistar rats, and described in detail by Wöhr and Schwarting
(2007) and Sadananda, Wöhr & Schwarting (2008). Type-2 stimuli were based on
calls recorded from pairs of interacting male Long-Evans rats. In brief, type-1 50-
kHz USVs were recorded from a male Wistar rat exploring a cage containing scent
from a cage mate. The stimulus consisted of 19 calls (total calling time: 1.19 s).
Fourteen of these calls were frequency-modulated and five were flat. Call duration
was 0.06 ± 0.01 s (mean ± SEM); peak frequency: 61.41 ± 1.51 kHz; bandwidth:
5.06 ± 1.09 kHz. The type-2 50-kHz calls were recorded during investigation of
an unfamiliar juvenile conspecific by an adolescent rat. The stimulus consisted of
15 calls (total calling time: 1.47 s). Eleven of these calls were frequency-modulated
and four were flat. Call duration was 0.10± 0.02 s (mean± SEM); peak frequency:
51.63 ± 1.14 kHz; bandwidth: 6.09 ± 1.35 kHz. Eighteen different 50-kHz USV
stimuliwere generated by randomizing the order of the individual calls usingSASLab
Pro (version 5.2.08, Avisoft Bioacoustics, Glienicke, Germany). Background noise
stimuli corresponding to the 50-kHz USV stimuli were generated by applying a
band-rejection filter to eliminate the calls in the USV stimuli, leaving only back-
ground noise. The filter was set as to remove all signal components between 20.90
and 80.00 kHz. 50-kHz USV stimuli were played at approximately 69 dB and corre-
sponding background noise was played at approximately 42 dB (measured from a
distance of about 10 cm). Type-1 22 kHz calls were recorded from a male Wistar rat
after applications of foot-shocks. Call duration was 1.18 ± 0.06 s; peak frequency:
23.61 ± 0.07 kHz; bandwidth: 1.37 ± 0.05 kHz; type-2 22-kHz stimuli consisted
of calls from another male adolescent Long-Evans rat investigating an unfamiliar
juvenile conspecific. Eighteen USV stimuli with a duration of 5 s were generated
by randomizing the order of 4 calls. The average duration of the calls was 0.80 ±
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0.07 s (mean± SEM) with a peak frequency of 26.30± 0.02 kHz. Creation of corre-
sponding background noise was similar to the 50-kHz stimuli, only now all signal
components between 21.40 and 68.30 kHz and between 69.80 and 100.00 kHz were
removed. The playback loudness was adjusted so that the ultrasonic components in
the 22-kHz USV stimuli were played at approximately 69 dB. As such, the loudness
of the background noise component was at approximately 32 dB.
2.4 Task Design
Behavioral tests were performed under red light during the active period of the rats
on consecutive weekdays. Before the beginning of the experiment, all rats received
one day of habituation to the maze and 14 days of shaping sessions where they were
gradually introduced to the testing conditions. Shaping procedures were similar to
PCT training and consisted of daily sessionswhere animals acquired the trial structure
(doors opening, compartment choice, doors closing, pellet delivery and consumption)
up until the point where behavioral training was similar to the final test procedure
except that no acoustic stimuli were presented.
In the final task, rats chose to enter one of the two choice compartments. Entering
resulted in acoustic playback for five seconds. This 5 s USV playback period corre-
sponds to the trial stage in the PCT when the partner is directed to the compartment
facing the choice compartment with the actor animal, when the animals can interact
acoustically through the aluminumgrid.Ultimately, a food reward (three food pellets)
was delivered to the actor rat, independent of which compartment was entered.
All rats performed the task under three conditions (Fig. 3), each for 8 consecutive
sessions. Under condition 1 (50-vs-noise), a 50-kHz USV stimulus was played back
in the choice compartment on one side and corresponding background noise in the
choice compartment on the other side. Condition 2 (22-vs-noise) was identical to
condition 1, except that a 22-kHz USV stimulus was presented together with corre-
sponding background noise. In condition 3 (50-vs-22), the 50-kHz stimulus was
played in one choice compartment and the 22-kHz stimulus was played in the other
choice compartment. The order of experimental conditions was pseudo-randomized
across rats within the groups, and the USV-compartment assignment was pseudo-
randomized across days, ensuring that a given USV stimulus was not assigned to
one side for longer than two days in a row. This pseudo-randomization approach
was employed to mimic the pseudo-random assignment of the Both Reward option
over days in the PCT, and to disambiguate playback preferences from potential side
biases and habit development.
Each condition encompassed 8 daily testing sessions, which in turn consisted of
four forced trials and 16 free trials. In the forced trials, only one door was opened in
a pseudo-randomized order to allow rats to sample and learn the current assignment
of acoustic stimuli to the choice compartments. In the free trials, both doors were
opened at the same time and rats were able to choose which side to enter. Data is
only reported for the free trials.
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Fig. 3 Sequence of the training and testing procedure and an individual experimental trial. a All
animals went through habituation to themaze (Days= 1) and shaping (Days= 14), where theywere
gradually familiarized with the testing conditions. Afterwards, a buffer session (Days= 1; identical
to the last shaping condition) took place, followed by a one-day break (Days = 1). Subsequently,
rats were trained and tested in the final task (Days= 8), again followed by a buffer session (Days=
1) and a break (Days = 1). The procedure for the experimental sessions was repeated for all three
conditions (curved arrow). b Before the beginning of a new trial, the animal was placed in the start
box. Either one door (forced trials) or both doors (free trials) were opened, and, once the animal
entered one of the two compartments, doors were closed and the trial timer was started (t = 0 s).
After a delay of twenty seconds (t = 20 s), the USV stimulus was played back for five seconds in
the respective compartment. Twenty-five seconds after trial onset (t = 25 s), the food reward was
delivered. After reward consumption rats were put back into their starting boxes for the next trial
Figure 3b shows the sequence of an individual trial. In each trial, the animal is
placed in the start box and the two doors leading to the choice compartments are
opened. Once the animal enters one compartment, the doors are closed and the trial
starts. After a delay of 20 s, the acoustic stimulus is played for 5 s. Subsequently,
the food reward is delivered. After reward consumption, the animal is placed back
into the start box for the next trial to begin. Adherence to the time points during each
trial was ensured by a custom-made software script (Matlab 2014b, MathWorks Inc.,
USA) that also initiated the playback of acoustic stimuli (Avisoft-recorder, Avisoft
Bioacoustics, Germany). After a session was finished, the maze was cleaned with a
70% ethanol solution to remove dirt and odor cues.
Both groups of rats, group 1 (USVType-1) and group 2 (USVType-2) performed this
task; as described above, the only difference between the groups was the origin of
the acoustic stimuli.
2.5 Data Analysis
Anticipating a transient response to the USV stimuli (Wöhr & Schwarting, 2012), we
took advantage of the expected decay in preference bothwithin and across sessions by
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using a cluster-based permutation test derived from EEG/MEG/LFP time-frequency
and spatio-temporal analysis included in the FieldTrip analysis Toolbox (Oostenveld
et al. 2011). Briefly, in cluster permutation analysis, voxels (in our case, units of
session-trial such as for example S3-T4) are assessed for significance by comparing
the playback preference (choices of USV) across rats for that session-trial combina-
tion to a randomly permuted (N= 1000 times) choice matrix (shuffling the position
ofUSVchoices but not the proportion). A reference distribution of preferences scores
was constructed by averaging across rats for each session-trial unit across the prefer-
ence scores resulting from the randomly permutated datasets and collection of these
averages. Units of session-trial in the original dataset were flagged as significant if
they fell outside the 99% confidence interval of this reference distribution. Clustering
then took place by including adjacent significant units in a larger cluster (crite-
rion: next-door-neighbours in horizontal (trial) or vertical (session) dimensions).
The cluster statistic that resolves the multiple-comparison problem is computed by
comparing the summed preferences for this cluster with the highest preference-sum
of any cluster generated per random iteration (i.e. 1000 max-sum clusters). If, for
positive (negative) clusters, the summed cluster score is higher (lower) than the 2.5%
tail of the random cluster scores, the cluster as a whole is flagged as significant.
Following the analysis convention established for the PCT by Hernandez-
Lallement, van Wingerden, et al. (2017), we also subdivided each session into three
blocks of five trials and computed the mean compartment preference across trials
within each block to contrast preferences between blocks. Analyses were performed
using Matlab (2014b, MathWorks Inc., USA).
3 Results
As expected from the USV playback literature, we found a transient preference for
the 50 kHz playback in the 50-vs-noise condition (Fig. 4a) and a transient prefer-
ence against the 22 kHz playback in the 22-vs-noise condition (Fig. 4b). Cluster-
permutation analysis indicated a significant 2 × 2 cluster spanning sessions 1–2
× trials 1–2 (p < 0.05 cluster permutation test, outlined in a white rectangle) in
favor of the 50 kHzUSVs in the 50-vs-noise condition, while the transient preference
against the 22-kHz playback in the 22-vs-noise condition visible in early trials across
sessions did not reach statistical significance. Surprisingly, the sessions offering a
direct choice between 50- and 22-kHz USV stimuli did not replicate this pattern.
Instead of exhibiting a clear preference, rats were mostly indifferent between the 50-
and 22-kHz USV playback (Fig. 4c), suggesting the possibility of an interaction of
the call types when presented in the same setting.
This observation was supported by a more standard analysis, confirming that rats
chose the compartment associated with USV stimulation significantly more often in
the 50-vs-noise than the 22-vs-noise condition with both stimulus classes (paired-
sample t-test, t(14) = 2.16, p < 0.05; Fig. 5a).We observed inter-individual differences
between the preference strengths for 50-kHz USVs (50-kHz vs. control) and 22-kHz
422 T. Kalenscher et al.
Fig. 4 Preference maps for the three conditions, calculated for each session-trial unit, averaged
across rats and smoothed using a 3-unit kernel. PseudoColor scale indicates level of preference for
stimulus A (hot colors) vs stimulus B (cool colors). a 50 kHzUSV versus control, b 22 kHz USV
versus control, c 50 kHz versus 22 kHz USV. White rectangle: significant preference cluster (p <
0.05 cluster permutation test, corrected for multiple comparisons)
a b c
Fig. 5 Preference difference for 50- over 22-kHz USV s when paired with its control stimulus,
a preference per condition considering both stimuli types, all sessions and all trials, b difference
in preference considering both stimuli types, all sessions and all trials. Barplots indicate mean
difference in preference for the 50-kHz versus Noise minus preference for 22-kHz versus Noise,
±SEM. Dots represent individual rats. c Same as in b, but now broken up in three blocks of five
trials (trials 1–5, 6–10 and 11–16)
USVs (22-kHz vs. control; Fig. 5b). Blockwise-analysis, grouping trials 1–5, 6–10
and 11–16, showed that, in line with previous reports (Seffer, Schwarting, & Wöhr,
2014;Willuhn et al., 2014; Wöhr & Schwarting, 2007, 2012), the difference between
the playback conditions was especially pronounced in the first block of five trials (6.5
± 1.4%, tr. 1–5, one-sample t-test vs. 0; t(14) = 4.80; p < 0.001, Fig. 5c), as compared
to blocks 2 (1.0 ± 2.7%, tr. 6–10; t(14) = 0.37; n.s.) and 3 (−0.2 ± 2.2%, tr. 11–16;
t(14) =−0.10; n.s.). Indeed, the difference in preference in block 1 was significantly
larger than the preference differences of blocks 2–3 combined (paired-sample t-test;
t(14) = 2.88; p = 0.01), confirming the transient nature of the effectiveness of USV
playback in influencing spatial preferences.
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Such a pattern of results could stem from either a preference for 50-kHz USVs
over control stimuli, an avoidance of 22-kHz USVs over control stimuli, or both.
Comparing the preference in the first block to the rest of the session suggests that
only the preference for 50-kHz USVs over control was significantly higher in the
first block (53.8 vs. 50.5%; t(14) = 2.41; p < 0.05) while no differences could be
detected in the 22-kHz USVs vs control condition (47.3 vs. 49.8%; t(14) = −1.14;
n.s.).
To gain further insights into the temporal pattern of the preference habituation
effects and directly compare the effects found through the cluster based permutation
approach,we comparedpreference for compartments infirst trial blockof thefirst half
of sessions (sessions 1–4) with preferences in the second half of sessions (sessions
5–8). Interestingly, though some attenuation in preference across sessions could be
found, the preference difference between the 50-vs-Noise and 22-vs-Noise condition
for the first block showed up in the first half (6.7 ± 2.8%, t(14) = 2.43; p < 0.05)
and the second half (6.3 ± 2.7%, t(14) = 2.35; p < 0.05) of sessions. However, only
in the first half of the sessions did the preference in the first block of trials differ
significantly from indifference in the 50 versus control condition (55.3± 1.9%, t(14)
= 2.78, p = 0.01, Fig. 6a).
Taken together, these results confirm that rats exhibit a transient preference for
playback of 50-kHzUSVs over non-ultrasonic control stimuli, combinedwith a trend
towards avoidance of 22-kHz USV playback. As such, it seems plausible that USVs
could be one channel of social feedback involved in driving spatial preferences linked
to social outcomes in the PCT.
Finally, we asked if our Long-Evans rats responded differently to USVs origi-
nating fromLong-Evans conspecifics (USV type-2 calls), or from rats fromadifferent
strain (Wistar rats; USV type-1 calls). However, our results showed that the pattern of
results did not significantly differ between the USV-types used (Fig. 6b, independent
samples t-tests at the level of 50 kHz playback, 22 kHz playback or the difference; all
|t(13)| < 0.25; all p > 0.05), suggesting that there is no evidence that rats discriminate
between the strains of the USV sources.
4 Discussion
In this article, we present evidence supporting our hypothesis that USVs could act
as social reinforcers, driving spatial preferences as observed in the pro-social choice
task. In line with the social reinforcement hypothesis (Hernandez-Lallement, van
Wingerden, et al., 2017), we theorized that USVs reinforce behavior that is associated
with USV playback, but acoustic stimuli in a similar frequency range, yet without
the social significance of USVs, do not act as social reinforcers. More specifically,
we expected that 50-kHz USVs act as positive reinforcers, and that the probability of
repeating actions coupled to 50-kHz USVs playback is larger than the probability of
repeating actions associated with 22-kHz USVs or a non-ultrasonic control stimulus
(Burgdorf et al., 2008). By contrast, we predicted that 22-kHz USVs act as negative
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a b
Fig. 6 Preferences in 50-vs-Noise and 22-vs-Noise sessions, averaged across rats for the first block
of five trials (1–5) and the first half of sessions (1–4). a Preference for 50 over noise was significantly
above chance, while no significant difference from chance could be detected in the 22-vs-Noise
sessions. The difference in preference for both session types was significant, though. b Individual
data points for the data in a, now also split by stimulus type. No difference between stimulus type
1 (blue) and stimulus type 2 (green) could be detected
reinforcers, and that the probability of repeating actions associated with 22-kHz
USVs is lower relative to 50-kHz USVs or non-ultrasonic control stimuli. Using an
experimental paradigm adapted from the rodent PCT, we confirmed the reinforcing
quality of USV playback, most prominent in the preference exhibited by rats for
the playback of appetitive 50 kHz USV calls over control acoustic stimuli. The
reinforcing quality is transient, however, as predicted from the literature (see below).
Finally, we used two different sets of stimuli to test our hypothesis: one set of USVs
was recorded from Wistar rats (Wöhr & Schwarting, 2007) and the other set from
Long-Evans rats, as described above.We found that Long-Evans rats did not respond
differently to USVs originating from conspecific Long-Evans rats, or from a different
strain—Wistar rats.
Previous studies showed that 50-kHz USV stimuli induce strong, but transient
approach behavior during initial playback and that this approach response quickly
attenuated across trials (Wöhr & Schwarting, 2012; Seffer et al., 2014), together with
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a decline in physiological measures of the rewarding properties of the USV stimulus
(Willuhn et al., 2014). The authors explained this effect by USVs being secondary
reinforcers that, after repeated exposure might, at least partially, lose their value
(Willuhn et al., 2014). This explanation is in line with our hypothesis that USVs are
not rewarding or aversive by themselves, but only by their virtue of carrying social
significance in a social context.
A further issue that warrants elaboration is the nature of the motivating property
of the USV stimulation. Because the USV playback stimuli were consistently paired
with food rewards, as was the case in the partner session in the rodent PCT, we
cannot conclude with certainty that USV playback by itself motived approach or
avoidance behavior in the present study. Rather, the USV stimuli might have modu-
lated the reinforcing value of the food rewards; that is the appetitive value of the
food rewards was possibly enhanced by pairing it with 50-kHz playback and it was
possibly reduced by pairing it with 22-kHz playback. Such a putatively modulating,
rather than activating, effect of the USV stimuli on motivation might explain the
relatively mild and transient size of the effects reported here.
Finally, our Long-Evans rats showed identical behavior towards USV stimuli
recorded from Wistar and conspecific Long-Evans rats. Taken together, these data
support our hypothesis that 50-kHz USVs, in contrast to comparable, but non-social
acoustic stimuli, act as positive social reinforcers that influence behavior and might,
therefore, contribute to orchestrating social interaction between rats. Our findings
corroborate and extend the results of a recent study that showed that rats show
instrumental responses to produce 50-kHz USV playback in a non-spatial operant
conditioning setup (Burgdorf et al., 2008). However, the evidence for a putative role
of 22-kHzUSVs as negative social reinforcers is less conclusive. This result suggests
that positive, rather than negative social feedback might drive the spatial preferences
linked to different social outcomes (partner also rewarded or not) in the pro-social
choice task.
Although the social reinforcement mechanism described here and elsewhere
(Hernandez-Lallement, van Wingerden, et al., 2017) provides a parsimonious, plau-
sible and realistic explanation for rat social behavior, it is agnostic about how rats
actually cognitively represent their social world: as discussed above, our social rein-
forcement theory does not explain how a rat conceptually links and represents the
different stimulus levels—the USV’s physical dimension (rhythmic oscillations of
air compression and deflation creating auditory perception), the emotional level (the
putative enjoyment or averseness of listening to USVs) and their motivational level
(50 kHzUSVs are wanted and they prompt action to obtain them) – into a coherent
cognitive representation of a social situation. In the following section, wewill present
a philosophically inspired attempt to theoretically model how rats link and process
these stimulus levels into a complex cognitive representation of social interaction.
The second part of this paper, thus, attempts to provide a novel approach to
animal learning and cognition. The “cascade” approach regards the categorization
and cognitive representation of types of action as potentially multilevel. When a rat
learns in an experimental setting that certain types of action are rewarding, its brain is
assumed to form an action cascade that categorizes this type of action simultaneously
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as an act of getting a reward. The multilevel approach can be applied to model social
behavior asmultilevel: a cognitive complex of performing the basic physical behavior
and thereby at the same time a particular kind of social behavior. Applying likewise
to human cognition, cascade theory is a candidate for connecting animal and human
cognition.
Part II: Cascades in Animal Cognition
5 A Cognitive Perspective: Acting at Multiple Levels
This section offers a theoretical perspective on the neurocognition of the represen-
tation of action. Applied to rats, it is not to be taken as a theory rival to existing
psychological accounts of animal learning, but rather as an account concerning the
cognitive representation involved and the cognitive implementation of conditioning.
The most prominent feature of the “Cascade” theory of cognitive representation is a
multilevel approach to categorization. It applies, it appears, to humans and animals
likewise.1
5.1 Goldman’s Multilevel Theory of Human Action
5.1.1 Goldman’s Notion of Level-Generation and the Notion of Cascade
When humans categorize and conceptualize an action, they usually do it in more
than one way at the same time. The philosopher Alvin Goldman developed a theory
of human action that is based on this principal observation (Goldman, 1970). If I
open a door, this is a physical act of interaction with an object that changes its state.
Opening a particular door can be achieved by a variety of bodily actions. If it is a
hinged door, I can push the door at its handle or somewhere else with my hand, I can
push it with my foot, I can lean against it with my shoulder or my back; depending
on my position and the construction of the door, I may have to pull at the door. For
sliding doors or automatic doors, other types of action are required. Thus, ‘opening
a door’ refers to at least two levels of action: (1) the basic physical action one applies
to the door, and (2) the more abstract functional level of causing the door to open.
The acts at the physical and at the functional level do not concern the same properties
of the door. The physical act changes the spatial position of the door leaf or leaves.
The higher-level act concerns states of the door that are related to its functioning as
an object that is used to obstruct or enable access to a space behind it.
The lower-level action is necessary for achieving the higher-level action. This
achievement is not automatic but requires certain circumstances; for example, the
1The theory is introduced in more depth and detail in Löbner (this volume).
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mechanical doormust not be locked, the automatic doormust be in function.Goldman
(1970) speaks of “level-generation” if actions are related in this way: under certain
circumstances, the lower-level action “generates” the higher-level action, the lower-
level action is a method of doing the higher-level thing; by pushing the door or
pulling at it, one opens it. While in this case the level-generating relation is based on
causation, there are also other mechanisms such as conventional level-generation;
for example, if I nod my head, this may conventionally generate an approval or
permission because nodding one’s head is a conventionally established method of
approving or permitting.
Crucially, if an action A generates a higher-level action B, A and B are actions
by the same agent and at the same time, done in one. It is very important to note
that level-generation does not relate an action to an event it causes. If I open the
door for someone and let them pass, I first open the door and then the other will pass
through the door a moment later. Level-generation does not obtain between these
consecutive actions by two different agents. Rather it obtains between the action of
opening the door and the action of opening a passage for the other. These two actions
are actions by the same agent and they occur at strictly the same time. It is this feature
of Goldman’s theory of action that makes it a theory of multilevel categorization.
According to Goldman, a basic action may level-generate more than just one
higher-level action; it can generate a complex multilevel structure of actions with
many steps that build on each other; the structure can also branch into different lines
of generation. For example, by pushing a door and opening it, one may at the same
time open a passage in an aisle as well as cause an air draft; opening the passage may
in turn generate doing a favor; causing a draft may further generate making a window
slam. We will give complex examples below. Goldman uses the term “act-trees” for
structures created by level-generation; we prefer to call them “cascades” as there are
good reasons to transfer the notion to other things than action2. Crucially, the actions
that form a cascade are actions of different type. For example, leaning against the
door and opening the door are not actions of the same type. A door can be opened
by other methods, and leaning against the door can have other effects than opening
it; for example, it may as well be an act of closing the door, or of keeping the door
closed if somebody is pushing against it from the other side.
5.1.2 Goldman’s Level-Theory as a Psychological Theory
of Categorization
It is convenient to use the term ‘doing’ for that to which a cascade description applies:
there is one doing, for example with the door, but this one doing can be categorized
in many different ways as constituting as many different types, or categories, of
action as the cascade provides. In the discussion of his theory of action with other
philosophers, Goldman emphasizes that the distinction of types involved in a cascade
of action is a psychological distinction, not a distinction of things out there in the
2See Löbner, this volume, ss. 5–7.
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world. The cascade agent produces one doing, but it is categorized simultaneously at
different levels in a hierarchy of level-generation (Goldman, 1979). A cascade forms
in our minds, in our view and cognitive modeling of what is going on or what we are
doing ourselves.What a person does in a concrete situation, to us, is, in our reality, all
these acts in the cascade at the same time. The particular doing in our door example of
level-generation may belong at the same time to the action categories ‘push against
the door’, ‘open the door for Adam’, ‘do Adam a favor’, and maybe others. It is
important to realize that the different categories we may apply to the one underlying
doing are not just a bunch of categories that are somehow associated. Rather they
are organized in a tree structure of dependence. The higher actions depend for their
coming about on the lower actions that “generate” them. And all higher-level actions
depend on necessary circumstances to come about.
As the door example illustrates, the formation of cascades takes place even with
as simple actions as opening a door. We may well assume that humans categorize
almost any willful action by a human as a cascade of action rather than just as the
basic physical doing. We will inevitably try to interpret the actions of others in terms
of the intentions they pursue by doing what they do; if they act on an artefact in
a normal way, for example on a door, we will assume that the action is related to
the usual function of the object. Thus, categorizing an action as ‘opening the door’
would provide a causal explanation of the observable physical act.
5.1.3 Social Action and Interaction
One observation relevant in our context is the fact that social action necessarily
constitutes higher-level action. Searle (1995) developed a theory of social reality
that distinguishes between a physical level and a social level of action, persons, and
objects. A certain movement with the head is an approval if and only if it counts as
such; a human is the president of Canada if and only if they count as such, and a
piece of paper is money if and only if it counts as money. The things that count as
something in these examples are physical entities and what they count as are social,
entities that is, entities in our social reality. Notably, in all these cases, the things
considered are necessarily both at the same time: the physical entity and the social-
reality entity. For the part of Searle’s theory concerning acts, the relation between
things at the physical and at the social level is captured by Goldman’s more general
notion of level-generation.
As a consequence of the principal higher-level character of social action, social
behavior always ‘parasitizes’ on more basic physical behavior.3 For example, one
may turn up the corners of one’s mouth and expose the front teeth and thereby level-
generate a smile which, if directed at someone, may under circumstances constitute
a social signal which constitutes a display of affection, or something else. Up from
the level ‘smiling at someone’, the cascade reaches a social level. If we go back to
3The terminus parasitewas introduced in this connection by Kearns (2003) who relates to the lower
and the higher level of a two-level cascade as ‘host’ and ‘parasite’, respectively.
Rat Ultrasonic Vocalizations as Social Reinforcers … 429
Fig. 7 A door-opening
cascade: doing six things in
one
A  gains (a lile) pleasure
↥
A  makes  B  smile at  A
↥
A  obliges  B
↥
A  does  B  a favor
↥
A  keeps the door open for  B
↥
A  keeps the door open
the example in the introduction, we get an even more complex structure. Using an
upward arrow ↥ for level-generation, we can represent the cascade bottom-up as in
Fig. 7.
As the example illustrates, own action may cascade to ultimately giving oneself
a pleasure (or any other kind of emotional experience) by doing what one does.
Obviously, this too cannot be done without the support of some physical action. We
may keep in mind two general points about cascades: (i) physical action may cascade
to social action, and (ii) action may cascade to obtaining an emotional experience,
where emotional-level action may or may not come about by means of social-level
action like in our fictitious example.
There is another aspect to the door-opening example. Social reality is constructed
interactively (seeClark (1996) on amultilevel interactional account of verbal commu-
nication). If A keeps a door open for B, meaning to do B a favor and cascading the
conceptualization of their own act correspondingly, then the thanks A receives from
B will confirm that A and B share the social construal of their interaction: B would
not have thanked A if B had not construed A’s act as involving the level-generation
of doing B a favor. An analogous consideration applies to the next level above the
favor: the level-generation of obliging B by doing B a favor. Acknowledgment and
confirmation of this additional, emotional level, is executed by B sending a smile to
A. Given that receiving a smile is felt as something pleasant, the level-generation of
‘B please A’ by ‘B smile at A’ is part of the joint construal of B’s reaction.
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5.2 Cascades and Learning
Goldman’s theory was constructed for the categorization of individual action tokens.
It can, however, also be applied to the consistentmultilevel categorization of recurring
types of action. For example, if we experience that the light goes on when we flip a
certain switch, and if we repeat the action and achieve the same effect, we will learn
a cascade: that flipping this switch goes with switching that light on. We acquire a
piece of procedural knowledge by memorizing a two-level action cascade concept
composed of the two single-level action concepts ‘flip this switch’ and ‘turn on that
light’. Our environment being as it is, we will easily generalize this cascade to other
switches and other lights, and so on. Thus, action learning is cascade learning, at least
for all but merely physical basic action like turning one’s head or lifting ones hand.
We learn that doing one thing also means doing the higher-level thing, and the level
above that, and so on. An action and the higher level achieved with it are conflated
into one concept. Cascade learning may also include that, by an action, we trigger
approval or disapproval, cause pleasure or pain, a particular taste or other bodily
sensations. If we assume that cascading plays a role in concept formation, we may
conclude that action concepts are formed that link basic actions and the recurring
achievement of certain causal effects into one multilevel concept.
It is important to note that even for humans, kids or adults, learning of action
cascades does not necessarily involve reflection. It just requires that the learning
subject register that the lower-level action goes with the higher-level action. In partic-
ular, the learning of cascade levels that are causally linked does not require any causal
understanding. We learn that pressing the red button of the TV remote control means
turning the TVon or off, butwemaywell diewithout ever having understoodwhatwe
actually do at the technical level by pressing this button. This level of understanding
is not relevant for learning how to succeed in dealing with TVs and remote controls.
To know how to deal with a remote control is essentially ‘knowledge how’4, and the
mechanism by which we acquire this knowledge is learning by doing.
Cascade learning does not only concern practical abilities. A child may cascade-
learn that a certain kind of behavior always upsets her mother; the child will register
this and adjust her behavior accordingly, but may possibly never understand why
her mother reacted that way. We learn in countless regards that our actions are
accompanied by higher cascade levels of particular qualities. Cascade learning will
result in a “practical” implicit understanding of the environment, in the sense that
we learn which intended or unintended higher-level kinds of action are generated by
certain other kinds of action. We learn things like “if I do x, I give myself experience
y”. Given that we are able to undertake certain action or refrain from it, this kind of
understanding our environment will enable us to adapt to it.
Cascade knowledge need not be accessible to consciousness: we may have it
without being aware of it and without being able to describe it. For example,
pronouncing a word in a way that enables others to recognize it phonetically means
to enact a cascade of production based on intentional action of our articulatory organs
4See Katzoff (1984) for the connection of knowing how to Goldman’s theory of action.
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to produce articulated sounds, thereby producing speech sounds, thereby producing
certain speech phonemes, and with them an established sound form of a word in
a particular language. All this is stored in the language production repertoire—a
normal language user is not aware of the levels of actions involved and they would
not be able to describe what they do at which levels. All they need to be able to do is
to aim at doing something particular at a pretty high level, something with the result
of making audible a particular sound pattern.
5.3 Applying Cascade Theory to Rat Behavior
in the Experiments Reported
We proceed to propose that the cascade model of action categorization and action
learning applies to rats as well. First of all, it appears that there are certain types of
rat action that are relevant to the actors at levels beyond the mere physical doing.
Among these are levels that constitute social action. For example, if young rats do
rough-and-tumble play, they recognize that this is not hostile fight: crucially, the
fight is ‘friendly’ to both of them. In some way or other, they succeed in letting the
other “know” that their own behavior is not hostile, and they succeed in categorizing
the other’s behavior in the same way. Both rats engaged in a rough-and-tumble play
possess two categorizations of representing physical fight or else fight-like action.
At a lower level they categorize the physical action, at a higher, social, level they
categorize it as hostile fighting or as play. At the lower level they “know” bodily
methods of fighting, for instance, pushing or biting, and they are able to modulate
these methods as to cascade either to a real fight or to rough-and-tumble play. There
can be no doubt that a rough-and-tumble play to the rats is both, bodily interaction
and a social interaction that is different from hostile fight.What they do has a function
to them at both levels, as some sort of bodily learning and some sort of social learning.
When we say that this “is to the rats” a particular type of action, we do not imply
consciousness on the part of the rat. The cascade view does not commit us to the
assumption that rats have consciousness (at least not in the same sense as humans);
it only commits us to assume that the rats’ brains categorize the rats’ doing in these
ways and that, in this sense, the rats register what is going on at both levels. As rats
are able to recognize and repeat types of action, for example under experimental
conditions, they must have cognitive representations of types of action. Crucially,
they register the character of what is going on not only for their own part, but also
for the part of their interaction partner.
Among the actions that have multilevel character to rats are the USVs (ultra-
sonic vocalizations) mentioned above. The fact that these vocalizations trigger brain
reactions associated with emotion, shows that these are not just plain sound produc-
tions (like, for example, the production of the sound they produce when they scratch
their ear or shuffle around); these special sound productions are ‘received’ at an
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acoustic and an emotional level. We do not know if the rat, when hearing a 50-
kHz USV, hears this as a display of comfort or pleasure. If this should be the case,
the rat might have a two-level representation of the act by their conspecific. All we
seem to be entitled to assume at present is that 50-kHz USVs must have a pleasant
‘ring’ to the perceiver. But this is sufficient for the assumption of a two-level neural
cascade representation of 50-kHz USVs issued by other rats, whence these USV’s
carry emotional significance.
In the experiments, the rats learn. They acquire behavior. The experiments are
designed in the way that the behavior acquired leads to getting themselves a reward.
We can apply the cascade model to the learning process, if we assume that learning
a particular behavior consists in acquiring a multilevel action cascade. The general
structure of reward-inforced learning would be the acquisition of a cascade that
amounts to: ‘do x’ ↥ ‘get a reward’; here ‘get’ is to be taken tomean active acquisition,
not just passive reception, because the latter would not be an action by the animal.
Assume that the actor rat learns that it will receive pellets upon entering compart-
ment c1. That learnt, the rat will repeat the action if it likes to get pellets. This
behavior can be interpreted as involving the acquisition of an action cascade of three
levels:
One might speculate that it is the rewarding course of events that supports not
just the behavior as such, but primarily the formation of the cascade described; if the
animal forms and then memorizes the cascade, this results in a mental condition that
enables the animal to repeat these rewarding experiences at will by taking the action
at the bottom of the cascade.
In the prosocial choice task experiments described in Hernandez-Lallement et al.
(2015), some rats seem to have learnt just Cascade 1. The prosocial rats, however,
developed a behavior that involves a more complex cascade structure with a second
branch on the first node (Fig. 8, blue branch).
They register that the partner rat gets pellets, too, and their brain ascribes it to
themselves as a generated higher-level action. As for the third step of the cascade, we
know that there are 50 kHzUSVswhen the actor rat and the partner rat simultaneously
get their pellets; however, due to the technical equipment used, it was not possible
to ascribe the vocalizations to one or the other rat or to both. We are entitled to
assume that the actor rat sees and thereby registers that the partner rat gets pellets.
We do not know whether this constitutes a pleasant experience to the actor rat. If we
could be sure that the partner rat produces a 50 kHz USV, we might assume that the
actor rat hears it and experiences this as an emotional reward. We can explain the
preference for this condition only if we assume that the prosocial behavior cascades
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Fig. 8 Act-trees for the
actions taken by the rats in
the PCT experiment. The
black branch represents the
action cascade acquired by
every rat in this experiment.
The blue structure represents
the additional cascade branch





make partner get pellets 
get pleasure
to an additional reward in the left branch of the cascade. The left cascade branch
would then level-generate an additional third-level ‘get pleasure’.
In the new experiments described above, with no partner rat present, the USV
constitutes an additional two-step branch generated by Level 2 in the first cascade,
to be construed as ‘get a 50 kHzUSV’, thereby ‘get pleasure’. We will assume that
the two-way reward (transiently) outweighs the one-way reward of the no-USV
condition. An explanation as to why the effect of the USV gets weaker in the course
of the experiment will not be attempted here.
5.4 Psychological Commitments of the Cascade Approach
Application of the cascade model to rat learning involves certain psychological
commitments.
(i) The rat’s brain implements cascade formation.
The rat’s brain creates links between basic types of bodily action and what goes
with them, perceptibly to the rat; if the rat brain works in this way, it ascribes the
effects of behavior to the behavior itself, connecting, for example, eating certain food
to staying hunger. In this way, the animal learns by experience what its behavior
“means” to it. When we talk of “meaning” here, we mean it in the basic sense
of immediate concomitance, not involving reasoning or convention: if something
is of category A and category A cascades to category B, then this instance of A
“means”/“constitutes”/simply “is” also an instance of B—to the cognitive subject.
Level-generation presupposes that the animal perceives its own action, and
attributes it to itself. This results in a second psychological commitment:
(ii) Rats have a (weak) sense of agency. Their brain records their action.
There can be no doubt that rats, by way of proprioception and perception of the
environment, sense that they are acting.
In addition, we need to assume that the rat’s brain categorizes what the animal is
doing. This amounts to the following commitment:
(iii) The rat’s brain forms concepts (representations) of types of own action.
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Crucial for the cascade formation is the following assumption:
(iv) The rat’s brain assigns credit to the animal itself for what happens concomitant
with action of the particular type.
Cascade formation then means that the rat’s brain generates a higher cascade level
for the underlying action concept that amounts to making happen what happens after
action of the given type.
There are restrictions on this condition. First, we will assume that it holds only for
such events following the rat’s action that are significant to the animal’s well-being,
and hence of “interest”. Second, there is supposed to be a limit on the time that
may lapse between the rat’s action and later events. The rat’s brain will possibly not
connect the animal’s doing to things that happen after a long time.
It appears that commitments (ii) to (iv) are uncontroversial; we construe the
changes in behavior of rats in experimental settings as learning behavior under the
conditions of the experiment. This would be unexplainable if we would not assume
that the animals’ brains register the animals’ doings as their own and as of a particular
type and if their brains did not credit the animals with what follows their own action
as something they can ascribe to this type of action.5
(v) The rat’s brain stores in long-termmemory the repeated concomitance of certain
effects with a type of own action.
This means that the rat’s brain connects this type of action—not only individual
single action tokens —with this kind or result.
Of course, the crucial assumption is the first one. The other assumptions are
implicit in everyday experimental practice.
5.5 What Can the Cascade Approach Buy Us?
What the cascade theory buys us is twofold. First, it provides a fundamental neurocog-
nitive mechanism for a model of the animal’s learning about its environment. If the
animal’s brain builds cascades on the types of physical action the animal is capable
of, then the brain integrates the type of action with the achievement of its results
into one multilevel concept. The type of action is thereby invested with a particular
significance for the animal, for example emotional significance, significance relevant
for survival, or the significance of performing a certain type of social action or inter-
action. Cascade-format action concepts link an action to the achievement of its result
as something ascribed to the animal as self-caused—and thereby controlled by own
behavior. Cascade learning of effects of their doing invests the animalswith the ability
to choose ways of action, to seek advantage and avoid disadvantage. Thus, cascade
formation for own-action types provides a basic mental mechanism of adapting to
the environment, including the animal’s social group, in a learning-by-doing way.
5See Takahashi et al. (2011) for exceptional conditions of the animals under which the credit
assignment required does not work.
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Second, the cascade approach offers an explanation for theway inwhich an animal
is able to acquire a practical understanding of theways of its environment, as its brain
links types of behavior to the triggering of its outcome. If the cognitive system of
an animal is equipped with the ability of action cascade formation—i.e. if it records
what the animal does to itself if it acts in this way or another—it enables adaptation
to the environment without requiring any level of causal understanding, reasoning,
or modeling. Thus, the cascade model of learning is a model of learning by doing
and what is acquired is plain knowledge-how.
The cascade approach might be successful in modeling multilevel categorization
across humans and animals, in particular as part of modeling the acquisition of
multilevel action concepts and methods of how to do things, and of what is ‘social
reality’ to the cognitive subjects. Another way of looking at cascade theory is to
consider it a psychological theory of “meaning”, in the very basic sense that acting at
a lower cascade level also “means” to act at the generated higher level. In this sense,
cascading provides action with meaning to the cognitive subject.
In the field of cognitive theory and psychology, the theory is at its very beginning.
It seems to be able to claim some plausibility (cf. Vallacher &Wegner, 2011). In any
event it would be interesting to try to develop methods for testing it experimentally.
For example, a cascade approach to learning raises concrete questions concerning
structural constraints on cascades to be acquired in terms of the number of levels, of
branching complexity, and of memorizability.
6 Conclusions
In this study, we present evidence supporting our hypothesis that USVs act as social
reinforcers. In line with the social reinforcement hypothesis (Hernandez-Lallement,
vanWingerden, et al., 2017), we show that rats preferred T-maze compartments asso-
ciatedwith 50-kHzUSVplayback over compartments associatedwith non-ultrasonic
control stimuli. This observation fuels the hypothesis that USVs might orchestrate
and structure social interaction between rats. Finally, we argue that one avenue
towards understanding the conceptual representation of the emotional and moti-
vational significance of rat USVs might require a multilevel approach, as proposed
by Goldman (1970) in his cascade model of mental representation of human action.
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Abstract Language-motor interaction is suggested by the involvement of motor
areas in action-related language processing. In a double-dissociation paradigm we
aimed to investigate motor cortical involvement in the processing of hand- and
foot-related action verbs combined with manner adverbs. In two experiments using
different tasks, subjects were instructed to respond with their hand or foot following
the presentation of an adverb-verb combination. Experiment 1, which prompted
reactions via color changes of the stimuli combined with a semantic decision,
showed an influence of manner adverbs on response times. This was visible in faster
responses following intensifying adverbs compared with attenuating adverbs. Addi-
tionally, an interaction between implied verb effector and response effector mani-
fested in faster response times for matching verb-response conditions. Experiment 2,
which prompted reactions directly by the adverb type (intensifying vs. attenuating),
revealed an interaction between manner adverbs and response effector with faster
hand responses following intensifying compared with attenuating adverbs. Addi-
tional electroencephalography (EEG) recordings in Experiment 2 revealed reduced
beta-desynchronization for congruent verb-response conditions in the case of foot
responses along with faster response times. Yet, a direct modulation of verb-motor
priming by adverbswas not found. Taken together, our results indicate an influence of
manner adverbs on the interplay of language processing and motor behavior. Results
are discussed with respect to embodied cognition theories.
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1 Introduction
Embodied cognition theories propose that modal brain regions involved in percep-
tion and action are likewise involved in the processing and storage of semantic
memory traces (Barsalou, 2008) as opposed to the classical view of amodal brain
regions storing semantic memory traces in the form of symbols (for a review
see Meteyard, Rodriguez Cuadrado, Bahrami, & Vigliocco, 2012). Specifically,
the motor component inherent to language containing action concepts triggers a
simulation of the implied movement in sensorimotor areas which is likely reflected
in increased activation (Kiefer & Pulvermüller, 2011). The association between
perceptual-motor and more cognitive brain areas can be explained through learning
experiences, but the precise role of the re-activation of these areas during semantic
processing is still under debate (Pulvermüller, 2018). For instance, it is important to
elucidate in which detail semantic processing is supported by sensory-motor areas.
This issue can be operationalized experimentally in different ways. The current
study used adverb-verb combinations to modify the underlying action concept
during verbal processing. Behavioral and neurophysiological data were examined in
order to find possible interactions of adverbial context with verb processing. These
interactions would argue for the contribution of motor cortical areas to language
processing being specific and detailed, going beyond superficial epiphenomena.
In turn, theories of language and semantic processing are continuously revised
to accommodate empirical findings concerning the functional and neuroanatomical
grounding of semantic memory in modality-specific areas (Barsalou, 2008; Binder
& Desai, 2011; Pulvermüller, 2018). The current study was aimed at contributing
to this discussion by investigating one aspect of embodied cognition, namely the
potential interaction between action verb processing and a modifying adverb.
Previous studies reported motor activation either during language processing
of action sentences (Aziz-Zadeh, Wilson, Rizzolatti, & Iacobini, 2006; Boulenger,
Hauk, & Pulvermüller, 2009; de Vega, Léon, Hernández, Valdés, Padrón, & Ferstl,
2014; Tettamanti et al., 2005) or action verbs (Hauk, Johnsrude, & Pulvermüller,
2004; Kemmerer, Castillo, Talavage, Patterson, & Wiley, 2008; Yang & Shu, 2011).
Motor activation seems to be somatotopical in the sense that action verbs implying the
movement of a specific extremity elicit activation in corresponding cortical motor
areas (Hauk et al., 2004; Pulvermüller, 2005). On the other hand, another study
reported no somatotopical activation in primary and premotor areas but rather found
action-related activation in the pre-SMA potentially holding an abstract representa-
tion of the action verbs in the form of instructional cues (Postle, McMahon, Ashton,
Meredith, & de Zubicaray, 2008).
On behavioral level, an interaction between action-related language processing
and motor execution emerged in altered kinematic measures (Boulenger, Roy,
Paulignan, Deprez, Jeannerod, & Nazir, 2006; Dalla Volta, Gianelli, Campione, &
Gentilucci, 2009) and in reaction time (Buccino, Riggio,Melli, Binkofski, Gallese,&
Rizzolatti, 2005; Sato, Mengarelli, Riggio, Gallese, & Buccino, 2008). Conversely,
motor output was shown to affect action language processing (Rüschemeyer,
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Lindemann, van Rooij, van Dam, & Bekkering, 2010). Depending on the task and
stimulus timing both facilitation (Andres, Finocchiaro, Buiatti, & Piazza, 2015;
Glenberg & Kaschak, 2002; Klepp et al., 2017; Scorolli & Borghi, 2007) and
interference or prolongation (Boulenger et al., 2006; Klepp, Niccolai, Buccino,
Schnitzler, & Biermann-Ruben, 2015; Sato et al., 2008) of motor behavior (i.e.
response times) were found.
The demonstrable engagement of motor areas is also evident in studies showing
an impairment of action-related language processing in patients suffering from
Parkinson’sDisease (Fernandino et al., 2013;Herrera,Rodríguez-Ferreiro,&Cuetos,
2011) and Amyotrophic Lateral Sclerosis (Bak, O’Donovan, Xuereb, Boniface, &
Hodges, 2001; Grossmann et al., 2008). These impairments indicate an initially
important role of motor areas in the ontogenesis of language acquisition (Perniss &
Vigliocco, 2014), while neurological disorders affecting motor areas seem to impede
an efficient and complete access to semantic memory traces in later life. This can,
however, be still partly compensated for by other brain areas (Pulvermüller, 2018).
Yet, these results suggest a substantial contribution of motor areas to action-related
language processing.
Aside from somatotopy, there is further evidence that sensorimotor involvement
in language processing is specific and detailed. For instance, it may reflect semantic
features of verbal material: The amount of effector-specific movement affected verb-
motor priming (Klepp et al., 2017). Additionally, functional magnetic resonance
imaging (fMRI) activity in parietal areas within the motor network was modulated
by the specificity of action plans described by verbs (van Dam, Rüschemeyer, &
Bekkering, 2010). Activity in pre-motor areas can reflect motor features described
in action sentences, e.g. the degree of physical effort the described action requires
as determined by a verb-object combination (Moody & Gennari, 2010).
In natural language, however, important cues about the precise implied action
may not only come from the verb itself, but from other sources such as objects and
adverbial constructions. The linguistic focus hypothesis (LFH) postulated by Taylor
and Zwaan (2008) suggests that motor simulation, which is assumed in the theo-
retical framework of embodied cognition theories regarding action-related language
processing, is dependent on the linguistic focus. If the described action is maintained
within the linguistic focus, e.g. through action-modifying adverbs, motor simula-
tion of the action occurs beyond the action verb itself and continuation of motor
activity should be observed; if the linguistic focus is shifted away from the action,
e.g. through agent-modifying adverbs, no motor simulation occurs and termination
of motor activity should be observed. The study conducted by Taylor and Zwaan
(2008) demonstrated that adverbs can influence reading times. Participants were
instructed to read a sentence frame by frame by turning a knob either in clockwise
or counter-clockwise direction. The sentences contained hand action verbs depicting
either clockwise or anticlockwise movements followed by an adverb either modi-
fying the action (e.g. quickly) or the agent (e.g. happily). Facilitation of reading times
occurred in direction-matching versus non-matching verb-response conditions and
when adverbs modified the action instead of the agent.
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Yet it remains unclear, if the motor simulation of the action verb is differen-
tially affected by different kinds of adverbs. For example, despite relating to a
bodily action, action verbs might not contain lexically specific information about
the amount of force with which the action is executed (Goldschmidt, Gamer-
schlag, Petersen, Gabrovska, & Geuder, 2017). This questionnaire study examined
whether the force component in the German action verb “schlagen” (to hit) could
be modulated in sentences containing adverbs. Crucially, force-denoting manner
adverbs (lightly/hard) directly modified the action’s force component in the direc-
tion suggested by the adverb. Moreover, force modification may also be achieved by
inferences through agent-oriented adverbs (Goldschmidt et al., 2017). The current
study uses manner adverbs denoting a clear attenuation or intensification of either the
force component or the speed component, thus expected to directly modify the action
described by verbs. Note that the term “force” is used as a synonymous expression
for “intensity” and is not used in terms of causality, as it is in the linguistic field of
“force semantics” and “force dynamics”.
Based on these findings we investigated in two separate experiments if adverbs
further influence reaction times in a well-established priming paradigm containing
hand/foot action verbs and hand/foot responses (Klepp et al., 2017). In both experi-
ments, the interaction of verb type and response effector was anticipated as a priming
effect resulting in faster response times for congruent verb-response conditions. We
furthermore introduced intensifying and attenuating manner adverbs as an additional
factor. The previously observed interaction of verb type and response effector was
hypothesized to be more pronounced when the action verb was combined with an
intensifying compared to an attenuating adverb resulting in even faster response times
in congruent verb-response conditions. Adverb-verb (Experiment 1) and verb-adverb
(Experiment 2) order of presentation realized in two separate experiments addition-
ally allowed investigating the influence of the time point of adverb presentation with
respect to the action verb processing stream.
A useful technique to investigate the time course of activation with respect to
action verb processing is EEG. Increased activity in motor areas is typically accom-
panied by increased desynchronization in the mu (10–15 Hz) and the beta band
(15–25 Hz). This oscillatory pattern is generally associated with motor preparation
and execution (Pfurtscheller & Lopes da Silva, 1999; Pfurtscheller, Neuper, Andrew,
& Edlinger, 1997). Typically, desynchronization increases, reaching a peak during
response execution, while a rebound consisting in increased synchronization is found
about a second after movement offset (Pfurtscheller, & Lopes da Silva, 1999). A
similar pattern has also been observed during action verb processing (van Elk, van
Schie, Zwaan, & Bekkering, 2010; Moreno, de Vega, Léon, Bastiaansen, Lewis, &
Magyari, 2015; Niccolai, Klepp, Weissler, Hoogenboom, Schnitzler, & Biermann-
Ruben, 2014). Neural oscillatory and event-related potential (ERP) effects related
to the presentation of action verbs have been reported as early as 170–250 ms after
word onset (Pulvermüller, Härle, & Hummel, 2000, 2001; van Elk et al., 2010),
displaying somatotopy (Hauk et al., 2004; Pulvermüller et al., 2001). This pattern
of results suggests that motor areas contribute to the processing of verbal linguistic
action stimuli.
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We therefore conducted EEG measurements in Experiment 2 to gain further
insights in the processing of the action verb and its possible interaction with the
adverb. According to the somatotopic organization of the motor cortex, differential
effects for hand and foot responses were hypothesized in electrode sites C3 and
Cz, respectively. We expected stronger hand-related activity at electrode site C3 and
stronger foot-related activity at electrode site Cz. This approach has been success-
fully used regarding evoked EEG activity during action verb reading before (Hauk
& Pulvermüller, 2004; Pulvermüller et al., 2000, 2001). We specifically focused on
the mu and beta band in our study due to their role in motor processes (Pfurtscheller
& Lopes da Silva, 1999) and action-related language processing (Klepp et al., 2015,
Moreno et al., 2015; van Elk et al., 2010). Thus, we expected the mu and beta desyn-
chronization around the onset of the response to be reduced in congruent conditions
due to the priming effect of the action verbs (Grisoni, Dreyer, & Pulvermüller, 2016;
Schacter, Wig, & Stevens, 2007).
As the manner adverb directly modified the action verb which elicits motor
activity if semantically processed, we expected the adverb to further modulate the
language-motor interaction. The interaction of verb type and response effector was
hypothesized to be more pronounced when the action verb was combined with an
intensifying compared to an attenuating adverb, resulting in reduced mu and beta
desynchronization in congruent verb-response conditions.
Methods and Results of Experiments 1 and 2 will be reported separately followed




Thirty-two participants (eleven male; mean age = 24.97 years, SD = 6.71) were
included into the study. Exclusion criteria were academic linguistic expertise, history
of prior neurological or psychiatric disorders and medication affecting the central
nervous system. Participants were monolingual German native speakers with normal
or corrected-to-normal vision. Right-handedness and footedness was assessed and
confirmed. Hand dominance was assessed with the Hand Dominance Test (HDT,
Steingrüber, 2011), as well as with the German version of the Edinburgh Handedness
Questionnaire (EHI, Oldfield, 1971). Right footedness was tested with a self-report
questionnaire extracted from the Lateral Preference Inventory (LPI, Ehrenstein &
Arnold-Schulz-Gahmen, 1997).
This experiment is in accordance with the Declaration of Helsinki and was
approved by the ethics committee of the Medical Faculty at Heinrich-Heine-
University Düsseldorf (study number: 3400). All subjects gave written informed
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consent before the beginning of the experiment and received course credit or financial
reimbursement.
Two subjectswere excluded due to data loss. Three subjects exceeded our criterion
of at most 10% incorrect responses during the experiment. After the experimental
session, one participant reported taking medication affecting the central nervous
system and was also excluded. The final set of participants in Experiment 1 therefore
consisted of 26 subjects (nine male, mean age = 25.28 years, SD = 7.39).
2.1.2 Stimuli
We used a total of 36 disyllabic German verbs and eight German adverbs (for an
overview see Table 1). The verb set consisted of three categories with 12 verbs each:
manual actions, e.g. “klatschen” (to clap), foot actions, e.g. “rennen” (to run) and
abstract actions, e.g. “denken” (to think). We used a subset of verbs out of a previous
selectionwhich had been based on successive rating andmatching procedures (details
see Klepp et al., 2014) including familiarity, imageability and movement energy, as
well as word length and verb frequency (Leipzig Corpora Collection, LCC, Biemann,
Heyer, Quasthoff, & Richter, 2007, available at http://wortschatz.uni-leipzig.de). As
indicated by amultivariateANOVAwith verb category as an independent variable the
final set of verbs differed with regard to some of these variables, but only in compar-
ison to the abstract verb category. This category served as the No Go-condition,
however and was not further analyzed. Importantly, hand and foot verbs did not
differ significantly (all p > 0.087).
Twenty-five adverbs entered a rating process (n = 4) serving to redefine stimuli
selection. Participantswere asked to evaluate the probability of verb and adverb going
together (from “not at all” to “absolutely”). This was termed as the semantic fit of
adverb-verb combinations. Adverb selection was based on their semantic fit with the
previously selected set of action verbs, as well as the possibility to define opposed
pairs of intensifying and attenuating adverbs, e.g. “kräftig”—“kraftlos” (strongly—
feebly). This resulted in the subsequent inclusion of eight out of the initially selected
25 adverbs, four of which strengthening or accelerating the movement implied by the
verb (intensifying adverbs) and four weakening or slowing the implied action (atten-
uating adverbs) . Exact Mann-Whitney-U-Test revealed no significant differences in
the frequency of intensifying and attenuating adverbs (U = 14.50, p = 0.343) nor
differences in their semantic fit to hand verbs (U = 6.50, p = 0.645) or foot verbs
(U = 5.00, p = 0.381), respectively. Please note that linguistically all adverbs are
adjectives applied in an adverbial manner of use. For the sake of simplification we
will refer to them as “manner adverbs” in this article.
2.1.3 Procedure
Subjects were seated at a distance of 95 cm from a computer screen (ASUS VG248,
ASUS Computer International, Fremont, California, USA) with a keyboard in front
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Table 1 The stimulus set
consisted of 36 verbs and 8
adverbs. All adverbs and
verbs are reported in German
and English, respectively,
although only the German
version was used in the study









































































Adverb category Intensifying Attenuating
kräftig (forcefully) kraftlos (feebly)
hektisch (hectically) ruhig (calmly)
stark (strongly) zaghaft (tentatively)
flink (swiftly) träge (dully)
of them and a foot pedal (USB Triple Foot Switch II; Scythe, Tokyo, Japan) posi-
tioned under the table. All trials started with a black background screen containing
a white fixation cross at the center presented for 1200 ms. This was followed by the
presentation of a mask consisting of two horizontal lines of seven white ‘X’ for a
jittered interval between 400 and 700 ms. Thereafter, an adverb was presented in
white letters pseudorandomly above or below the fixation cross for 400 ms together
with the remaining upper or lower line of seven ‘X’. The verb followed in white
letters replacing the latter seven ‘X’ and the adverb-verb combination was displayed
together for another 400 ms. Then, the stimuli turned either blue or yellow. Subjects
were instructed to respond as fast and accurately as possible with the hand or the foot
according to the color of the adverb-verb combination, but only if the verb expressed
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1200 400-700 400 max. 1600 / response onset
Fig. 1 Experimental procedure. A Experiment 1. B Experiment 2
a concrete bodily action. Participants were pseudorandomly assigned to one of two
groups of color change instructions: color change to blue required a hand response
by pressing the ‘space’-key on a keyboard while a color change to yellow required
a foot response by pressing down a foot pedal for 50% of the subjects. For the other
50%, the assignment was reversed. The experimental procedure of each trial is shown
in Fig. 1A.
Pseudorandomization of the spatial position of verb and adverb was introduced to
prevent participants from adopting a strategy to solely attend to the stimulus relevant
for solving the experimental task, i.e. the verb in Experiment 1 and the adverb in
Experiment 2, respectively. The spatial predictability of these stimuli could have
resulted in impaired semantic processing of adverb-verb-combinations, which we
tried to preclude by variation of the spatial positions.
Each adverb was combined with each verb and presented once with each type of
color change resulting in a total of 576 trials per subject. The experiment lasted about
50 min. Stimuli were presented using Presentation 14.9 software (Neurobehavioral
Systems, Albany, California, USA).
2.1.4 Statistical Analysis
We computed a linear mixed effect model using the package lme4 (version 1.1–13,
Bates, Maechler, Bolker, & Walker, 2015) for R (version 3.3.3) including crossed
random effects for subjects and items. This method is especially advantageous
for studies incorporating psycholinguistic stimuli since it is assumed that not only
participants but also the items are randomly drawn from a population (Baayen,
Davidson, & Bates, 2008). Linear mixed effect models allowed the inclusion of
the two-level factor verb (hand, foot), the two-level factor adverb type (intensi-
fying, attenuating) and the two-level factor response effector (hand response, foot
response). Thus, the fixed effects included the factors verb, adverb type and response
effector, as well as their two-way and three-way interactions. Random effects for
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participants included random intercepts with random slopes for the factors verb,
adverb type and response effector. Random effects for items only included random
intercepts. All analyses used logarithmically transformed reaction times of correct
responses within 150 to 1500 ms. T-values below −2 or above 2 are considered
to represent significant effects. Post hoc tests were calculated using the package
lsmeans (version 2.25–5, Lenth, 2016).
2.2 Results
2.2.1 Behavioral Data
Errors and responses faster than 150 ms or slower than 1500 ms after the Go-signal
onset were excluded resulting in the exclusion of 358 trials (3.59%). The Go-signal
is defined as the cue stimulus prompting a response, i.e. here the color change of the
adverb-verb-combination. Raw data are shown in Fig. 2A. We observed a significant
main effect of response effector (t = 4.86) with faster hand responses than foot
A B
Fig. 2 Data distribution in Experiment 1 (A) and Experiment 2 (B). Raw data is split for verb condi-
tions (hand verb, foot verb) on the x-axis, y-axis indicates the response times in milliseconds. Data
is furthermore split according to the response effector (hand responses, foot responses) following
intensifying (blue) and attenuating (red) adverbs. Red and blue lines indicate mean values in the
respective conditions
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responses. The main effect of adverb type was significant (t = 4.01) as well, with
faster responses following intensifying adverbs compared to attenuating adverbs.
Furthermore, the interaction between verb and response effector was significant (t
= −11.20). Post hoc tests indicated significantly faster (z = 3.25, p = 0.001) hand
responses following hand verbs compared to foot verbs and significantly faster (z =
−3.76, p < 0.001) foot responses following foot verbs compared to hand verbs. The
hypothesized three-way interaction of verb, response effector and adverb type was
not significant (t = −0.32). All model estimates are given in Table 2. Fitted model
parameters (±SD) for verb x adverb type x response effector are depicted in Fig. 3A.
Table 2 Results of statistical analyses of behavioral data. Model estimates (β), standard error (SE)
and t-values are reported for Experiment 1 (left) and Experiment 2 (right). Significant effects are
bold
Experiment 1 Experiment 2
β SE t β SE t
Verb −0.002 0.006 −0.27 0.005 0.003 1.63
Adverb type 0.010 0.002 4.01 0.017 0.010 1.66
Response effector 0.045 0.009 4.86 0.044 0.008 5.65
Verb x adverb type −0.002 0.002 −1.03 −0.001 0.002 −0.79
Verb x response effector −0.023 0.002 −11.20 −0.003 0.002 −1.70
Adverb type x response effector 0.001 0.002 0.47 −0.009 0.002 −4.68
Verb x adverb type x response effector −0.001 0.002 −0.32 0.002 0.002 0.82
A B
Fig. 3 Effects of Experiment 1 (A) and Experiment 2 (B). The 2-level factor verb (hand verb,
foot verb) is denoted on the x-axis, y-axis indicates log-transformed response times. Data are split
according to adverb type (intensifying adverb, attenuating adverb) and response effector. Circles,
squares and error bars indicate fitted model parameters with standard deviation




Seventeen participants (six male; mean age= 24.82 years, SD= 4.90) were included
into the study. Exclusion criteria were the same as in Experiment 1. Handedness and
footedness was assessed as in Experiment 1. The experiment is in accordance with
the Declaration of Helsinki and was approved by the ethics committee of theMedical
Faculty at Heinrich-Heine-University Düsseldorf (study number: 3400). All subjects
gave written informed consent before the beginning of the experiment and received
course credit or financial reimbursement.
Two subjects were excluded due to unidentifiable artifacts in the EEG recordings
and excessive eye blinks during stimulus presentation. The final set of participants
in Experiment 2 consisted of 15 subjects (six male, mean age = 24.93 years, SD =
5.23).
3.1.2 Stimuli
The stimulus set included the same adverbs and concrete verbs as in Experiment 1,
i.e. 24 concrete verbs (twelve hand verbs and twelve foot verbs) and eight adverbs
(four intensifying adverbs, four attenuating adverbs).
3.1.3 Procedure
All subjects participated in two separate experimental sessions at least seven days
apart. Sessions differed regarding the instructions: in one session subjects had to react
with their right hand to intensifying adverbs and with their right foot to attenuating
adverbs. Reaction times were recorded. The response effector-adverb type relation-
ship was reversed in the other session. The order of sessions was counterbalanced
across subjects. Experimental sessions were conducted in an electrically shielded
room. The experimental setup was the same as described in Experiment 1 with only
few changes. First, the verb preceded the adverb. Second, the onset of the adverb
instantaneously cued the response effector according to the respective instructions
of the current session, i.e. there was no color change. Third, the verb-adverb combi-
nation was presented until response onset or maximally 1600 ms. The trial design is
depicted in Fig. 1B. Each adverb was paired with each verb and each combination
was shown twice, thus resulting in a total of 384 trials per subject. Each experimental
session lasted about 30 min. Stimuli were presented using Presentation 14.9 soft-
ware (Neurobehavioral Systems, Albany, California, USA) in white font on a black
background.
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3.1.4 EEG Data Acquisition
We recorded the EEG signal with 29 Ag–AgCl electrodes mounted in an elastic
cap (EASYCAP GmbH, Herrsching, Germany), according to the 10/20 system. The
average of right and left mastoid was used as reference and electrode position AFz
as ground. Vertical EOG was recorded using bipolar electrodes. EEG-signals were
amplified with a BrainAmp MR Plus amplifier (Brain Products, Munich, Germany).
A sampling rate of 1000 Hz and an online high-pass filter of 0.3 Hz were applied.
Impedance of all electrodes was kept below 10 k. EEG and EOG signals were
registered with BrainVision Recorder (Brain Products GmBH, Munich, Germany).
3.1.5 EEG Data Processing
Neurophysiological data were analyzed with Fieldtrip (version 20160629, Oosten-
veld, Fries, Maris, & Schoffelen, 2011), an open source toolbox for Matlab (version
R2016a, Mathworks, Natick, Massachusetts, USA). Episodes include time-windows
from 2 s before verb onset to 0.5 s after response onset. A semi-automatic artifact
detection routine was applied to identify electrode jumps and muscle artifacts.
A lowpass filter at 120 Hz was applied and line noise at 50 and 100 Hz filtered
out. Trials were visually inspected for blink artifacts in the critical time window
between verb and response onset as well as for non-EOG artifacts in the whole trial.
Trials containing artifacts were rejected. Remaining blink artifacts in the baseline or
post-response period were removed using independent component analysis (ICA).
Data were subsequently split into eight conditions defined by adverb type (inten-
sifying vs. attenuating), verb (hand vs. foot) and response effector (hand vs. foot) and
entered a time-frequency analysis. To discern and investigate semantic processing
around adverb onset and motor processes during response execution more closely,
we conducted two analyses locked to adverb and response onset, respectively. In both
analyses data were aligned to the respective event, with 0 either denoting the onset of
adverb or response. Time-frequency representations (TFRs) were computed in steps
of 2 Hz from 2 to 30 Hz using a Fourier transformation. We applied a single Hanning
taper with a width of 5 cycles, sliding in steps of 40ms. Data were baseline-corrected
using a time window of ta =−1.3 to−0.8 s for the adverb-locked analysis and tr =
−1.5 to −1.0 s for the response-locked analysis.
3.1.6 Statistical Analysis
Behavioral Data
The linear mixed effect model contained the two-level factors verb (hand, foot),
adverb type (intensifying, attenuating) and response effector (hand response, foot
response). Fixed effects included the factors verb, adverb and response and their
interactions. Random effects for participants included random intercepts for subjects
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and random slopes for the factors verb, adverb and response. Random effects for
items only included random intercepts. Logarithmically transformed reaction times
of correct responses within 150 to 1500 ms entered the analysis. T-values below−2
or above 2 are considered to represent significant effects. Post hoc tests were carried
out using the package lsmeans (version 2.25-5, Lenth, 2016).
EEG Data
To statistically analyze the EEG data we computed pseudo-t-values for each partici-
pant to normalize individual differences (compareLange,Oostenveld,&Fries, 2011).
These t-values were then transformed into z-values to account for different number
of trials in each condition (Klepp et al., 2015; see van Dijk, Nieuwenhuis, & Jensen,
2010). Then we applied a non-parametric statistical procedure to assess significant
differences on the group level. This non-parametric randomization approach identi-
fies clusters containing neighboring timepoints and frequencieswhile simultaneously
correcting for multiple comparisons (Maris & Oostenveld, 2007).
Conditions were considered significantly different if the test statistic obtained
from 5000 permutations resulted in an alpha-level below 0.05. We defined the rele-
vant contrasts of conditions based on the resulting significant behavioral effects. In
addition, we investigated if semantic priming is mirrored in reduced desynchroniza-
tion in congruent verb-response conditions, as stated in our hypothesis. ElectrodesC3
as proxy of the right hand and Cz as proxy of the right foot were analyzed separately.
3.2 Results
3.2.1 Behavioral Data
Errors and responses faster than 150 ms or slower than 1500 ms after adverb onset
were excluded from further analysis resulting in the exclusion of 411 trials (3.57%).
Raw data are shown in Fig. 2B. The mixed model analysis showed a significant
main effect for response effector (t = 5.65) with faster hand responses than foot
responses. A significant interaction between the factors adverb type and response
effector emerged (t = −4.68). Post hoc tests revealed significant differences for
hand responses (z = 2.448, p= 0.014) with faster hand responses following intensi-
fying compared with attenuating adverbs. No difference emerged in the case of foot
responses (z= 0.820, p= 0.412). The interaction between verb and response effector
was not significant (t =−1.70). The three-way interaction of verb, response effector
and adverb type was not significant (t = 0.82). All values are given in Table 2. Fitted
model parameters (±SD) for verb x adverb type x response effector are depicted in
Fig. 3B.
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Cz
Fig. 4 Grandaverage EEG data and statistical contrasts relating to significant effects in the adverb-
locked analysis of Experiment 2. The time in seconds is depicted on the x-axis with 0 denoting the
onset of adverb, the frequency in Hertz is shown on the y-axis. Data is furthermore color-coded
according to the power relative to baseline (left andmiddle column) or according to the z-value (right
column) of the respective statistical comparison. The contrast shows hand- and foot response-related
activity in electrode Cz with the significant cluster outlined in black.
3.2.2 EEG Data
Adverb-Locked Analysis
A cluster between ta = 0.48 and 1 s after adverb onset (p = 0.003) indicated a
significant difference between response effectors in the electrode Cz ranging from
17 to 30Hz, i.e. stronger beta desynchronization for foot responses (Fig. 4). No effect
was found in C3 (all p > 0.201). Neither adverbs nor any interaction with response
effector or verb showed significant effects in electrodes C3 nor Cz (all p > 0.110).
Response-Locked Analysis
A cluster at tr =−0.16 to 0.32 s (p < 0.001) indicated a significant difference between
hand and foot responses in electrode C3 ranging from 9 to 30 Hz showing stronger
mu and beta desynchronization for hand responses (Fig. 5A). Complementarily, in
electrode Cz, a cluster indicated a significant difference between the hand and foot
condition at tr= 0–0.4 s after response onset (p= 0.002) ranging from15 to 30Hz, i.e.
stronger beta desynchronization for foot responses (Fig. 5B). A significant cluster
(p = 0.019) in electrode C3 showed that in the case of foot responses, the hand
verb condition showed significantly more beta desynchronization than the foot verb
condition at tr = −0.64 to 0.16 s ranging from 12 to 18 Hz (Fig. 5C). No effect
was observed in electrode Cz (p > 0.082). No corresponding effect emerged for hand
responses (all p > 0.116).




Fig. 5 GrandaverageEEGdata and statistical contrasts relating to significant effects in the response-
locked analysis of Experiment 2. The time in s is depicted on the x-axis with 0 denoting the onset of
response, the frequency in Hz is shown on the y-axis. Data is furthermore color-coded according to
the power relative to baseline (left and middle column) or according to the z-value (right column)
of the respective statistical comparison. A: Hand response- and foot response-related activity in
electrode C3 with the significant cluster outlined in black. B: Hand response- and foot response-
related activity in electrodeCzwith the significant cluster outlined in black.C: Foot response-related
activity following hand verbs and foot verbs with the significant cluster outlined in black.
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3.3 Discussion
Our results show an influence of manner adverbs on motor behavior. In Experiment
1, we found a significant main effect of adverb indicating faster responses following
intensifying compared with attenuating adverbs. This effect might depend on the
direct relation between the force component of the action verb and themanner adverb
specifying the amount of force implied in the movement (Goldschmidt et al., 2017).
Action verbs are reported to elicit motor activation (Hauk et al., 2004; Pulvermüller,
2005), especially when processed semantically (Klepp et al., 2017; Sato et al., 2008).
Motor output interacts with action-related language processing because of shared
neuronal circuits (Boulenger et al., 2006; Dalla Volta et al., 2009). Manner adverbs
modifying an action verb might therefore modulate its elicited motor activation
by modulating the amount of force implied in the action. As was shown in the
case of imageability (Klepp et al., 2015) and effector-specific movement (Klepp
et al., 2017), semantic features of the action verb might influence motor behavior.
Cortical motor areas might therefore also be involved in the processing of semantic
features of stimuli relating to the action verb. This is furthermore corroborated by
the complementary results of Experiment 2. Here, though no significant main effect
of adverb type emerged, manner adverbs interacted with the response effector.
Hand responses following intensifying adverbs were significantly faster than hand
responses following attenuating adverbs. Participants had to respond depending on
the adverb type.
Comparing Experiments 1 and 2 it seems that the main effect of adverb type in
Experiment 1 switched to an interaction between adverb type and response effector
in Experiment 2. The main difference between these two experiments is the order of
adverb-verb (Experiment 1) and verb-adverb (Experiment 2) presentation combined
with the instruction cues color change (Experiment 1) and adverb type (Experi-
ment 2). The relevance and subsequent psycho-linguistic processing of the adverb
for successfully operating on the tasks hence was different in Experiments 1 and
2: In Experiment 1, priming of force components could have taken place resulting
in a main effect of adverb type even though the semantics of the adverbs were
of minor relevance. In Experiment 2 on the other hand, the semantics of the adverb
were indicative for the required response potentially resulting in simulation processes
directly interactingwith response preparation. In addition, while both tasks prompted
semantic processing of the verbal material, Experiment 2 might have increased the
participants’ awareness of the semantic features of the manner by making them
task-relevant. Studies concerning the mental timeline argued that mental simula-
tions only occur during language processing, if the semantic features of the verbal
material is task-relevant and the processor is aware of these features (Maienborn,
Alex-Ruf, Eikmeier, & Ulrich, 2015; Ulrich & Maienborn, 2010). The increased
awareness of the semantic features may have resulted in the more specific interac-
tion between adverb and response. That the effect was only found for hand responses
and not for foot responses might be attributable to the closer connection of the hand
with language (Rizzolatti & Arbib, 1998). Another explanation could be that due to
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longer response times for foot responses the interaction with adverbs might fade with
processing time. Still, foot responses to intensifying adverbs were numerically faster
than to attenuating adverbs. Arguably, intensifying adverbs might increase motor
activation per se thereby increasing the motor contribution to the processing of the
action verb. This might reflect a semantic priming effect even for manner adverbs.
This remains elusive, however, since no corresponding effect of manner adverbs was
found in the neurophysiological data of Experiment 2. Differential motor activation
relating to intensifying and attenuating adverbs could arise in studies focusing solely
on the semantic processing of manner adverbs. Yet both experiments reported in
this study incorporated manner adverb-action verb combinations which might have
limited our ability to discern adverb- and verb-related processes regarding brain
oscillations.
In addition to the effects of manner adverbs, action verbs interacted with motor
behavior. In Experiment 1, facilitated hand and foot responses in congruent compared
with incongruent verb-response combinations revealed a semantic priming effect,
which is in line with previous findings (Scorolli & Borghi, 2007; Klepp et al., 2017).
This is corroboratedby theneurophysiological data recorded inExperiment 2.Results
showed reduced beta desynchronization in electrode C3 for foot responses following
foot verbs compared to hand verbs. As expected, the congruent condition presented
with reduced motor activation (Grisoni et al., 2016; Schacter et al., 2007). The onset
of the effect was about 600 ms before response onset, which would have allowed the
action verb to be processed semantically and subsequently interacting with response
execution (Kutas & Hillyard, 1984). However, the effect emerged in electrode C3
only, which was located approximately above the cortical motor hand area, whereas
no complementary effect for hand responses emerged in electrode Cz. Furthermore,
no verb x response effector interaction was visible in the behavioral data of Exper-
iment 2. Hence, the observed differences might alternatively be accounted for by
significant differences between hand and foot verbs, respectively. This might be due
to the limited set of action verbs employed in this study. To reduce confounding
effects of imageability, familiarity and frequency, we matched our verb set very
carefully. However, this might have prevented us from mapping a wider range of
possible differences in the action verbs, for instance with regard to their movement
pattern as well as other linguistic features. Differences in brain oscillations for foot
responses following hand and foot verbs might therefore alternatively be unrelated
to a semantic priming effect but merely reflect an overall stronger desynchronization
following hand verbs compared with foot verbs independent of the response effector.
Two further aspects should be discussed, namely the somatotopy of response
effectors and timing. Hand and foot responses were required in a double-dissociation
paradigm. As visible in the behavioral data of both experiments, hand responses were
overall faster than foot responses, which is in line with previous findings (Buccino
et al., 2005; Gianelli & Dalla Volta, 2015; Klepp et al., 2017). Experiment 2 indi-
cated differential motor activation for hand and foot responses in electrodes C3
and Cz in analyses around adverb and response onset. Oscillatory differences arose
predominantly in the beta frequency range in a time window relating to response
execution. Crucially, stronger desynchronization for hand responses was observed
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in electrode C3, while stronger desynchronization for foot responses emerged in
electrode Cz. Our results thus demonstrate somatotopical activity differences related
to the respective response effector, as hypothesized. This should have allowed for
the detection of differential EEG effects of verbs and adverbs for the two response
effectors. Indeed, stronger desynchronization for hand than foot verbs preceding foot
responses in electrode C3 was found, but not the full pattern of effects expected from
the double dissociation paradigm. One straightforward explanationmay be that when
no behavioral effects were found, there simply might have been no differences in
neurophysiological processing to be measured by EEG. Note, however, that neuro-
physiological effects are sometimes reported in the absence of behavioral differences
(Mollo, Pulvermüller, & Hauk, 2016). Nevertheless, the paradigm of Experiment 2
may be not optimally suited for the detection of language-motor priming effects.
More specifically, the temporal proximity between manner adverb and hand/foot
responses onset in Experiment 2 might have been too close to discern oscillatory
differences in the semantic processing of manner adverbs. Instead, potentially subtle
activity differences relating to the processing of the manner adverb might have been
overshadowed by motor activation induced during response execution processes. In
addition, potential activation differences might have been observable in other elec-
trodes, especially located above other language-related brain areas, e.g. temporal
regions; these regions might also reflect differences based on the type of manner
adverb or its interaction with action verbs.
An important concern in the comparison between the effects of Experiment 1 and
Experiment 2 is the temporal structure of stimulus presentation and the average
response time. In Experiment 1, the average time interval between adverb and
response onset was 1300 ms while the average time interval between action verb
and response, on the other hand, was only 900 ms. There was a priming effect of
verb effector, but only an unspecific effect of adverb type. Thus, Experiment 2 was
designed to induce more semantic interaction with the hypothesis to find an interac-
tion of priming and adverb type, reflected in neurophysiological data. The reversal
of verb and adverb presentation order also implied that the average time interval
between verb presentation and response was 1150 ms, with 750 ms between adverb
and response onset. Action verbs did not influence response times possibly due to the
prolonged interval between verb and response onset. Accordingly, stimulus-response
intervals likely modulated the effects observed in the two experiments.
Further, a relatively small sample size and the inclusion of only two EEG elec-
trodes in the statistical analyses might have limited the power of our results. Inclu-
sion of a greater sample to increase effect sizes and a greater number of EEG elec-
trodes could lead to a more detailed picture regarding the interplay of action-related
language processing and motor activity and its modulation by manner adverbs.
Future studies should furthermore investigate which semantic aspects of manner
adverbs potentially elicit motor activation, e.g. differentiating between force and
velocity, providing closer insights into the extent of motor involvement in language
processing. The small number of force- and velocity-modulating adverbs (two each
for intensifying and attenuating adverbs) prevented us from validly deducing differ-
ential effects on the verb-response interaction. On the other hand, some action verbs,
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e.g. “boxen” (to box), might be predominately modulated by adverbs defining the
amount of force, while others, e.g. “tippen” (to type), might be more susceptible to
an adverbial modulation relating to the velocity of the action. This raises the impor-
tant question whether such differences are mirrored in the overt motor behavior or
neurophysiological activity. Additionally, previous studies suggested an influence of
various movement-dependent factors on beta-desynchronization in motor areas (Tan
et al., 2013; Nakayashiki, Saeki, Takata, Hayashi, & Kondo, 2014). A consecutive
study might therefore also be concerned with the influence of manner adverb on
the motor response by taking various movement-related parameters into considera-
tion. Furthermore, adverb-verb combinations should be included in natural sentences
to shed more light on the influence of grammatical constructions on action-related
language processing in sensorimotor areas.
Taken together, our study provides an indication that manner adverbs influence
motor behavior while corroborating the already existing data concerning the inter-
action between action verb processing and motor output. These findings are in line
with assumptions made by embodied cognition theories proposing an essential role
of sensorimotor areas in the processing and storage of action concepts inherent in
action-related language. The adverbial modulation of motor behavior might reflect
a certain variation of motor involvement in language processing. This involvement
could be susceptible to grammatical constructions modifying the action component
of action verbs. Yet, effects of the verb material in a closely matched verb set and
influences of timing have to be taken into account.
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When Mechanical Computations Explain
Better
Silvano Zipoli Caiani
Abstract In this paper I defend the epistemic value of the representational-
computational view of cognition by arguing that it has explanatory merits that cannot
be ignored. To this end, I focus on the virtue of a computational explanation of optic
ataxia, a disorder characterized by difficulties in executing visually-guided reaching
tasks, although ataxic patients do not exhibit any specific disease of the muscular
apparatus. I argue that addressing cases of patientswho are suffering fromoptic ataxia
by invoking a causal role for internal representations is more effective than merely
relying on correlations between bodily and environmental variables. This argument
has consequences for the epistemic assessment of radical enactivism, which invokes
the Dynamical System Theory as the best tool for explaining cognitive phenomena.
Keywords Computational explanation · Dynamical system theory · Radical
enactivism · Visual affordances · Optic ataxia
1 Introduction
According to a new generation of scholars, the computational paradigm that have
informed the study of cognition for decades now creak under the weight of the new
enactivist approach to cognition. Over the last few years, indeed, several philoso-
phers and cognitive scientists have proposed to replace the mechanical and repre-
sentational assumptions underlying the computational paradigm with a dynamical
and extensional way to understand cognition (e.g., Chemero, 2011; Hutto & Myin,
2017, Gallagher, 2017). Supporters of the radical enactivist view (RE) argue that the
computational paradigm does not add explanatory power over and above the physical
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description of a cognitive system, and therefore it should be abandoned (e.g., van
Gelder, 1995; Chemero, 2011; Hutto & Myin, 2012).1
The aim of this paper is to defend the epistemic value of the computational view
of cognition by arguing that it has explanatory merits that cannot be ignored. To
this end, I focus on the virtue of a mechanical-computational explanation of the
behavior of patients suffering from optic ataxia, a disorder characterized by diffi-
culties in executing visually-guided reaching tasks, although patients do not exhibit
any specific disease of the muscular apparatus (Balint, 1909). I argue that addressing
cases of patients who are suffering from optic ataxia by invoking the causal role for
internal representations ismore effective thanmerely relying on correlations between
bodily and environmental variables.
According to the computational paradigm, the cognitive system forms visual
representations of the available actionable opportunities in the environment, which
have a causal role in action planning and execution (e.g., Fodor & Pylyshyn, 1988;
Mcculloch & Pitts, 1944; Putnam, 1967). This serves to emphasize the need to
identify the parts and the mechanical structures characterizing the causal chains
underlying and generating the behavior of interest (Craver & Darden, 2013; Illari
& Williamson, 2012; Bechtel & Richardson, 1993; Craver, 2006). Thus, such an
account shows why an agent performs a certain behavior by describing the relevant
mechanisms linking internal representations with the agent’s motor system.2
In a different vein, RE denies the need to invoke internal representations to account
for the interaction between vision and action.According toRE,modeling the relation-
ships between vision and action requires attending to the ways in which individuals
dynamically engage with certain worldly offerings by means of extended interac-
tions (Hutto &Myin, 2017). In doing this, RE assumes that visual cognition does not
involve the selecting, storing, and processing of information in the brain. Differently,
RE conceives visual cognition as an extensive phenomenon concerning the variation
of bodily and environmental variables spanning multiple temporal and spatial scales.
This amounts to an assumption that the agent and the environment form a unified
system whose behavior cannot be modeled as a causal chain linking separate parts
(Chemero, 2011). Accordingly, the interlocking between vision and action should
be explained via a methodological framework that does not posit mental representa-
tions, like dynamical systems theory (DST). Notably, modeling cognition by means
of DST allows for a lawful account of how agents interact with the action-related
properties of the environment, without the need to involve internal resources such as
causal states and computations (e.g., Beer, 2000; Spivey, 2008; Chemero, 2011).
1For the sake of the present argument, I focus exclusively on Radical Enactivism (e.g., Chemero,
2011; Hutto & Myin, 2012), excluding the different theoretical strands that populate the enactivist
world (e.g., Maturana & Varela, 1991; Noë, 2004; O’Regan & Noë, 2001; O’Regan, 2011). At
present, radical enactivism is the most developed, discussed, and challenging alternative to the
classical computational paradigm that has informed cognitive science for about sixty years.
2It should be noted that the mechanical approach to explanation improves our comprehension of the
causal chain that allows a behavior to occur in conjunction with certain environmental conditions,
thusmaking the execution of an action a non-surprising event (Cohen, 2015; Schupbach&Sprenger,
2011).
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Though RE is currently encountering enthusiastic appraisals, it is not un-common
that someone may still consider it as a proposal that is more easily explained than
proved. Whether RE is only on the crest of a fashionable wave that is doomed to
leave no tracks in the sand, or whether it is a tsunami with the power to sweep away
the existing explanatory practice in the cognitive sciences, is something that has not
yet been carefully assessed. In order to address this issue, I follow Hutto andMyin in
considering that the only naturalistically respectable way to decline RE is “to give it
its day in empirical court” (Hutto & Myin, 2017, p. 19). This amounts to wondering
whether the methodological tools of DST, instead of a computational-mechanical
approach, offer the best explanation of basic cognitive phenomena. This paper shows
that there are factual circumstances concerning the ability and inability to perceive
and exploit visual affordances for which DST is not able to explain, but which are
suitably accounted for through the adoption of a computational architecture based
on the dual streams model of vision (Goodale & Milner, 1992). More precisely,
I maintain that RE provides a valuable explanation of why agents perceive action
opportunities, whereas a computational view provides an explanation for why agents
have such an ability in addition to why this ability can be lost.
This paper is divided into six parts. In the first part (Sect. 2), I introduce RE by
distinguishing between two claims, the former concerning the ontological status of
representational entities, and the latter concerning the explanatory power of a non-
representational account of cognition. In Sect. 3, I focus on the explanatory claim and
provide details concerning the strategy underlying DST, showing that it amounts to a
correlational approach. In Sect. 4, I introduce the case of optic ataxia, and argue that
it is an ideal target for measuring the explanatory power of DST. In Sect. 5, I show
that the correlational analysis provided by DST is not suitable to explain relevant
aspects of ataxic behavior, since it does not suffice to provide an etiological account
for it. Finally, in Sect. 6, I introduce a computational model of vision for action, and
show that it is suitable to provide the etiological account that is required in the case
of optic ataxia.
As a result, although sometimes the dynamical systems theory and the compu-
tational paradigm can be “natural allies”, playing both a complementary role in
describing the interactions between vision and action (Kaplan, 2015), in the case of
optic ataxia, the computational view ismore explanatory than the dynamical one. This
outlines that there is an epistemological shortcoming of radical enactivism compared
to the computational account.
2 Radical Enactivism and the Explanatory Claim
According to RE, there are cognitive facts that can be fully and completely accounted
for by means of an extensional language, that is, by conceiving themmerely in terms
of activities in which the agent’s body is dynamically engaged with the environment.
Notably, considering cognitive phenomena in a purely extensional way, supporters
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of RE state that the body-environment relations do not involve any computational
manipulation of information (e.g., Chemero, 2011; Hutto & Myin, 2012, 2017).
In denying the computational nature of cognition, supporters of RE might be
committed to more than one claim. As Chemero (2011) has noted, when one
proclaims that cognition does not involve computations, there are at least two theo-
retical views one might endorse. First, one might be making a claim aboutwhat there
is andwhat there is not, namely, a claim about the ontology of the cognitive sciences.
Second, one might be claiming something about the best way to provide explana-
tory arguments in the cognitive sciences. While in the former case, the rebuttal of
the computational view amounts to a metaphysical thesis, in the latter case it rests
on epistemological grounds, that is, on the analysis of the needs and practices that
characterize the work of cognitive scientists. The key difference between the two
claims is that only the explanatory claim is an empirical hypothesis, whereas the
metaphysical claim concerns our philosophical criteria for establishing the place of
cognition in nature (Chemero, 2011).
Over the last decades, many arguments have been raised against the attempt
to provide a successful naturalization of computational systems (for a review see,
Kriegel, 2013; Pietroski, 1992; Ramsey, 2007, 2015), such that it is an ongoing debate
whether computational processes should be considered parts of the natural ontology
or not. Although it raises a fascinating philosophical discussion, the metaphysical
hypothesis has little impact on the scientific practice since one may continue to refer
to a computational approach to cognition with or without compromising with any
sort of naturalization of the computational states (classically Dennett, 1987; more
recently see Egan, 2013; Colombo, 2014). Accordingly, given the different purposes
underlying the practical use of a word such as “computations”, the metaphysical
claim is hardly defensible on empirical grounds (Chemero, 2011).
Differently, the epistemological hypothesis concerning the explanatory value of
the computational approach to cognition has dramatic consequences on the real
practices of cognitive scientists. According to this hypothesis, the great variety of
experiences and behaviors are best understood without appealing to the manipula-
tion of causal states but rather by focusing on the dynamical interactions between
the agent’s body and the environment. When it comes to accounting for intelligent
activity, supporters of RE subscribe to the Equal Partner Principle (Hutto & Myin,
2017), according to which variables of any kind make an equal explanatory contribu-
tion, regardless of whether they concern aspects located in or out of the boundaries
of skull and skin. This means that citing internal factors endowed with a causal
status does not carry more explanatory value than, for example, referring to environ-
mental and bodily factors that merely correlate with each other. Accordingly, since
the computational view is refuted as an explanatory tool for the cognitive sciences,
agents and environmental factors can be modeled as a unified, non-decomposable
system whose behavior cannot be accounted for, even approximately, as a set of
separate causal parts.
When Mechanical Computations Explain Better 467
3 Radical Enactivism and the Dynamical System Theory
According to the previous considerations, the adoption of DST may be pivotal for an
epistemological approach to RE (e.g., Beer, 2000; Chemero, 2011; van Gelder, 1995;
Heinke, 2000;Walmsley, 2008). Indeed, the methodological assumptions underlying
DST allow for an approach to the study of cognition that avoids mechanical states
and inner computational processing (Spivey, 2008, Chemero, 2011). Conceiving
cognition from an extensional point of view allows for a lawful account of how
agents interactwith the action-related properties of the environment, without the need
to involve internal resources such as causal states and computations. According to
DST, cognitive explanations are arguments based on factual premises and inferential
rules inasmuch as they take the form of a reasoning in which the phenomenon to
explain (explanandum) follows as a deductive consequence of the selected premises
(explanans). This is, indeed, the core idea of the well-known covering-law model of
explanation (Hempel, 1965; Walmsley, 2008).3
Over the last few decades, this methodological approach has been endorsed in
the cognitive science of vision to account for the way agents perceive an affordance
in the environment, that is, a possibility of action that surround the agent’s body
(Gibson, 1979). According to this view, the perception of affordances is construed
as the detection of a relation between features of the environment and certain motor-
related properties of the agent’s body. Hence, in order to study the perception of
affordances by means of DST, some environmental parameters should be considered
in relation to some relevant variables concerning the agent’s body and the related
motor skills (e.g., Harrison, Turvey, & Frank, 2016; Lopresti-Goodman, Turvey, &
Frank, 2011; Mark, 1987; Rietveld & Kiverstein, 2014).
Therefore, if a cognitive agent guides its activity by detecting affordances in the
environment, it is possible to suppose that these affordances must be sensible with
regard to the lawful relationships between environmental aspects and the relevant
features and motor skills of its own body. DST, indeed, starts by selecting the critical
parameters that characterize the state of the agent-environment system and attempts
to disclose the way such parameters relate with one another. Then, DST focuses
on the trajectories in a phase space that the parameters of the agent-environment
system traverses, given the covariation of bodily, practical and environmental vari-
ables, describing the laws according to which its behavior changes because of the
modification of one or more parameters (Beer, 2000; Chemero, 2011).
To this extent, DST improves our access to the laws governing the interactions
between the agent’s body and its environment, thusmaking the occurrence of a certain
agent’s intelligent behavior not a surprising event. This would be particularly evident
if we were interested in making predictions concerning the manner in which agents’
3In this view, one explains the occurrence of a certain event E by arguing that it is expected because
of the factual conditions C1… Cn and the deductive laws L1…Ln. Such a type of explanation is
suitable to answer the question “Why does phenomenon E occur?” by showing that its occurrence—
or its probability of occurring—results from the combination of particular circumstances (C1…Cn),
in accordance with the general laws (L1,…Ln).
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behavior varies over time. Indeed, once we know the relevant ambient parameters
and the laws governing the dynamical evolution of the environment-agent system,
the future values of the agent’s behavior become nothing but a matter of deduction.
According to this view, if a dynamical systems account is sufficiently accurate to
describe what would occur in counterfactual circumstances, it can be considered as
a tool suitable for reducing surprise about the occurrence of a behavioral event (e.g.,
Chemero & Silberstein, 2008; Thelen & Smith, 1996).
To sum up, the epistemological approach to RE and the methodological tools of
DST form a joint venture that has recently attracted the attention of an increasing
number of cognitive scientists. DST, indeed, rests on the Equal Partner Principle by
providing an account of the agent’s behavior that does not discriminate between
internal and external resources. Accordingly, DST offers deductive-nomological
explanations that are merely based on the fine-grained analysis of the internal
dynamics characterizing the covariation of selected parameters spanning the agent’s
brain, the body and its environment.
Although RE is gaining an increasing consensus, it is still an open issue whether
it will be able to replace the mechanical-computational paradigm that has guided
the cognitive sciences over the last sixty years. If so, DST should be able to provide
a satisfactory explanation of any sort of cognitive phenomena, with emphasis on
the agent’s basic cognitive behaviors, such as the perception and misperception of
affordances in the environment (Hutto & Myin, 2012). However, in the remaining
part of this paper, I will show that this is not the case.
4 Explaining Anomalies: The Case of Optic Ataxia
The study of cognition is not a mere theoretical game, but it has relevant practical
implications for the development of therapies and rehabilitation programs for patients
suffering from cognitive deficits. Considering this purpose, it is interesting to assess
the explanatory virtue of RE as it pertains to its possible clinical consequences.
Thus, it may be helpful to assess the adoption of DST as a methodological tool for
the explanation of non-standard cases of perception such as optic ataxia, a condition
in which some or all aspects of visual guidance of reaching with the hand and arm are
lost. Patients suffering from optic ataxia have an intact visual field, good oculomotor
control, and normal motor skills; however, they are not able to detect the possible
practical relations between their motor abilities and the features of the environment,
meaning that they are not able to perceive the affordances available to them.
The scientific literature concerning cases of optic ataxia reports alterations in the
initial and final stages of the visually guidedmovement of reaching to grasp. Anoma-
lous dynamics have been reported in scaling the aperture of the hand according to the
target (Cavina-Pratesi, Connolly, & Milner, 2013) in following objects’ trajectories
and in executing the final stage of a grasping action (Blangero et al., 2010). Further-
more, ataxic patients show a lack of automatic correction when a target changes
location (Pisella et al., 2000) and a lack of ability to avoid collisions with distractors
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when reaching for something (Schindler et al., 2004). However, although optic ataxia
is a permanent impairment, patients can relieve their deficit and improve their perfor-
mances bymeans of specific rehabilitation programs. For example, patients exhibit an
enhanced performance in reaching and grasping when a delay is introduced between
the perceptual stimulus and the behavioral response (Himmelbach&Karnath, 2005).
Moreover, a common rehabilitation program includes compensatory strategies such
as the recourse to external prostheses (e.g., planners, calendars, recording devices,
timers and pagers) in addition to internal cueing (e.g., developing mnemonics or
an internal checklist). Generally, patients have been demonstrated to reduce errors
and improve performance by following non-perceptual cues, such as conceptual
information, but only when their memory is relatively preserved (Zgaljardic et al.,
2011).
Evidence such as this begs for an explanation. Notably, two main questions arise:
the first concerns the very etiology of optic ataxia, and the second concerns the
fact that, at least in certain cases, ataxic patients exhibit good performance. It is
interesting, indeed, to understand why patients with lesions precisely located in the
parietal cortex are not able to detect and select affordances in the environment and
why precisely the execution of delayed tasks and the retrieval of conceptual informa-
tion improve patient performances (Himmelbach & Karnath, 2005; Zgaljardic et al.,
2011). To this extent, explaining optic ataxia may be used as a testing ground for
examining the epistemic virtue of DST. It seems reasonable, indeed, to assume that a
good account of basic cognitive abilities should be able to address anomalous cases
as well. Accordingly, a valuable explanation of affordance perception should explain
why agents may lose such an ability as well as why they may be able to recover it
given certain circumstances.
5 Covariation Is not Enough
Because DST approaches the perception of the affordances by means of covering-
law explanations (see Sect. 3), it provides an account of optic ataxia that is addressed
on the covariation of selected parameters that characterize the state of the agent-
environment system. Notably, in explaining the anomalous behavior of patients
suffering from optic ataxia, DST focuses on the trajectories in a mathematical phase
space that the agent-environment system traverses over time, and it specifies how
they depend on changes in one or more parameters of the coupled system.
The efforts of scholars working in the context of DST has been merely devoted
to observe how patterns of correlation between bodily and environmental vari-
ables emerge, stabilize and are sometimes lost. Indeed, according to a correlational
approach, explaining anomalous performances in perceiving and exploiting affor-
dances requires the identification of appropriate patterns of variables to quantify
and qualify the nature of the deficit. Although DST is usually focused on non-
disabled individuals, several studies have recently measured the ability to perform
visually guided reaching actions in patients with lesions to the parietal cortex that are
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comparable to those characteristics of optic ataxia (e.g., Kamper et al., 2002; Pisella,
Rossetti, & Rode, 2017).4
Correlational evidence provides quantitative data to assess the actual disruption of
default modes of coordination in ataxic patients and the possible motor-control gain
following rehabilitation therapy. The available experiments show that ataxic patients
do not detect the dynamical relationship between environmental features and the
motor properties of their own bodies. This means that ataxic patients are unable to
judge the scaling of environmental variables in relation to their bodily variables,
resulting in the performance of anomalous behavioral patterns.
However, although the study of correlational variables provides a description of
the dysfunctional ataxic behavior, this approach offers no cues concerning the causes
underlying such conditions. This means that a correlational account can be fruitfully
employed to gain information about the variability of the disease symptoms, showing
different degrees of severitywith respect to standard behavioral patterns, but it cannot
be employed for the purpose of etiological diagnosis. Indeed, the methodological
tools of DST are not suitable for highlighting the individual causes of a disease
phenomenon (see Sect. 3), thus DST is unable to explain why ataxic patients with
are impaired in performing visually guided grasping actions. After a complete corre-
lational analysis, one may still require an explanation of why lesions in the parietal
cortex correlate with ataxic behaviors, albeit no correlational analysis can answer
this question. Though a correlational methodology allows one to predict that lesions
in the parietal cortex usually result in the inability of the agent to detect action possi-
bilities in the environment, it seems incompetent in explaining why there are cases
in which they reduce errors and relieve their conditions.
Of course, a correlational approach may be able to predict this phenomenon by
means of generalizations based on previous cases but is unable to say why such
a phenomenon occurs. A correlational account, indeed, is unable to explain why
using conceptual information may improve the performance of ataxic patients (Zgal-
jardic et al., 2011). The mere knowledge that an alteration of cortical parameters is
correlated with variations in parameters concerning visually guided actions does not
provide sufficient reasons to infer that the recourse to external prostheses (e.g., plan-
ners, calendars, recording devices, timers and pagers) in addition to internal cueing
(e.g., developing mnemonics or an internal checklist) may reduce errors and relieve
4Experimental results show that after a measurable lesion in the left posterior parietal cortex, the
agent’s ability to reach a target is characterized by significant alterations in several parameters such
as the initial movement direction, decreased hand velocity, decreased elbow velocity, and increased
trajectory curvature (Kamper et al., 2002). A purely correlational analysis also shows that patients
with lesions to the parietal cortex have difficulty in performing reaching-to-grasp actions located in
the contralesional visual field andwith the contralesional hand. In this respect, a relevant discrepancy
is observed when ataxic patients use the ataxic hand for actions directed towards the ataxic field,
whereas less severe discrepancies are observedwhen patients use the healthy hand towards the ataxic
visual field or the ataxic hand towards the healthy visual field. In contrast, actions performed with
the healthy hand towards the healthy visual field exhibit no discrepancies compared with normal
subjects (Pisella, Rossetti, & Rode, 2017).
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the condition of patients suffering from optic ataxia (Sect. 4). This means that a reha-
bilitation program based on such a kind of resource is hardly configurable from the
point of view of DST, and its results cannot be explained by means of a correlational
approach.
6 When Computations Explain Better
Over the last few decades, the dual streammodel of visual processing (Jacob & Jean-
nerod, 2003; Milner & Goodale, 1995) served as basic ground to build up a compu-
tational architecture according to which an agent computes visuomotor information
in the environment (e.g., Cisek & Kalaska, 2010; Thill et al., 2013; Zipoli Caiani,
2014; Tillas et al., 2017). According to the dual streams model, visual processing
involves two subsystems: the dorsal system, which performs processes associated
with detecting affordances and visually guiding actions, and the ventral system,
which performs processes associated with semantic identification and intentional
planning (Goodale & Milner, 1992).
The essence of the dual streams model of vision lies in the functional differences
between the two streams.Onone hand, the ventral streamallows an agent to recognize
objects in the environment, attaching meanings and establishing causal relations.
Such operations are crucial for acquiring a conceptual grasp of the environment,
providing resources for incorporating previously stored information into the online
control of current actions and making intentional action planning possible (Goodale
& Milner, 1995; Goodale, 2014). On the other hand, the dorsal stream performs
transformations that convert information about the shape and location of the source of
the stimulus into parameters suitable for action execution. Along the dorsal pathway,
the anterior intraparietal area and the ventral premotor cortex extract and compute
sensorimotor information from the perceptual stimulus, making it possible to detect
action possibilities from the information detected through the retinotopic map (e.g.,
Andersen & Buneo, 2003; Mohan et al., 2017; Rizzolatti & Luppino, 2001).5
Importantly, over the last few years, several studies have shown that the ventral
stream also biases the detection of action possibilities by exploiting functional inter-
actions with different points of the dorsal processing (Briscoe, 2009; Briscoe &
Schwenkler, 2015; Chinellato&Pobil, 2016; Zipoli Caiani & Ferretti, 2017). Among
the various interactions between the information processed in the two streams, an
5A generally agreed-upon architecture for affordance perception assumes that visuomotor informa-
tion is computed by means of a sensorimotor matching mechanism (Rizzolatti & Sinigaglia, 2008).
This amounts to an assumption that action-related information is detected and processed by the
agent’s sensorimotor apparatus depending on its body shape and motor abilities. According to this
view, since the stimulus information in visual perception and the motor information underlying the
action are coded together (Prinz, 1997), it seems possible to account for the attentional facilitation
that characterizes the detection of action possibilities in terms of visually elicited motor repre-
sentations (Brozzo, 2017; Butterfill & Sinigaglia, 2014; Ferretti, 2016, Ferretti & Zipoli Caiani,
2019).
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important connection is precisely that which occurs at the level of the parietal cortex,
that is, the region of the brain damaged in optic-ataxic patients. This interaction
strongly affects motor preparation and control of movements, suppressing elicited
sensorimotor patterns to prevent undesired actions from being triggered. Indeed,
information from the ventral stream may help in selecting the relevant patterns of
action processed in the dorsal pathway, allowing to the agent’s conceptual knowl-
edge to influence the execution of visually guided actions (e.g., Borra et al., 2010;
Hoshi & Tanji, 2007). It may be argued that this computational architecture offers
an adaptive advantage to the extent that it allows a fast link between perception,
conceptualization and action by means of reliable information integration (Zipoli
Caiani, 2018).
Concerning the computational role of the parietal cortex, emerging data from
neuropsychology and neuroimaging support the view that portions of this region
are devoted to integrating information for guiding actions according to the agent’s
specific goal (Culham, Cavina-Pratesi, & Singhal, 2006). Notably, a number of TMS
studies have shown that the parietal cortex is functionally involved in the processing
of the visual motor information required to adjust the motor plan to perform hand
actions and achieve intentional goals (Iacoboni, 2006). Evidence such as this shows
that the parietal cortex is responsible for representation and conversion of visual
information into movements and for online control of motor actions (Blangero et al.,
2010). Lesions in this area, therefore, leave patients without a fundamental structure
for visuomotor integration and control, thus causing disorders in the representation of
the surrounding objects and impairments in planning and execution of goal-directed
actions.
Interestingly, the computational architecture based on the dual stream model of
vision explains why patients with lesions to the parietal cortex may suffer from
optic ataxia. Moreover, the same architecture explains why ataxic patients exhibit
intact performance when a delay is introduced between the perceptual stimulus and
the behavioral response or when the patient relies on conceptual knowledge of the
target. According to this architecture, the impairment of the parietal cortex does not
completely prevent agents from processing and exploiting conceptual information.
The massive interaction between the ventral stream and the dorsal stream allows for
a reallocation of functions that ensures the recognition of affordances in the environ-
ment bymeans of compensatory strategies such as the exploitation of conceptual cues
(Zipoli Caiani & Ferretti, 2017). This means that, once the functional specializations
and reciprocal interactions between the two streams have been defined, it is possible
to explain why a lesion in the parietal cortex may induce the inability to immediately
detect a pragmatic relation between the agent’s body and the features of the environ-
ment. Moreover, it is also possible to explain why, in certain circumstances, the use
of conceptual information may relieve such a deficit.
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7 Conclusions
RE is a view according to which cognitive phenomena should be explained by means
of DST instead of a mechanical computational account. Although the adoption of the
methodological tools of DST is gaining increasing consensus in the cognitive science
of vision, it faces an explanatory shortcoming that should not be underestimated.
It is well known, indeed, that descriptive and predictive adequacy do not imply
explanatory adequacy (Salmon, 1984). Accordingly, although DST is suitable to
provide precise correlations between environmental, bodily and behavioral variables,
such a methodology remains silent about the underlying causes of such correlations.
However, by means of a computational architecture based on the dual stream
model of vision it has been possible to explain why patients with lesions to the
parietal cortex become unable to detect affordances in the environment, as well
as why they gain good visuomotor performances given appropriate conditions (see
Sect. 6). The computational integration of pragmatic and conceptual information in
vision for action, indeed, makes it possible to explain why a lesion in an area of the
parietal cortex is correlated with inability to detect and exploit affordances, but also
why particular circumstances (e.g., delayed responses and conceptual information)
allow the agent to use alternative cognitive strategies to recognize and take advantage
of the affordances of the environment.
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